

**THE VĀTSĪPUTRĪYAS,
SAMMATĪYAS, DHARMOTTARĪYAS,
BHADRAYĀNĪYAS, SAṆṆAGARIKAS,
VAIBHĀṢIKA SARVĀSTIVĀDINS,
MŪLASARVĀSTIVĀDINS,
SAUTRĀNTIKAS AND DĀRṢṬĀNTIKAS**

Chapters XV-XXIII from *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (1955)

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Abbreviations and Bibliography:

Bareau	<i>Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule et leurs Abhidharmapiṭaka</i> , BEFEO, volume du cinquantenaire de l'EFEO, Paris, 1952, pp. 1-11.
Bareau	<i>Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques dus à Vasumitra, Bhavya et Vinitadeva</i> , J.A. Paris, 1954, 1-2.
BEFEO	Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient.
Bhavya	Cf. Walleser, Teramoto and Hiramatsu, and Bareau.
J.A.	<i>Journal Asiatique</i> , Paris, since 1822.
LVP	La Vallée Poussin, Louis de.
PTS	Edition of the Pāli Text Society, London
Siddhi	La Vallée Poussin (de): <i>Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi</i> , 2 vol. (Buddhica, Mémoires no. 1), Paris, 1928-1929.
TS	Edition of Taishō Issaikyō.
Kouei-ki	See Oyama.
Masuda	<i>Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools ... of Vasumitra's Treatise</i> , (Asia Major, t. II, fasc. 2) , 1925, pp. 1-78.
Oyama	<i>Yi pou tsong louen louen chou ki fa jen</i> , Kyōto, 1891.
Schiefner	<i>Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien</i> , Saint-Petersburg, 1869.
Teramoto and Hiramatsu	<i>Samayabhedoparacanacakra</i> , etc., Kyōto, 1935.
Vasumitra	See Masuda, Walleser, Oyama, Teramoto and Hiramatsu, and Bareau.
Vinitadeva	See Teramoto and Hiramatsu, and Bareau.
Walleser	<i>Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus</i> , Heidelberg, 1927.

A.

INTRODUCTION

As early as the first centuries of its history, the Buddhist Community split into numerous sects and schools, on the occasion of sometimes tremendous schisms, and each of these divisions held opinions accused of being heretical, by the others. The present work is concerned with (a) these sects, (b) these schools, (c) these schisms and (d) these heresies.

Before getting to the heart of the matter, it is important to clarify the meaning of the above terms which we are using in the absence of better ones but which do not express exactly the Indian notions which they claim to represent.

AA.

SECTS AND SCHOOLS

What the Sanskrit Buddhism calls *nikāya* and the Pāli Buddhism calls *ācariyavāda*, we will call *sect* or *school*.

- A *nikāya* is a group of people who submit to the same rules. It is also, and more generally, a collection of objects, such as the collections of *sūtras*, precisely called *nikāya* in Pāli. By comparing the word *kāya*, which has the same root and means *body*, we may say that a *nikāya* is a constituted *body* or a *body* of doctrine according to whether the word is applied to people or to things. Thus it is rendered fairly well by the word *sect* even though it is built up from a quite different etymology.
- The Pāli word *ācariyavāda* means the oral teaching (*vāda*) of a master (*ācariya*) and corresponds rather to our word *school*.

As the Sanskrit texts call *nikāya* what the Pāli texts call *ācariyavāda*, we will use the words *sect* and *school* giving them the same meaning. They express the idea of a spiritual association constituted under the patronage of a master whose teaching it follows.

The Buddhist sects differ from those of the early Christianity in (i) that, since the Buddhist Community did not have, like the Christian Church, a supreme authority incarnated in a single person, pope or patriarch, the sect or school was not truly separated from the Community, and (ii) that its heresy was purely relative to the doctrine of the other fractions of the Community. In most cases even, the relationships between different sects were not deprived of peace and harmony, and we should compare the Buddhist sects with the Protestant sects which, while sometimes differing greatly concerning doctrine or worship, are somewhat united in a certain way in the bosom of the ecumenical movement.

AB.

SCHISM

We will call *schism* what the Buddhists call *saṅghabheda*, 'breaking the Community', which constitutes one of the five major crimes, comparable in gravity to patricide, matricide, the killing of an Arhat and the wounding of a Buddha with a hateful mind. It occurs when an

intelligent and virtuous monk, who therefore <ii> enjoys great authority, drags along behind himself a part of the Community and gives it a new teacher and a new Path.¹ But once again, since the Community lacks a supreme authority, the Buddhist schism is purely relative and the schismatic claims to be the guardian of the doctrinal or moral purity that is weakened by the decline of the Community out of which it stems and of which it presents itself to be the reformer.

AC.

HERESY

We will call *heresy* what the Buddhists call *dr̥ṣṭi* (Pāli *diṭṭhi*), 'afflicted view' of the mind, a personal opinion that does not conform to the teaching of the Buddha. It is also called *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, 'false view', as opposed to *samyagdr̥ṣṭi*, 'right view'. These words in general have, moreover, only relative value; what is heresy or false view for one sect is right view for another.

