JOURNEY - the buddha's way

Fifty-one Mental Events

The Function of the Defilements & The Ten Defilements

Mind and Mental Factors by Acharya Sherab Gyaltsen

Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun. Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness by Tripiṭaka-Master Hsüan Tsang
Mind itself
is extremely vast,
it has
no end,
no limits.

The Classification of Mind
has been well-summarized in terms of the
important essence
So that the light of the intelligence
of
fresh minds
may expand.

The objects of mind,
Manas,
and the other consciousnesses
are not distinct
from their own nature.
Therefore, I declare that all things are
mere consciousness
and there is nothing else which is
external
to the mind.
The International Kagy় Sangha Association of Buddhist Monks and Nuns [I.K.S.A.] was founded in 1981 by the four Regents of the Karma Kagy় Lineage:

H.E. Shamar Rinpoche, H.E. Tai Situ Rinpoche, H.E. Jamгон Kongtrül Rinpoche and H.E. Gyaltsap Rinpoche. Its main purpose is to increase the communication between the monastic Sangha and its centers and to further the education of the monks and nuns and their understanding of the monastic life.

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Editorial

Thank you for your interesting letters with suggestions as to how to proceed.

In the meantime I had the chance to discuss this issue with Khenchen Thrangu, Rinpoche and the Venerable Dzogchen Pönlop, Rinpoche, just to find that Khenchen Thrangu, Rinpoche already had encouraged Dzogchen Pönlop, Rinpoche to start a Dharma magazine about which you can read more in the article “JOURNEY - The Buddha's Way” on pages 6-7.

In regard to The Profound Path of Peace, it seems that it will develop into something “with footnotes”, as Pönlop Rinpoche put it, along the lines of The Nālandākirti Journal which was published years ago with Dzogchen Pönlop, Rinpoche as Chief Editor, and which featured scholarly articles and translations, both from the East and the West. In many respects this won’t change the PPP all that much, as it already has had heavy leanings in that direction for quite some time.

It seems to me that this development is timely. During his recent visit to Gampo Abbey, Khenchen Thrangu, Rinpoche talked about establishing a monastic college at Gampo Abbey where the monastics could acquire a degree in Buddhist Studies following an already well-established and successful curriculum at a western college.

At the same time, Dzogchen Pönlop, Rinpoche completed successfully the second round of Nitartha Institute, and likewise in other centers study programs seem to be much more dominant than years ago.

In this context, both Khenchen Thrangu, Rinpoche and Dzogchen Pönlop, Rinpoche talked about the Eight Great Treatises of Sutra and Tantra of the Kagyū Lineage and their commentaries.

The Five Great Treatises of Sutrayana view, path and meditation which summarize the entire presentation of the Buddha’s teachings on the Tripitaka or the Three Turnings of the Wheel of Dharma, and which are studied among all the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism, are:

1) Vinayamūlasūtra or Root Verses of Vinayasūtra, by Guṇaprabha. Commentary by Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje.
2) Abhidharmakośa or Treasury of Abhidharma, by Vasubandhu. Commentary by Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje.

3) Pramāṇavārttika or Commentary on Valid Cognition, by Dharmakirti. Commentary by Seventh Karmapa, Chödrak Gyamtso.

4) Abhisamayālaṃkāra or Ornament of Clear Realization, by Maitreyanātha. Commentary by Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje.

5) Madhyamakāvatāra or Entrance to the Middle Way, by Chandrakirti. Commentary by Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje.

In addition to the those Five Great Treatises, the following three texts are added making Eight Great Treatises of Sutra and Tantra:

6) Uttaratantra śāstra or Supreme Continuity, by Maitreyanātha. Commentaries by Jamgön Kongtrül the Great, Tashi Namgyal, etc.

7) Zabmo Nangdön or Profound Inner Meaning, by Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje. Commentary by Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje and Jamgön Kongtrül the Great.

8) Hevajratantra by Lord Buddha Śakyamuni. Commentary by Jamgön Kongtrül the Great.

There are supplementary texts which are emphasized, such as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā or Treatise on the Middle Way, by Nagarjuna, the Madhyamakālaṃkāra or Ornament of the Middle Way, by Śhāntarakṣhita, the Dharmaḥarmatāvibhaṅga or Treatise that Distinguishes Phenomena and Pure Being, by Maitreyanātha, the Madhyāntavibhaṅga or Treatise that Differentiates the Middle from the Extremes, by Maitreyanātha, the Bodhicharyāvatāra by Śhāntideva, etc.

This seems to be the overall direction of which The Profound Path of Peace will be a part. Dzogchen Pönlop, Rinpoche compared it to a great and historic struggle:

“You can’t always get what you want, but you must try ...”

Yours

Lodrö Sangpo
Planning is now underway for the publication of JOURNEY: the buddha's way, an international Kagyu magazine. JOURNEY will regularly provide news and in-depth coverage of Kagyu teachers and their teachings. The Dzogchen Pönlop, Rinpoche has agreed to help lead an independent team initially to organize and publish JOURNEY.

Many dharma students around the world have expressed a need for a magazine consisting of pure dharma teachings, international sangha communication, and enlightened messages from different teachers. Lineage teachers and students have requested Rinpoche to assist in producing a magazine to provide such information for the sangha.

The goals of JOURNEY

A typical issue of JOURNEY will touch on many areas of interest. Each issue will present:

* Articles presenting a dharma teaching by a specific teacher, such as Ven. Thrangu, Rinpoche and Ven. Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso, Rinpoche;
* Articles providing insight into various centers and dharma communities, such as for example Tsurphu, or the sangha in Australia;
* Occasional articles on important Kagyu pilgrimage sites such as a Milarepa cave;
* News from around the world, teaching schedules of prominent Kagyu teachers, and listings for center programs;
* Reviews of books, videos, movies, World Wide Web sites and other publications of interest; and
* Articles discussing important issues, with a forum for letters and opinions.
One of the ways to create stronger ties within the community is through Internet communications. Accordingly, the team intends to engage in a parallel project to develop a World Wide Web site to provide similar information over the developing medium of the Internet. The magazine and web site will cooperate closely to jointly reach the international community on a timely basis.

Your help and participation

At this time, the magazine will largely be a volunteer effort and will primarily depend on contributions to cover its costs. If you would like to make a contribution or have specific skills in the publishing area and are interested in participating in the project, please contact either:

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FIFTY-ONE MENTAL EVENTS

(LO) Lorig (Khenpo Tsurtrim)
(CW) Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun

A) The five omnipresent mental factors (T. kun 'gro; S. sarvatraga)
1) S.: vedana; T. tshor-ba: (LO) 'feelings' (T. tshor-ba; (CW) 'sensation'
2) S. samjnä; T. 'du-shes: (LO) 'discrimination'; (CW) 'conception'
3) S. chetanä; T. sms-shes: (LO) 'impulse' or 'intention'; (CW) 'volition'
4) S. sparä; T. reg-pa: (LO) 'contact'; (CW) 'contact'
5) S. manaskära; T. yid la byed-pa: (LO) 'mental engagement'; (CW) 'attention'

B) The five object-determining mental factors (T. yul nges; S. viniyata)
1) S. chhandä; T. 'dun-pa: (LO) 'aspiration'; (CW) 'desire'
2) S. adhimoksha; T. mos-pa: (LO) 'belief'; (CW) 'resolve'
3) S. smrti; T. dran-pa: (LO) 'recollection'; (CW) 'memory'
4) S. samädi; T. ting-nge-'dzin: (LO) 'meditative stabilization'; (CW) 'meditation'
5) S. prajña; T. shes-rab: (LO) 'superior knowledge'; (CW) 'discernment'

C) The eleven virtuous mental factors (T. dge-ba; S. kushala)
1) S. shraddha; T. dad-pa: (LO) 'faith'; (CW) 'belief'
2) S. hri; T. ngo-tsha shes-pa: (LO) 'shame'; (CW) 'sense of shame'
3) S. apatäpya; T. khrel-yod-pa: (LO) 'embarrassment'; (CW) 'sense of integrity'
4) S. alobha; T. ma chags-pa: (LO) 'non-attachment'; (CW) 'non-covetousness'
5) S. adväsha; T. zhe-sdang med-pa: (LO) 'non-hatred'; (CW) 'non-anger'
6) S. amoha; T. gti-mug med-pa: (LO) 'non-ignorance'; (CW) 'non-delusion'
7) S. virya; T. brtson-'grus: (LO) 'joyous effort'; (CW) 'zeal' or 'diligence'
8) S. präshradhi; T. shin-tu sbyangs-pa: (LO) 'suppleness'; (CW) 'composure of mind'
9) S. apramäda; T. bag yod-pa: (LO) 'conscientiousness' or 'heedfulness'; (CW) 'vigilance'
10) S. upekåha; T. btang-snyoms: (LO) 'equanimity'; (CW) 'equanimity'
11) S. avihimsa; T. nm-par-mi-tshe-ba: (LO) 'non-harmfulness'; (CW) 'harmlessness' or 'non-injury'
D) The six root afflictions (T. rtsa-nyon; S. mūlakleśha)
1) S. rāga; T. ‘dod-chags: (LO) ‘desire’; (CW) ‘covetousness’
2) S. pratīgha; T. khong-khro: (LO) ‘anger’; (CW) ‘anger’
3) S. māna; T. nga-rgyal: (LO) ‘pride’; (CW) ‘conceit’
4) S. māna; T. nga-rgyal: (LO) ‘ignorance’; (CW) ‘delusion’
5) S. vichikitsā; T. the-tshom: (LO) ‘doubt’; (CW) ‘doubt’
6) S. dṛṣṭi; T. lta-ba nyon-mongs can: (LO) ‘afflicted view’; (CW) ‘false views’

E) The twenty secondary afflictions (T. nye-nyon nyi; S. upakleśha)
1) S. krodha; T. khro-ba: (LO) ‘wrath’; (CW) ‘fury’
2) S. upanaha; T. ‘khon-’dzin: (LO) ‘resentment’; (CW) ‘enmity’
3) S. mṛkṣaṇa; T. ‘chab-pa: (LO) ‘concealment’; (CW) ‘concealment’ or ‘hypocrisy’
4) S. pradāśa; T. ‘tshig-pa: (LO) ‘spite’; (CW) ‘vexation’
5) S. irṣryā; T. phrag-dog: (LO) ‘envy’, or ‘jealousy’; (CW) ‘envy’
6) S. māṅsāra; T. ser-sna: (LO) ‘avarice’; (CW) ‘parisṛṇa’
7) S. māyā; T. sgyu: (LO) ‘hypocrisy’; (CW) ‘duplicity’ or ‘fraudulence’
8) S. shāthya; T. g.yo: (LO) ‘deceit’; (CW) ‘deception’
9) S. mada; T. rgyags-pa: (LO) ‘self-satisfaction’ or ‘haughtiness’; (CW) ‘pride’
10) S. vihimsa; T. nmam-pa ‘tshe-ba: (LO) ‘harmfulness’; (CW) ‘harmfulness’
11) S. āhrikṣa; T. ngo-tsha med-pa: (LO) ‘non-shame’; (CW) ‘shamelessness’
12) S. anapatrāpya; T. khrel med-pa: (LO) ‘non-embarrassment’; (CW) ‘non-integrity’
13) S. styaṇa; T. rmugs-pa: (LO) ‘laziness’; (CW) ‘torpid-mindedness’
14) S. audhdhayat; T. rgod-pa: (LO) ‘agitation’; (CW) ‘agitation’ or ‘restlessness’
15) S. aśhraddhyat; T. ma-dad-pa: (LO) ‘non-faith’; (CW) ‘unbelief’
16) S. kausidyata; T. le-lo: (LO) ‘indolence’; (CW) ‘indolence’
17) S. pramāda; T. bag-med-pa: (LO) ‘non-conscientiousness’; (CW) ‘idleness’
18) S. mushitaṁśatīta; T. brjed ngas-pa: (LO) ‘forgetfulness’; (CW) ‘forgetfulness’
19) S. vikṣepa; T. nmam-par g.yeng-ba: (LO) ‘distraction’; (CW) ‘distraction’
20) S. asamprajñat; T. she-bzhin ma-yin-pa: (LO) ‘non-introspection’; (CW) ‘non-discernment’ or ‘thoughtlessness’

F) The four changeable mental factors (T. gzhan ‘gyur; S. aniyața)
1) S. kaucṛta; T. ‘gyod-pa: (LO) ‘contrition’ or ‘remorse’; (CW) ‘remorse’
2) S. mīḍḍha; T. gnyid: (LO) ‘sleep’; (CW) ‘drowsiness’
3) S. vitarka; T. rtoq-pa: (LO) ‘examination’; (CW) ‘reflection’
4) S. vichāra; T. dpyod-pa: (LO) ‘analysis’; (CW) ‘investigation’
The Function of the Defilements

(Abhidharmakosha:) We said that the world, in all its variety, arises from action (karma). Now it is by reason of the anuśhayas,¹ or latent defilements, that actions accumulate:² in the absence of the anuśhayas, actions are not capable of producing a new existence. Consequently the roots of existence (bhava), that is, [1] of rebirth or [2] of action, are the anuśhayas.

When a kleśha or defilement enters into action, it accomplishes ten operations:
1. it makes solid its root, its prāpti—the possession that a certain person (āśhrava) already had of the kleśha—preventing it from being broken;
2. it places itself in a series (that is, it continues to reproduce itself);
3. it accommodates its field, rendering the person (āśhraya) fit for the arising of the kleśha;
4. it engenders its offspring (niṣhyanda), that is, the upakleśhas: hatred (pratigha) engenders anger (krodha), etc.;
5. it leads to action;
6. it aggregates its causes, namely, incorrect judgment;
7. it causes one to be mistaken with regard to the object of consciousness;
8. it bends the mental series towards the object or towards rebirth;
9. it brings about a falling away of good;
10. it becomes a bond (bandhana) and prevents surmounting of the sphere of existence to which it belongs.

Sanghabhadra adds:
11. it puts one in a bad state, it makes one unfit;
12. it is hostile to spiritual qualities;
13. it provokes shameful actions and makes someone the object of blame;
14. it makes one leave the good path, for it disposes one to follow erroneous masters;

Footnotes:
1 For the Sarvāstivādins kleśha is the equivalent of anuśhaya. The anuśhaya of a kleśha, for example kamarāga or sensual desire, is the kleśha itself; for the Sautrāntikas, it is the seed of the kleśha, the dormant kleśha.
2 “To accumulate” means to gain force and fruitfulness, “to necessarily produce a retribution”.
The Ten Defilements

Ten *kleśhas* or *anuśhayas* ["take up their abode" in the object:]

(1) attachment (*rāga*),

and then [i.e. by reason of attachment:]

(2) anger (*pratigha*),

(3) pride (*māna*),

(4) ignorance (*avidyā*),

(5-9) false views (*drśti*):

[5] belief in a self (*satkāyadrśhti*),

[6] false views (*mithyādrśhti*),

[7] belief in the extremes (*antagrāhadrśhti*),

[8] esteeming of views (*drśtíparāmarśha*),

[9] esteeming of morality and ascetic practices (*śilavrataparāmarśha*)

(10) doubt (*vichikitsā*).
The seventh Gyalwang Karmapa, Chödrak Gyamtso, wrote a text called *The Ocean of Texts on Logic* (T. rigs pa’i gzhung lugs rgya mtsho). Just as all rivers flow into the ocean, in this same way, all the material contained in the texts on logic written by Dignāga and Dharmakirti is contained in this text written by Chödrak Gyamtso which is like an ocean of texts on logic. Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso, Rinpoche took the essence of *The Ocean of Texts on Logic*, sometimes also translated as *The Ocean of Reasonings*, and presented the *Classification of Mind* (T. blo rig) in a short text called *The Essence of the Ocean of Texts on Logic* or *The Essence of the Ocean of Reasonings* (T. rigs gzhung rgya mtsho’i snying po) which is the basis for the following teaching. The italicized page numbers refer to the English translation by Karl Brunnhölzl and Chryssoula Zerbini.

The explanation of 'The Presentation of the Classifications of Mind, the Essence of the Ocean of Texts on Logic', has three parts:

I) The definitions of mind, *p. 3*

II) The divisions of mind, *pp. 4-27*

III) The concluding summary which states the purpose in the form of logical reasonings, *p. 28*

We will look at the first point, the definitions of mind.

**I) THE DEFINITIONS OF MIND**

There are definitions [of mind], because the definition of a mind is 'that which is clear and aware',
The definition of mind (T. blo; S. buddhi) is 'that which is clear', which means that the nature or essence of mind is clarity. The second part of the definition, 'aware', expresses the function or action of mind, which is to be aware or to know or to cognize. That which possesses the nature of clarity is aware of objects; it knows objects, it cognizes objects.

The definition of a consciousness is 'that which is aware of objects',

Consciousness (T. shes-pa; S. jñāna) is that which is aware of objects, whether they are a specifically characterized phenomenon (T. rang mtshan; S. svalakṣaṇa) or a generally characterized phenomenon (T. spyi mtshan; S. sāmānyalakṣaṇa).

The definition of an awareness is 'that which experiences an object of comprehension.

Awareness (T. rig pa; S. saṃvedana or saṃvititi) is defined as that which experiences an object of comprehension which may be either a specifically characterized phenomenon or a generally characterized phenomenon. These three: mind, consciousness and awareness, are synonymous but they are different names and they each have their own definition.

Let us look again at this term, 'mind' (T. blo). In the Vaibhāṣika (T. bye brag smar ba) and Sautrāntika (T. mdo sde pa) systems, mind (T. blo) is a general name for 1) mind (T. sens; S. chitta), 2) mind (T. yid; S. manas), and 3) consciousness (T. rnam shes; S. vijñāna). Sens is always translated as mind. Yid is also mind, and rnam shes is consciousness. In these two schools, mind (blo), awareness (rig pa) and consciousness (rnam shes), and then these three other terms, mind (sens), mind (yid), and consciousness (rnam shes), all these six words are synonymous (T. don gcig), when used as general terms.

In the Chittamātra (T. sens tsam) or Mind-only system, these three, mind (sens), mind (yid), and consciousness (rnam shes), are used as a general term for mind (blo). However, when these terms are being used in a specific context or in a strict sense, mind (sens) refers to the all-basis consciousness, the alayavijñāna (T. kun-gzhi'i rnam-par shes-pa). Mind (yid), the second one in the list, refers to the afflicted mind, kleśha mind (T. nyon yid; S. kliśṭa-manas). In this system, yid equals the kleśha mind, and consciousness (rnam shes) refers to the six sense consciousnesses.
When the Vaibhāshika and Sautrāntika systems make classifications of mind (*blo*), they have six divisions into the six sense consciousnesses because they only assert six consciousnesses, from the eye to the mental consciousness. When the Chittamātra system classifies mind (*blo*), they have eight consciousnesses, the six sense consciousnesses, the afflicted mind, and the all basis consciousness.

When different terms are being defined, they each may have their own different definition, but that doesn’t mean that they refer to different things. The terms can be synonymous even though they each have their own definition. For example, ‘impermanence’ and ‘compounded’ are synonymous; however, their definitions are different. ‘Impermanent’ is defined as that which changes from moment to moment, ‘compounded’ is defined as that which arises from its own causes and conditions. Nevertheless, they are synonymous. In terms of our discussion, for example, mind, consciousness, and awareness in essence are the same; however, they are different isolates. On the basis of being different isolates (T. *ldog pa*; S. *vivartana*) then they have different definitions.

What is an isolate? First you have to understand that isolates do not arise to non-conceptual consciousnesses. For example, when you look at a flower, how does the isolate arise? Basically isolates arise only to the conceptual mind; they do not arise on the basis of non-conceptual consciousness or non-conceptual perception. For example, if we take ‘consciousness’ as an example of an isolate, when we say ‘consciousness’, what appears to the conceptual mind is an isolate, ‘consciousness’. Isolate is defined by the reverse of that which it is not. Sometimes it is loosely translated as ‘aspect’. It is an isolated aspect that appears to the conceptual mind. The Tibetan for isolate is *dog pa* (T. *ldog pa*; S. *vyatireka*), which simply means ‘reverse’ or ‘opposite’, the reverse of what it is not. When you say book, it is the opposite of what it is not. It is not a pillar, it is also not other books. What appears to you is an image of the book which is the opposite of not being other books, not being other things that it isn’t. Just only that appears to you.
THE EIGHT CONSCIOUSNESSES OF THE CHITTAMĀTRA

So far we have discussed the definition of mind. Continuing on from that point, in the Chittamātra school, eight consciousnesses are presented. They posit an all-basis consciousness, the basis for habitual patterns as seeds which, in their full manifestation produce all the appearances of saṃsāric phenomena. The all-basis consciousness is said to be 'unobscured and neutral'. That which is 'unobscured and neutral' can be called either the all-basis consciousness or a mind which is clear and aware. 'Unobscured' means that this consciousness which is the basis for the habitual tendencies is itself not obscured by the mental afflictions. 'Neutral' means that its essence is neither virtuous nor non-virtuous. Its essence has not been indicated to be either one of these.

The all-basis consciousness is given a number of different names, one of which is the 'perpetuating consciousness' because it is what perpetuates or takes on the next birth, what joins one to one's next existence continuously in saṃsāra. On the basis of the habitual tendencies which are present within this ground, one then takes on the next birth again and again. It is what makes one continue on from one life to another.

The all-basis consciousness is sometimes also referred to as the 'source of all objects of knowledge'. The Chittamātra tradition, when speaking of the ultimate and the relative, talks about the three natures: the imputed nature (T. kun btags; S. parikalpita), the dependent nature (T. gzhan dbang; S. paratantra), and the fully existent nature (T. yongs grub; S. parinīṣṭhpanna). The all-basis consciousness is the source or the place which gives rise to these three natures or to all objects of knowledge.

Why is the all-basis consciousness called 'all-basis' (T. kun gzhi)? It is because it is the basis for everything within saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.

As we said earlier, the all-basis consciousness is the support or basis for habitual tendencies. We can look at this in terms of two aspects or two isolates. There is i) the 'all-basis consciousness for the seeds (S. bija)' and ii) the 'all-basis consciousness for maturation (S. vipāka)'.

i) The first, the 'all-basis for the seeds' (the seeds of habitual patterns) is the aspect of the consciousness which acts as a support for these seeds of habitual tendencies to ripen at a future time.
ii) The ‘all-basis for maturation’ is the support for the maturation of previous habitual patterns, both virtuous and non-virtuous. Habitual tendencies, having been stored within the all-basis in previous lives, will mature into various kinds of results in subsequent lives. The all-basis consciousness is the support for the habitual tendencies to ripen or mature in their respective ways. Therefore it is called the ‘all-basis consciousness for maturation’.

From the point of view of the all-basis itself, there is no difference between these two aspects; they are simply two ways of looking at the all-basis. One way is from the point of view of the seeds, and the other way is from the point of view of maturation. The aspect of maturing is related to the fact that in previous lives accumulated karma and habitual tendencies were stored in the all-basis, and that at the present time one is experiencing their maturation, the aspect of the seeds which will ripen into fruits, into results in a future time.

The afflicted mind, kleśha mind (T. nyon yid; S. kliśṭa-mañas), is that which conceives of the all-basis consciousness as a self. This afflicted mind regards the all-basis as a self (S. ātmadarśṭi), is attached to or fixated upon it as a self (S. ātmasaññā) and develops pride about this self (S. ātmamāna). These are various ways in which the afflicted mind takes the all-basis to be a self.

Then there are the six sense consciousnesses which are the sense consciousnesses of the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and mind, each of which has its own particular, its own unshared dominant condition, which is the unshared dominant condition of a sense faculty. These are known as the six sense consciousnesses, sometimes translated as six groups of consciousnesses or six sense consciousnesses which engage.

Whether we’re talking about the Chittamātra tradition which posits eight consciousnesses or the Sautrāntika tradition which posits six, in either case, when we say mind (blo), we are talking about the consciousness which apprehends objects. In our text we have a quotation from the Commentary on Valid Cognition by Dharmakirti:

_This is so, because it is stated in the Commentary on Valid Cognition:_

_‘Consciousness is the phenomenon that apprehends an object.’_
Now we come to the second main section of the text, the explanation of the divisions of mind which has three points.