Of the twenty or thirty sects or schools of the Hinayāna, we have the works only of the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins plus a few works, particularly of the Vinaya, of the Dharmaguptakas, Mahīśakas, Mahāsāṅghikas, Lokottaravādins, Mūlasarvāstivādins, Sammatīyas, Kāśyapīyas, Haimavatas, Abhayagirivāsins, Bahuśrutīyas or Prajñāptivādins. Fortunately there are some collections of theses classified according to sects, collections of arguments, some commentaries on both of them, and a rather large number of facts scattered in several treatises such as the *Vibhāṣā* or the *Abhidharmakośa*. The comparative and critical study of all these documents of such varied origins has turned out to be much less disappointing than had been generally thought based on the testimony of summary works, early and often poorly drawn up. It turns out that certain pessimistic judgments were based on bad readings of the texts, on the use of faulty editions, or simply on grave errors of method, like the one, too frequently committed, which consists of putting documents of very different time periods and worth on the same level, and then, after superficial examination, concluding that the contradictions existing between them render them completely unusable. The worst is that these errors have a long life, that some are reverently preserved for a century and used, without any shadow of verification, by often eminent researchers.

Undoubtedly, the value and accuracy of the used documents and very provisional conclusions that can be drawn from their study should not be exaggerated. The study of Indian Buddhism requires much cautiousness and it can be stated almost unreservedly that, in this domain, historical certainty does not exist, that there are only greater or lesser probabilities. It is all the more true that, despite the magnificent efforts accomplished since more than a century, there still remains an enormous amount to be discovered in the vast forest of documents that have come down to us, without counting those, certainly much more numerous, alas, that have

¹ LVP: *Kośa*, IV, pp. 208-209.

disappeared without a trace. Here more than elsewhere, it is appropriate to constantly remember that our facts are fragile, uncertain, that they are always asking for an interpretation from which it is quite difficult and undoubtedly even impossible to remove the part due to ‘the personal equation’, that of the reader and that of the author, what could be the integrity and experience of the one and of the other.

The purpose of the present work has been, first and foremost, to provide documents <iii> and references. In its original form, it should have been just a series of notes incorporated into the French translation of the treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinitideva. The general portions and various hypotheses that have been taken from the direct study of documents thus collected are none other than simply propositions, simple theses, attendant antitheses, and not definitive conclusions. They have no other goal than to show new aspects of old problems and to ask new questions.

B.

CHAPTER XV: THE VĀTSĪPUTRĪYAS

According to the agreement of all the sources, the sect of the Vātsiputriyas is perhaps the first exit from the Sthavira trunk after that, however, of the Haimavata. The schism that gave rise to it would have occurred just 200 years after the Nirvāṇa (≈ 480 B.C.), about 280 B.C. according to the Sammatīya tradition which would be based on the Vātsiputriya tradition itself, or at the beginning of the 3rd century after the Nirvāṇa, which is a little after 280 B.C., according to the traditions of the North-West. One would not be much mistaken in placing this event under the reign of Bindusāra Maurya (289-264 B.C.).

The Vātsiputriyas take their name from the founder of their sect, Vātsiputra.² According to the *Mañjuśrīpariṣcchāsūtra*, the latter was a master of discipline (*vinayadhāra*).³ According to K'oueiki, he was of the Brahman caste.⁴ Paramārtha, in fact, makes him a disciple of Śāriputra.⁵

The Ceylonese tradition calls them Vajjiputtakas and not, as we might expect, Vacchiputtakas. The difference may be easily explained phonetically, but it should be pointed out because the name Vajjiputtakas also designates the Vṛjjiputrakas, i.e., the monks of Vaiśali of the Vṛjji clan who, by their breaches of the disciplinary rules, provoked the convocation of the Synod of Vaiśali, 100 or 110 years after the Nirvāṇa. From this, it might be concluded that the Vātsiputriyas were none other than these Vṛjjiputrakas if, on the one hand, the Ceylonese tradition identified them, which is not the case, and if all the other traditions did not clearly distinguish the two names. There is, therefore, certainly no link between them.⁶

Lin Li-Kouang, using the suspect testimony of the Chinese monk Seng-yeou (beginning of the 6th century A.D.), has worked out an ingenious hypothesis from which it emerges that the Vātsiputriyas are none other than the "reformed Mahāsāṅghikas".⁷ The fragility of this hypothesis, as appealing as it may be, is too great for it to be taken into consideration. At the beginning of the chapter dedicated to the Mahāsāṅghikas, we have seen what must be thought of this "reform" that arose among the latter. Lin Li-Kouang, very fairly, does not conceal that the identification of the Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya with that of the Vātsiputriyas does not exist in the post-scriptum of the former on which it is based. It is, therefore, an invention of Seng-yeou. On the other hand, and this is decisive, the *agreement of all the sources*, Indian or directly inspired by

² M. S. J. Thomas, in his *History of Buddhist Thought*, pp. 38-39, notes, suggests another explanation: the Vātsiputriyas were the monks from the land of the Vatsas, capital Kauśāmbi.