II) THE EXPLANATION OF THE DIVISIONS OF MIND, pp. 4-27
A) GENERAL TEACHING ABOUT THE IMPORTANT DIVISIONS OF MIND, pp. 4-12
A.1) VALID COGNITION (T. tshad ma; S. pramāṇa), pp. 4-12
   a) DIRECT VALID COGNITION (T. mngon sum tshad ma), pp. 4-9
      i) Direct valid cognition pp. 4-8
         1) Sense direct valid cognition (T. dbang po mngon sum tshad ma), pp. 5-6
         2) Mental direct valid cognition (T. yid mngon sum tshad ma), pp. 6-7
         3) Self-aware direct valid cognition (T. rang rig mngon sum tshad ma), pp. 7-8
         4) Yogic direct valid cognition (T. rnal 'byor mngon sum tshad ma), p. 8
      ii) Seeming direct valid cognition (T. mngon sum ltar snang), pp. 8-9
   b) INFERENTIAL VALID COGNITION (T. rjes dpag tshad ma), pp. 9-11
A.2) NON-VALID COGNITION (T. tshad min gyi blo), p. 12

B) SPECIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE ESSENTIAL MODE OF ENGAGEMENT OF MIND [3], pp. 13-21
B.1) The mode of engagement of a mind apprehending generality and particulars, pp. 13-14
B.2) The mode of engagement of a mind apprehending appearance and elimination, pp. 14-16
B.3) The mode of engagement of a mind cognizing the object of expression and the means of expression, p. 17
B.4) The mode of engagement of a mind cognizing contradiction and connection, pp. 18-20
B.5) The mode of engagement of a mind ascertaining definition, definiendum and illustrating example, p. 21
C) DELINEATION OF THE NECESSARY DISTINCTION
BETWEEN MIND AND MENTAL FACTORS, pp. 22-27
C.1) The definitions of mind and mental factors, p. 22
C.2) Establishing mind and mental factors to be congruent, p. 22
C.3) The explanation of the fifty-one mental factors [25], pp. 22-27

Ad C.1, p. 22

When talking about 'mind and mental factors', 'mind' (T. *sems; S. *chitta) refers to the 'primary mind' (T. *gtsa *sems), also sometimes translated as 'main mind', and 'mental factors' (T. *sems *byung; S. *chaitta) are those mental factors which accompany (T. 'khor) that primary mind or attend that primary mind. Both of these are divisions of mind. We may, at this point, recall the synonyms for mind: mind (T. *sems), awareness (T. *rig *pa), and mind (T. *blo).

The first [exists], because 'that which causes awareness of the essential nature of an object' is the definition of a primary mind and 'that which causes awareness of the particular [attributes] of an object' is the definition of a mental factor.

The definition of a 'primary mind' is 'that which causes awareness of the essential nature of an object'. The primary mind is that which knows simply the object, that which perceives the specifically characterized phenomenon. The primary mind is divided into different divisions according to the different philosophical systems. According to the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas, it is divided into the six sense consciousnesses. According to the Chittamātra tradition, it is divided into the eight consciousnesses. As we have said, the mental factors are what accompany the primary mind, and if we look at the definition of 'mental factors', i.e. 'that which causes awareness of the particular attributes of an object', the mental factors are what know the features of the object. In general, we can say that the mental factors are that which, on the basis of the primary mind observing an object, engage with the object from the point of view of other features, such as its functions and so forth. The text *Distinguishing the Middle and the Extremes* gives a definition of the 'primary mind' as being 'the consciousness which sees the object' or 'the consciousness which perceives the object'. Again 'object' means the specifically characterized phenomenon, and
‘mental factors’ means ‘that which engages with the features of the object’. It is that which perceives the function of the object or perceives its pleasantness or unpleasantness, its various features.

Does this mean that a primary mind can never experience a generally characterized phenomenon? This is a point about which scholars debate, and there are many different assertions by different scholars and traditions. The definition sometimes used for ‘primary mind’ is ‘that which knows the referent’, or sometimes ‘that which simply knows the object’. When the word don or ‘referent’ is used in the definition, then it would be understood to refer to specifically characterized phenomena. But sometimes when in the definition the word yul or ‘object’ is used, then you could understand that its object could also be a generally characterized phenomenon. Our text here uses the word don in the definition, which is translated as object, and Sherab Gyaltsen understands this as referring to specifically characterized phenomena. However, he says he has never seen any texts where it is clearly laid out one way or the other, i.e. that the primary mind knows only specifically characterized phenomena or that it knows both specific and generally characterized phenomena.

This point, whether primary minds know as their object specifically characterized phenomena or generally characterized phenomena, should be discussed. In the shedra, quite a lot of time was spent debating on this topic which actually wasn’t resolved [laughter]. Different scholars say different things about primary minds. There are those who say that the object of the primary mind is a specifically characterized phenomenon, and others who say that the objects for primary minds are both generally characterized and specifically characterized phenomena. However, scholars don’t come out and say very clearly that the primary mind is only a non-conceptual mind. But, of course, those who say that its objects are specifically characterized phenomena are saying that primary minds are non-conceptual. Those who say that the objects for a primary mind are both generally characterized and specifically characterized phenomena are saying that primary minds can be both conceptual and non-conceptual.
Ad C.2, p. 22

Given the mind and mental factors, they are congruent in terms of the five kinds of congruence, because the primary [mind] and the attendant [mental factors] are congruent in terms of focus: they focus on the same object; they are congruent in terms of aspect: they have the same apprehended aspect of the mode of apprehension; they are congruent in terms of time: they occur at the same time; and they are congruent in terms of substance: they [share] an equal number of [moments of] a similar type.

The primary mind (T. gtso sems) and its attendant (T. 'khor) mental factors have five kinds of congruence, sometimes translated as five similarities. These congruences are presented differently in the two abhidharmic traditions, the tradition of the Abhidharmakośa and the tradition of the Abhidharmasamuccaya.

According to the Abhidharmakośa presentation, the five are i) 'congruence of support' (T. rtten mtshungs; S. āśhraya), ii) 'congruence of focus' or 'congruence of the observed object' (T. dmigs mtshung; S. ālambana), iii) 'congruence of aspect' (T. rnam mtshungs; S. ākāra), iv) 'congruence of time' (dus mtshungs; S. kāla), and v) 'congruence of substance' (T. rdzas mtshungs; S. dṛavya).

i) **Congruence of support** means that mind and mental factors have the same 'support' or 'basis'. If we take, for instance, an eye consciousness as an example of a primary mind, its support or basis will be the eye faculty. Its attendant mental factors will also have the same support or basis, an eye faculty.

ii) **Congruence of the observed object.** In the case of an eye consciousness, its observed object is a form. Its attendant mental factors will also have the same observed object, a form.

In general when you have a primary mind and its specific attendant mental factors, they will both have the same object. But there are times when mental factors are present and a primary mind is present also, but the mental factors, being conceptual, will have their own particular object, and at that point in that situation, the primary mind does not have the same object as
the mental factors. For example, in the case of a king and his entourage, when they are going to a particular place, when they both have the same object in mind, they both go to the same country. But in their general state of existence, even though the ministers are part of the king's entourage, there are times when they are doing different things than the king and going to different places than the king.

All the mental factors do not necessarily have to accompany a primary mind. For example, when you recollect or think about something, there is still the primary mind with its attendant mental factors of feelings and so on, looking out and seeing this room. When we say 'attendant' here we are mainly referring to the five omnipresent factors. But that primary mind itself is not taking the object of recollection as its object. It is not the primary mind for the recollection.

Mind itself is extremely vast, it has no end, no limits. But when we talk about primary mind and its accompanying mental factors of feelings, discriminations and so forth, it seems that we are making the mind very small. But in fact the mind, like an ocean, is one continuum but also has many parts just like an ocean is one vast continuum of water, but you can speak about its southern end, its northern end, and so on. There are several primary minds; there is a primary mind for the eye-consciousness, ear, nose, taste and body consciousness, each accompanied by its five omnipresent mental factors, and at the same time there are other mental factors occurring in our minds, like recollection and so forth, all happening, as it were, almost all at once. This is why the mind is said to be limitless or immeasurable. This is why we practice meditation in order to develop this limitless quality of mind. We talk about limitless loving kindness, compassion, joy and equanimity. In that context we are exploring these limitless possibilities of mind. The mind is not limited in the way the physical body is; no matter how much we train physically, we will be able to jump only so far, because a physical body can jump only a certain distance. The mind does not have such limits. There is no limit to our mind and for that reason, we are trying to develop its limitless capabilities through, for example, meditating on loving kindness, compassion, joy and equanimity, exploring the limitless capabilities of the mind.
iii) **Congruence of aspect.** In the case of an eye consciousness, an aspect of a form will arise to it. For its attendant mental factors there also will arise an aspect of a form.

iv) **Congruence of time.** The arising, abiding and ceasing of the primary mind, as for example an eye consciousness, occurs simultaneously with the arising, abiding and ceasing of its attendant mental factors. This may be phrased in another way by saying the mind and its attendant mental factors arise, abide and cease together.

If there is a primary mind, there will be its accompanying or attendant mental factors, in particular the five omnipresent mental factors. Just because it is a mind doesn’t mean that it is a primary mind, but if there is a primary mind present, there will be its attendant mental factors. If there is no primary mind present, there will not be the attendant mental factors. However, all of this is one mental continuum. That which knows the object is what is called ‘primary mind’, and that which distinguishes the features of the object on the basis of that observation of the object is called ‘mental factors’, but all of this is taking place within one mental continuum. The primary mind and the mental factors have different functions. ‘Congruence of time’ means that the arising, abiding, and cessation of the primary mind and its attendant mental factors occur simultaneously.

v) **Congruence of substance.** If, for example, the eye consciousness, the primary mind, is a single substance or substantial entity, then its attendant factors will be single. This substance will have the same number of moments of the same type. If the primary mind is single, then there will only be one of each of the corresponding mental factors.

The presentation of the five kinds of congruence is slightly different in the Abhidharmasamucchaya: i) ‘congruence of substance’ (T. rdzas mtshungs; S. dravya); ii) ‘congruence of the observed aspect (T. dmigs mtshungs; S. alambana); iii) ‘congruence of essence’ (T. ngo mtshungs); iv) ‘congruence of time’ (T. dus mtshungs); v) ‘congruence of realm and level’ (T. kham dang sa mtshungs-pa). ‘Congruence of time’ and ‘congruence of substance’ are the same as in the Abhidharmakośa. The Abhidharmasamucchaya, however, combines the ‘congruence of observed object’ and the ‘congruence of aspect’ as one (T. dmigs mtshungs). That makes three congruences; then they
add two others: ‘congruence of essence’ or ‘congruence of essential nature’ and ‘congruence of realm and level’.

Congruence of essence or congruence of essential nature means that if the primary mind is a mind affected by the mental afflictions or kleshas, then the attendant mental factors will also be afflicted, and if the primary mind is one which is free from the mental afflictions, then the attendant mental factors will also be free from mental afflictions.

Congruence of realm and level means that if the primary mind belongs to the desire realm, then the attendant mental factors will also belong to the desire realm. If the primary mind belongs to the form realm, then the attendant mental factors will be those of the form realm. In the same way, if the primary mind belongs to a being in the formless realm, the attendant mental factors will be those belonging to the formless realm. This means that there will never be a case of a primary mind belonging to the desire realm with the attendant mental factors belonging to the form and formless realms.

C.3) THE EXPLANATION OF THE 51 MENTAL FACTORS IN SIX GROUPS: pp. 22-27

The fifty-one mental factors are divided into six groups:

1) five omnipresent mental factors (T. kun 'gro lnga)
2) five object-determining mental factors (T. yul nges lnga)
3) eleven virtuous mental factors (T. dge-ba bcu-gcig)
4) six root afflictions (T. rtsa-nyon drug)
5) twenty secondary afflictions (T. nye-nyon nyi shu)
6) four changeable mental factors (T. gzhan 'gyur bzhi).

In general, the presentations so far of valid cognition [i.e. in the unpublished chapters,] are on a coarser level. Now when we are looking at mind and mental factors, we are getting into a lot of subdivisions of which none are forms in which it can be clearly delineated which part of the form is being discussed. For this reason Jamgon Lodrö Thaye said that one has to approach these teachings on mind and mental factors with confidence in the scriptures. Often one can’t ascertain exactly what’s being talked about in the same way that one can look at a form and say ‘Oh, you’re talking about that part.’
1 THE FIVE OMNIPRESENT [MENTAL FACTORS], pp. 22-23

In the Thirty Verses it is stated:

Feeling, discrimination, impulse, contact, mental engagement:
These are the five kinds of omnipresent [mental factors].

1) ‘Feelings (T. iteral-ba; S: vedana):

Accordingly, these are presented in terms of definition, definiendum [and example]:

The definition ‘that which has the nature of experiencing’ defines feeling. The illustrating example is the feeling of happiness.

In the same way, the illustrating examples following on this are to be added using [one’s own] understanding.

‘Feelings’ is that which has the nature of experiencing. What does it experience? It experiences feelings of happiness (S. sukha), suffering (S. duḥkha) and indifference (S. aduḥkhā-sukha) which arise from virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral karma respectively. A feeling of happiness is a pleasant feeling, one that one wishes to have repeated, that one wishes will continue. A feeling of suffering is an unpleasant feeling, one that one wishes will go away, that one wishes to separate from. Feelings which are neither happiness or suffering are called feelings that are of indifference or neutral feelings.

Feelings can also be divided from the point of view of their basis or support into i) physical (S. kāyika) feelings, i.e. the feelings or sensations of the body, and ii) mental (S. chaitasika) feelings. Physical feelings are also classified as three, happiness, suffering and indifference. Mental feelings again are three, happiness, suffering and indifference. What is the difference between the physical feelings and the mental feelings? The physical feelings are those feelings which arise through association with the five sense consciousnesses. Mental feelings are those which arise through association with the mental consciousness. So why is the first kind, since they arise from the sense consciousnesses, called ‘physical feelings’ or ‘feelings that arise from the body’? It is because these five sense consciousnesses are based upon the five sense faculties, and the sense faculties abide within the body.
The body sense faculty pervades the entire body and in that way is the abode for the other four sense faculties. The eye, ear, nose and tongue sense faculties abide within the body. It is on the basis of these sense faculties which are present in the body that the sense consciousnesses arise. The feelings that arise associated with the five sense consciousnesses are called 'physical feelings' or 'feelings that arise from the body'.

Feelings can also be classified as either i) materialistic feelings or ii) non-materialistic feelings. Since each of the three physical feelings can be classified as either materialistic or non-materialistic, in this way there are six physical feelings. The same applies to the mind, and there are six mental feelings, making a total of twelve. Materialistic feelings are those feelings which arise in association with an attachment to one’s skandhas. They arise through craving for the skandhas which are contaminated and which are what perpetuates suffering. Any feelings associated with this attachment to the skandhas are called materialistic feelings. Non-materialistic feelings are those associated with the wisdom or knowledge that realizes the lack of a self-entity.

One may wonder how a feeling which is classified as non-materialistic can also be one of suffering. This presentation of feelings as materialistic and non-materialistic comes from the Abhidharmakosha, which explains that arhats do have suffering, that they have some subtle karma, the cause of their suffering, for example, in the form of headaches or physical pain when they step on a thorn.

Sometimes feelings are classified into eighteen from the perspective of the support or basis, which refers to the sense consciousnesses. Each of the six sense consciousnesses can experience happiness, suffering and indifference, making a total of eighteen.


The definition ‘apprehending characteristics’ defines discrimination. ‘Discrimination’ means the apprehension of the uncommon characteristics of a specific object on the basis of the coming together of the object, the faculty and the consciousness. This is divided into two types, i) ‘discrimination of objects’ and ii) ‘discrimination of conventional expressions’.
i) Discrimination of objects means apprehending the characteristics of an object. This means that one apprehends a specifically characterized phenomenon individually without mixing up its features. For example, you see the color blue and you see the features of that distinctly without mixing it up with anything else.

ii) Discriminating conventional expressions means that one apprehends the characteristics of what the conventional expression refers to, as for example, when you say: ‘That’s a man, that’s a woman, that’s a pillar, that’s a vase.’ You apprehend the characteristics to which that conventional expression is referring, in a distinct manner without mixing it with something else.

There are also other ways to classify ‘discrimination’. If the classification is done from the point of view of the ‘support for discrimination’, then there are six categories relating to the six consciousnesses, from eye through mind. Another way to classify discrimination is from the point of view of its ‘observed object’, and that also has six divisions, i) ‘discrimination associated with characteristics’, ii) ‘discrimination without characteristics’, iii) ‘discrimination of the small’, iv) ‘discrimination of the vast’, v) ‘discrimination of the limitless’, and vi) ‘discrimination of nothingness’.

i) Discrimination involving characteristics (S. sanimmittasaṃjñā) is the discrimination of someone who is skilled in making the connections between names and their reference. This refers to someone who knows the connection between a name and its object. They know that the word ‘vase’ applies to a specific object and they apprehend the object on the basis of being able to make a connection between a name and the object.

ii) Discrimination without characteristics (S. animmittasaṃjñā) refers to those who don’t know how to make such connections, for example, a new-born baby who doesn’t know the names for anything, and so doesn’t make a connection between an object and its name.

iii) Discrimination of the small (S. parittā saṃjñā) refers to the discrimination of ordinary beings in the desire realm who focus on sense pleasures. These beings have not attained the first concentration which belongs to the form realm.
iv) **Discrimination of the vast** (*S. mahadgata samjñā*) refers to the discrimination which takes place in the form realm.

v) **Discrimination of the limitless** (*S. apramānasamjñā*) refers to the type of discrimination that occurs in one of the formless realms. For example, in the first of the formless realms, beings abide in a concentration or a samādhi focussing on limitless space.

vi) **Discrimination of nothingness** (*S. akiñchinsamjñā*) refers to the formless realm of nothingness where beings concentrate or focus on nothingness.

‘Discrimination of the small’ refers to the desire realm; ‘discrimination of the vast’ refers to the form realm; and ‘discrimination of the limitless’ and ‘discrimination of nothingness’ refers to the formless realm.

Discrimination can be either i) conceptual or ii) non-conceptual.

3) ‘Impulse’ or ‘intention’ (*T. sms-pa; S. chetanā*).

The definition ‘the expression of the mental [consciousness] in the phase where mind moves towards an object’ defines **impulse**.

‘Intention’ is also defined as ‘that which moves the mind towards an object and directs it there’. ‘Intention’ is the most important of the mental factors. In engaging an object, if there is no intention, then the primary mind and the other mental factors will not engage with it. ‘Intention’ is likened to a magnet which automatically pulls in iron filings. If there is ‘intention’, then the primary mind and the other mental factors will go towards whatever object is designated by ‘intention’. ‘Intention’ is also classified into six types based on the six supports, the eye consciousness through the mental consciousness.

4) ‘Contact’ (*T. reg-pa; S. sparśha*).

The definition ‘that which fully determines the change in the sense faculty in accordance with pleasant or painful feelings occurring due to the meeting of object, sense faculty and mental engagement’ defines **contact**.

‘Contact’ occurs due to the coming together of object, sense faculty and mental engagement, and here ‘mental engagement’ specifically refers to the sense consciousnesses. Through the coming together of the object, sense faculty
and sense consciousness, there is contact which is the cause or basis for feelings of happiness or suffering to which one then becomes attached or towards which one has aversion. ‘Contact’ gives rise to the feelings of happiness, suffering or indifference. If there is no contact, there will be no feelings that arise. If there are no feelings of happiness, suffering or indifference, then what arises from those feelings: attachment, aversion and stupidity, also won’t arise.

‘Contact’ means that which happens through the coming together of the object, faculty and corresponding consciousness. Therefore there are six categories of contact from the perspective of there being six types of support, from the eye through the mental consciousness. Because there are six kinds of contact, then we have six kinds of feelings related to each of the sense consciousnesses, and there are three possibilities for each of those six, happiness, suffering or indifference, making a total of eighteen feelings.

5) ‘Mental engagement’ (T. yid la byed-pa; S. manaskāra).

The definition ‘apprehending the object of focus as something particular to which the mind is directed again and again’ defines mental engagement.

‘Mental engagement’ is that which repeatedly directs the mind to its observed object. You might wonder: Don’t both intention and mental engagement observe the object? The difference between ‘intention’ and ‘mental engagement’ is that ‘intention’ simply moves the mind towards its object, it simply focuses the mind on the object in a general way, whereas ‘mental engagement’ is the repeated apprehension of a particular object. ‘Intention’ is more generalized, the general moving of the mind towards the object, and ‘mental engagement’ is a more concentrated focus on the object.

Given these five, there is a reason to call them ‘the five omnipresent [mental factors]’ because they are present as the attendant [factors] of all primary minds included in the three realms. These five, feeling, discrimination, intention, contact and mental engagement, are called the five omnipresent mental factors. The reason they are called ‘omnipresent’ (T. kun ‘gro; S. sarvatraga) is because whenever there is a primary mind, all five of these accompany it. If one of these is not present, the object is not experienced. Let us take, for example, the eye consciousness
apprehending a form. If one of these omnipresent mental factors is not present, the object will not be experienced. If the mental factor of 'feeling' is not present, there will be no experience. If 'discrimination' is not present, there will be no apprehension of the characteristics of the object. If 'intention' is not present, there will be no approaching the object. If 'intention' and 'mental engagement' are not present, the mind will not be directed towards the specific object. If there is no 'contact', then there will be no basis for feelings to arise. Therefore whenever there is a primary mind, it is always accompanied by these five omnipresent mental factors.

When the primary mind is experiencing an object, it must be accompanied by these mental factors. If these mental factors are not present, then the action will not be completed. It's like a king and his entourage. If the king is going somewhere, he has to be accompanied by his entourage; he can't go without his entourage. For the action of relating or apprehending an object to be complete, the primary mind must be accompanied by these mental factors.

We will now look at the second group, the five object-determining mental factors (T. yul nges lnga; S. viśhayapratiṇīyama). Our text says:

3.2 THE EXPLANATION OF THE SECOND GROUP, THE FIVE OBJECT-DETERMINING [MENTAL FACTORS], p. 23

In the [work] just [quoted] it is stated:

Aspiration, belief, recollection, meditative stabilization and superior knowledge:
These are the five kinds of object-determining [mental factors].

'In the work just quoted' refers to Vasubandhu's Thirty Verses.

1) 'Aspiration' (T. 'dun-pa; S. chhana).

Accordingly, these are presented in terms of definition and definiendum:

The definition 'striving for an intended object' defines aspiration.

'Aspiration' is the mental factor of ascertaining or knowing an object for which one is striving, for example, a particular text one is studying. 'Aspiration' is wanting to attain the particular object of one's thought, it is striving for a specific object.
There are three types of aspiration, i) the 'aspiration which wishes to meet with something', ii) the 'aspiration of wishing not to separate from something' and iii) the 'aspiration that seeks something'.

i) An example of the 'aspiration that wishes to meet with something' is when one aspires to accumulate virtue in order to meet with happiness.

ii) An example of the 'aspiration of wishing not to separate from something' is the aspiration of not wishing to separate from that happiness that one has attained through doing virtuous actions.

iii) An example of the 'aspiration that seeks something' is the aspiration which is seeking that which one desires; it is the aspiration to seek an understanding of the view; it is the aspiration which seeks certain kinds of conduct; it is the aspiration which seeks meditation and so on. There are many different kinds.

In the *The Ornament for Clear Realization* (*Abhisamayālaṃkāra*) by Maitreya, the definition of developing bodhichitta is given as the wish to attain complete enlightenment for the sake of oneself and others. This mental factor of wishing to attain unsurpassable enlightenment for the sake of oneself and others, is aspiration, and among the types of aspiration, it is the third type, the 'aspiration which seeks'. Here it specifically means it seeks what one desires.

The aspiration which seeks the view is applied specifically to the philosophical tenets. There are many types of this aspiration, for example, there is the aspiration which seeks the view as explained by the Vaibhāṣikas; there is the aspiration which seeks the view as explained by the Sautrāntikas, by the Chittamātrins, by the Madhyamikas and so forth. There are as many types of aspiration which seek the view as there are types of view or types of philosophical systems.

2) 'Belief' (T. mos-pa; S. adhimoṅkṣha).

The definition 'apprehending something about which certainty has been obtained as exclusively that' defines belief.

'Belief' is the mental factor of apprehending something that one has gained certainty or conviction about on the basis of either inferential valid cognition or direct valid cognition. For example, if one has the belief that all
phenomena are empty, one first had to determine this through the view and through using reasons. Once one has the inferential valid cognition that has ascertained that the true nature of all phenomena is emptiness, then one has the certainty that they are that way. One has the apprehension of the object about which one has gained certainty, and that mental factor is called ‘belief’. If one has this stable conviction about the fact that all phenomena are empty, then one will not be dissuaded from this belief, one will not be led away from this belief by other people saying something contradictory to it.

‘Belief in the Three Jewels’ means that one has determined that the Buddha is the undeceiving teacher, that what he taught, the Dharma, is the Path, and that those who properly practice the Dharma, the Saṅgha, are the friends on the Path. Having such conviction or certainty is what is meant by ‘belief’. When one has such a belief in the Three Jewels and when that belief is very stable, one will not be led away from that by other people, say for example, non-Buddhists. No matter what kinds of reasons they present to one, because one has this strong certainty, one’s mind cannot be turned. The criterion for considering whether one is a Buddhist or not is mainly dependent on whether one takes refuge or not. If one has determined that the Buddha is the teacher of the Path, his teachings are the Path and the Saṅgha are the friends on the Path, one develops a firm belief in the Three Jewels. Belief is said to be very important in the beginning, in the middle, and in the end, when one accomplishes the Path. It has also been said that the root of the virtuous dharma is belief, meaning that if one has belief then one is able to practice the dharma properly. If one does not have such belief, then one is unable to practice properly.

3) ‘Recollection’ (T. dran-pa; S. smṛti). This is the same word that in other contexts we translate as ‘mindfulness’.