³ TS 468, p. 501 b.

⁴ K'oueiki, II, p. 5 b.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 6 a.

⁶ Dutt: *Early Monastic Buddhism*, II, p. 174, accepts, however, the hypothesis of this identification.

⁷ Lin Li-Kouang: *Introduction au Compendium de la Loi*, pp. 194, 202, n. 2, 297-302.

Indian testimonies, absolutely distinguishes the Vātsīputriyas from the Mahāsāṅghikas.⁸ <115> Seng-yeou, over whom clearly the accusation of “manipulation of texts” hangs, could not be right against such agreement.

The Vātsīputriyas themselves have left no trace of their residence in India or elsewhere. This is most probably due to the fact that they were soon eclipsed by one of their sub-sects, the Sammatīyas, whose extraordinary development in India in the 7th century A.D. has been noted by Hiuan-tsang.

Nothing of their literature is known except that, on the testimony of the author of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtrāśāstra*⁹ and of Paramārtha, their *Abhidharmapiṭaka* was called *Śāriputrābhidharma* or *Dharmalakṣaṇābhidharma*, and was made up of nine parts. Unfortunately it has not come down to us.

According to Tāranātha, the Vātsīputriyas still existed as a distinct sect at the time of the Pāla kings (10-11th century A.D.).¹⁰

Here are the theses attributed to them:

- 1) The person (*pudgala*) is perceived (*upalabhyate*) as an evident reality (*sākṣitkṛtaparamārthena*). The person is neither identical (*sama*) with the aggregates (*skandha*) nor different (*viśama*) from them. It exists neither within the aggregates nor outside them.¹¹

It is the personalist (*pudgalavādin*) thesis that distinguishes them from all other Buddhists and brings them closer to the Brahmans, Hindus and Jains.

Here are some of the numerous arguments by means of which the Vātsīputriyas support their thesis. It has been said by the Blessed One:

Having transmigrated (*sandhāvitoāna*) seven times at the most (*sattakkhattuparamaṇi*), the person (*pudgala*) puts an end to suffering (*dukkhassantakaro hoti*) and becomes one who has exhausted all the fetters (*sabbasaññojanakkhaya*),

thus there exists a person who transmigrates (*sandhāvati*) from this world (*asmā lokā*) to another world (*paraṇi lokam*) and from another world to this world. It has been said by the Blessed One:

O monks, I see (*passamāhaṇi*) by means of the perfectly pure (*visuddha*) and superhuman (*atikkantamānusaka*) divine eye (*dibba cakkhu*) the sentient beings (*satta*) who pass away

⁸ A. Bareau: *Une confusion entre Mahāsāṅghika et Vātsīputriya*, J.A., 1953, pp. 399-406.

⁹ Lamotte: *Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*, I, p. 112. Demiéville, *Origine des sectes bouddhiques*, pp. 23 and 57. This is not the T 1548, despite the similarity of titles.

¹⁰ Schiefner: *Tāranātha*, p. 274.

¹¹ *Kathāvatthu*, I, 1; *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, T 1646, p. 259 a; *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, pp. 55 a and 8 b; Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 5; Vinitadeva, thesis 1; LVP ix. F 232.

(*cavamāna*), who are reborn (*upapajjamāna*), lowly (*hina*) or excellent (*paṇita*), handsome (*suvaṇṇa*) or ugly (*dubbaṇṇa*), having good destinies (*sugata*) or bad destinies (*duggata*), I know (*pajānāmi*) the sentient beings who are rewarded according to their actions (*yathākammūpaga*).

It has been said by the Blessed One:

O monks, I will explain to you the burden (*bhāra*), the bearer of the burden (*bhārahāra*), the taking up of the burden (*bhāradāna*), the setting down of the burden (*bhāranikkhepana*).

It has been said by the Blessed One:

A person, O monks, who is born (*uppajjamāna*) into the world (*loka*), is born (*uppajjati*) for the benefit of many people (*bahujanahitāya*).

A stream-enterer (*sotāpanna*), who dies (*cuta*) in the world of men (*manussaloka*) and is reborn (*uppanna*) in the world of the gods (*devaloka*), stays there as stream-enterer. There is someone who sees (*passati*), who hears (*suṇāti*), who smells (*ghāyati*), who tastes (*sāyati*), who touches (*phusati*), who knows (*viñāti*), something that is seen, heard, etc., ..., something through which one sees, hears, etc., ... In the same way, there is someone (*koci*) who is endowed with the super-knowledges (*abhiññā*), who hears sound (*sadda*) by means of the divine (*dibba*) ear (*sotadhātu*), who knows (*jānāti*) the mind of another (*paracitta*), etc., ... The existence of consciousness assumes the existence of the subject of the consciousness, which is the person. Since there are <116> mothers (*mātā*), fathers (*pitā*), noblemen (*khattiya*), brāhmins, gods (*deva*), men (*manussa*), etc. ..., there are persons who bear these names. A similar argument is based on the recognized existence of the various kinds of Buddhist saints.

- 2) That which is graspable (*upādāniya*) and endowed with graspings (*upādāna*) by the passions and the defilements, i.e., what is based on the aggregates (*skandha*), sense-spheres (*āyatana*) and the sense-elements (*dhātu*), is merely a designation or conception (*prajñapti*).¹²

This thesis is a corollary of the preceding. That with which ignorant people identify the person, i.e., such and such an aggregate, sense-sphere, sense-element, that is subject to the passions and the defilements, is only a fiction, a pure designation or conception, and cannot therefore be the person itself.¹³

- 3) Except for the person (*pudgala*), no factor (*dharma*) transmigrates (*saṅkrāmati*) from this world here (*asmāloka*) to another world (*paraṃ lokaṃ*).¹⁴

¹² Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 1.

¹³ Kouei-ki, p. 26 b.

¹⁴ Vasumitra, thesis 3; Bhavya, theses 2 and 3.

If no factor transmigrates, it may be said that, when the life faculty (*jīvitendriya*) has ceased (*niruddha*), all factors have equally ceased. But as the person (*pudgala*) has not ceased, it can transmigrate from one world to the other and, as factors are not different from the person, it can be said that there is transmigration (*saṃkrānti*).¹⁵

- 4) All conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*) last only for a single instant (*ekakṣānika*).¹⁶

According to Bhavya, the Vātsīputriyas maintained that the conditioned phenomena are instantaneous or not. Lacking any commentary, it is hard to understand this last proposition.

- 5) The five sense consciousnesses (*viññāna*) are neither endowed with passions (*sarāga*) nor devoid of passions (*virāga*).¹⁷

The five consciousnesses are neither endowed with passions nor devoid of passions for they are merely indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), i.e., neither good (*kuśala*) nor bad (*akuśala*).

- 6) There are also heretics (*tīrthika*) who possess the five super-knowledges (*abhijñā*).¹⁸

The heretics can obtain the super-knowledges by means of vision (*darśana*) and cultivation (*bhāvanā*).

- 7) The abandonment (*prahāna*) of the fetters (*saṃyojana*) of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) that should be abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanayā prahātavya*) is what is called detachment (*virāga*). This is not the abandonment of the fetters that should be abandoned by vision (*darśanena prahātavya*).¹⁹

The fetters of the realm of desire that must be abandoned by cultivation are delusion (*moha*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and attachment (*rāga*). Delusion is illusion (*māyā*). It does not put an obstacle (*āvaraṇa*) to the constituents [of enlightenment, such as empty (*śūnya*), nonself (*anātmya*), etc., ...]. The six practices of meditation²⁰ on the fluxes (*āsrava*) cannot make evident (*sāksītkaroti*) these constituents, they can only control delusion. Delusion is therefore not a factor that must be abandoned by vision. <117> As soon as these constituents have been seen, one can definitively abandon the fetters. Ordinary persons (*prthagjana*) and noble

¹⁵ K'oueī-ki, III, p. 27 a

¹⁶ Vasumitra, thesis 2; Bhavya, thesis 3.

¹⁷ Vasumitra, thesis 5; Bhavya, thesis 8; Viniitadeva, thesis 3.

Masuda: The five consciousnesses (*pañcaviññāna*) neither (conduce to) passion (*sarāga*) nor to freedom from passion (*virāga*).

¹⁸ Vasumitra, thesis 4.

¹⁹ Vasumitra, thesis 6.

²⁰ **Masuda:** "The so-called sixfold meditation is the comparative meditation of lower and higher stages".

persons (*ārya*) abandon the fetters of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), etc., ... by means of six practices.²¹

- 8) Presentiment (*kṣānti*), names (*nāman*), aspects (*ākara*)²² and the highest mundane factors (*laukikāgradharma*) are called 'those that can cause one to enter into the absolute good (*samyaktva*) and to give up rebirths (*upapatti*)'.²³

The stage of 'presentiment' is that in which, at the beginning of the clear understanding (*abhisamaya*) of the four truths (*satya*), the latter are examined only together.

The stage of 'name' is that in which one can examine the factors (*dharma*) of the teaching (*śāsana*).

The stage of 'aspects' is that in which, following the clear understanding of the truths, one examines the essence of their constituents.