The definition ‘not forgetting familiar objects’ defines recollection. ‘Recollection’ means to not forget objects with which one has become very familiar. That is very easy, we all understand that. It means, for example, to recall what we did yesterday. (Laughter.) The mental factor of recollection has three features: i) The ‘feature of the object’ is a thing with which you are familiar. ii) The ‘feature of the aspect’, which means that having
observed that object, one does not forget it. iii) The 'feature of its function' means to cause or bring about non-distraction. These are the three features which must be present in order to have recollection.

i) Feature regarding the object means that the object has to be a familiar object. It is not simply that you have seen something before, because just seeing the object doesn’t mean that you are familiar with it. If you are not familiar with the object, you are not going to remember it. In order to have recollection, you must be familiar with the object.

ii) Feature which concerns the aspect means that in order to not forget an object, simply being familiar with it is not enough. You also need to bring it to mind. It must be an object which arises in your mind, and if both of these particular features are present, namely, being a familiar object and that which you have brought to mind repeatedly, then you will recollect it.

iii) Feature of its function is to bring about non-distraction.

In the Bodhicharyāvatāra, Śāntideva speaks about recollection, introspection or attentiveness. There he is using this word recollection or dran-pa in a particular way, equating it with ‘not forgetting what should be adopted and what should be abandoned’, i.e. not forgetting that it is virtue that should be adopted and negative actions that should be abandoned. He draws the analogy between our minds, which always follow after outer things, in particular after negative things, our kleśhas, and so forth, and an elephant. If you have a crazy elephant, and you don’t tie him up, restrain him in a pen, if you just let him out, he will destroy everything nearby, even the whole forest. The mind that follows after a mind influenced by kleśhas only accumulates negative actions. It is constantly pursuing that which is negative, mental afflictions and so forth. The negative mind needs to be tied up just like the crazy elephant. How do we tie it? We tie it with recollection. ‘Recollection’ is therefore more specifically defined as ‘not forgetting what is to be adopted and what is to be abandoned’. If one understands clearly what virtuous actions are and what negative actions are, then one will only engage in what is virtuous and one will abandon what is negative. Those who wish to attain liberation and omniscience need recollection in the beginning as the basis, and need recollection on the path, in fact, need recollection until the result is attained. For this reason, Śāntideva
said that people should always protect or maintain recollection in their minds, because if our recollection is very strong, then our shamatha practice will be strong, our practice of vipaśyanā will then consequently go well, and if that is very strong, then we will realize that the true nature of all phenomena is emptiness.

Śāntideva said in the Bodhicharyāvatāra:

To those who desire to guard the mind,
I pray, saying,
‘Preserve your inspection and awareness
Even if it costs you your life.

4) ‘Meditative stabilization’ (T. ting-ngel-dzin; S. samādhi).

The definition ‘a one-pointed mind concerning objects to be examined’ defines meditative stabilization.

‘Objects to be examined’ refers to conceptually imputed objects. These objects which one concentrates upon one-pointedly without distraction can be either pure or impure. ‘Pure objects’ would refer, for example, to the image of the Buddha on which one is concentrating; ‘impure objects’ would be, for example, the unpleasantness or impurity of one’s own physical body upon which one is meditating.

One may wonder whether the meditative stabilization must always take a mentally or conceptually imputed object, whether it can take a non-mentally imputed object such as a specifically characterized phenomenon or emptiness as an object. The text on mind and mental factors that is being referred to in this teaching, The Necklace of Clear Understanding by Ye-shes rgyal-mtshan (1713-1793), says that the object in meditative stabilization is an object for the mental consciousness, that it is an object for the conceptual mind. According to this text, one could say that the main object for samādhi is a conceptually imputed object. Because it arises within the mental consciousness, meditative stabilization is an object for the mental consciousness. According to our text, Asaṅga said that the object for the mind in meditative stabilization is an object for the mental consciousness and is not an object for a sense consciousness. However, it is not contradictory to
use an object for the sense consciousnesses for meditative stabilization; it's fine to use a specifically characterized phenomenon for your meditation, and if you look at what you're doing when you're using such an object, you will probably see that you are mixing together the referent object and the appearing object, so that you are actually mixing together the specifically characterized phenomenon and a concept of that.

This is not saying that you can't use an object of the sense consciousnesses for meditation, it's just pointing out that meditative stabilization does not arise from the sense consciousnesses but arises from the mental consciousness. There are two ways in which we can be distracted. We can be distracted towards objects or we can be distracted by our thoughts. We are very easily distracted by an object for the sense consciousness, that is forms, sounds, smells, and so forth. They can be used as objects for meditation but since meditative stabilization arises through the mental consciousness, it is said to be easier to use a mental object.

5) 'Superior knowledge' (T. shes-rab; S. prajñā). The texts give many different definitions for prajñā. The definition that Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso, Rinpoche has presented in our Lorig text is:

The definition 'fully distinguishing specifically and generally characterized phenomena' defines superior knowledge.

'Superior knowledge' is sometimes defined as 'that which distinguishes or differentiates phenomena', which has the same meaning as the above definition. In other texts one finds the definition as 'that which distinguishes false and good qualities'. There are two divisions to knowledge, i) worldly knowledge, and ii) transcendental knowledge, what is beyond the world.

i) **Worldly knowledge** is studying and reflecting on the sciences of healing, arts and crafts, grammar, and valid cognition.

ii) **Transcendent knowledge** is listening, studying, and meditating upon the science of inner topics, where 'inner topics' refers to the dharma. In fact, 'transcendent knowledge' specifically refers to the knowledge which arises from meditation. But since listening and reflection are the causes of the knowledge which arises from meditation, they also are called 'knowledge'; so it is a case here of the name of the result being given to the cause.
We speak of the three types of knowledge, or three types of prajña, as being the prajñas of listening, reflecting, and meditating.

The text concludes this section by saying:

Given those, there is a reason to call them the 'five object-determining [mental factors]' [27] because since the mind does not apprehend anything other than those objects that are intended, certain, familiar and to be examined (or alternatively: objects that are imputed), just those objects are determined.

'Given those' refers to the five mental factors: aspiration, belief, recollection, meditative stabilization and superior knowledge. With 'aspiration' one has an intention towards the object; with 'belief' one is certain about it; with 'recollection' one is relating to a familiar object; and with 'meditative stabilization' one is relating to an object that is either to be examined or that is conceptually imputed. When one has these five factors, including superior knowledge, then one is able to determine objects without one's mind being swayed towards other objects. One simply determines the ones which are intended, one is certain about, one is familiar with and which are imputed.

The first and the second group, the five omnipresent mental factors and the five object-determining mental factors, are now finished. Now we will look at the third group, the eleven virtuous mental factors (T. dge-ba bu-gcig; S. kuśala).

3.3 THE EXPLANATION OF THE THIRD GROUP, THE ELEVEN VIRTUOUS [MENTAL FACTORS], pp. 23-24

In the [work] just [quoted] it is stated:

'Faith, shame, embarrassment
Non-attachment, non-hatred, non-ignorance,
Joyous effort, suppleness, conscientiousness,
Equanimity and non-harmfulness:
All these eleven are virtuous.'

This quotation again is from the Thirty Stanzas by Vasubandhu.
1) ‘Faith’ (T. dad-pa; S. shraddha).

Accordingly, these are presented in terms of definition and definiendum:

The definition ‘appreciation and belief’ defines faith.

‘Appreciation’ refers to the quality of feeling joyful about or being inspired by something, and ‘belief’ refers to the quality of wishing to attain something, having enough interest in something that one wishes to attain oneself. If we take as our example having faith in the excellent qualities of the Three Jewels, ‘faith’ means that having seen their excellent qualities, one feels inspired by them, one has a sense of appreciation of them or joyful feeling about them, and one wants to attain the same qualities oneself. There are three divisions of faith: i) the faith of confidence (T. yid ches gyi dad-pa), ii) inspired faith (T. dang-ba’i dad-pa), and iii) aspiring faith (T. mgnon ‘dod gyid dad-pa).

i) Faith of confidence has as its object the Four Noble Truths. Confident faith means, for example, that one has gained certainty about the Truth of the Origin, i.e. that causes give rise to corresponding results, that from the practice of virtuous actions one attains the happiness of the desire realm as a result, that through having done non-virtuous actions, one gains the suffering of the desire realm as a result, and through unwavering karma, one attains the happiness of the two higher realms, the form and formless realms. One also understands the Truth of the Path, i.e. that on the basis of the Path, one attains the result of cessation. One has gained confidence in the dependent relationship between causes and their results.

ii) Inspired faith (T. dang-ba’i dad-pa), which can also be translated as ‘clear faith’ or ‘lucid faith’, has as its object the excellent qualities of the Three Jewels, as we said before. It means that one feels inspired by, or has interest in, or has respect for the Buddha as the teacher of the Path, the Dharma as the Path itself and the Sangha as the friends who have accomplished the Path. Seeing their excellent qualities, seeing the excellent qualities of the Three Jewels, is referred to as ‘inspired faith’. It is ‘clear faith’ or ‘lucid faith’, because dang-ba has the meaning ‘to clarify’ or ‘to clean something’. To illustrate this quality of clarifying, the following example is used: there
is a water-clarifying jewel that you can put in very dirty water, and just by putting this jewel in the water, the water automatically becomes very clear. Once the water is completely clear, it can, for example, reflect the image of the moon. If the water is not clear, it cannot reflect the image of the moon. In the same way, if we have this inspired or clarifying faith in the Three Jewels through seeing their excellent qualities, all the excellent qualities of the Buddha or excellent qualities of realization can arise within our own mind-stream. This faith gradually purifies our own mind-stream of negative karma and kleshas.

iii) Aspiring faith is, for example, the aspiration or the wish to attain the same excellent qualities that the Buddha has, the excellent qualities of the Dharma and the excellent qualities of the Sangha. Having seen their qualities, one wishes to attain these for oneself, one wishes to give rise to them.

One can look at these three types of faith from the point of view of a causal relationship. In order for there to be the ‘aspiring faith’, one first has to give rise to the ‘inspired or lucid faith’, and that itself is based on the ‘faith of confidence’. One must begin with having confidence in the Four Noble Truths; from that one feels inspired about the Buddha, his path and the followers of it, and from that follows the ‘aspiring faith’, the faith that wishes to attain those qualities for oneself.

‘Faith’ is the foundation for our practice; ‘faith’ is like the foundation for a house. Once we have this as our foundation, we can enter into the Path. It is a foundation which serves as the basis for the Path from the very beginning up through the practices of Mahāmudrā. If one does not have faith, the excellent qualities of the Path will not arise within one’s mind-stream. For this reason, we must first give rise to faith and then the qualities of the Path and the result will arise. If we don’t have faith, we may try to practice the Dharma but we won’t give rise to any of the qualities of the Path. It’s like trying to plant a burnt seed; you can plant it in the ground but nothing will grow from it. Therefore ‘faith’ is considered to be most important.

2) ‘Shame’ (T. ngo-tsha shes-pa; S. hri).

The definition ‘refraining from negative deeds considering oneself’ defines shame.
'Shame' is the avoidance of negative actions from one's own side, on the basis of reasons related to oneself. For example, if one is at some point not being mindful or attentive, and one is about to kill some being because of that lack of mindfulness, all of a sudden one will remember that the result of such an action is something that one will experience. One will remember 'Oh, if I do this, I will suffer', and so one avoids this negative action.

3) 'Embarrassment' (T. khrel-yod-pa; S. apatrapya).

The definition 'refraining from negative deeds considering others' defines embarrassment.

'Embarrassment' means that one avoids doing negative actions for reasons which come from other people. For example, one would avoid doing non-virtuous actions because one would think 'Oh, if I do this, then my guru or my fellow dharma students will think very badly of me. They will be very displeased, they will despise me for doing such things.' In this way one avoids negative actions because of how others would react.

The function of both shame and embarrassment is that they act as the support for avoiding negative conduct; they restrain oneself from doing negative actions. The difference between them lies in whether one avoids negative actions from the point of view of oneself or from the point of view of others. But both enable one to avoid, or literally restrain oneself, from doing negative actions with body, speech and mind.

If one has no shame or no embarrassment, one will have no reason for not doing negative actions. If one has no sense of shame, has no concern for oneself about doing negative actions, one will have no fear of doing them, one will have no reason not to do them. If one has no embarrassment, if one is not concerned that one's guru and fellow practitioners will think very badly of one for doing certain kinds of actions, one will have no reason for avoiding them. There will be no methods for stopping or preventing oneself from doing what is actually harmful. Therefore these two, 'shame' and 'embarrassment', are considered important.

4) 'Non-attachment' (T. ma chags-pa; S. alotha).

The definition 'in no way clinging to the five appropriated aggregates and the enjoyments of [cyclic] existence' defines non-attachment.
'Non-attachment' means that one does not have any clinging to one’s skandhas which are called the ‘appropriated skandhas’ or ‘perpetuating skandhas’. The ‘appropriated skandhas’ are defiled, they involve mental afflictions, they arise due to mental afflictions. One also has no attachment to and no fixation on the enjoyments of samsāra.

Depending on the level of the person one is talking about, one can explain non-attachment in three different ways: i) If one simply has no attachment to this life, if one is not attached to one’s skandhas and the enjoyments of samsāra, because one is striving for better things in one’s next life, then this is the ‘non-attachment of lesser beings’. ii) Not having attachment to samsāra because one sees that it has the nature of suffering is the ‘non-attachment of intermediate beings’, and iii) not having attachment to both samsāra and nirvāṇa, that is, to existence or to peace, is the ‘non-attachment of great beings’.

5) ‘Non-hatred’ (T. zhe-sdang med-pa; S. advesha).

The definition ‘having no maliciousness towards objects of hatred’ defines non-hatred.

‘Anger’ or ‘hatred’ has three objects: i) ‘anger towards suffering’; ii) ‘anger towards other sentient beings’; and iii) ‘anger towards the causes of suffering’. An example of what is meant by ‘non-hatred’ is a mind endowed with patience.


The definition ‘not being obscured about what to adopt and what to reject’ defines non-ignorance.

‘Non-ignorance’ means understanding correctly what is to be adopted, i.e. virtue, and what is to be rejected, i.e. negative actions. ‘Non-ignorance’ is the prajñā or knowledge which can discriminate between virtue and non-virtue.

These three, non-attachment, non-hatred and non-ignorance, are the root of all virtue. It is said in the Ratnamiśā: ‘Whatever arises from non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance, is virtuous.’ This shows that these three are the root that gives rise to virtue; whatever arises from not having attachment, not having anger, and not having ignorance, will be virtue.
7) 'Joyous effort' (T. brtson-'grus; S. virya).

The definition 'unabated delight in virtue' defines joyous effort. 'Joyous effort' is often translated as 'diligence' or just simply 'effort'. 'Effort' means to delight in virtue. This has been said by Śāntideva who said that effort means to take delight in what is virtuous, to feel joyful about what is virtuous. Usually we consider any type of exertion in worldly activities, business or whatever, to be 'effort' or to be 'diligence'. But this is not 'diligence' or 'effort'; it is, in fact, a type of laziness in which we are attached to negative or inferior actions or activities, because 'effort' or 'diligence' is defined as 'taking delight in what is virtuous'. Clearly, in worldly activities we are not taking delight in what is virtuous and making an effort in that, but we are fixating, in fact, on negative or meaningless activities, and therefore worldly activities are a type of laziness.

There are many divisions that are made concerning 'effort'. However, we will look at the five divisions that are made according to the Abhidharmasamucchaya, which are: i) 'effort of armor', ii) 'effort of application'; iii) 'effort of no despondency'; iv) 'effort of irreversibility'; and v) 'effort of non-satisfaction'.

i) **Effort of armor.** 'Armor' is what one wears when one goes to battle so that one will not get hurt by arrows and spears. This type of effort refers to the joyous attitude to which one gives rise before engaging in virtuous activity, so it acts like an armor for one. This joyous enthusiastic state of mind that one generates before actually engaging in the action is called the 'effort of armor'.

ii) **Effort of application**, or **effort in terms of the application**, refers to the joyous state of mind that we have when we are actually engaging in or undertaking the activities of listening, reflecting and meditating.

iii) **Effort of no despondency**, or **effort without despondency** means not thinking that whatever particular virtuous action we are about to undertake is beyond our ability, like 'Oh, someone like me can't accomplish something like this.' It's not feeling discouraged, feeling confident that we can do whatever it is we are about to undertake. For example, we could think Jetsun Milarepa attained enlightenment in one lifetime and in one body,
but I’m not like that. I don’t have that ability.’ This is wrong, we shouldn’t have that kind of attitude. Jetsün Milarepa was a person, and we too are people; he himself said that he was a person who has done many evil deeds, and we haven’t done the kinds of things that he did. So given that he was a person and that we are people, there is absolutely no reason why we can’t achieve enlightenment in one lifetime and in one body just like Milarepa. Having this kind of confidence about whatever we are undertaking is called ‘effort without despondency’.

‘Effort without despondency’ is very important. Sometimes when we’re studying things like Madhyamaka and Lorig and Tarig, we might find them very hard and think ‘I can’t understand these at all’. Sometimes we might even think ‘It’s better I don’t even try. I should just give up’. Instead of giving up at this point, we need this ‘effort of no despondency’. This kind of effort is what enables us to complete whatever we are undertaking. It is joyous effort towards whatever we happen to be studying. Without this kind of joyous effort free of despondency, we will be unable to complete our studies or practice, whatever it is. This effort is needed to overcome any feelings of discouragement we might have in our studies.

iv) Effort of irreversibility means not to be dissuaded from whatever virtuous activity one has begun, not to have one’s mind turned away from whatever one has undertaken. If one has this kind of resolve, then one will complete whatever the virtuous activity is.

v) Effort of non-satisfaction is effort which is never felt to be sufficient. This means not to think that the little bit of virtuous action one has already done is sufficient, and that one doesn’t need to do anything more. This means that one should joyfully engage in developing or practicing as much virtuous action as one can until one has attained enlightenment. An example of what this means is that one should not feel that one’s studies of Lorig and Tarig up until now are fine, sufficient, so that one doesn’t need to do any more. One should feel that one now needs to go on and study a text such as The Ocean of Reasonings and the two texts by Dignāga and Dharmakirti, the Pramāṇasamucchaya and the Pramāṇavarttika. One needs to keep doing more.
8) 'Suppleness' (T. shin-tu sbyangs-pa; S. praśhrabdhi).

The definition 'the mind being made serviceable with respect to its object of focus through workability of body and mind' defines suppleness. [28]

'Suppleness' refers to suppleness or pliancy of body and mind. This means that one’s body and mind have become workable or serviceable so that they can be used in whatever way one wishes. This also means that any negative tendencies of body and mind have been cut off. The cause of physical and mental suppleness is samādhi, meditative stabilization. Having become habituated to samādhi, having become very familiar with the state of samādhi, suppleness of body and mind will develop.

There are two types of suppleness, i) ‘physical suppleness’ and ii) ‘mental suppleness’.

i) Physical suppleness arises through the force of samādhi and is the purification of all physical faults or all physical negativities. One’s body has become light like a ball of cotton and one is able to use one’s body in whatever way one wishes for virtuous activity. One can do as many prostrations as one wants, one can meditate for as long as one wants, and one will have no physical problems; one’s body will, in fact, feel lighter and more comfortable. There are stories of arhats who had attained suppleness of body and mind and so they could remain within samādhi for eons.

ii) Mental suppleness is described in the same way as ‘physical suppleness’. Through the force of one’s samādhi, one separates oneself from any negativities of mind, any mental faults, and one’s mind becomes very workable, very serviceable. One is able to engage with or rest the mind on whatever particular object is desired without any impediment.

This ‘mental suppleness’ is something that we need to develop. Sometimes when we are meditating, we find it difficult to sit even for a few minutes and we find that our mind will not rest on a particular object in meditation at all. The reason for this is that our samādhi is not strong, and because of our samādhi not being strong, we have no suppleness or workability of body and mind.
9) ‘Conscientiousness’ or ‘heedfulness (T. bag yod-pa; S. apramāda).

The definition ‘guarding the mind from defiled phenomena and cultivating virtuous phenomena’ defines conscientiousness.

‘Defiled phenomena’ refers to the klešhas, mental afflictions, and ‘guarding the mind from those’ means not following after them. ‘Conscientiousness’ is keeping the mind from pursuing what is negative and also cultivating what is virtuous. Nāgārjuna described conscientiousness as the source of nectar and the lack of conscientiousness as the source of death. When one has conscientiousness, one does not pursue what is negative and one gradually frees oneself from mental afflictions. Having conscientiousness is the cause for the paths and bhūmis and eventually for liberation and omniscience, whereas not having conscientiousness means that one is wrapped up in the pursuit of what is negative, and in the end, that is what keeps one in saṃsāra, taking negative or poor rebirths. Therefore it is said that for those of us who are practicing Dharma, conscientiousness is very important for listening, reflecting and meditating.

10) ‘Equanimity’ (T. btang-snyoms; S. upeksa).

The definition ‘when resting in equipoise, effortlessly engaging in equality without the faults of laxity, agitation and so on’ defines equanimity.

‘Equanimity’ is here defined as resting in meditative equipoise free from the faults of dullness, agitation and so on. ‘And so on’ refers to other negative states of mind. There are normally three types of equanimity: i) ‘equanimity of conditioned existence’, ii) ‘equanimity of feelings’, equanimity which is a feeling, and iii) ‘equanimity of the immeasurables’ or ‘immeasurable equanimity’.

Sometimes ‘equanimity’ is spoken of as one of the three types of feelings in which case it is defined as simply being that which is neither happiness nor suffering. It is also sometimes referred to as one of the Four Immeasurables. Here it is being referred to as neither of those two types but as the equanimity which is the cause of the form and formless realms. ‘Unwavering karma’ is what is meant by ‘equanimity’ in this case.
'Unwavering karma' is what arises from samādhi; the mind doesn’t waver, doesn’t move from samādhi, so whatever karma is accumulated is called 'unwavering karma'. This type of equanimity which is found in conditioned existence, and which is the cause of the two higher realms, is defined specifically as resting in equipoise without the faults of dullness and agitation.

11) 'Non-harmfulness' (T. rnam-par-mi-'tshe-ba; S. avihiṃsa).

The definition 'through a compassionate aspect of mind, not disparaging others' defines non-harmfulness.

'Non-harmfulness' simply means not harming others. It means having compassion for others and therefore not harming them, not causing them suffering in any way.

There are many types of virtue; what is virtuous is not limited to these eleven types. But these eleven are spoken of as the 'eleven virtuous mental factors' because they are all mental factors which within themselves are virtuous (T. dge-ba; S. kuśāla); their being virtuous does not depend on one's motivation or attitude at the time. Just within their own nature they are virtuous.

We speak about five types of virtue: i) what is 'virtuous in terms of its nature'; ii) what is 'virtuous through connection'; iii) what is 'virtuous through a subsequent connection'; v) what is 'virtuous due to the motivation'; and v) what is 'virtuous because it is ultimate'.

i) **Virtuous by nature** is the eleven virtuous mental factors which are virtuous in and of themselves without even having to look at whether the motivation is virtuous or not.

ii) **Virtuous through its connection** refers to the minds and mental factors that accompany these eleven virtuous mental factors.

iii) **Virtuous through a subsequent connection** refers to virtuous habitual patterns which are placed in the all-basis consciousness and which arise through the force of having done previous virtuous actions.

iv) **Virtuous in terms of the motivation** refers to any physical or verbal actions which are motivated by any of the virtuous mental factors, such as faith.

v) **Virtuous through being ultimate** refers to 'dharmatā' or 'suchness' which
is called a 'virtue', or more specifically, a virtuous state of mind. Through meditating on suchness or dharmata, all of one's obscurations, negative karma, mental afflictions and so on, are purified and therefore it is called 'virtuous' but in fact, it is not actually a virtuous mental factor, but is simply called that because through focusing on it in meditation, all of one's negativities are purified.

Our text concludes in the form of a reasoning why these eleven mental factors, meaning faith, shame and so forth, are called 'virtuous':

Given those eleven, there is a reason to label them 'virtuous', because if properly cultivated, they bring forth a pleasant fully ripened [result].

The third grouping of the fifty-one mental factors is now finished.

Next is the fourth group of the fifty-one mental factors, the six root mental afflictions (T. rtsa-nyon drug; S. mulakleśha).

3.4 THE EXPLANATION OF THE FOURTH GROUP, THE SIX ROOT AFFLICTIONS, pp. 24-25

In the [work] just [quoted] it is stated:

"Desire, anger, pride,
Ignorance, doubt and [afflicted view:
These are the six kinds of root afflictions."

1) 'Desire' (T. 'dod-chags; S. rāga).

Accordingly, these are presented in terms of definition and definiendum:

The definition 'clinging to the places, bodies and enjoyments of the three realms' defines desire.

The Tibetan 'dod-chags' is a compound. 'Dod' refers to 'dod-pa which means 'to desire' or 'to wish' or 'to want', and chags is chags-pa, which means 'to be attached to' or 'to fixate on'. 'Dod chags' can be translated simply as 'desire', but it is also sometimes translated as 'attachment' because it means that one desires some attractive object and then becomes attached to it.
'Places' refers to the worlds, 'bodies' to one's own bodies and other people's bodies, and 'enjoyments' to the sense pleasures, forms, sounds, smells, and so on, of the three realms. 'Three realms' refers to the desire realm, the form realm and formless realms. An example illustrating this is the mental factor which fixates on an attractive outer form which is called 'desire' or 'desire-attachment'.