In the stage of 'highest mundane factors', which without interruption follows the stage of appearance, one attains the path of vision (*darśanamārga*). The Vātsīputriyas maintain that these four things alone are called good roots (*kuśalamūla*).²⁴

- 9) In the path of vision (*darśanamārga*), there are twelve moments of mind (*cittakṣana*) where one is called "approacher" (*pratipanna*). On the thirteenth moment of mind, one is called "fruit of abiding" (*sthitiphala*).²⁵

Three minds are dedicated to each truth (*satya*). [Thus, in regard to the truth of suffering (*duḥkhasatya*)]:

- i) cognition of the doctrine with regard to suffering (*duḥkhadharmajñāna*) by means of which one examines the suffering of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*).
- ii) presentiment of the doctrine with regard to suffering (*duḥkhadharmakṣānti*): after having examined the truth of suffering of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), one abandons (*prajahāti*) the delusion (*moha*) that has not yet been abandoned (*aprahīna*) [in the realm of desire] (for there still is delusion in the higher realms [*dhātu*]), by means of repeated examination.
- iii) Subsequent cognition with regard to suffering (*duḥkhānvayañāna*): by examining together the suffering of the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and of the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*), one exhausts the truth of suffering in all three realms.

²¹ K'oueï-ki, III, p. 28 a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa*, v. F 13-14.

²² **Masuda**: "Characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*)."

²³ Vasumitra, thesis 7.

²⁴ K'oueï-ki, III, p. 48 b, and Oyama, III, p. 48 b. Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 165-169.

²⁵ Vasumitra, thesis 7; Vinitadeva, thesis 4.

The thirteenth mind is either a mind that is continuous (*santati*) with the subsequent cognition with regard to the path (*mārgānvayajñāna*) or a mind of clear understanding of the four truths all together. After having successively passed through [the first twelve minds], one obtains the fruit (*phala*), and then, likewise, successively, the second and the third fruits.²⁶

10) The object of cognition (*jñeya*) is expressible (*abhilāpya*) and inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*).²⁷

11) One should not say that extinction (*nirvāṇa*) is truly identical with all factors, nor that it is truly different.²⁸

This is a corollary of thesis 1 above. If the person (*pudgala*) is neither identical with nor different from the factors, his extinction is necessarily neither identical with nor different from them.

12) One should not say that extinction (*nirvāṇa*) really exists or does not really exist.²⁹

This is a corollary of the preceding thesis. <118>

13) The perfected being (*arhat*) can retrogress (*parihāyati*) from arhatship (*arahattva*).³⁰

It was said by the Blessed One:

O monks, five factors (*dhamma*) lead to (*saṃvattanti*) to retrogression (*parihāna*) of the monk liberated limited by the occasion (*samayavimutta*). – What are these five? – The fact of taking pleasure in worldly action (*kammārāmatā*), the fact of taking pleasure in talk (*bhassārāmatā*), the fact of taking pleasure in sleep (*niddārāmatā*), the fact of taking pleasure in company (*saṅghaṇikārāmatā*), [the fact of taking pleasure in vain fancies (*papañca*)].³¹ As the liberated (*vimutta*) mind (*citta*) does not observe (*paccavekkhati*) them, in truth, O monks, these five factors lead to the retrogression of the monk liberated limited by the occasion.

14) The highest mundane factors (*laukikāgradharma*) are the five praxis-oriented faculties of faith (*śraddhendriya*), diligence (*vīryendriya*), mindfulness (*smṛtindriya*), concentration (*samādhindriya*) and discrimination (*prajñendriya*), due to their intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).³²

²⁶ K'oueī-ki, III, p. 49 ab LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 179-185.

²⁷ Vinitadeva, thesis 5. Lacking any commentary, the meaning of this proposition remains enigmatic.

²⁸ Bhavya, thesis 6.

²⁹ Bhavya, thesis 7.

³⁰ *Kathāvatthu*, I, 2.

³¹ **LS:** The fifth point is missing in Bareau. Inserted from *Āṅguttara*, iii. 293.

³² *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 8 b.

Unaided, these five praxis-oriented faculties are good (*kuśala*) by their intrinsic nature. It is because they are mixed with them that the others may also be said to be good. It is because they are based on these five praxis-oriented faculties that the noble persons (*ārya*) are distinguished from other people, and not because they are based on the other faculties. As the *sūtra* says:

There are five praxis-oriented faculties that increase resolution. Because they are cultivated and because they are practiced equally and fully, one completely realizes liberation (*vimukti*).³³

15) The person (*pudgala*) cognizes (*jānāti*) the factors (*dharma*).³⁴

16) Cognition (*jñāna*) is only a member of the path (*mārgāṅga*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) is only a member of existence (*bhavāṅga*).³⁵

The *sūtra* indeed says that right view (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*) is a member of the path, whereas consciousness has the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) as object.³⁶

17) One single eye (*cakṣus*) sees (*paśyati*) visual forms (*rūpa*).³⁷

18) It is only in regard to the person (*pudgala*) that the contaminants (*anuśaya*) have the meaning (*artha*) of growing (*anuśayana*).³⁸

It is the person, not the mind (*citta*), etc., that is at the same time endowed with and devoid of contaminants, for it is that [person] that is fettered or unfettered.³⁹

19) Extinction (*nirvāṇa*) is at the same time 'those in training' (*śaikṣa*), 'those beyond training' (*aśaikṣa*) and 'those neither in training nor beyond training' (*nevaśaikṣanāśaikṣa*).⁴⁰

20) The ten contaminants (*anuśaya*) that are to be abandoned by vision (*darśanena prahātavya*) in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) constitute the nature (*bhāva*) of the ordinary person (*prthagjana*).⁴¹

³³ *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 8 b.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42 c. No line of argument is mentioned.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 44 b.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 44 b.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 62 a. No line of argument is mentioned.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 110 b.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 110 b.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 169 a and 8 b. No line of argument is mentioned.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 231 b and 8 b; on p. 8 b, it is said that the contaminants are dissociated (*viprayukta*).

The nature of the ordinary person is included in the desire realm. This defiled nature (*kliṣṭabhāva*) is to be abandoned by vision. It is included (*saṃgrahita*) in the aggregate of formations (*saṃskāraskandha*) associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the mind (*citta*).⁴²

21) The fetters (*saṃyojana*), that which is fettered (*saṃyojaniya*) and the person (*pudgala*) are real.⁴³

22) Sound (*śabda*) is a ripened effect (*vipākaphala*).⁴⁴ <119>

It is said in the *sūtras* that the Bodhisattva, having abandoned coarse bad speech during his previous existences, obtains the heavenly sound (*brahmasvara*) because of the accomplishment of this action. This is why it is said that sound is a ripened effect.

23) All sentient beings (*sattva*) have two types of losses (*āpatti* ?): the loss of the mind (*manas*) and the loss of the object (*vastu*).⁴⁵

24) Birth (*jāti*) and death (*maraṇa*) have two types of dominant causes (*adhipatīhetu*): the defilements (*kleśas*) and actions (*karman*).⁴⁶

25) Two kinds of factors (*dharma*) are dominant cause (*adhipatīhetu*) for liberation (*vimukti*): insight (*vipaśyanā*) and calming (*śamatha*).⁴⁷

26) If it is not based (*āśraya*) on the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) and does not take shame (*hri*) as dominant condition (*adhipatīratyaya*), the good law (*saddharma*) does not accompany man.⁴⁸

27) The roots (*mūla*) of the defilements (*kleśa*) are of two types: perpetually, they are in operation according to all sentient beings, and in ignorance (*avidyā*) there is craving (*tṛṣṇā*).⁴⁹

28) There are seven types of places of purity (*viśuddhisthāna*).⁵⁰

29) The object-fields of the cognition of the Buddhas (*buddhajñāna*) are dissociated (*viprayukta*) from morality (*śīla*), etc.⁵¹

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 231 b and 8 b; on p. 8 b, it is said that the contaminants are dissociated (*viprayukta*).

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 288 b and 8 b: no line of argument is mentioned.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 612 c.

⁴⁵ Vasumitra, supplementary series to the version of Paramārtha, thesis 1. Lacking any commentary, this thesis remains enigmatic.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, thesis 2. Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 307-308.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, thesis 3. Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 280 and vii. F 21.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, thesis 4. Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 172.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, thesis 5. See Bhavya, thesis of the Dhamottariyas.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, thesis 6.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, thesis 7.

30) By being based (*āśraya*) on right understanding that has everything (*sarva*) as object-support (*ālambana*), the Buddhas are able to penetrate all factors (*dharma*).⁵²

31) There are six types of common factors that are included in cessation (*nirodha*).⁵³

32) In the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*), there is no entry into the absolute good (*samyaktva*).⁵⁴

33) When the Bodhisattvas are reborn into an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*), if they formerly have given rise to the cognition of destruction (*kṣayañāna*) and the cognition of non-arising (*anutpādajñāna*), they can attain the rank of Buddha.⁵⁵

The Vātsīputriyas, like the Sammatīyas, therefore, accepted the intermediate existence. They also accepted that a Bodhisattva could become Buddha in the intermediary existence.

34) The *sūtras* expounded by the Tathāgata have three meanings (*artha*):

- i) the revelation of offenses (*āpatti*) [that lead to] birth (*jāti*) and death (*maraṇa*);
- ii) the revelation of merits (*punya*) [that lead to] liberation (*vimukti*);
- iii) the non-revealable.⁵⁶

The Buddha's teaching has therefore, partially, an esoteric meaning.

35) The highest mundane factors (*laukikāgradharma*) are included (*paryāpanna*) in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*).⁵⁷ <120>

Indeed, if on a stage (*bhūmi*) there is the noble path (*āryamārga*), on that stage there are these the highest mundane factors.

36) There are six destinies (*gati*), including that of the Asuras.⁵⁸

37) The contaminants (*anuśaya*) are formations dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*).⁵⁹

38) There is only one unconditioned phenomenon (*asaṃskṛta*), namely, extinction (*nirvāṇa*).⁶⁰

⁵² *Ibid.*, thesis 8.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, thesis 9. The translation is uncertain.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, thesis 10.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, thesis 11.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, thesis 12.

⁵⁷ *Vibhāṣā*, TS 1545, p. 14 a; TS 1546, p. 9 b.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, TS 1545, p. 8 b; TS 1546, p. 6 a.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, TS 1545, p. 8 b.