The object of desire is always a pleasant, attractive object. One doesn't become attached to an unattractive object. Because it is an attractive object, to separate oneself from desire and attachment is very hard. This is illustrated by the example of cotton cloth dipped in oil. Once the cloth is dipped in oil, it's very hard to get the oil out of the cloth. In the same way, as long as one has this object of desire, one's desire keeps increasing and to free oneself from the desire and attachment for it is very difficult. For this reason it is said that desire is like salt water. If one drinks salt water to quench one's thirst, one will just end up feeling more thirsty; no matter how much one drinks, one can't quench one's thirst, one just wants more water.

We are attached to our own bodies. We see our own bodies as something pleasant, something nice, as being very clean, and that's why we become attached to them. Our attachment is not formed on the basis of perceiving them as unattractive and unclean.

There are three kinds of 'desire' related to the three realms: i) 'desire of the desire realm', ii) 'desire of the form realm', and iii) 'desire of the formless realms'. The Abhidharmakosha, however, classifies 'desire' as being of two kinds, i) 'desire of the desire realm' (S. kamaraga), and ii) 'desire of existence' (S. bhavaraga).

i) Desire of the desire realm is, for example, desiring attractive forms, sounds, and so forth, and on the basis of focusing on those, one develops attachment.

ii) Desire of existence refers to desire found in the two higher realms, the form and formless realms. This refers to the fixation on the samādhi or meditative concentration in which the beings in these two realms are absorbed. Some people mistake these samādhis of the form and formless realms to be the path of liberation. By pointing out that there is desire in these realms, that these states of samādhi are in fact states
of fixation and attachment, one points out that those samādhis are not the path of liberation.

ii) Desire of existence refers to the desire found in the two higher realms, the form and formless realms.

2) 'Anger' (T. khong-khro; S. pratīgha).

The definition 'totally malicious intention focusing on the harmer: a sentient being, the harm: suffering, and the harming conditions: poison, weapons and so on' defines anger.

'Anger' is, for example, the immediate reaction one has when an enemy, someone who harms one, does some harmful action, such as speaking very rudely or roughly to one. One doesn’t immediately feel happy but one immediately feels anger. The mental factor or mental state that arises is called 'anger'.

'Anger' is the malicious intention, the malicious attitude that develops spontaneously without fabrication towards any one of these three objects that one perceives as causing harm to oneself.

The function of anger is to destroy all one's happiness in this life and in future lives, and anger is said to be like a fire. When there is a fire in a house, it burns up the whole house. Anger has the same effect. It changes a person’s whole expression, they may be quite nice looking, but once they get angry, they look horrible. Even when you eat really tasty food, it tastes horrible if you are angry. Even if you have a very comfortable bed, you can't sleep when you are angry. Anger burns up all the merit that we have accumulated, which we would have experienced as happiness in the future and which would have ultimately enabled us to attain liberation and omniscience. For this reason, Śāntideva said that the virtue accumulated throughout thousands of eons is burned up by one instant of anger. Anger also affects others; it doesn’t just harm ourselves. For example, if we see someone who is very angry we immediately know it from the way they look, and we feel uncomfortable. Just looking at somebody else who is angry, makes us feel uneasy. And this is the power of anger. Anger is like a fire. If there is a fire burning in the house next door to you, there is the danger that your own house is going to catch on fire. You need to call the
fire truck to protect your house too. When you are with people who are very angry, you need to call your fire truck, loving kindness and compassion, to put out the fires of anger.

3) ‘Pride’ (T. nga-rgyal; S. maṇa).

The definition ‘a haughty attitude having the aspect of arrogance based upon the views of the transitory collections’ defines pride. [29]

‘Pride’. If someone thinks that in terms of, for example, wealth or possessions or personal qualities, there is no one better than themselves, that is ‘pride’. The feeling of superiority to everyone is an example of pride.

There are seven types of pride: i) ‘pride’ (T. nga-rgyal); (the first one is just called pride); ii) ‘excessive pride’ (T. lhag-pa’i nga-rgyal), iii) ‘pride beyond pride’ (T. nga-rgyal las kyang nga-rgyal), iv) ‘pride thinking ‘I’” (T. nga’o snyam-pa’i nga-rgyal), v) ‘pride which is conceit’ (T. mgon-pa’i nga-rgyal), or ‘conceited pride’, vi) ‘pride of slight inferiority’ (T. cung-zad snyam-pa’i nga-rgyal), and vii) ‘wrong pride’ (T. log-pa’i nga-rgyal).

i) Pride is the feeling that one is superior to others who are in some way inferior to oneself in terms of wealth, in terms of knowledge, or some kind of personal qualities.

ii) Excessive pride is to feel that one is superior to those who are actually one’s equals. For example, within a class students where are all at the same level, one of them may think that they are better than everybody else, then that’s called excessive pride.

iii) Pride beyond pride means thinking that one is superior to those who are actually one’s superiors.

iv) Pride of thinking ‘I’ is the pride of thinking ‘I’, having focused on the five skandhas. As long as we have the view of the transitory collection, i.e. the view of the skandhas as a self, then we have this ‘pride of thinking I’. It’s something that we all have from the moment we’re born; we don’t have to be taught this by our parents or our teachers.

v) Conceited pride is to think that one has attained that which one hasn’t attained. To think that one has attained the qualities of a bodhisattva abiding
on the bhūmis when one hasn't, or to think that one has clairvoyance or any other types of super cognitions is conceited pride.

vi) Pride of slight inferiority means to feel proud thinking that one is only slightly inferior to those who are very superior to oneself.

vii) Wrong pride is to take pride in having attained good qualities that one takes to be very positive, which they are not, and which, in fact, are a straying on the path.

The function of 'pride' is to prevent one from respecting those who have excellent qualities and also to prevent one from attaining the good qualities of the scriptures and realization. If one is very proud, if one is convinced that one is better than anyone else, one will not be able to respect those who actually do have good qualities, for example, spiritual teachers. With such pride, one will not think that one should develop any other qualities thus preventing one from developing the qualities of the dharma, of the scriptures and realization. A Tibetan saying is: 'The water of excellent qualities can't stay on the balloon of pride'. A balloon is something hollow, all puffed up; it looks big, but in fact there is nothing inside, and if you try to pour onto that balloon the water of excellent qualities, the water just rolls off the balloon, it won't stay on the balloon at all.

This shows clearly why pride is an obstruction and why pride is something that will prevent us from attaining the path of liberation.

However, in the Vajrayāna we do speak of the pride of the deity, but this is something completely different.

4) 'Ignorance' (T. ma-rig-pa; S. avidyā).

The definition 'being obscured about the meaning of the Four Truths and of suchness' defines ignorance.

'Ignorance' is not knowing, being ignorant of the Four Truths, not knowing the actual nature of phenomena. Being deluded about what should be adopted and what should be abandoned is an example of ignorance.

There are two types of ignorance, i) 'ignorance about karma and its results' and ii) 'ignorance about suchness'.
i) Ignorance which is being deluded about actions and their results is what causes us to be reborn in lower realms. This means not understanding that if one does something positive, one will have a positive result, and that if one does something negative, there will be a negative result. This is what creates the karma which brings about birth in the lower realms.

ii) Ignorance of suchness creates the karma which keeps us in saṃsāra. Having this type of ignorance, we are unable to cut through the root of saṃsāra and we are constantly reborn in saṃsāra.

'Ignorance' is said to be the root of saṃsāra, the root of our circling in the three realms. 'Ignorance' is also said to be the foundation for karma and mental afflictions. Therefore in the presentation of the twelve interdependent links which depict how we cycle through saṃsāra, the first link is 'ignorance'.

5) 'Doubt' (T. the-tshom; S. vicikitsa).

The definition 'being undecided concerning the truths and cause and effect' defines doubt.

'Doubt' means to be uncertain about whether there are past and future lives; it means to be uncertain about karma and its effects, i.e. to feel uncertain about whether positive causes bring results of happiness, whether negative causes bring results of suffering. It also means to feel doubt about the path and result, to wonder whether the path of listening, reflecting and meditating brings about the result of liberation and omniscience; it means to not be certain about this, to think maybe it is and maybe it isn't. The function of doubt is to obstruct our seeing the true nature of phenomena.

How does doubt prevent us from seeing the true nature of phenomena? The root of saṃsāra is the apprehension of a self, and the remedy for that is the prajñā which realizes the lack of a self. If we have doubt, if we wonder whether the prajñā which realizes the lack of a self really does cut through the root of saṃsāra, we won't be able to practice that prajñā; and if we don't practice it, we won't see the true nature of phenomena.

6) 'Afflicted view' (T. lta-ba nyon-mongs can; S. drṣṭi).

The definition 'afflicted superior knowledge' defines [afflicted] view.
The last of the root afflictions is called simply ‘view’. The definition is ‘knowledge, which involves the mental afflictions, that (literally) looks’, i.e. ‘views’. It is a view which involves the mental afflictions. There are five types: i) ‘view of the transitory collection’ (T. 'jig tshogs la lta ba; S. satkāyadrṣṭi); ii) ‘view of holding an extreme’ (T. mthar-'dzin pa'i lta-ba; S. antagrāhadrṣṭi); iii) ‘view that holds a wrong view as supreme’ (T. lta-ba mchog 'dzin; S. drṣṭiparāmarṣha); iv) ‘view that holds wrong types of ethics and modes of discipline as supreme’ (T. tshul-khrims dang zhugs-mchog 'dzin; S. śīlavrataparāmarṣha); v) ‘perverted views’, or ‘wrong views’ (T. log-lta; S. mithyādṛṣṭi).

i) View of the transitory collection involves mental afflictions. ‘Transitory collection’ refers to the apprehension of the perpetuating five skandhas (S. upādānaskandhas) as being an ‘I’ and ‘mine’. Our five skandhas are called ‘perpetuating’ because they perpetuate the mental afflictions. They are not a self, but we take them to be a self by thinking ‘I’. The knowledge or intelligence that involves the mental afflictions and takes these five skandhas to be a self when they are not, is called ‘the view of the transitory collection’. If we look at this term ‘transitory collection’, the first part, ‘transitory’, means impermanence and ‘collection’ means ‘many parts’. This is referring to the five skandhas. The five skandhas are impermanent, they are a collection, and we take this impermanent collection to be a self. We take the five skandhas to be permanent and single. We think of them as being one single self. This term ‘transitory collection’ is pointing out or is negating that the skandhas are permanent by saying ‘transitory’, and also negating them as being something single by calling them a ‘collection’. All of us have this type of wrong view as our basic way of being, because we all have this view that the five skandhas are a self. We have these views of the transitory collection as being a self and being ‘mine’.

There are twenty divisions of the ‘views of the transitory collection’, because each of the skandhas is regarded in four ways. Taking the form skandha as an example: i) the form skandha is seen as a self; ii) the self is seen to have the form skandha; iii) the form skandha is seen as ‘mine’; and iv) the self is seen to abide in the form skandha. The difference between the second and the third is simply a difference in the way the mind is looking at the form skandha.
Each of the other skandhas, the skandhas of feeling, discrimination, mental formation, and consciousnesses, are seen in these same four ways giving twenty divisions of the view of the transitory collection. The twenty views are also explained in the sixth chapter of the Madhyamakāvatāra.

The function of this type of incorrect view is that it is the cause or basis for all the other incorrect views which we have listed: holding on to an extreme, holding a wrong view as supreme, and so on. They are all based on viewing the five skandhas as a self or as 'mine', which means that when one gives up these wrong views of the transitory collection, all the other incorrect views will automatically be abandoned.

ii) View which holds to an extreme is described as the knowledge involving the mental afflictions which takes the self that has been conceived of in terms of the views of the transitory collection as being either something permanent or non-existent. The views of the two extremes are: a) 'view of permanence', and b) 'view of nihilism'.

a) View of permanence is that one regards the self to be something permanent and unchanging. This is the self which is being apprehended through having these views of the transitory collection. Taking that as the basis, one looks at this self which one thinks exists, and one takes it to be something unchanging and permanent.

b) View of nihilism is to regard this self which has been apprehended through these first wrong views of the transitory collection as not having a continuum that will go on into future lives, and to think this self exists only in this one life.

Views of holding to one extreme or the other is the view of holding this self to be something permanent or to be something which does not continue, something which does not exist beyond this present life.

If one has not understood the teaching that all compounded things are impermanent, then one may take the five skandhas to be something permanent. Because one hasn’t understood that everything is impermanent, then when one conceives of the five skandhas as a self, then one takes this self to be something permanent. When one hasn’t understood the teachings
on dependent origination properly, then the view of annihilation or nihilism develops. Both these views of an extreme are corrected by understanding dependent origination. With the view of annihilation, one has not understood that everything originates from a cause, that a cause will have a result, and then that result will be a cause for another result. One does not understand this continuum properly.

iii) **View of holding a wrong view as supreme** can involve the view of the transitory collection, the view of an extreme, or wrong views. The main point of this view is that one has the view of the transitory collection as a self, and then one mixes that with any other view. Because one has the view of the transitory collection, i.e. the five skandhas as being a self, then any further view one may adopt will become also this view of taking a wrong view to be supreme, for the reason that one holds the view that the skandhas are a self to be correct. The point here is that it is, again, an afflicted state of knowledge or intelligence which takes this idea of the five skandhas as a self to be supreme in conjunction with other kinds of wrong views. The other types of wrong views are not the main issue here. The main issue is that one is taking the view of the skandhas as a self to be something supreme.

The function of 'the view of taking a wrong view to be supreme' is to act as the basis for holding onto wrong views.

iv) **View which holds wrong kinds of ethical conduct and discipline to be supreme** is to engage in wrong kinds of conduct and discipline in order to purify one’s kleshas and attain liberation from samsāra. For example, some religious followers, in order to prevent themselves from killing, pierce their hands with a trident. To stop themselves from lying, they pierce their tongue with a trident. To purify the negative actions of their body, they sit in the middle of a fire. These kinds of actions are considered to be incorrect types of ethical conduct and discipline.

v) **Wrong view, or perverted view** means that one doesn’t think that actions give rise to results, one thinks that there are no past or future lives. Wrong views are the opposite of the ‘correct view’. As long as one has a wrong view, one cannot give rise to the correct view. As long as one has the
wrong view concerning actions and their results, the correct worldly view, i.e. that actions give rise to results, cannot arise, because a correct worldly view is that actions give rise to results. And as long as one has a wrong view concerning the abiding nature of phenomena, concerning dharmata, one is unable to give rise to the correct transcendent view. In order to give rise to correct views, one must first give up wrong views or contradictory views.

If we count these five afflicted views as one, then there are six kinds of root afflictions. If we count each separately, then there are ten root afflictions: i) desire, ii) anger, iii) pride, iv) ignorance, v) doubt, vi-x) five afflicted views.

This section in the text concludes by saying:

Given those, there is a reason to call them 'the root afflictions', because they are the root for the occurrence of the secondary afflictions.

These six or ten, depending on how we are counting, are called root afflictions (T. risa nyon; S. mūlakleśha) because they are the root of all the secondary afflictions.

3.5 THE EXPLANATION OF THE FIFTH GROUP, THE TWENTY SECONDARY AFFLICTIONS, pp. 25-27

In the [work] just [quoted] it is stated:

'Wrath, resentment,
Concealment, spite, envy,
Avarice, hypocrisy,
Deceit, self-satisfaction, harmfulness, non-shame,
Non-embarrassment, lethargy, agitation,
Non-faith, laziness,
Non-conscientiousness, forgetfulness,
Distraction, non-introspection, ...

The quotation is again from the Thirty Stanzas.

1) 'Wrath' (T. khro-ba; S. krodha).

Accordingly, these are presented in terms of definition and definiendum:
The definition ‘being unable to bear harm’ defines wrath.

’Wrath’ is not being able to be patient in the face of someone trying to harm oneself. ’Wrath’ is described as a very malicious state of mind which desires to harm others whom one perceives as harming oneself in some way. There are nine bases for wanting to harm others which are divided into three parts:

i) The first part refers to when one wants to harm another when one is thinking a) they have harmed me, b) they are harming me, or c) they will harm me.

ii) The second part refers to when one wants to harm someone that one perceives as a) having harmed, b) harming, or c) going to harm one’s friends.

iii) The third part refers to when one is wanting to harm someone whom one thinks a) has helped, b) is helping, or c) will help one’s enemies. This is a state of mind where one actually wishes to do harm to someone else. One actually has the intention to hit them, or beat them, or something like that.

We may wonder if there is a difference between ‘anger’, which is one of the root afflictions, and ‘wrath’, which is one of the secondary afflictions. Yes, there is.

‘Anger’ is a malicious state of mind which has no patience that arises through focusing on the three objects described as a) suffering, b) the causes of suffering, and c) sentient beings.

‘Wrath’ is an increase of that anger when one is in the presence of that which provokes the anger. It is an extremely agitated state of mind which wants to actually do something on the basis of feeling angry, for example, to beat someone physically.

2) ‘Resentment’ (T. ’khon- ’dzin; S. upanāha).

The definition ‘keeping in one’s mind harm [done by others]’ defines resentment.

‘Resentment’ is a state of mind where one holds onto one’s wrath and wishes to return the harm that someone has done to oneself. For example, if one thinks that someone has harmed one earlier, one keeps thinking about it, one keeps remembering that, and says, ‘Some day I will get back at them’. As long as one has resentment, one will have no patience towards the other person in any way.
3) 'Concealment' (T. 'chab-pa; S. mrakṣha).

The definition 'keeping one's own negative deeds secret and hiding them' defines concealment.

'Concealment' means that one keeps secret and concealed whatever negative actions one has done with one's body, speech, and mind. This can apply, for example, in the case of an ordained person who has broken their vows, who has committed some infraction of their vows, and has not confessed this in front of the sangha, their guru, or their preceptor. They would be concealing a fault that they had.

'Concealment' develops primarily due to ignorance or stupidity. It occurs because the person doesn't understand what is to be adopted and what is to be abandoned. A small negative action which is concealed, not regretted and not confessed, can increase greatly. For example, if you have only a small amount of poison and if you pour this poison into a reservoir or some large container of water, everyone who drinks that water will die. In the same way, a small infraction or a small negative action will increase if it is concealed, and can become an obstruction in the attainment of liberation. Therefore, infractions, negative actions, and so on, should be confessed with a sense of regret in the presence of the Three Jewels. That will prevent them from increasing and one will then not be concealing them.

4) 'Spite' (T. 'tshig-pa; S. pradāśha).

The definition 'wanting to say harsh words due to previous wrath and resentment' [30] defines spite.

'Spite' is a mental factor of wishing to speak harshly to someone because one is angry, feels wrath or resentment. This is, of course, in the context of ordinary beings, because it is said that sometimes it is permissible for a bodhisattva to engage in the three non-virtuous actions of body and the four non-virtuous actions of speech. 'Spite' is speech which is considered to be non-virtuous for ordinary beings because it is defined as being based on a feeling of anger, wrath, or resentment.

Spite is not simply, for example, a facial expression, looking aggressive, and it is not just simply speaking harshly. It is actually the intention to
speak harshly because one is extremely angry.

5) ‘Envy’, or ‘jealousy’ (T. phrag-dog; S. irshyā).

The definition ‘not being able to bear others’ achievements and prosperity’ defines envy.

‘Envy’ or ‘jealousy’ is defined as not being able to stand the fact that other people have very good qualities or that they are wealthy and have a lot of enjoyments.

When one feels jealous about other people, one automatically feels unhappy. For example, if one sees that other people have a lot of wealth and possessions and then thinks, ‘Oh, I don’t have these things’, then one automatically suffers. If one looks at others and sees their skills and accomplishments, and thinks, ‘Oh, I haven’t done any of these things. I’m not as accomplished’, one suffers. Having jealousy prevents one from feeling happiness in this life and in future lives.

Generally, ‘jealousy’ or ‘envy’ is said to be negative, but sometimes it is good. For example, when one is studying, feeling envious about those who are more learned will often cause one to study harder and to become more learned oneself. Sometimes there is this sense of jealousy among students in a class, but there it is really not so bad because it often is the cause or the motivating factor for the students to strive in their studies. In this way it becomes good.

From the point of view of envy being a mental affliction, it’s not very good. But from the point of view of its influence or its effect on one’s achievements, then it can be good. For example, in the Rumtek shedra, there were two classes, the upper and the lower, and often Khenpo Rinpoche had them compete in debate against each other, and it was through this kind of competition that all became better, that their studies improved, because each one of them didn’t want to be beaten by the other one. Maybe a little bit of jealousy here in Nitartha Institute might be good. (Laughter).


The definition ‘not being able to give away one’s possessions’ defines avarice. [30-31]
'Avarice' is not being able to give up any of the things that one owns, one's wealth, and so on. ‘Avarice’ is what prevents one from developing the pāramitā of generosity. If one has avarice, then one never enjoys one’s own possessions and wealth and never lets others enjoy them, because one is always worried about them being used up or being insufficient. Sherab-la says he knew a man from his area, the wealthiest man in that area, who was such a miser, had such avarice, that he wouldn’t part with anything that he owned. He never rode in a car or any kind of vehicle, but always walked to places. When he walked, he would always put his shoes under his arm, and when he went to hotels, he always brought his food from home because he was so worried about spending money. He had accumulated a great deal of wealth, but he never spent a thing because he was so fixated on it; he didn’t understand that everything is impermanent, that you can’t take it with you when you die. His great attachment to his wealth created a lot of obstacles for him when he was dying. He didn’t spend his wealth in a way that would increase his own merit, so he suffered from his avarice in this life, and also, karmically, this state of mind carries on into future lives.

7) ‘Hypocrisy’ (T. sgyu; S. māyā).

The definition ‘pretence in terms of one’s own physical and verbal conduct with an attitude of deceiving others’ defines hypocrisy.

‘Hypocrisy’ is having the intention to deceive others and acting in a hypocritical or deceptive way, for example, when somebody who really has no personal achievements acts as if they do. Because they want to be respected and served by other people, they say, ‘I am a great scholar and I’ve studied a lot’. ‘Hypocrisy’ refers to the actual intention to deceive.

8) ‘Deceit’ (T. g.yo; S. shāthya).

The definition ‘changing one’s own faults that can be seen or heard into something else’ defines deceit.

‘Deceit’ is transferring one’s own faults to someone else. For example, Sherab-la said, if he broke this glass when no one was around to see it, but then said when everybody came, ‘Did you all know that Tenam broke this glass?’
This hypocritical or deceitful state of mind acts as an obstacle to receiving the true instructions of the dharma in this life and will also prevent one from meeting with spiritual teachers of the Mahāyāna in future lives. It will create the conditions for experiencing what one doesn’t wish, not being able to receive instructions.

9) ‘Self-satisfaction’ (T. rgyags-pa; S. mada) or ‘haughtiness’.

The definition ‘the mind being full of one’s own glory and riches such as youthfulness and so on’ defines self-satisfaction.

‘Self-satisfaction’ or ‘haughtiness’ is to think very highly of oneself in terms of one’s physical appearance, one’s intelligence, one’s power and influence, one’s wealth and so on.

In his Suhrllekhā, Nagarjuna says:

‘Look at the vain glory of your social status and appearance, Your learning, your youth, and your power as your enemies’.

There are five causes for people’s self-satisfaction or feeling of greatness:

i) Rank. This means to think ‘There is no one greater than me’. This can be illustrated very well by the situation in India where brahmins think that they are of the highest rank, that there is no one better than them in the world.

ii) Feeling very satisfied with one’s physical appearance. A good example of this is those who win the Miss Universe contest. They obviously think they are the best in the world in terms of physical beauty.

iii) Study. Someone may think that they have studied more than anybody else, for example, that they have studied the Buddha’s teachings and all of the treatises so much that there is no one who has studied more than they have.

iv) Youthful beauty. This is usually described as referring to people around sixteen years old. Those of that age, male or female, who think that they have it over everybody else, are an example.

v) Authority. Someone who, due to previously accumulated merit, is very powerful and has a great deal of authority in the world may become very haughty and think that they are more powerful than anyone else.
Nāgārjuna says that people should regard these five causes as being like enemies because they give rise to this negative quality of haughtiness or self-satisfaction.

10) ‘Harmfulness’ (T. rnam-pa 'tshe-ba; S. vihimsa).

The definition ‘oneself attempting to kill or beat others and so on, or to make others do so’ defines harmfulness.

‘Harmfulness’ is the mental state of intending to hurt others, to kill them or beat them, or to cause others to do so. This is a mental state which completely lacks any compassion or kindness.


The definition ‘not refraining from negative deeds considering oneself’ defines non-shame.

‘Non-shame’ is easy to understand once you understand what shame is. An example of shame would be a monastic who has the vow not to take intoxicants. If such a person was considering whether or not to drink alcohol, beer or hard liquor, they would think, ‘Oh, I have this vow not to drink.’ By looking at reasons which concern themselves, their decision not to drink would be an example of shame. But if that person decided to drink, that would be an example of having no shame because they were not avoiding something negative for reasons that they possess. ‘Lack of shame’ means not avoiding negative deeds, unvirtuous actions, faults and so on, because of reasons which concern oneself.

12) ‘Non-embarrassment’ (T. khrel med-pa; S. anapatrāpya).

The definition ‘not refraining from negative deeds considering others’ defines non-embarrassment.

‘Embarrassment’ means not engaging in negative deeds because one considers what other sangha members, one’s guru, one’s teachers, will think about it. One avoids things that would cause them displeasure or cause them to criticize oneself. However, if one doesn’t refrain from negative deeds because of what others might think, that is called ‘non-embarrassment’, lack of embarrassment.
Lacking shame and embarrassment is said to be the cause for all faults. The lack of these two actually is an assistance for the arising of all klešhas and non-virtuous actions, because if one doesn’t have any reason to avoid negative actions, such as reasons that concern oneself, or reasons that concern others, one won’t avoid them. For example, if one thinks about the matura­tion of a negative action and, through thinking about it, becomes concerned that one will experience the results of something negative, then one avoids it. One is avoiding it for reasons that concern oneself. If one thinks about how others will perceive it, then one will also avoid it. However, if one doesn’t have either of these two reference points, one will have no reason to avoid things which are negative and one will engage in harmful activity with no concern.

13) ‘Lethargy’ (T. rmugs-pa; S. stīyāna).

The definition ‘the mind not being workable concerning its object of focus’ defines lethargy.

‘Lethargy’ is, for example, the state of our mind and body when we try to practice shāmātha after having over-indulged in delicious food and haven’t been able to digest properly. As our body feels extremely heavy, our mind will feel very heavy and will become obscured and unworkable.

14) ‘Agitation’ (T. rgod-pa; S. auddhatya).

The definition ‘being distracted again towards objects which are one’s previous actions’ defines agitation.

‘Objects which are one’s previous actions’ refers specifically to objects of desire, things that one has experienced before, and to which one has attachment, or finds them desirable. It does not refer to all of one’s previously experienced objects. ‘Being distracted again’ means that one’s mind moves again towards an object of desire which one has previously experienced. Generally, ‘agitation’ refers to the mind going out to outer objects, but here that is not what is meant, because here ‘agitation’ is classified as one of the mental afflictions and as a sub-category of desire. ‘Agitation’ specifically means the mind which, due to reasons of desire and attachment, goes to a previously experienced object of desire or sense pleasure.
We talk about agitation, in this context, from three points of view:
i) in terms of its ‘object of observation’, ii) in terms of its ‘aspect’, and ii) in terms of ‘its function’.

i) **Object of observation** is an attractive, pleasing object.

ii) **Aspect** refers here to the perceiving subject which is a mental state in which there is no peace and which is not calm, that moves towards an object. It is considered to be a sub-category of desire. It is the mind that engages with objects due to craving.

iii) **Its function** is to act as an obstruction to resting the mind on a virtuous object. In this context, agitation is one of the five factors which obscure meditative concentration.

Other instances of agitation that are not motivated by desire are simply referred to as the mind being distracted to outer objects, the mind going out to outer objects. These are considered part of this agitation which is one of the twenty secondary mental afflictions.

15) ‘Non-faith’ (T. ma-dad-pa; S. āśhraddhya).

**The definition** ‘having no desire for victorious phenomena due to lack of confidence in them’ defines *non-faith*.

‘Non-faith’ means that because one has no confidence in karmic causes and results, one therefore does not have the first type of faith, the ‘faith of confidence’, and one also does not have the other two types, ‘inspired faith’ or ‘aspiring faith’. Because there are three categories of faith, there are also three categories of ‘non-faith’.

16) ‘Laziness’ (T. le-lo; S. kausidyā).

**The definition** ‘not delighting in virtuous phenomena while clinging to bad actions’ defines *laziness*.

There are three types of laziness: i) ‘laziness of fixating on negative activities’; ii) ‘laziness of discouragement’; iii) ‘laziness of indulging oneself’.

i) **Laziness of fixating on negative activities** is to engage in various kinds of work, business, and so on, that one has to do in this life for reasons of
food, clothing, fame, and so on, with attachment or fixation. The main thing here is one's motivation. If one is motivated by attachment, then the actions that one does, one's work, whatever it is, will be considered to be this laziness of clingling to bad actions. However, if one's motivation is in accordance with the dharma, for example, from the Hinayana point of view one is developing renunciation for samsāra, or, from a Mahāyāna point of view, one is developing bodhichitta and one is regarding all the activities as being like a dream or an illusion, then it's not this laziness of being attached to negative activities. The problem with this kind of laziness is that one is concerned only with acquiring things in this life, and one has no interest in doing things that are virtuous.

ii) Laziness of discouragement is, for example, thinking 'Someone like me, who is a beginner and full of klešhas, couldn't possibly attain enlightenment' or 'Someone like me, who has so little intelligence, couldn't possibly understand all of those teachings on valid cognition and Madhyamaka', and then because one feels so discouraged, one doesn't even try, one makes no effort, then this is the laziness of discouragement.

iii) Laziness of indulging oneself is, for example, leaning back when one is sitting in meditation, which automatically brings sleep. Or, if one eats too much, this causes one to go to sleep. If one has this kind of laziness, then one also won't make any efforts towards doing things that are virtuous.

17) 'Non-conscientiousness' (T. bag-med-pa; S. pramāda).

The definition 'not guarding the mind and completely letting go of conscientiousness' defines non-conscientiousness.

'Not guarding the mind' means not keeping the mind from negative actions and klešhas. 'Completely letting go of conscientiousness' means letting one's mind just do whatever it wants. If one just lets one's mind go in that way, then one's body and speech will also follow, and then one's actions will also lack conscientiousness. If one guards one's mind and is conscientious about what one does mentally, one's body and speech will naturally follow. It is like the relationship between a boss and his servants. If there is a good boss, then the servants will do their work well, but if there is a really lousy boss, then the servants won't do their work well. Our mind
is like that. Our mind is the boss or the leader, and our body and speech are the servants that follow.

If one lacks conscientiousness, one won’t do anything virtuous or positive. One won’t be concerned with the benefits of virtue. Also, one won’t be concerned with the faults of one’s negative actions. Lacking conscientiousness increases all of one’s klešhas and faults.

18) ‘Forgetfulness’ (T. brjed ngas-pa; S. muṣhitasmṛtā).

The definition ‘virtuous objects of focus being unclear and [the mind] forgetting them again and again’ defines forgetfulness.

‘Forgetfulness’, in this context, means being under the influence of the klešhas and not having the clarity of a virtuous mind. Here it specifically means forgetting virtuous objects of focus. Forgetting objects which involve the klešhas is not considered forgetfulness in this context.

19) ‘Distraction’ (T. rnam-par g.yeng-ba; S. vikṣhepa).

The definition ‘being distracted towards an object of any of the three poisons’ defines distraction.

‘Three poisons’ refers to attachment, aggression, and ignorance. Being distracted towards such an object is called ‘distracted’, and there are six types.

There are six [types of distraction]: i) essential distraction (T. ngor-bo-nyid gyi g.yeng-ba), ii) outward distraction (T. phy-rol tu g.yeng-ba), iii) inward distraction (T. nang gyi g.yeng-ba), iv) distraction of characteristics (T. mtschan-ma’i g.yeng-ba), v) distraction of adopting bad tendencies (T. gnas-gnan-len g.yeng-ba) and vi) distraction of mental engagement (T. yid-la-byed-pa’i g.yeng-ba).

i) Essential distraction refers to the five sense consciousnesses which are distracted in terms of their nature because samādhi is something which occurs only with the mental consciousness. Samādhi does not arise within the five sense consciousnesses. As soon as a sense consciousness arises, the mind cannot stay with its virtuous object, i.e. it cannot stay one-pointedly in meditation. The five sense consciousnesses have distraction as their nature, because distraction is defined as the mind moving towards an outer object.
ii) **Outward distraction** occurs when the mind is being engaged in either listening, reflecting, or meditating, and then is distracted towards a sense pleasure, an external object, and therefore does not remain with that activity of listening, reflecting, or meditating. This prevents the mind from resting on its particular virtuous object of engagement and causes it to engage with something which is incorrect.

iii) **Inward distraction** occurs when one is resting evenly in samādhi and either dullness, agitation, or fixation on that experience of samādhi arises.

iv) **Distraction of characteristics** means more specifically a distraction towards names, renown, fame. It occurs whenever one engages in the dharma in order to achieve a name, a status, whenever one’s pursuit of the dharma involves the eight worldly dharmas, or eight worldly qualities, or when one wants to attain a particular state of samādhi or a level, such as an arhat or a bodhisattva bhumi, simply because one likes the sound of the name.

v) **Distraction of adopting bad tendencies** occurs when one is based on the view of the transitory collection and the bad tendencies of pride and one engages in the dharma with an inflated or arrogant mind that is simply concerned with ‘I’ and ‘mine’, with a fixation on self.

vi) **Distraction of mental engagement** occurs when one relinquishes something higher for something lower. For example, if one is absorbed in the fourth level of meditative concentration, and one then abandons that to take up one of the lower three levels, that is this distraction of mental engagement. Or, if one has begun the practice of the Mahāyāna and has been developing the qualities of the Mahāyāna, i.e. compassion, bodhichitta, and so forth, and then one gives that up and enters into the Hinayāna, this is also said to be this distraction of mental engagement. It occurs when one is not progressing from something lower to something higher, but one is mixing up the progression and going back from a higher level to something lower. The analogy is if you are in a higher class in school, you don’t normally go back and start over at the beginning; you keep going on from where you are.

These six types of distraction cover all categories of distraction, but not all of them are included as part of the distraction which is this secondary mental
affliction. For example, the first kind, ‘essential distraction’ refers to the five sense consciousnesses which are neutral. They do not involve the kleshas, they do not involve something non-virtuous. And the last one, the distraction of mental engagement, is a distraction involving something virtuous. Just because they are a distraction doesn’t mean that they are necessarily a distraction which is a secondary mental affliction.

20) ‘Non-introspection’ (T. she-bzhin ma-yin-pa; S. asamprajanya).

The definition ‘a mental state of afflicted superior knowledge improperly analyzing what is to be adopted and rejected’ defines non-introspection.

‘What is to be adopted and rejected’ means, for example, that we adopt what is virtuous and reject what is non-virtuous. We adopt the state of definite goodness or the state of nirvāna and reject the state of saṃsāra. Knowledge that involves the mental afflictions and which improperly analyzes or comes to a wrong understanding of what is to be adopted and what is to be abandoned, is called ‘non-introspection’, or ‘lack of introspection’.

This section is concluded with a statement in the form of a reasoning:

Given those, there is a reason to label them ‘the secondary [or close] afflictions’, because they are secondary [or close] to the root afflictions.

‘Given those’ refers to the twenty secondary afflictions (T. nye nyon; S. upakleśha) from ‘wrath’ to ‘non-introspection’. Another way of translating ‘secondary’ in Tibetan is ‘close’, so ‘secondary afflictions’ could also be translated as ‘close afflictions’. They are called ‘close’ because they are close to the root afflictions; they follow closely along with the root afflictions.

3.6 THE EXPLANATION OF THE SIXTH GROUP, THE FOUR CHANGEABLE [MENTAL FACTORS], p. 27

In the [work] just [quoted] it is stated:

‘... contrition and likewise also sleep,
Examination and analysis [31]
Are secondary afflictions with two aspects each.’
Each of these four changeable (T. gzhan 'gyur; S. aniyata) [mental factors] has two aspects, two parts.

1) ‘Contrition’ or ‘remorse’ (T. 'gyod-pa; S. kaukṛtiya).

   Accordingly, they are presented in terms of definition and definiendum.

   The definition ‘subsequently regretting former deeds’ defines contrition.

‘Contrition’ means that one later on regrets actions which have been done previously, that one constantly feels a sense of regret or remorse for previous actions. ‘Remorse’ is described as the feeling of regret for actions that one has previously done, either oneself through one’s own intentions, or actions that one has done through the urging of others. These actions may either be actions which are considered proper or improper. It is this feeling of wishing later on that one hadn’t done something one has done through either one’s own intention or through the urging of others.

The quotation from the Thirty Verses says that each of these changeable mental factors has two aspects. In other texts, they are described as having three aspects. There doesn’t seem to be any problem with presenting the three aspects. The two statements are not contradictory. So remorse can be either i) virtuous, ii) non-virtuous, or iii) neutral.

i) If one has previously done some kind of negative action, and later understands the consequences of it and realizes that it was something improper to do and feels remorse, that will purify the negative action. So that kind of remorse is considered virtuous.

ii) If one has been gathering the accumulations of merit, if one has entered into the practice of the dharma and is listening, reflecting, and meditating, but later comes across an unvirtuous spiritual friend who has wrong views who then convinces one that what one has been doing up to this point has been an incorrect path, and if one then regrets all of the things that one has done on the Buddhist path, then this is an unvirtuous type of regret.

iii) If one has remorse for things that one has done that are neither beneficial
nor harmful, just ordinary activities of really no consequence, but one regrets having done them, that kind of regret is neutral in character.

2) ‘Sleep’ (T. gnyid; S. middha).

The definition ‘the engaging consciousnesses gathering inside’ defines sleep.

We all understand sleep. Sleep occurs when our body gets to feel very heavy when it gets dark outside. Sleep is described as occurring when the engaging consciousnesses gather inwardly. When our consciousnesses which engage with objects are outwardly directed, i.e. directed towards objects, then we don’t fall asleep; but when they gather inwardly or internally, then we fall asleep.

‘Sleep’ can be i) virtuous, ii) non-virtuous, and iii) neutral, and this depends on one’s motivation prior to going to sleep.

i) If, prior to going to sleep, one’s motivation or attitude has been a virtuous one, such as bodhichitta, then all of one’s sleep is virtuous. For example, if you’re sitting in class and you have the very strong motivation to listen to the teachings and to study, this is a virtuous motivation. If you fall asleep in class, then your sleep will be virtuous. And so you’ll have the double virtue of your sleep: your sleep will be virtuous, plus you have the virtue of sitting and hearing the teachings. (Laughter)

ii) If before going to sleep, one is caught up in one of the three mental poisons, anger for example, and one thinks, ‘Oh, tomorrow, I’m really going to get that person’, then when one falls asleep, because one’s mind has been really engaged in anger and one’s attitude or motivation is one of anger, then all of one’s sleep in unvirtuous. The same is true for virtue.

iii) A neutral state of sleep is one in which there is no prior motivation, either virtuous or non-virtuous. For example, if you regard going to sleep as what you do at night, like your work at night, with no particular motivation, then that’s a neutral state of sleep.

3) ‘Examination’ (T. rtog-pa; S. vitarka).

The definition ‘engaging in compounded phenomena in a coarse way’ defines examination.
'Examination' occurs when your intelligence or prajñā engages with phenomena in a rough or coarse way.

4) 'Analysis' (T. dpyod-pa; S. vīchāra).

   The definition 'a mind engaging [in compounded phenomena] in a detailed way' defines analysis.

'Analysis' is prajñā or intelligence or mind engaging with compounded phenomena in a more subtle way.

These two, 'examination' and 'analysis', can be i) virtuous, ii) non-virtuous, or iii) neutral.

i) Virtuous examination and analysis is when one is motivated by renunciation for samsāra, and examines and analyzes the true nature of phenomena to be the lack of a self-entity.

ii) Non-virtuous examination and analysis is when one examines and analyses attractive or unattractive objects with an attitude either of desire or hatred.

iii) Neutral examination and analysis involves neither a virtuous nor unvirtuous state of mind, when one is engaging in ordinary kinds of worldly activities, such as crafts.

   Given those four, there is a necessity to call them 'the four changeable [mental factors]' because there is no definite certainty as to whether they are virtuous or unvirtuous and they can be changed by conditions into virtue or negativity: for example, contrition arising for something virtuous turns into non-virtue and contrition arising for something unvirtuous turns into virtue.

These four, remorse, sleep, examination and analysis, are called the changeable mental factors (T. gzhan 'gyur; S. anyathābhāva) because they are not always virtuous, not always non-virtuous. They are considered to be virtuous or non-virtuous depending on the motivating factor involved with them. They are influenced by other conditions. If one's attitude is a virtuous one, then it will change the particular activity of remorse or sleep or examination or analysis into something virtuous. If one's attitude is a negative one, it will turn these four into something negative.
This completes the 'Delineation of the necessary distinction between mind and mental factors', which is like a map. Now we have been introduced to this map of the mind and mental factors. It has been pointed out which ones are virtuous, which are unvirtuous, what are the faults of some of them. Now we need to apply this to our own mind and look at our own mind in terms of this map. We need to recognize our own mental afflictions and secondary afflictions. We can now recognize them based on this map, see their faults and apply remedies to eliminate them.

III) THE THIRD MAIN POINT, THE CONCLUDING SUMMARY WHICH STATES THE PURPOSE IN THE FORM OF LOGICAL REASONINGS; p. 28

Given the context of the first division, it is necessary to explain the mind as two: valid cognition and non-valid cognition, because a mind examining whether something is a correct object of comprehension or not has to depend on valid cognizers and non-valid cognizers.

Given the context of the second division, it is necessary to explain the modes of engagement [of the mind] such as generality, particulars, appearance, elimination and so on, because there must be certainty as to the modes of engagement of conceptual and non-conceptual minds and [also] as to the appearing object, the conceptualized object and so on that depend upon conceptual and non-conceptual minds. [32]

Given the context of the third division, it is necessary to explain the divisions of mind and mental factors, because for all Dharma spoken by the Buddha from the Śrāvakayāna up to the Vajrayāna, knowing the divisions of mind and mental factors is very important.

Thus the Classification of Mind, the ways of dividing and summarizing mind,

From The Ocean of Texts on Logic of the Seventh Supreme Victorious One

Has been well summarized in terms of the important essence So that the light of the intelligence of fresh minds may expand.
This presentation of the mind and mental factors is something which we will find throughout all the Buddhist schools, from the Śrāvaka schools up to the Vajrayāna. Since in all the Buddhist schools the emphasis is on the mind, it is considered very important to study the mind and its fifty-one mental factors in all these schools, from the Vaibhāshika up through the Vajrayāna. If you wish to study this more extensively, you should study the Abhidharmakośa, the Thirty Verses and the Twenty Verses by Vasubandhu, and the Abhidharmasamuccaya.
CH’ENG WEI-SIH LUN
DOCTRINE OF MERE-CONSCIOUSNESS
BY
TRIPITAKA-MASTER HSÜAN TSANG

English Translation by Wei Tat

The major work of Hsüan Tsang (559-664), the Ch‘eng Wei-shih Lun (Treatise on the Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness), is based on the Trīṃśikā by Vasubandhu, one of two founders of the Yogachāra or Vijñaptimātratā School of Mahayana Buddhism. The Trīṃśikā consists of thirty stanzas on the doctrine of Mere-Consciousness (Wei-shih). It is composed - according to the authorities - on the basis of the teachings of six sūtras and eleven śāstras. The six sūtras are 1. the Avatāṃsaka Sūtra; 2. the Saṃdhinirmochana Sūtra; 3. the Tathāgata-gūña-ālāṃkāra; 4. the Mahāyānābhidharma Sūtra; 5. the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra; and 6. the Ghanavyūha Sūtra. The eleven śāstras are 1. Yogāchārabhūmi-śāstra; 2. the Āryadeśhāṅvīkhyāpāna-śāstra; 3. the Mahāyāna-Sūtrālāṃkāra-śāstra; 4. the Pramāṇasamuccaya-śāstra; 5. the Mahāyāna-samparigraha-śāstra; 6. the Daśabhūmi-Sūtra-śāstra; 7. the Vikalpa-Yogāchāra-śāstra; 8. the Ālambana-parikṣha-śāstra; 9. the Vimatikakārika; 10. the Madhyānta-vibhaṅga-śāstra; 11. the Abhidharma-samuccaya.

Realizing that his Trīṃśikā was replete with intricate and profound meanings, Vasubandhu had intended to write his own commentary on it, but he died before attempting to do so. Subsequently the task of expounding the philosophy underlying the thirty stanzas devolved upon a galaxy of ten śāstra masters who each composed a commentary on them. These ten śāstra-masters are 1. Dharmapāla; 2. Sthiramati; 3. Chitrabhanu; 4. Nanda; 5. Guṇamati; 6. Jinamitra; 7. Jñānachandra; 8. Bhandushri; 9. Shuddhachandra; and 10. Jinapūra.

The Ch‘eng Wei-shih Lun is a creative and elaborate exposition of the Trīṃśikā and a synthesis of its ten commentaries. It received the most careful attention of Hsüan Tsang and his most eminent disciple K‘uei Chi. It represents the flower of their literary and spiritual genius. It was received with acclaim by later scholars who extolled it as a work of outstanding excellence and as the cornerstone of the doctrine of the Wei-shih or Yogachāra School.
Vasubandhu’s *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-trimśika* consists, as its title indicates, of thirty stanzas, of which the first twenty-four are devoted to the explanation of the specific characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) of all dharmas; the next two to the explanation of the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of all dharmas; and the last four to the description of the five stages of the Holy Path leading to the attainment of Buddhahood.

Mr. Wei Tat, the translator of the *Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun*, put together a synopsis of the essential points of the *Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun*.

**Book I: Atman-adhesion and Dharma-adhesion**
1. The purpose of the Treatise
2. Belief in the existence of real Atman and real dharmas
3. Ātmagrāha (Atman-adhesion)
4. Dharmagrāha (Dharma-adhesion)

**Book II: The eighth or Alaya consciousness**
1. Three names
2. Definition of Bija
3. Origin of Bijas
4. Characteristics of Bijas
5. The perfumable and the perfumer
6. ‘Mode of activity’ of the Alayavijñāna
7. Saṃprayuktas (associated mental activities)
8. Moral Species
9. The stream of consciousness
10. The cessation of the Alayavijñāna
11. Names and varieties of the eighth consciousness
12. Proofs of the existence of the Alayavijñāna

**Book III: The seventh or Manas consciousness**
1. Saṃprayoga (associated mental activities) of Manas
   i. The four kleśhas
   ii. Other chaittas of Manas
   iii. The ‘moral’ species of Manas
   iv. Bhumi of Manas
2. The cessation of Manas
3. Proofs of the existence of Manas
Book IV: The first six consciousnesses
   1. Names of the six consciousnesses
   2. Condition of manifestation of the six consciousnesses
   3. ‘Essential nature’ and ‘mode of activity’
   4. Moral species of the six consciousnesses
   5. Saṃprajuktas (associated mental activities)
   6. Relations of the eight consciousnesses

Book V: Mere-Consciousness (Vijñaptimātratā)
   1. Proofs of Vijñaptimātratā

Book VI: Causality and Saṃsāra
   1. The four pratyayas (conditioning factors)
      i. Condition qua cause (hetupratyaya)
      ii. Condition qua antecedent (samantarapratyaya)
      iii. Condition qua perceived object (ālambanapratyaya)
      iv. Condition qua contributory factor (adhipatipratyaya)

Book VII: Saṃsāra and the three vāsanās

Book VIII: The three natures
   1. Nature of mere-imagination (parikalpitasvabhāva)
   2. Nature of dependence on others (paratantrasvabhāva)
   3. Ultimate Reality (parinīṣṭhānāsvabhāva)
   4. The three natures and the three niṣṭāsvabhāvatās

Book IX: The holy path of attainment
   1. The stage of moral provisioning (sambhāravastha)
   2. The stage of intensified effort (prayogavastha)
   3. The stage of unimpeded penetrating understanding (prativedhavastha)
   4. The stage of exercising cultivation (bhāvanāvastha)
   5. The stage of ultimate realization (niṣṭāvastha)
   6. Vijñaptimātratā

The following presents the synopsis of book I to V.
BOOK I
ATMAN-ADHESION & DHARMA-ADHESION

1. THE PURPOSE OF THE TREATISE

i. According to Sthiramati

Vasubandhu wrote the Triṃśikā (Thirty Stanzas) for those who misunderstood or made nothing of the Doctrine of the two Śūnyatas or Voids,1 in order that they might acquire a correct understanding of it.2 A correct understanding of this doctrine is essential if one is to eliminate the two heavy āvaraṇas or barriers [i.e., (1) kleshāvaraṇa, the barrier of vexing passions which obstructs one’s way to Nirvāṇa or true deliverance, and (2) jñeyāvaraṇa, the barrier which impedes Mahābodhi or Supreme Enlightenment].3 Both these āvaraṇas are due to a belief in the subjective existence of the Ātman or individual ego (atmagraha, Ātman-adhesion) and to a belief in the objective existence of dharmas of phenomenal entities (dharmagrāha, dharma-adhesion). If the two Śūnyatas are realized, both barriers will be removed.4 The sundering of the two barriers has as its excellent fruits the attainments of true deliverance of Nirvāṇa and of Supreme Enlightenment or Mahābodhi.5 The former is the result of eliminating the barrier of vexing passions which cause rebirth, while the latter is the result of eliminating the barrier which hinders Absolute Knowledge.6

ii. According to Chitrabhānu and others

The Triṃśikā was composed to instruct those who had erroneously admitted the reality of Ātman and dharmas, misunderstood the Doctrine of Vijñaptimātra (Mere-Consciousness), or had been unable to assimilate the truth that ‘nothing exists apart from consciousness’ (vijñana), and thus enable them to pierce the two Voids and know the true principles of Vijñaptimātra.

iii. According to Dharmapāla

Inasmuch as there were certain classes of scholars who misunderstood or were ignorant of the principles of Vijñaptimātra, for instance:

(1) Scholars who considered that external objects existed in the same way as consciousness did - in other words, that both outer objects and inner consciousness were co-existent [as did the Sarvastivādins],
(2) Those who considered that internal consciousness was non-existent in the same way as external objects were non-existent - in other words, that inner consciousness and outer objects were both non-existent [as did Master Bhāvaviveka and others],

(3) Those who considered that the various consciousnesses were all of one and the same substance despite the variety of their activities [as did a certain class of Mahāyāna Bodhisattvas],

(4) Those who considered that, apart from mind (chitta or vijñāna) and three of its mental properties, sensation, conception, and volition, no other associated mental properties (chaittas) existed [as did the Sautrāntikas],

the Tīrīṣhika was composed to refute their erroneous views in order to enable them to reach a true understanding of those profound and wonderful principles.