⁶⁰ LVP: *Kośa*, i. F 7, n. 2.

- 39) The nature of the ordinary person (*prthagjanabhāva*), bad (*akuśala*) bodily action (*kāyakarman*) and vocal action (*vākkarman*) are to be abandoned by vision (*darśana prahātavya*).⁶¹

The nature of the ordinary person is an undefiled (*akliṣṭa*) and indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) factor (*dharma*). Bad bodily or vocal action, ripened as a bad destiny (*durgatī*), is form (*rūpa*). Now, the quality of an ordinary person and the action that causes a bad destiny are in contradiction with the path of vision (*darśanamārga*). They must therefore be abandoned by vision.

- 40) Bodily manifest action (*kāyaviññapti*) is movement (*gati*), for it occurs when there is movement, not when there is no movement.⁶² <121>

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, i. p. 79.

⁶² *Ibid.*, iv. p. 4.

C. **CHAPTER XVI: THE SAMMATĪYAS**

All the old sources agree in considering the Sammatīyas as one of the four sects stemming from the Vātsīputriyas, either the third (sources of the North-West) or the fourth (Ceylonese sources). According to the former, their appearance would date back to the middle of the 3rd century after the Nirvāṇa, or the middle of the 2nd century B.C. In reality, no definite trace of their existence is found before the 2nd century A.D. If, as Paramārtha claims, the schism that gave rise to them was provoked by a discussion concerning the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* of the Vātsīputriyas, it is necessary to date their appearance back to the 1st century before or after our era.

Following the orthographies and the translations, their name may mean: those who live in harmony, or those who should be respected (Pāli, *saṃmatīya*), those who are assembled, or equal (Pāli, *samītiya*), those who have a correct measure, or the equal ones (*saṃmītiya*). According to Bhavya (1st list), their name would come from their teacher Saṃmata. K'oueï-ki explains that, as the meaning (*artha*) of the very profound (*sugambhira*) law (*dharma*) that they uphold is correct, without error, highly esteemed, correctly measured, they were given this name.⁶³

Only two inscriptions attest to their presence, the one at Mathurā from the 2nd century A.D.,⁶⁴ the other at Sārnāth in the 4th century, where they had replaced the Sarvāstivādins who themselves had supplanted the Sthaviras previously.⁶⁵

From the beginning of the 7th century, their importance had become so significant that Hiuan-tsang, I-tsing and Vinitadeva considered them to be the preeminent school of the Vātsīputriyas, grouping all the sects of this branch under their name.

In the second quarter of the 7th century, Hiuan-tsang encountered more or less important groups of them in the entire middle Ganges valley, where they totaled some 12,000 monks living in about 80 monasteries, more than 5,000 in fifteen monasteries in the lower Ganges, 20,000 in hundreds of monasteries in Mālava, 6,000 in a hundred monasteries at Valabhī, 20,000 in hundreds of monasteries in the Indus delta.⁶⁶ According to Hiuan-tsang, it was the most numerous group with more than 60,000 monks out of 220,000 in all. In the last years of the 7th century, I-tsing noticed them especially in western India, at Laṭa and at the Sindhu, where they were by far the most flourishing sect, at Magadha in eastern India, and in small numbers in the south, but neither in Ceylon nor in northern India. Always, according to I-tsing, a few of them were encountered in the Sonde islands and an important group at Champa where they predominated.⁶⁷ According to Bhavya (1st list) and Vinitadeva, at this time they⁶⁸ were divided

⁶³ K'oueï-ki, II, p. 6 b.

⁶⁴ H. Sastri: *Epigraphia Indica*, vol. XIX (Calcutta, 1927-8), p. 67.

⁶⁵ Hultzsch: *Epigraphia Indica*, vol. VIII (Calcutta, 1905-6), p. 172.

⁶⁶ See detail above, 1st part, chap. III.

⁶⁷ Takakusu: *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiv, 8 seq.

into two schools, the <122> Avantakas and the Kurukulas. These two names can be made clear geographically: the Avantakas perhaps being the Sammatīyas from Avanta or Avanti, i.e., the region situated north of the Narbada and east of the lower Indus; the Kurukulas, “those of the Kuru family”, may have been the Sammatīyas residing in the territory of the ancient Kurukṣetra, i.e., on the upper Ganges around Sthāneśvara. The sister of the famous king Harṣa Śīlāditya who was clearly from the lineage of the princes of Sthāneśvara, is said to have revered the sect of the Sammatīyas especially,⁶⁹ and on the other hand, Hiuan-tsang found, at the same time, numerous monks of this sect in the region.