2. Belief in the existence of real Ātman and real dhammas

In Stanzas 1 and 2a, Vasubandhu opens his disquisition with the following pronouncement:

Concepts of Ātman and dhammas do not imply the existence of a real Ātman and real dhammas, but are merely fictitious constructions [produced by numerous causes].
Because of this, all varieties of phenomenal appearances and qualities arise.
The phenomena of Ātman and dhammas are [all mental representations] based on the manifestation and transformation of consciousness.
Consciousnesses capable of unfolding or manifesting themselves may be grouped in three general categories:

(1) The consciousness whose fruits (retribution) mature at varying times (i.e., the eighth or 'Storehouse' consciousness or Ālayavijñāna); (2) the consciousness that cogitates or deliberates (i.e., the seventh or thought-center consciousness or Manas); And (3) the consciousness that perceives and discriminates between spheres of objects (i.e., the sixth or sense-center consciousness or Manovijñāna and the five consciousnesses).
In his *Treatise*, Master Hs’üan Tsang introduced two conceptions of ‘manifestation of consciousness’ in the following terms:

1. Manifestation (*parināma*) indicates that what essentially constitutes consciousness (that is to say, its substance, the *samvittibhāga*), when it is born, manifests itself in two functional divisions (*bhāgas*), namely, image and perception, i.e., the object perceived (or perceived division) and the perceiving faculty (or perceiving division) (*nimittabhāga* and *darshanabhāga*). These divisions arise out of a third division called the ‘self-witness’ or the ‘self-corroboratory division’ (*samvittibhāga*) which constitutes their ‘essential substance’. It is on the basis of these two functional divisions that Ātman and dharmas are established, for they have no other basis.

2. Manifestation of consciousness means also that the inner consciousness manifests itself in what seems to be an external sphere of objects. By virtue of the ‘perfuming’ energy (*vāsana*) deposited in the mind by wrong concepts (*vikalpa*) of Ātman-dharmas, the consciousnesses, on becoming active, develop into the semblance of Ātman and dharmas. Although the phenomena of Ātman and dharmas lie within the consciousness, yet, because of wrong mental discrimination or particularization, they are taken to be external objects. That is why all sentient beings, since before the beginning of time, have conceived them as real Ātman and real dharmas.

To illustrate the above conceptions, he gives the analogy of a man in a dream, who in that state believes all the images he sees to be real external objects, whereas actually they are only the projections of his own mind.

3. Ātmagrāha

i. Three theories of Ātman-adhesion

In trying to refute the belief in the reality of the Ātman, the Master first sets forth the following three theories concerning the Ātman held by various heterodox schools:

1. Sāmkhyas and the Vaiśeṣhikas hold that the substance of the Ātman is eternal, universal, and as extensive as infinite space. It acts everywhere and, as a consequence, enjoys happiness or suffers sorrow.
2. The Nirgranthas, the Jainas, etc., hold that, although the substance of the Atman is eternal, its extension is indeterminate, because it expands and contracts according as the body is large or small (just as a piece of leather expands when it is wet and shrinks when dried in the sun).

3. The Pashupatas (Animal-Lord worshippers), Parivrajakas (recluses), etc., hold that the substance of the Atman is eternal but infinitesimal like an atom, lying deeply embedded and moving around within the body and performing acts of all kinds.

In a lengthy discussion, he then proves all of them to be untenable.

ii. Cessation of Atman-adhesion

The Master proceeds to set forth two kinds of Atman-adhesion (ātmagrāha), namely, 1. that which is innate (sahaja) and 2. that which results from mental discrimination or particularization (vikalpita).

1. The innate Atman-adhesion is perpetually present in the individual, owing to the internal causal influence of a false perfuming (vāsanā) which has been going on since before the beginning of time. Thus, without depending on external false teachings or discriminations, it spontaneously operates. That is why it is called innate.

This Atman-adhesion, however, is again subdivided into two kinds:

i) The first is constant and continuous, and pertains to the seventh consciousness of Manas, which, directing itself to the eighth consciousness or Alayavijñāna, produces from this an individualized mental image to which it adheres as though there were a real Atman.

ii) The second kind is at times interrupted and pertains to the sixth consciousness or Manovijñāna which, directing itself to the five ‘tenacious aggregates’ (upadanaskandhas) that are evolved from consciousness, in toto or in part, produces out of them an individualized mental image to which it adheres as though there were a real Atman.

These two kinds of innate Atman-adhesion, being subtle, are difficult to eliminate. It is only later, on the Path of Meditation and Self-cultivation (bhavanāmārga), that a Bodhisattva, by repeatedly practising the ‘sublime contemplation of the voidness of individuality’ (pudgalashūnyatā), is able finally to annihilate them.
2. As for the Ātman-adhesion caused by mental discrimination, it is derived from the force of external factors and so is not innate in the individual. It must wait for false teachings or discriminations before it can arise. That is why the term 'mental discrimination' is applied to it. It pertains exclusively to the sixth consciousness or Manovijñāna.

This Ātman-adhesion is also of two kinds:

i) The first pertains to the sixth consciousness, Manovijñāna, which, taking as its object the 'aggregates' spoken of in one school of false teaching, produces within itself an individualized image to which, as a result of discrimination and speculation, it adheres as though there were a real Ātman.

ii) The second kind also pertains to the sixth consciousness, Manovijñāna, which, taking as its object the various Ātman-concepts or characteristics as defined by one school of false teaching, produces within itself an individualized image to which, through discrimination and speculation, it adheres as though there were a real Ātman.

These two kinds of Ātman-adhesion are crude and, consequently, easy to interrupt. when an ascetic attains the first stage of the Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth (darśhanamārga), he can finally annihilate them by contemplating the 'Bhūtatathatā (Suchness) which is revealed by the voidness of all individualities and dharmas'.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

In examining the various Ātman-adhesions and their objects, we find that, in certain but not all cases, Ātman-adhesion has as its object the 'aggregates' external to the mind, while in all cases it is the 'aggregates' within the mind that form that point of support for Ātman-adhesion.

Let us therefore conclude that all Ātman-adhesions take as their object the impermanent five 'tenacious aggregates' (upādanaskandhas) which are internal images (nimittabhāga) of the mind, and falsely adhere to it as a real Ātman.

These five aggregate-images, arising as they do from causes and conditions (pratyaya), exist as illusory phenomena only. As for the Ātman which is merely a false interpretation of the aggregates (like the interpretation of magic), it has definitely no real existence whatsoever.
This is why the Sutra says: ‘Know ye, O Bhikṣhus, that all beliefs in the Atman (satkārya-dṛṣṭi) of the Brahmins and Śramaṇas are only produced by reason of the five upādanaskandhas.’

iii. Refutation of objections

The question is raised: If a real Atman does not exist, how can memory, perception of objects, etc., be explained?

In reply to this, the Master expresses the view that ‘each sentient being has a fundamental consciousness (Mulavijñāna, i.e., Alavavijñāna), which evolves in a homogeneous and continuous series and carries within it the ‘seeds’ or ‘germs’ (bijas) of all dharmas. This fundamental consciousness and the dharmas act as reciprocal causes on one another, and, because the ‘perfuming’ energy (vāsanā) of the dharmas imprints its essence permanently on the Alavavijñāna in the form of ‘seeds’, or Bijas, memory, cognition, etc., are brought into manifestation, the Bijas manifesting themselves as actual dharmas which in turn produce Bijas in the Alaya.’

Further questions are raised: If there is no real Atman, by whom is a deed accomplished? By whom are the fruits of deeds reaped?

In reply, the Master points out the truth that, by virtue of the force of causes and conditions, the mind and its activities (chitta-chaittas) of each sentient being evolve in a continuous uninterrupted series, resulting in the accomplishment of acts and the reaping of their fruits.

Another question is raised: If there is really no Atman, who is it that goes from one state of existence (gati) to another in ‘cycles of birth and death’ (samsāra)? Again, who is it that is disgusted with suffering and seeks to attain Nirvāṇa?

In reply, the Master expresses the view that ‘each sentient being is a continuous physical and mental series which, by the force of vexing passions (kleśhas) and impure acts, turns from one state of existence (gati) to another in cycles of transmigration. Tormented by suffering and disgusted with it, he seeks the attainment of Nirvāṇa.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

There is positively no real Atman; there are only various consciousnesses which, since before the beginning of time, have followed one another, the subsequent one
arising with the disappearance of the antecedent, and thus a continuous series of causes and effects (karmic seeds – actual dharmas – karmic seeds) is formed. By the perfuming energy (vāsanā) of false thinking, an image of a pseudo-Ātman (of the likeness of an Ātman) arises in the consciousness, and it is this pseudo-Ātman which the ignorant take for a real Ātman.

**4. Dharmagrāha**

Coming to the subject of Dharma-adhesion (dharmagrāha, belief in the reality of dharmas), the Master sets forth the beliefs and theories held by the heterodox schools or Tirthikas and by the Hinayāna Schools, refutes them one by one, and sets forth the correct doctrine.

i. Cessation of Dharma-adhesion

Thereafter he sets forth two kinds of Dharma-adhesion, namely, 1. that which is innate (sahaja) and 2. that which results from mental discrimination or particularization (vikalpita).

1. Innate dharma-adhesion is perpetually present in the individual, owing to the internal causal influence of a false perfuming (vāsanā) which has been going on since before the beginning of time. Thus, without depending on external false teachings or discriminations, it operates spontaneously. That is why it is called innate.

This dharma-adhesion may again be sub-divided into two kinds:

i) The first is constant and continuous, and pertains to the seventh consciousness or Manas, which, directing itself to the eighth consciousness or Alayavijñāna, produces from this a mental image to which it adheres as a real dharma.

ii) The second is at times interrupted and pertains to the sixth consciousness or Manovijñāna, which, directing itself to the skandha-āyatana-dhātus that are evolved from consciousness, in toto or in part, produces from them a mental image to which it adheres as a real dharma.

These two kinds of innate dharma-adhesion, being subtle, are difficult to cut off. It is only later, in the course of the ‘ten lands’ (bhūmis) [on the Path of Meditation and Self-Cultivation (bhāvanāmārga)] that the ascetic, by practising repeatedly ‘the sublime contemplation of the voidness of dharmas’ (dharmashūnyatā), is able to annihilate them.
2. As for the dharma-adhesion which results from mental discrimination, it is derived from the force of external factors and so is not innate in the individual. For its production, the influence of false teachings and discrimination is necessary. It resides exclusively in the sixth consciousness, Manovijñāna.

This dharma-adhesion is also of two kinds:

i. The first pertains to the sixth consciousness or Manovijñāna, which, taking the skandha-āyatana-dhātus explained in one school of false teaching (the Hinayāna school) as its object, produces in itself an interior image to which, through discrimination and speculation, it adheres as a real dharma.

ii. The second kind pertains also to the Manovijñāna, which, taking as object the essential nature (pradhāna), the categories or elements (padartha), etc., explained in one school of false teaching (Sāmkhyas, etc.), produces in itself an image to which, through discrimination and speculation, it adheres as real dharma.

These two kinds of dharma-adhesion are crude and, consequently, easy to eliminate. When an ascetic enters the ‘first Land’ on the Path, he can finally annihilate them by contemplating the ‘Bhūtatathata (Suchness) of the voidness of all dharmas’ (i.e., the Bhūtatathata revealed by dharmaśūnyatā).

CONCLUSION

In examining all the varieties of dharma-adhesion, we find that, in certain but not all cases, dharma-adhesion has, as its object, dharmas exterior to the mind (the archetypes), while in all cases it is the dharmas interior to the mind that form the supporting basis for dharma-adhesion.

We can therefore aver with precision that all dharma-adhesion has as its object the seeming dharmas which are manifestations of the mind, but which are falsely adhered to as real dharmas.

These seeming dharmas, arising as they do from causes and conditions (pratyāyā), exist as illusory phenomena only. The ‘real dharmas’, the objects of dharma-adhesion, being false imaginations and speculations, are definitely non-existent.

This is why Bhagavat, the World-Honored One, has said: ‘Know ye, O Maitreya, that the objects of the various consciousnesses are only appearances or manifestations of consciousness produced by causes and conditions, like magic.’
GENERAL CONCLUSION

There is no external sphere of objects. It is the internal consciousness which mani- 

fests itself in the semblance of external objects. As one of the stanzas of a Sūtra 
says, 'External objects do not really exist as the ignorant imagine. The mind, agi- 
tated and defiled by perfuming (vāsanā) develops into what seems to be an exter-

nal sphere of objects.'

BOOK II
THE EIGHTH OR ĀLAYA CONSCIOUSNESS
1. THREE NAMES

i. Ālaya

Book II begins with the statement that the fundamental consciousness capable of 
manifestation, in the Mahayana and Hinayana teachings alike, is termed the 
Ālayavijñāna or the 'Storehouse Consciousness'. The Ālayavijñāna is the most 
important of the eight kinds of consciousness to be discussed in the Ch'eng Wei-
shih Lun. It may be understood as the synthesis of the 'Subconscious Mind' and 
the 'Supermind'. From it there evolve what seem to us to be external phenomena, 
but at the same time these phenomena act upon the Ālaya consciousness in a never-
ending cycle.

The name of this consciousness has three meanings:

1. It is actively ālaya, storehouse, because it plays the active part of storing up the 
   Bijas (seeds) which, being stored, are passively ālaya.

2. It is passively ālaya in the sense that it is 'perfumed' by the defiling dharmas of 
   samkleśha. [These dharmas create in it the Bijas, which make of it a storehouse 
   and store themselves in it.]

3. It is the object of attachment. Manas attaches itself to it as to its Ātman. In other 
   words, the Ālayavijñāna and the defiling dharmas of samkleśha are the cause of 
one another; sentient beings cling to the Ālayavijñāna and imagine that it is their 
inner self.

ii. Vipāka

This basic consciousness has two other names, Vipāka and Sarvabijaka. 
Considered as effect it is called Vipāka.
It is the vipakaphala, the ‘fruit of retribution’ of good or bad deeds which
draw or direct the individual concerned into a certain sphere of existence,
into a certain destiny, and into a certain womb (dhātu, gati, yoni) for reincar­
nation. Apart from this consciousness, there is no ‘vital principle’ nor any
dhāra which can form a perpetual series and be truly and pre-eminently
vipakaphala.

iii. Sarvabijaka

Considered as cause, the eighth consciousness is called Sarvabijaka or the ‘seed
consciousness’, which means that it is endowed or furnished with all the Bijas. It is
capable of holding firmly and retaining the Bijas of all dharmas, without allowing
them to be lost. Apart from this consciousness, no other dharma is capable of
retaining the Bijas of all things.

2. DEFINITION OF BIJA

The Bijas are the different potentialities which are found in the Mulavijñana, root-
consciousness, i.e., the Alayavijñana, and which immediately engender their fruit,
that is to say, the actual dharmas (i.e., dharmas in activity).

The Bijas, in relation to the root-consciousness and the fruit, are neither identical
nor different. Such is, in reality, the mode of relation between the substance
(svabhāva), consciousness, and the activity (kārītra), Bija; between the cause (hetu),
Bija, and the fruit (phala), actual dharma.

3. ORIGIN OF BIJAS

i. Chandrapāla

In regard to the origin of Bijas, one theory asserts that ‘they are all inborn and
natural’, i.e., innately existing in the Alaya consciousness; none of them come into
being as a result of ‘perfuming’. But they are capable of increasing and growing
by the action of perfuming. In other words, the seeds from which spring the seeming
manifestation of things in the outer world are all of them eternally innate in the
Alaya consciousness. They are thus not engendered by the ‘perfuming influence’
of the other seven kinds of consciousness, namely, Manas, Manovijñana, and the
five sense consciousnesses. They are only stimulated in their further growth by
this influence.
ii. Nanda and Śrīśeṇā

According to another theory, however, Bijas are all born as a result of perfuming. That which perfumes (actual dharmas) and that which is perfumed (Alayavijñāna) have existed since before the beginning of time: hence the Bijas have been created at all times by perfuming. [In other words, there has never been a time when the seeds of the Alayavijñāna have not been engendered.]

iii. Dharmapāla

There is a third theory held by Dharmapāla that there are actually two kinds of Bijas. Some Bijas are natural or inborn, and denote those potentialities which have forever existed innately in the Vipākavijñāna by the natural force of things (dharmatā) and which engender mental elements, sense-organs, and seeming external objects. Other Bijas are those whose existence has had a beginning and come into being as a result of perfuming by actual dharmas, which perfuming has been repeated and repeated from time immemorial. On the foregoing points, Dharmapāla elaborates as follows:

Let us conclude that sentient beings have been endowed, since before the beginning of time, with pure Bijas which are not produced by perfuming but are in essence inherent in them. In course of time, when the truth-seeker, in his advancement along the Path, arrives at the ‘stage of excellence’, perfuming causes the Bijas to increase and grow. The pure dharmas which are born when he has entered the Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth have these Bijas as their cause. These pure dharmas perfume in turn and thus produce new pure Bijas.

It should be understood that the same process of mutual production applies to the Bijas of impure dharmas. Thus, some Bijas are innate and natural while others are engendered by perfuming.

This means that the seeds contained in the Alayavijñāna, being perfumed by the other seven consciousnesses, are thus caused to grow resulting in the appearance of things or dharmas. The Alayavijñāna (of which the seeds form a part) is what is perfumed; the other seven consciousnesses are the perfuming agents.
4. SIX CHARACTERISTICS OF BIJAS

According to the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun, the Bijas have approximately six characteristics:

1. The Bijas are momentary, kshanika. Only those dharmas can be Bijas which perish immediately after birth and which possess a superior power of activity.

2. The Bijas are simultaneous with their fruit. Only that dharma is a Bija which is simultaneously and actually connected with its fruit (that is, with the actual dharma which it engenders).

3. The Bijas form a continuous series. They must, for a long period of time, continue in a homogeneous and uninterrupted series until the final stage, i.e., until the moment when the Holy Path is attained which will counteract and thwart them.

4. The Bijas must belong to a definite moral species. They must possess the capacity to engender actual dharmas, good, bad, the non-defined: this capacity is determined by the cause of the Bijas, i.e. the actual dharmas, good, bad, non-defined, which have perfumed and created them.

5. The Bijas depend on a group of conditions. To realize their capacity to produce an actual dharma, the Bijas require a concourse of conditions.

6. The Bijas ‘lead’ to their own fruit. Each Bija leads to the production of its own fruit: a Bija of mind (chitta) leads to the manifestation of mind, and a Bija of rūpa leads to the production of rūpa.

A detailed explanation of these six characteristics is given in the Treatise.

5. THE PERFUMABLE AND THE PERFUMER

[The perfumable is that consciousness in which Bijas can be created or nourished. The perfumer is that dharma which creates or nourishes Bijas. Given the ‘perfumable’ and a ‘perfumer’, there is ‘perfuming’ (vāsanā), i.e., creation or nourishment of Bijas.]

What are the characteristics on the basis of which the name of vasana or ‘perfuming’ is established?

The perfumable and the perfumer have each four characteristics which cause the birth and growth of Bijas. Hence the name vasana or ‘perfuming’.
i. What are the four characteristics of the Perfumable?

(1) It is durable. That dharma is perfumable which, from beginning to end, is of one single species, continues in an uninterrupted series, and is capable of receiving and keeping the vasana or habit-energy.

This definition rules out the first seven consciousnesses (pravṛttiljñānas) and their mental attributes (chaittas), sound, wind, etc., which are not of a durable and permanent nature.

[If the Pravṛttijñānas can be perfumed and harbor Bijas, these impure Bijas will be lost in the mindless meditation when these consciousnesses are not in action, and at the first stage of the Path when the pure mind manifests itself. If ‘material form’ (rupa) is perfumable and can harbor Bijas, these Bijas will not be possessed by those sentient beings who are born in the ‘formless world’ (Ārūpyadhātu).]

(2) It is non-defined. That dharma is perfumable which is equal, which is not in contradiction (either with the good or with the bad), and which is capable of receiving the habit-energy.

This definition rules out that which is good or bad: being too intense and strong in its own quality for impressing or perfuming, the good or the bad is not capable of receiving the habit-energy. It rules out also the eighth consciousness of the Tathagatha which is immaculate by reason of his possession of the Adarśajñāna: this consciousness is capable of conserving the acquired Bijas, but incapable of being perfumed anew and receiving new Bijas.

(3) It is perfumable. That dharma is perfumable which is autonomous, which is not as hard as stone, and which is capable of receiving the habit-energy.

This definition rules out the mental associates (chaittas) which depend on the mind (chitta); it also rules out the unconditioned dharmas (asaṁskṛtas), (e.g., space), which, being unique and immutable, are not perfumable.

(4) It is in intimate and harmonious relation with that which perfumes. That dharma is perfumable which is simultaneous with, and in the same place as, the perfumer, and which is neither identical with nor separate from the perfumer.

This definition rules out the physical bodies of other persons and the anterior and posterior moments. These physical bodies and the moments, not being harmoniously related with the perfumer, are not perfumable.
Only the eighth consciousness, when it is *vipāka* (retribution), presents these four characteristics. It is this Vipākavijñāna that is perfumable, not its five *chaittas* and the Pravṛttivijñānas.

**ii. What are the four characteristics of the ‘perfumer’ or perfuming factor?**

(1) The perfuming factor comes into existence and passes away (that is to say, it is born and perishes). *That dharma perfumes which is not eternal, which is capable of activity, and which can create and nourish Bijas* (i.e., *habit-energy*).

This definition rules out those dharmas which are unconditioned, which are always identical, and which can neither create nor nourish.

(2) It is endowed with eminent activity. *That dharma perfumes which is born and perishes, which possesses great creative power, and which is capable of producing the perfuming habit-energy* (*vāsanā*).

This definition rules out the eighth consciousness (the Vipāka-mind and its mental associates) and all other dharmas the force of which is weak and slight (that is to say, the image-aspect, *nimittabhāga*, of the consciousnesses).

(3) It is capable of increase and decrease. *That dharma perfumes which is endowed with eminent activity, which is capable of increase and decrease, and capable of enveloping and planting the vāsanā* (*habit-energy*).

This definition rules out the perfect, good dharmas of the ‘fruit of Buddha’, because these dharmas, being free from increase and decrease, cannot perfume. If they could perfume and create or nourish Bijas, the four pure wisdoms of the Buddha would not be perfect, and the fruits of the Buddha would be of different grades, some superior and others inferior.

(4) It is in intimate and harmonious relation with that which is perfumed. *That dharma perfumes which is simultaneous with, and in the same place as, the perfumed, and which is neither identical with nor apart from the perfumed*.

This definition rules out the physical bodies of other persons and the earlier and subsequent moments. These physical bodies and the moments, not being harmoniously related with the perfumed, are not the perfumer.

Only the seven Pravṛttivijñānas, with their mental associates, possess eminent activity and are capable of increase and decrease. Possessing these four characteristics,
they are the ‘perfumers’.

Thus, there is perfuming when the consciousness that perfumes (i.e., the darśhanabhāga of one of the seven consciousnesses) is born and perishes simultaneously with the consciousness that is perfumed (i.e., the svamvitibhāga of the eighth consciousness). In fact, at that moment, the Bijas (vāsanā) are born or increase in the perfumed consciousness. This perfuming process is analogous to that of the odor of the sesame flower. The seven consciousnesses perfume the Ālayavijñāna just as the sesame flowers perfume the seeds when mixed together to be ground for oil. Hence the name vāsanā or ‘perfuming’.

iii. Bijas and Actual Dharmas

The consciousness that perfumes (darśhanabhāga of a Pravṛttivijñāna) is born of Bijas: at the moment of its birth, it is a cause capable of increasing and creating Bijas. Hence three dharmas must be considered: the Bijas that engender the consciousness, the engendered consciousness that perfumes and creates Bijas, and the Bijas created or caused to grow by the perfuming influence of the engendered consciousness. These three revolve in a cycle reciprocally and simultaneously functioning as cause and effect, just as a candle-wick engenders the flame and the flame engenders the incandescence of the wick. Or again they are like bundles of reeds stacked side by side, each of which is supported by the other. It is in conformity with irrefutable logic to admit the simultaneity of the cause and the fruit (cause and effect).

The perfumer engenders the Bija; the Bija produces the actual dharma: these two reciprocal simultaneous causes, being similar to the ‘co-existence cause’ (sahabhūhetu) of the Lesser Vehicle, produce the ‘fruit that is useful to man’ (purushakāraphala).

The earlier Bija engenders a subsequent Bija of the same species; this is the ‘similar cause’ (sabhāgaḥetu) which leads to the ‘similar efflux fruit’ (nishyandaphala).

These two types of generation (actual dharma engendering Bija and Bija engendering actual dharma; Bija engendering Bija) are the true ‘causality’ (hetupratyaya). Apart from these, all other dharmas, are not conditions qua cause (hetupratyaya). If they are termed condition qua cause it is metaphorically speaking.

This concludes the summary exposition of the Sarvabijaka.
6. MODE OF ACTIVITY OF THE ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA

This section discusses the ‘mode of activity’ (ākāra) of the Ālayavijñāna. The mode of activity is perception or discrimination, because it is in perception or discrimination that consciousness has its mode of activity. The object of perception of the Ālayavijñāna is twofold: its ‘place’ (sthāna) and ‘what it holds and receives’ (upādi). By ‘place’ is meant the receptacle-world, because it is the place that supports all living beings. The upādi in turn is twofold: the Bijas and the ‘body with its five sense-organs.’ Upādi means holding and receiving, that is to say, the Bijas and the physical body are held and received by the Ālayavijñāna. Both the upādi and the sthāna are the objects of perception (alamabhāna) of the Ālayavijñāna.

Here are also explained the various aspects or bhāgas of the Alaya, especially the ‘image-aspect’ or nimittabhāga and the ‘perception-aspect’ or the darshanabhāga.

7. SAMPRAYUKTAS (associated mental activities)

Vasubandhu says that the Ālayavijñāna is associated with five mental attributes or chaittas, i.e., (1) mental contact (sparśha), (2) attention (manaskāra), (3) sensation (vedanā), (4) conception (samjñā), and (5) volition (chetanā).

The nature and characteristics of these five chaittas are described and explained in great detail in the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun.

8. MORAL SPECIES

This section discusses the moral species of the Ālayavijñāna and its chaittas. Vasubandhu says that the Ālaya is ‘non-defiled’ and ‘non-defined’. In this connection it may be stated that, from a moral point of view, dharmas are of three kinds: good, bad, non-defined; but, to be more precise, they are four kinds, because the ‘non-defined’ can be defiled or non-defiled. The Ālayavijñāna is exclusively non-defiled and non-defined, because it is ‘retribution’ (vipāka) in its essential nature.

1. If it were good (kusīla), existence or the cycle of life and death (i.e., suffering) would be impossible; if it were defiled (akusīla, bad), return and disappearance (i.e., extinction and the way) would be impossible.

2. Again, this consciousness is the point of support or infrastructure for good and defiled dharmas. If it were good or defiled, it would not be capable of supporting
good or defiled dharmas, because the consciousness itself and the supported dharmas
would be opposed to each other.

3. Again, this consciousness is by nature a perfumable dharma. If it were good or
defiled, then, like an object that has an extremely fragrant or offensive smell, it
would not be perfumable. Now it is in the perfuming of the Ālayavijñāna and in
the Bijas created by this perfuming that the cause and the fruit of defiled and pure
dharmas are to be found. If there were no perfuming, the cause and the fruit of
defiled and pure dharmas could not be ascertained. Hence the Ālayavijñāna is non-
defiled and non-defined.

For the same reason, the five chaittas of the Alaya are non-defiled and non-defined.

9. THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The question is asked: Is the Ālayavijñāna permanent or impermanent?

The answer is that it is neither permanent nor impermanent, for, says Vasubandhu:

*It is in perpetual evolution like a violent torrent.*

1. By ‘perpetual’ is meant that, since before the beginning of time, this conscious-
ness has evolved in a homogeneous series without interruption, because it is the
creative basis of manifestations of the transmigratory course through the three
realms of existence (*dhātus*), the five directions of reincarnation (*gatis*), and the
four forms of birth (*yonis*), and also because in its essential nature it is firm enough
to hold Bijas without allowing them to be lost.

2. By ‘evolution’ is meant that this consciousness, from before the beginning of
time, is born and perishes from one moment to another ever changing. As cause it
perishes and as fruit it is then born. Thus, it never remains continuously a single
entity. Through the evolutions of the other consciousnesses, it is perfumed and
thus forms seeds.

If it were permanent, like space, it would not be perfumable; if it were not
perfumable, the distinction between Samsara (birth and death) and Nirvāṇa (true
deliverance) would disappear.

The word ‘perpetual’ rules out the notion of impermanence or discontinuity; the
word ‘evolution’ indicates that it is not permanent.
Vasubandhu gives an example.

'Like a violent torrent': it is the nature and being (*dharmatā*) of 'causation' which is foreign to permanence and impermanence.

In its sequence of cause and effect, it is like a violent torrent which is never impermanent yet never permanent, and which ever flows onward in a continuous series, carrying with it what sometimes floats and sometimes sinks. So too is this Alayavijñāna, which, from before the beginning of time, is born and perishes, forming a series which is neither permanent, nor impermanent, carrying along sentient beings, sometimes floating, sometimes sinking, without allowing them to attain liberation from the cycle of mundane existence.

Again it is like a violent torrent, which, though beaten by the wind into waves, flows onward without interruption. So too is this Alayavijñāna, which, though it encounters conditions producing the visual and other kinds of consciousness, perpetually maintains its onward flow.

Or yet again it is like a violent torrent, in whose waters fish are borne along below and leaves of grass above, pursuing its onward course without abandoning it. So too is this consciousness, which perpetually follows its onward evolution, carrying with it the perfumed internal Bījas and the external chaittas (*sparṣha*, etc).

These comparisons show that the Alayavijñāna, from before the beginning of time, has been both cause and effect, and so is neither permanent nor impermanent. They mean that since before the beginning of time this consciousness has been one in which from moment to moment effects are born and causes perish. Because these effects are born, it is not impermanent; because these causes perish, it is not permanent. To be neither impermanent nor permanent: this is the 'principle of conditional causation or dependent origination' (*Pratityasamutpāda*). That is why it is said that this consciousness is in perpetual evolution like a torrent.

### 10. CESSATION OF THE ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA

As explained in a preceding section, this Allaya consciousness has all the time been flowing like a stream without interruption. The question arises: At what moment, in what stage, is it definitely and finally arrested?

Vasubandhu replies:

*The Ālayavijñāna ends at the stage of Arhatship.*
Hsüan Tsang explains:

The Aryas or the saints of the three vehicles are called Arhats from the moment (vajropamasamadhi) when they have completely cut off the obscuring 'barrier of vexing passions' (kleśhavaraṇa). [The expression 'to cut off completely' signifies: (1) to destroy radically, to eliminate, (2) to subjugate, to put out of action. The saints of the two Vehicles put their vexing passions (kleśha) beyond the possibility of rebirth, but they have not yet cleared away the 'barrier which impedes Buddha-enlightenment' (jneyavarana). At that moment the coarse dross (i.e., the crude and heavy Bijas) of the vexing passions is dissociated completely and for ever, and it is then said that the Ālayavijñāna is arrested.

11. NAMES AND VARIETIES OF THE EIGHTH CONSCIOUSNESS

The eighth consciousness, although it is possessed by all sentient beings, receives different names according to the variety of view-points:

1. Chitta, 'mind', of the root chi, to accumulate, because it is the 'accumulation of Bijas which are perfumed by various dharmas, i.e., the seven consciousnesses'.

2. Ādanavijñāna, 'consciousness that retains', that retains Bijas and material organs and prevents them from perishing.

3. Jñeyāshraya, 'basis and support for the knowable', because the eighth consciousness is the basis and support of dharmas, objects of knowledge (jñeya), defiled or pure.

4. Bijavijñāna, 'seed consciousness', because, universally, it carries within it all the mundane and supramundane Bijas.

All these names and others (Mulavijñāna, Bhavaṅgavijñāna, etc.) are suitable for all states of the eighth consciousness. But it is also called by the following names:

1. Ālaya, 'storehouse consciousness', because it includes all defiled dharmas (saṃkleśha) and thus prevents them from disappearing; because Self-belief (ātmadrṣṭi), Self-love (ātmasneha), etc., cling to it as to an Ego or Inner Self. The name of ālaya is only suitable for the eighth consciousness of Prthagjanas and Śaikshas, because defiled dharmas (saṃkleśha) are non-existent in Arhats and Bodhisattvas 'who do not fall back'.

2. Vipakavijñāna, the 'retribution consciousness', because it is the fruit of retribution of good and bad acts which project Sāṃsāra (birth and death). This name is suitable
for the eighth consciousness of Prthagjanas, the saints of the two Vehicles, and all Bodhisattvas, because in all those beings there are non-defined dharmas that are retribution. But this name stops at the Land of Tathāgatas, where there are no longer any non-defined dharmas that are retribution, where nothing remains but goodness.

3. *Vimalavijñāna*, 'stainless or immaculate consciousness', the basis and support for all perfectly pure dharmas (*anāśrava*). [Some scholars make this consciousness the ninth consciousness.] This name is only suitable for the eighth consciousness of the perfected beings of the Land of Tathāgatas, because the eighth consciousness of other beings (e.g., Bodhisattvas, saints of the two Vehicles, and Prthagjanas) carries impure Bijas of the *sāsrava* class, is susceptible to perfuming, and has not yet realized the state of a good and pure consciousness. As the *Tathāgataagunālaṃkārāsūtra* says: 'The stainless consciousness of the Tathāgatas is by nature pure and non-defiled (*anāśrava*), liberated from all obscuring veils (*āvaranas*) and hindrances, and associated with the 'Great Mirror Wisdom (*mahādarśhanajñāna*)'.

Vasubandhu, in the stanza, lays special emphasis on the cessation aspect of the Ālayavijñāna, partly because its 'faults' (*doṣha*) are serious and partly because it is the first of the two states that the saint abandons in the course of his spiritual advancement.

The Vipakavijñāna, itself also impure, is abandoned by Bodhisattvas at the moment when they are about to obtain Bodhi, by the Shravakas and Pratyekabuddhas at the moment when they enter 'Nirvāṇa-without-residue' and cease in consequence to experience the fruit of their acts.

There will never be a time at which the Vimalavijñāna (stainless consciousness) can be abandoned, because the period of meritorious service for sentient beings will never come to an end.

As regards the other names, *chitta, adāna*, etc., their appropriateness depends on the state of the consciousness. The time at which they are abandoned cannot be determined, because they are abandoned when the Ālayavijñāna or the Vipakavijñāna is abandoned.

One must distinguish the eighth consciousness in its impure state from that in a pure state.

1. In its impure state, the eight consciousness, that is to say the Ālaya or Vipāka, is, as we have described it, non-defined (*avyākṛta*), associated with five chaittas, mental
contact (*sparśha*) etc., having as its object the *upādis*, the *sthānas*, etc.

2. In its pure state, it is exclusively good (*kushala*). It is associated with twenty-one chaittas, namely, the five 'universals', the five 'specials', and the eleven good chaittas.

   (1) It is associated with the five universals because these chaittas accompany all minds.

   (2) It is associated with the special chaitta of desire (*chhanda*), because it always has the desire to realize and to know the thing considered; with resolve (*adhimokṣha*), because it always has decision and judgment in regard to all objects; with memory (*sūrīti*), because it always has a clear remembrance of things formerly experienced; with mental tranquillity (*sāmadhi*), because the Bhagavat never has a non-tranquillized mind; and with discernment (*prajñā*), because it always discerns and has a right discrimination of all dharmas.

   (3) It is associated with the eleven good chaittas because it is always associated with perfectly pure faith (*śraddhā*), etc.

It is associated with twenty-one chaittas only, because, not being defiled and not being distracted, it is not associated with bad and indeterminate dharmas. It is associated with the sensation of indifference (*upekṣha*), because it always manifests itself in a spontaneous manner and in perfect equality. It has as its object all dharmas, because the ‘Mirror Wisdom’ discerns universally all dharmas.

**11. PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF ĀLAYA VĪJÑĀNA**

This deals with the proofs of the existence of the eighth or Ālaya Consciousness. The question is asked: How can it be ascertained that, apart from the consciousnesses admitted by the Hinayāna, there is an eighth consciousness?

The reply is that this is known from the Scriptures of the two Vehicles and by logical reasoning.

**i. Mahāyāna sources**

A stanza from the *Mahāyanābhidharmasūtra* reads,

*There is a Dhātu (Ultimate Cause or World of Reality) which has existed since before the beginning of time.*

*It is the supporting basis for all dharmas.*

*From this have come into being different states of existence,*

*And because of this the attainment of Nirvāṇa is possible.*
The explanation is that the eighth consciousness is subtle in its essential nature and only manifests itself through its activity and effects. The first half of the stanza characterizes it in so far as it is cause (hetu) and condition (pratyaya). The last half defines it as supporting and carrying on the cyclic processes of birth and death and the abolition of existence (through the attainment of Nirvāṇa).

1. ‘Dhātu’ signifies cause (hetu): it is a question of the eighth consciousness considered as Bija, the Bijavijñāna, which, since before the beginning of time, has been developing itself in a continuous series, immediately engendering all dharmas.

2. The term ‘supporting basis’ (saṃśhraya) signifies condition (pratyaya): it is a question of the eighth consciousness considered as the Adānvijñāna which ‘takes and holds’ and which, since before the beginning of time, has been the supporting basis for all dharmas. By this is meant that the eighth consciousness takes and holds the Bijas and is the supporting basis for the actual dharmas. On the one hand, it develops itself as the receptacle-world and physical bodies with their sense-organs: it is the support of both. On the other hand, it is the supporting basis for the other consciousnesses: (1) it ‘takes and holds’ the five material sense-organs in dependence upon which the first five consciousnesses, the eye-consciousness, etc., manifest themselves; (2) it is also the supporting basis for Manas which, in its turn, is the support of Manovijñāna. It should be known that Manas and Manovijñāna, being both ‘evolving consciousnesses’ (pravṛttivijñānas), must, like the first five consciousnesses, support themselves on the sense faculties (indriyas) which are simultaneous with them, and that the eighth, being a consciousness, must also have a supporting basis, which is Manas.

Such is the activity of the eighth consciousness as cause (hetu) and as condition (pratyaya).

3. The words ‘from this’ in the stanza signify ‘by reason of the existence of this consciousness’.

4. The phrase ‘have come into being different states of existence’ means that there are good and bad destinies (gatis). It is by reason of the existence of this eighth consciousness that dharmas or Bijas favorable to ‘samsāric existence’ [birth and death (pravṛtti)] are taken and held in such a manner that sentient beings continue to proceed in cycles of birth and death.
5. The phrase ‘attainment of Nirvāṇa’ in the stanza signifies that, by reason of the existence of this eighth consciousness, the realization and attainment of Nirvāṇa can take place. In fact, it is this consciousness that takes and holds all the ‘dharmas of abolition or annihilation’: that is to say, the pure Bijas which cause the actual Path of Attainment to be born to enable the truth-seeker to arrive at Nirvāṇa.

ii. Source of the Lesser Vehicle

The sūtras of other Schools also, although in veiled language, say that there is an Ālayavijñāna of a special nature.

1. In the Āgamas of the Mahasamghikaniyakaya, it is, in an ‘esoteric’ manner, designated by the term ‘Mūlavijñāna’, ‘root consciousness’. In fact, it is the point of support for the consciousnesses of the eye, etc., just as the root of a tree is the origin and support of its stem, branches, etc. The consciousnesses of the eye, etc., cannot have the virtues of a root.

2. In the sūtras of the Sthāviras and the Vibhajyavādins, it is, in an ‘esoteric’ manner, designated by the term ‘Bhavāngavijñāna’. By bhava is meant the triple mode of existence (in the three Dhātus); by aṅga is meant cause (hetu). Only Ālaya, being eternal and universal (existing in the three dhātus in contradistinction to the eye-consciousness), can be ‘the cause of the triple existence’.

3. The Mahīśāsakas call it the ‘skandha which lasts right up to the end of Samsāra’ (samsāra-kotinīśthāskandha), because the Ālayavijñāna lasts right up to Vajropama. Apart from the eighth consciousness, there is no skandhadharma which lasts without discontinuity right up to the end of Samsāra.

4. The Sarvāstivādins, in their Ekottaragama, have a text which, in an esoteric manner, designates the eighth consciousness by the term ‘Ālaya’. The text says that sentient beings ‘have deep affection for the Ālaya, are very fond of the Ālaya, take much delight in the Ālaya, and rejoice greatly in the Ālaya.’

iii. Logical arguments

(1) Chitta as bearer of Bijas

The Sutra says:

‘It is named ‘chitta’ because it is there that the Bijas of defiled and pure dharmas are accumulated and produced.’
Apart from the eighth consciousness, there is no *chitta* which can hold the Bijas firmly. The various philosophers of the School of Sūtras and the Mahāsāṃghika, the Sthavira and the Sarvāstivādins Schools have only unacceptable theories.

Whatever the philosophers may think, Bijas are not held by the five *skandhas*.

1. The Pravṛttivijñānas (the first seven consciousnesses to the exclusion of the Ālaya) are not the *chitta* spoken of by the Sūtra.

The Pravṛttivijñānas are interrupted in the Nirodhasamāpatti and in the four other states of mental inactivity: therefore they cannot hold the Bijas perpetually. They are born by means of the sense-organs, the objects perceived and attention (*manaskāra*); they are occasionally of different natures, good, bad, etc.; they arise and disappear easily; therefore they cannot perfume one another. Like the flash of lightning, they are not firm and stable: therefore they are not perfumable. Nor are they capable of receiving and holding Bijas. They are not the Chitta in which defiled and pure Bijas are accumulated and produced.

On the contrary, the Ālayavijñāna is of one single species, always uninterrupted, and firm and stable like a grain of sesame seed (which absorbs the odor of flowers) or a piece of hemp (which absorbs color): therefore, susceptible to perfuming, it corresponds to the *chitta* spoken of by the Sūtra. By denying the existence of a *chitta* that is capable of carrying Bijas, one contradicts not only the Scriptures but also pure reason.

On the one hand, the actual dharmas, that is, defiled or pure thoughts, in the absence of a perfumable *chitta*, will not create Bijas and cause an increase of pre-existing Bijas: therefore they will be absolutely useless. On the other hand, if the actual dharmas are not born of Bijas, how will they be born? Do you admit, with the Tīrthikas, that they are born spontaneously and by themselves?

2. *Rūpa* and Viprayuktas are not perfumable; nor do they hold Bijas.

They are not mental in their essential nature: like sound, light, etc., they cannot be perfumed by internal dharmas, defiled or pure. How, then, can they hold Bijas? Furthermore, they have no real self-nature apart from consciousness. How can they be held to be the supporting basis for internal Bijas?
3. The chaītīṣas associated with the Pravṛttivijñānas are subject to interruption, being born in such and such a manner or not born at all. They are neither autonomous nor mental in their essential nature, being chaītīṣas only. Therefore, they are not capable of holding Bijas; nor are they capable of being perfumed.

One is therefore obliged to recognize the existence of a chīttā, distinct from the Pravṛttivijñānas, which holds Bijas.

(2) Vipākachīttā

According to the Śūtra, there is a Vipākachīttā, ‘a mind which is retribution’, created by good or bad acts. If the eighth consciousness is lacking, this Vipākachīttā should have no existence.

1. The six consciousnesses (eye-consciousness ... Manovijñāna) are subject to interruption; they are not always the fruit of acts. Like the flash of lightning, they are not Vipākachīttā.

We know for a fact that dharmas which are vipāka, once cut off, do not continue any more; for example, the ‘root of life’ (jivitendriya), once cut off, does not continue.

The six consciousnesses, when they are created by acts, are like sound, odor, etc., which do not form a perpetual series; therefore they are vipāka, ‘born of retribution’, but not real vipāka.

2. We must admit the existence of a real Vipakachīttā which corresponds to acts that lead to the ripening of the fruit, which may be found in all the three dhātus, which is perpetual, which manifests itself as the receptacle-world and the physical body with its sense-organs, and which is the supporting basis for the living being.

(3) Gātīs and yonis

The Śūtra teaches that sentient beings transmigrate ceaselessly through the five states of existence or destinies (gātīs) [infernal beings, hungry ghosts, animals, human beings, devas] and the four forms of birth (yonī) [(1) viviparous, as with mammals; (2) oviparous, as with birds; (3) moisture or water born, as with worms and fishes; (4) metamorphic, as with moths from the chrysalis, or with devas, or with infernal beings).
If they do not possess this eighth consciousness, one does not see what *gati* and *yoni* can consist of; that is to say, the *gati-yoni* entity should not exist at all.

1. The *gati-yoni* entity must be a real thing (and not an ideal dharma like the ‘vital principle’), perpetual (i.e., non-interrupted), universal (that is to say, it can be found in all the three *dhātus*), and non-mixed. Only a dharma with such attributes can be established as the real *gati-yoni* entity.

2. Only the Vipakachitta and its *chaittas* possess the four characteristics of reality, perpetuity, universality, and homogeneity, and constitute the real *gati* and *yoni*.

(4) **Theory of upādāna**

According to the Sūtra, the ‘material body with its sense-organs’ is appropriated (*upātta*), i.e., ‘held and borne’. If there is no eighth consciousness, where is one to find the *upādātar* of this body, ‘that which appropriates the body’?

If the five material organs (*rupindriya*), with the matter that serves as their support (altogether nine material *ayatanas* excluding sound) are appropriated, it is certainly by reason of a mind that appropriates them to it. To the exclusion of the six Pravṛttivijñānas (visual consciousness – Manovijñāna), this mind can only be the Vipākachitta. The latter, in fact, is projected by former acts; it is neither good nor defiled, but non-defined; it can be found throughout the three *dhātus*; and it exists in a continuous series.

(5) **Life, heat, and consciousness**

According to the Sūtra, life, heat, and consciousness last in a continuous series by supporting one another. We say that the eighth consciousness is the only consciousness capable of serving as a support for life and heat.

1. The Pravṛttivijñānas are discontinuous and variable like sound, wind, etc.; they are incapable of constantly operating as a support. Therefore they are not the consciousness discussed by the Sūtra. But the eighth consciousness, the Vipākavijñāna, like life and heat, is not discontinuous or variable. Hence one may attribute to it this supporting operation; hence it is the consciousness that sustains life and heat.

2. The Sutra teaches that these three dharmas support one another, and it is admitted that life and heat are homogeneous and constitute a continuous series. Is it reasonable to think that the consciousness in question is the Pravṛttivijñāna which is neither homogeneous nor continuous?
3. Life and heat are certainly impure dharmas (sāsrava): hence the consciousness which supports them is not pure (anasrava).

If you do not admit the existence of the eighth consciousness, say which consciousness will support the life of a being of the Ārupyadhatu who produces pure Pravṛttivijñānas.

Hence there exists a Vipākavijñāna, homogeneous (always non-defined), continuous, being found throughout the three dhātus, and capable of supporting life and heat: that is the eighth consciousness.

(7) The mind at conception and at death

The Sutra says that, at conception and at death, sentient beings are undoubtedly in a state of mental confusion and distraction, not in mindless meditation (nirodhasamāpatti). The mind at the moment of conception and at that of death can only be the eighth consciousness.

At these two moments, the mind and the body are stupefied as in dreamless sleep or extreme stupor. The quick and perceiving Pravṛttivijñāna (that is to say, the Manovijñāna) cannot arise.

At these two moments, one cannot attribute to the six Pravṛttivijñānas conscious acts of knowledge or the recognition or apprehension of objects: that is to say, these consciousnesses are not in operation, just as they are not in operation in the mindless state. For, if the mind at conception or at death is, as you maintain, a Pravṛttivijñāna, its activity and object must, as at all other times, be perceived and known.

The case of the eighth consciousness is entirely different. As it is extremely subtle, it is not perceived in its activity or in its object. Being the result of acts which project or lead to the existence in question, it is truly retribution (vipāka): it constitutes, for a determined period of time (i.e., for the duration of the existence), a perpetual and homogeneous series. It is this consciousness that is designated by the name of ‘mind at conception’ and ‘mind at death’. It is on its account that the sentient being, at these two moments, is in a state of ‘mental confusion and distraction’.

(8) Cessation meditation (nirodhasamāpatti)

According to the Sutra, ‘Of him who dwells in the meditation of cessation’ (nirodhasamāpatti), the activities (samskāras) of body, of voice and of mind are
all destroyed (nirroha); but his life is not destroyed; he is not bereft of his bodily heat; his sense-organs do not deteriorate; and his consciousness does not leave his body.

The only consciousness which does not leave the body in the course of the meditation of cessation is the eighth consciousness.

All the other consciousnesses (the visual consciousness, etc.) are, in their act of perception and knowledge, coarse and inconsistent. He in whom these consciousnesses manifest themselves in the perception of objects necessarily becomes tired and upset; hence he becomes disgusted and seeks to stop them for a time. Gradually he subdues and expels them up to the moment when they cease entirely (for a day or for a week or, according to the Mahayana, for a kalpa or even longer). The truth-seeker who attains this cessation is said to dwell in the meditation of cessation. Hence, in this samadhi, all the other consciousnesses, i.e., the seven Pravrttivijñānas, are entirely inactive.

If we do not admit the existence of an actual consciousness that is subtle, homogeneous (always non-defined), eternal, universal (existent in all the three dhatus), and capable of holding and sustaining life, the organs, etc., which consciousness is the Sutra referring to when it says that 'the consciousness does not leave the body'?

From the sacred teachings and the logical reasoning set forth above, it is abundantly clear that the eighth consciousness or Ālayavijñāna exists.

**BOOK III**

**THE SEVENTH OR MANAS CONSCIOUSNESS**

The Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun says that this evolving consciousness manifests itself with the Ālayavijñāna as its basis and support and takes that consciousness as its object. It has the nature and characteristics of cogitation or intellection. In the sacred teachings this consciousness is given the special name of Manas, because, in its perpetual practice of intellection, it surpasses the other consciousnesses.

1. **SAMPRAYOGA (ASSOCIATED MENTAL ACTIVITIES) OF MANAS**

i. The four klešhas

Inasmuch as Manas perpetually thinks about the ego (Ātman), to which it clings, it has close relationship with the four fundamental klešhas or vexing passions (sources
of affliction and delusion). These four are ‘Self-delusion or Atman-ignorance and Self-belief, together with Self-conceit and Self-love.’

(1) Self-delusion (ātmamoha) means lack of understanding. It is ignorant of the true character of the Atman, and delusion as to the principle that there is no Atman (Nairatmya, egolessness). Therefore it is called Self-delusion.

(2) Self-belief (ātma-dṛṣṭi) means adhering to the view that Atman exists, erroneously imagining certain dharmas to be the self when they are not so. Hence it is called Self-belief.

(3) Self-conceit (ātmamāna) means pride. Basing itself on the belief in an Atman, it causes the mind to feel superior and lofty. It is therefore called Self-conceit.

(4) Self-love (ātmasneha) means a greedy desire for the self. Because of its belief in the Atman it develops deep attachments to it. It is therefore called Self-love.

The words ‘together with’ indicate that Self-conceit and Self-love accompany Self-belief and the Self-love accompanies Self-conceit: an association which is not admitted by the Sarvastivadins.

These four kleshas, by their constant manifestation, disturb and pollute the innermost mind (Alayavijñāna) and cause the outer (i.e., the remaining seven) transforming consciousnesses to be perpetually defiled. Because of this, sentient beings are bound to the cycle of birth and death (transmigration) without being able to liberate themselves from it. Hence they are called vexing passions or kleshas.

ii. Other chaïttas of Manas

Like the Alayavijnana, Manas is accompanied also by five universal mental associates, namely, mental contact, attention, sensation, conception, and volition, and it is associated with only one sensation, that of indifference.

iii. The ‘moral’ species of Manas

As regards the moral species of Manas, the Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun says that it is exclusively ‘defiled-non-defiled’. The reason is that ‘the four kleshas associated with Manas, being defiled dharmas, are an obstacle to the Holy Path (arya-marga); they impede and obscure the mind (i.e., Manas which is their lord); they are therefore defiled. On the other hand, they are neither good nor bad; they are consequently non-defined.’
But, when Manas has been revolutionized at the first stage on the Path and transformed into Universal Equality Wisdom (Śhamatājñāna), it is exclusively good.

iv. Bhūmi of Manas

The question arises: To what dhātu or bhūmi (land) are the chaīttras or mental associates of Manas bound and confined? Vasubandhu says:

*Manas is active in the dhātu or bhūmi (land) in which the sentient being is born to which he is bound.*

When the eighth consciousness is born in Kāmadhatu or the World of Sensuous Desires, the chaīttras (e.g., Self-belief) associated with Manas are confined to Kāmadhatu. This is true for all bhūmis up to Bhavāgra, for they are spontaneous, taking always as their object the Ālayavijñāna of their particular bhūmi and considering it as the Ātman; they never take as their object the dharmas of other bhūmis.

2. THE CESSATION OF MANAS

Since before the beginning of time, this defiled Manas has continued in a perpetual series. In what state is it absolutely or temporarily cut off?

Vasubandhu replies to this question thus:

*Manas ceases to exist at the stage of Arhatship, in the meditation of annihilation (state of complete extinction of thought and other mental qualities), and on the supramundane Path.*

Arhats are the Āśārikās of the three Vehicles. In the state of Arhatship, defiled Manas, both actual and in Bija-form, has been entirely annihilated. Hence one says that it does not exist.

As regards the Śākaikās, in the state of ‘meditation of annihilation’ (nirodhasamāpatti) and while they are treading the Supramundane Path, defiled Manas is provisionally ‘subdued’ (i.e., incapable of actualizing itself). Hence one says that it does not exist.

3. PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF MANAS

How do we know that Manas, the seventh consciousness, is a consciousness apart from the first six consciousnesses? We acquire this knowledge from the sacred teachings and by the exercise of logical reason.
i. Arguments drawn from sacred teachings

1. The World-Honored One (Bhāgavat, the Buddha), in many passages of His Sūtras, teaches that *chitta* (mind), *manas* (intellection), and *vijñāna* (consciousness) have different meanings: that which accumulates and produces (all things) is called *chitta* (mind), that which reasons or cogitates is called *manas* (intellection), and that which discriminates is called *vijñāna* (consciousness).

These three terms apply to all the eight consciousnesses; but, in accordance with the characteristics of each of them, they apply with particular appropriateness to the three following categories respectively: The eighth is called *chitta*, because in it the Bijas of all dharmas are accumulated and from it all things arise. The seventh is called *manas*, because it takes as its object the Ālayavijñāna and, through its perpetual intellection, regards it as Atman, etc. The remaining six are called consciousness, because their functions are those of perceiving and discriminating - even though crudely, unstably, and with interruptions - the six special spheres of sense-objects.

One of the *gāthās* or stanzas of the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* says:

*The Ālayavijñāna is called chitta (mind);*  
*The cogitating principle is called manas;*  
*Those that can discriminate various sense-objects*  
*Are called vijñānas (consciousnesses).*

Furthermore, it is said in many other Mahāyāna Sūtras that there is a seventh consciousness. Hence this consciousness must exist, because we proved that the Mahāyāna Sūtras are the highest authorities.

2. Besides, a *muktakasūtra*, recognized by the Lesser Vehicle, also affirms the existence of the seventh consciousness. In the Sūtra, the following stanza is found:

'The defiled Manas always comes into being and perishes with the *kleśhas*; when it is emancipated from the *kleśhas*, it will not only cease to exist but will have neither a past nor a future.'

ii. The two pratyayas of Manovijñāna

The Sūtra says: 'By reason of the eyes and the colors there is born the eye-consciousness ... ; by reason of Manas and the dharmas there is born the sixth consciousness or Manovijñāna.' What is this Manas, causal condition (*pratyaya*) of Manovijñāna, but the seventh consciousness?
In reality the five consciousnesses must of necessity have an organ (*indriya*) as *pratyaya*, an organ that is the ‘condition qua agent’ (*adhipatipratyaya*) which is special for each consciousness (eye for visual consciousness, and so forth) which is simultaneous with consciousness, not immediately anterior to it. Manovijñāna, being comprised in the first six consciousnesses, must have a supporting basis (*āshraya*) of this type. If there is no seventh consciousness, Manas, there will be no such basis.

On the basis of these logical inferences, we may conclude that the Manovijñāna, being one of the six perfectly-established consciousnesses, must, like any one of these six, have a particular support (distinct from the eighth consciousness), a support which serves as a base (*ayatana*) for its name.

This support or *āshraya* is our seventh consciousness.

### iii. The name of Manas

The Sūtra says: ‘The faculty of cogitation is called Manas’, attributing to Manas a present action. What is this Manas that thinks, but the seventh consciousness?

Hence there is a seventh consciousness, distinct from the six, which is perpetually ‘thinking’ or ‘cogitating’, and which is called Manas.

### iv. The two samāpattis

The Sūtra distinguishes two meditations (*samāpatti*), the *asamijñīsamāpatti* and the *nirodhasamāpatti*. ‘Defiled Manas’ does not cease in *asamijñīsamāpatti* but ceases entirely in *nirodhasamāpatti*. If a defiled Manas does not exist, there should be no difference between these two samāpattis. The idea is that in both these meditations there is cessation (*nirodha*) of the first six consciousnesses and their chaittas; the twenty-two kinds of mental properties and their nature are the same in both cases. If there is no defiled Manas, how can we distinguish the one samāpatti, in which there remains the defiled Manas, from the other, in which there is no defiled Manas but only a purified Manas?

The Sarvāstivādins will say that the difference between the two samāpattis lies in the difference in the preparatory exercises (*prayoga*), in the sphere (*dhatu*) and ‘land’ (*bhumi*) where they are practised, and in the persons who practise them. But this explanation is inadmissible, because the cause of all these differences lies in the presence or the absence of Manas. If Manas does not exist, the cause of these differences will, likewise, not exist. Hence, positively, this Manas must exist.
v. Absence of Atman-adhesion

The Sutra teaches that a Prthagjana, no matter whether his thoughts are good, bad, or non-defined, still embraces Atmagraha. That presupposes the existence of Manas. If Manas is non-existent, such Atmagraha will likewise be non-existent.

Prthagjanas have thoughts of three natures (good, bad, and non-defined). While externally producing, by the power of the first six consciousnesses, various acts of a corresponding nature, they produce, internally and in a continuous manner, through the influence of Manas, Atmagraha, adhering to their Atman. Because of this Atmagraha, all their actions through the six consciousnesses, such as their practice of the Six Paramitas, Dana Paramita, i.e., charity, Dhyana Paramita, i.e., meditation and contemplation, etc.- are not free from nimitta, i.e., attachment to the image-aspect of the mind.

This is why the Yogashastra, 51, explains that defiled Manas is the supporting basis for the first six consciousnesses. As long as it is not destroyed, there is the 'binding or entrammelling of the perception-aspect (darshanabhaga) of the mind by the image-aspect (nimittabhaga)', with the result that deliverance or emancipation cannot be attained. As soon as defiled Manas is destroyed, liberation from the fetters of the image-aspect (nimitta-bandhana) is achieved.

In what does this enchainment of the mind consist? It consists in our inability to understand the true nature and character of external objects as having the same mode of existence as illusions and mirages. In consequence of this, the perception-aspect of the mind is fettered by the image-aspect. Being fettered, it cannot attain freedom or self-mastery.

It is in this sense that a stanza (gatha) reads: 'Defiled Manas is the supporting basis for consciousness. As long as it is not destroyed, the bondage of consciousness can never be broken.'

vi. Conclusion

Good dharmas, etc. are rendered impure by a Manas which, without cessation, produces Atmagraha. If this Manas is non-existent, the good dharmas cannot be impure. Hence this seventh consciousness must exist separately.
BOOK IV

THE FIRST SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES

Hsüan Tsang in his Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun says:

'Having next dealt with the evolving consciousness of intellection, we should explain the characteristics of the evolving consciousness which perceives and distinguishes (seemingly external) objects.'

1. NAMES OF THE SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES

These six categories of consciousness are classified in accordance with the six sense-organs (indriya) and their respective spheres of objects (vishaya). They are known as the visual consciousness (chakshurviñāna) and so on down to the sense-center consciousness (manoviñāna). [Thus the consciousnesses which distinguish by the senses the objects of the external world are of six varieties: the five senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) plus a sixth faculty, the sense-center consciousness, which unifies and coordinates the percepts derived from the five senses.]

2. CONDITION OF MANIFESTATION OF THE SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES

As regards the conditions in which these six consciousnesses manifest themselves, Stanzas 15 and 16 say:

In dependence upon the root consciousness (i.e., the eighth consciousness, Ālayaviñāna),

The five consciousnesses (of the senses) manifest themselves in accordance with various causes and conditions,

Sometimes together, sometimes separately,

Just as waves manifest themselves in dependence upon the condition of the water.

But the sixth consciousness (Manoviñāna) manifests itself at all times,

Except for beings born into the 'heavenly world without thought' (among Asamjñidevas in whom thinking has entirely ceased),

Except also for those in the two mindless Samāpattis (two forms of meditation in which there is no more activity of thought) and

Those who are in states of stupor or unconsciousness.
3. ‘ESSENTIAL NATURE’ AND ‘MODE OF ACTIVITY’

All these six consciousnesses have the perception and discrimination of objects as their essential nature, and they make use of this same perception and discrimination as their main characteristic. This enables us to understand why these special names are established and given to the first six consciousnesses in contradistinction to the seventh and the eighth. They are called consciousnesses because they perceive or distinguish the six spheres of objects.

As the Sutra says: ‘What is visual consciousness? It is that consciousness which, depending on the visual organ for support, perceives and distinguishes various colors and forms (rupas) ... What is Manovijnana? It is that consciousness which, depending on the Manas-organ for support, perceives and distinguishes all dharmas.’

4. MORAL SPECIES OF THE SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES

The six consciousnesses are good, bad, and neither the one nor the other. The expression ‘neither the one nor the other’ means ‘non-defined’, i.e., neither good nor bad.

We call ‘good’ (kushala) that which is profitable and beneficial to the present life and to future lives. The ‘joyful fruit’, i.e., human and celestial pleasure, although profitable to the present life, is not profitable to lives to come. [It may cause decay or disaster in future lives.] Hence we do not call it good.

We call ‘bad’ (akushala) that which is detrimental and disadvantageous to the present life and to future lives. The ‘sorrowful fruit’, i.e., physical and mental suffering due to ‘bad destinies’, although harmful to the present life, is not harmful to future lives. Hence we do not call it bad.

We call ‘non-defined’ (avyākṛta) that which cannot be defined as good or bad, profitable or unprofitable.

When the six consciousnesses have been ‘revolutionized’ upon entry into the Path and transformed into ‘Perfect Achievement Wisdom”, they are exclusively good.

5. SAMPRAYUKTAS (ASSOCIATED MENTAL ACTIVITIES)

i. Chaittas in general

The mental associates (chaittas) are so called because they always arise in dependence upon the mind (chitta), are associated with the mind, and are subordinate to and affiliated with the mind.
ii. Six classes of mental associates (chaittas)

Although all the chaittas are similarly designated, all of them being called ‘chaittas’, and although they all mean the same thing, namely, mental properties, yet they are divided into six different classes:

1. Universal chaittas, which are definitely found with all the eight consciousnesses.

2. Special chaittas, which are born when perceiving certain special characteristics of an object.

3. Good chaittas, which are born only with a good chitta.

4. Klešhas, which, by their very nature, are comprised in the mulaklešhas, i.e., fundamental kleśhas.

5. Upaklešhas, which, while being of the same nature as the klešhas, are the efflux of those klešhas.

6. Indeterminate chaittas, which can be found with a good chitta, a defiled one, etc., but which cannot be determined as belonging either to the one or the other.

1. The five universal chittas are: mental contact (sparśha), attention (manaskāra), sensation (vedanā), conception (samjña), and volition (chetanā).

2. The five special chaittas are: desire (chhanda), resolve (adhimokṣha), memory (smṛti), meditation (samādhi), and discernment (prajña).

3. The eleven good chaittas are: belief (śhraddhā), sense of shame (hri), sense of integrity (apatrāpya), non-covetousness (alobha), non-anger (advesha), non-delusion (amoha), zeal (virya), composure of mind (pṛaśhrabdhi), vigilance (apramāda), equanimity (upekṣhā), and harmlessness (avīhimsā).

4. The six vexing passions (kleśhas) are: covetousness (rāga), anger (pratigha), delusion (avidya), conceit (mana), doubt (vīchikitsā), and erroneous views (dṛṣṭi).

5. The twenty secondary vexing passions (upakleśhas) are: fury (krodha), enmity (upanaha), concealment or hypocrisy (mrakṣha), vexation (pradāśha), envy (irṣhya), parsimony (matsarya), deception (śāthya), duplicity or fraudulence (maya), harmfulness (vīhimsa), pride (mada), shamelessness (ahrikyā), non-integrity (anapatrāpya), agitation or restlessness (auddhatya), torpid-minded (styana), unbelief (āshraddha), indolence (kausidya), idleness (pramāda), forgetfulness
(muṣhitasmrti), distraction (vikṣhepa), and non-discernment (asamprajanya).

6. The four indeterminate mental associates are: remorse (kaukṛtya), drowsiness (middha), reflection (vitarka), and investigation (vichāra).

All these fifty-one chaītās are fully explained and problems relating to them discussed in great detail in the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun.

iii. The three sensations

These chaītās are all associated with the three sensations (vedanās) of joy, sorrow, and indifference.

The experience of the agreeable characteristics of an object, comforting the body and gladdening the heart, is called ‘joyful sensation’ (sukha vedanā). The experience of the disagreeable characteristics of an object, disconcerting and molesting the body and the mind, is called ‘sorrowful sensation’ (duḥkha vedanā). The experience of the neutral characteristics, producing neither comfort nor discomfort to the body and the mind, is called ‘sensation that is neither joyful or sorrowful’ (aduḥkhasukha vedanā).

6. RELATIONS OF THE EIGHT CONSCIOUSNESSES

The eight consciousnesses cannot, in their essential natures, be said to be definitely one (i.e., forming a single whole). This is because their modes of activity, the conditioning causes on which they depend, and their associated qualities, are different. It is also because one of them may perish without the others doing so, and because they differ in character in that the first seven perfume while the eighth is perfumed.

At the same time they are not definitely different (i.e., being separate units), for, as is noted in the sutra (Laṅkāvatāra), the eight consciousnesses are like the waves which cannot be differentiated from the water. This is because, if they were definitely different, they could not be as cause and effect to one another. Thus, they are like the tricks of a magician, for which no definite nature can be ascertained.

As to what has been said previously regarding the varying characteristics of the different consciousnesses, this conforms to a worldly kind of reasoning (yuktismṛty); it is not Ultimate Truth (paramārtha-paramārtha). From the latter point of view, the eight consciousnesses can neither be thought or spoken of.
As is said in a stanza of the *Lankavatāra Sūtra*: ‘From a popular point of view, the mind (*chitta*), intellection (*manas*), and the other consciousnesses, eight kinds in all, have different characteristics; but, from the point of view of Ultimate Truth, they have not. For neither their own characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) nor those things on which they confer characteristics (*lakṣhyā*) have any existence.’

**BOOK V**

**MERE-CONSCIOUSNESS (VIJÑĀPTIMĀTRATA)**

It has been explained in the first four Books that each of the eight consciousnesses is the basis or infrastructure for a twofold manifestation, the perceived division and the perceiving division (*nimittabhāga* and *darśanabhāga*). It has been asserted that Ātman and dharmas are merely conventional designations of this double manifestation of consciousness, of its *nimittabhāga* and *darśanabhāga*; that they are not real entities apart from these two *bhāgas*; and that, in consequence, ‘all is mere consciousness’ or ‘nothing exists but consciousness’. How should one understand this thesis?

Stanza 17 of Vasubandhu’s *Trimśika* says:

*The various consciousnesses manifest themselves in what seem to be two divisions:*

*Perception (darśanabhāga) and the object of perception (nimittabhāga). Because of this, Ātman and dharmas do not exist. For this reason, all is mere consciousness.*

Hsüan Tsang is his *Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun* says:

‘The various consciousnesses’ refer to the three evolving categories of consciousness previously discussed and their mental qualities. The term ‘evolving’ is applied to them because they are all capable of evolving into two seeming aspects: that of the perceiving division and that of the perceived division.

The perceiving division manifested is termed ‘discrimination’, because it apprehends the perceived division.

The perceived division manifested is termed ‘that which is discriminated’, because it is apprehended by the perceiving division.
According to this correct principle, there are definitely no 'real' Ātman or dharmas aside from what is thus evolved from consciousness. For, apart from what thus apprehends or is apprehended, there exists nothing else; there are no 'real' things apart from these two aspects (bhāgas). Therefore, everything phenomenal (saṃskṛta) and noumenal (asaṃskṛta), everything seemingly 'real' and 'false' alike, is inseparable from consciousness. The word 'mere' (in the term Mere-Consciousness) is used to deny that there are any 'real things aside from consciousness (Ātman and dharmas existing as such), but not to deny that the mental functions (chaittas), the two bhāgas, rūpa, Tathātā, etc., in so far as they are inseparable from consciousness, do exist.

Therefore, everything is Mere-Consciousness (or Representation-Only or Mere Ideation).

1. PROOFS OF VIJÑAPTMATRATA

The doctrine of Vijñaptimātrata (Mere-Consciousness) is established on the basis of sacred texts and by processes of logical reasoning.

i. The Sūtras

The sacred texts which affirm Vijñaptimātrata are numerous. A few of them are quoted here.

1. Daśhhabhumika: 'In the Three Worlds (dhatus) there is nothing but mind.'
2. Saṃdhinirmochana: 'Objects of perception are merely manifestations of consciousness.'
3. Laṅkavatara: 'All dharmas are inseparable from mind.'
4. Vimalakirti: 'Sentient beings become pure or impure in accordance with the mind.'

The Sutra teaches that Bodhisattvas who have perfected the Four Wisdoms (jñāna) will, following their enlightenment, penetrate the truth of Vijñaptimātrata and of the absolute non-existence of real objects (vīshaya).

These Four Wisdoms are:

1. The mystic knowledge of the cause of contradictory concepts: This means that the same thing perceived by ghosts, human beings, and deities (devas) appears differently to them according to their past deeds. If there is really an external sphere of objects, how can this diversity be possible?
(2) The wisdom which verifies that consciousness deprived of object permits clear perception:

This means that the past, the future, images in dreams, things imagined, etc., have no real, objective bases. They are possible because they are manifestations of consciousness. If these objective bases are non-existent, the rest is also non-existent.

(3) The wisdom which understands exactly without effort:

This means that if the intelligence of ignorant people is able to perceive the real sphere of objects, they should naturally achieve freedom from perverted views and should be able to achieve emancipation without any effort. [Since they are not emancipated, it shows that the objective spheres they perceive are not real at all.]

(4) The wisdom that changes with the following three wisdoms:

a. Changing with the wisdom of the Bodhisattva who has attained mastery of mind. This means that the Bodhisattva of the eighth Land who has attained ‘mastery of mind’ is capable of changing and transforming things at will, changing earth [into gold] and so forth without fail according to his desires. If an external sphere really exists, how can such a transformation be possible?

b. Changing with the wisdom of the Shrāvaka or Pratyekabuddha who medi­tates and has attained the power of inner perception: This means that, when the Shrāvaka or the Pratyekabuddha, who has achieved supreme calmness (samāpatti) and has practised the meditation of the Dharma, meditates on one sphere of objects, the various characteristics of the objects appear before him: impermanence, suffering, etc. If the sphere is real, why does it change according to his mind?

c. Changing with the wisdom of pure intuition or knowledge of the fundamental identity of all things (nirvikalpakajñāna). This means that, when a Bodhisattva has attained the fundamental, non-discriminating wisdom of pure intuition which reveals the true nature of things, all spheres of objects and their characteristics will cease to appear. If there are real spheres of objects, why should they cease to appear?

The Bodhisattva who has achieved the Four Wisdoms will definitely understand and penetrate the principle of Vijñāptimātrata.
5. Ghanavyūha Sūtra: One stanza says,

'The objects of mind, Manas, and the other consciousnesses are not
distinct from their own nature (svabhāva).
Therefore, I declare that all things are mere consciousness and there is
nothing else [which is external to the mind].'

Numerous indeed are the sacred texts which bear testimony to the truth of this
doctrine of Vijñāptimatrata.

ii. Reasoning

1. Each of the five 'commonly acknowledged' consciousnesses (the eye-conscious­
ness, etc.), like the other four, does not directly perceive any object distinct from
itself. [In other words, the eye-consciousness does not perceive sound: nor does
the ear-consciousness perceive form or color, and so forth. However, this is not the
case with the eye-consciousness of the Buddha, or of the Bodhisattva in his final
incarnation.]

2. The other 'commonly acknowledged' consciousness, - the sixth, i.e.,
Manovijñāna, - because it is a consciousness, like the five, does not directly per­
ceive dharmas distinct from itself either.

3. The immediate object of the six consciousnesses is not distinct from these
consciousnesses, because it is one of their two bhāgas (i.e., the nimittabhāga), just
as the perceiving division (i.e., the darśhanabhāga) is not distinct from conscious­
ness since it is consciousness in its essential nature.

4. The immediate object of consciousness, because it is an object, like the associ­
ated mental activities, is definitely not separable from chitta and chaittas.

Arguments and philosophical reasoning to prove this doctrine of Vijñāptimatrata
are numerous. We should therefore believe deeply in and accept it.

The conclusion is that the Atman and dharmas are non-existent; Tathata (the Void
or Emptiness) and consciousness are not inexistente. Atman and dharmas lie out­
side the category of existence; Tathata and consciousness lie outside the category
of non-existence. We have, therefore, in this doctrine, the Middle Way.
Footnotes:

1 The two Shûnyatās are: pudgalâshûnyatā, voidness of Atman or ego, and dharmâshûnyatā, voidness of all dharmas or external things.

2 This corresponds to the first two of the five stages of the Path leading to Vijñâpatimatrata, namely, the stage of moral provisioning (saṁbhâravastha) and the stage of intensified effort (prayogavastha).

3 This corresponds to the third stage of the Path, namely, the stage of unimpeded penetrating understanding (prativedhavastha).

4 This corresponds to the fourth stage of the Path, namely, the stage of exercising cultivation (bhavanavastha or bhavanamarga).

5 This corresponds to the fifth (i.e. the last) stage of the Path, namely the stage of final attainment or ultimate realization (nîshťavastha).

5 This corresponds to the moment of Vajropasamâdhi or diamond meditation, that of the last stage of the Bodhisattva, characterized by firm, indestructible knowledge and attained after all vestiges of illusion have been shed.