According to I-tsing, their Tripiṭaka contained only 200,000 stanzas (*śloka*), 30,000 of which were of the *Vinayapiṭaka* alone.⁷⁰ The bottom of their monastic robe was cut in an irregular shape, they slept in a kind of enclosure delimited by ropes and serving as a shared dormitory.⁷¹ They draped their lower robe in the way of Indian women, pulling back the right edge over the left side allowing the end sections to hang freely.⁷²

According to certain late Tibetan works, they had as patron the *śūdra* Upāli, the famous scholar who recited the *Vinayapiṭaka* at the Synod of Rājagṛha. Their language was Paśāci or rather Apabhraṃśa. Their outer robe was made up of twenty-one to twenty-five sections of fabric or from five to twenty-one sections. Their emblem was an areca flower. Their names ended preferentially with *-dāsa* and *-sena*, but sometimes also with *-śīla*, *-hari*, *-candra* and *-guhya*.⁷³

Of all their literature, there remains for us only the Chinese translation of the *Sammatīyanikāyaśāstra*, a rather short work, obviously post-canonical, which gives us some precious information on the Sammatīya doctrine,⁷⁴ and a short treatise on the Vinaya.⁷⁵

According to Paramārtha, the Sammatīyas formed one of the four schools stemming from the Vātsīputriyas who, dissatisfied with the *Abhidharma* of Śāriputra, the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* of the latter, composed treatises (*śāstra*) to complete the meaning of the *sūtras*. They “... explained the

⁶⁸ The names of these two schools are not certain for they correspond poorly to the translations, both Tibetan and Chinese, given by the *Mahāvīyutpatti*.

⁶⁹ Watters: *On Yuan-chwang's travels*, I, p. 346. Hiuan-tsang says elsewhere that she was, on the contrary, an ardent Mahāyanist: Grousset: *Sur les traces du Bouddha*, p. 196.

⁷⁰ Takakusu: *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiv and 8.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

⁷³ Lin Li-Kouang: *Introduction au Compendium de la Loi*, pp. 176-181 and 205-208.

⁷⁴ T 1649, translated between 350 and 431.

⁷⁵ T 1641.

Abhidharma of Śāriputra, completing the meaning of it—in the places where it is insufficient—by means of the meaning of the *sūtras*".⁷⁶

Vasumitra tells that the schism must have been due to differing explanations given by the four sects of the following stanza (*gāthā*):

Being already liberated, one retrogresses again.
The retrogression comes from passion; one returns again.
Having obtained the place of calm joy, this is happiness.
If one follows the practices of happiness, this is perfect happiness.

Commenting on this passage by Vasumitra, K'ouei-ki explains that, according to the Sammatiyas, six types of persons correspond to the four fruits (*phala*):

- 1) those who are liberated (*vimukta*), i.e., the "stream-enterer" (*srotāpanna*) who has obtained liberation (*vimukti*);
- 2) those who go from family to family (*kulaṃkula*), i.e., the one who heads for the second fruit;
- 3) those who have obtained the fruit of the once-returner (*sakṛdāgamin*);
- 4) those who have no more than one separation <123> (*ekavīcika*);
- 5) those who will never return here any more (*anāgamin*);
- 6) the perfected beings (*arhat*).

The first quarter-verse (*pāda*) points out those who are liberated but who can retrogress into delusion.

The second quarter-verse points out those who go from family to family, the fourth persons, who can retrogress because of desire (*kāma*), and the third persons, who will return to this world.

The third quarter-verse points out the fifth persons [who will not return to this world].

The fourth quarter-verse points out the perfected beings (*arhat*).⁷⁷

The tradition of the Sammatiyas cited by Bhavya attributes to them only one thesis which is given as fundamental:

What should exist (*bhavanīya*) and what does exist (*bhava*), what should cease (*nirodhavya*) and what has ceased (*niruddha*), what should arise (*janitavya*) and what has arisen (*jāta*), what should die (*maraṇīya*) and what is dead (*mṛta*), what should be done (*kṛtya*) and what is done (*kṛta*), what should be liberated (*moktavīya*) and what is liberated (*mokta*), what should go

⁷⁶ Demiéville: *Origine des sectes bouddhiques*, p. 58.

⁷⁷ K'ouei-ki, III, p. 30 ab. Cf, LVP, *Kośa*, vi. F 195-230.

(*gantavya*) and what goes (*gāmin*), what should be understood (*viññeya*) and consciousness (*viññāna*) exist.

Lacking any commentary, the exact meaning of this thesis escapes us. Nevertheless, it seems correct that it deals with the ontological problem.

Only Vinitadeva and, above all, the *Kathāvatthu* inform us in some detail about their doctrines. Here are their theses:

- 1) The person (*pudgala*) is apprehended (*upalabbhati*) as an evident reality (*sacchikaṭṭhaparamatṭhena*). The person (*pudgala*) is not truly identical with the aggregates (*skandha*). It is not in the aggregates, neither does it exist outside of the aggregates.⁷⁸
- 2) The perfected being (*arhat*) may retrogress (*parihāyati*) from arhatship (*arahattā*).⁷⁹
- 3) There is no pure religious life (*brahmacariyavāsa*) among the gods (*deva*).⁸⁰

Among the gods there are no monks who have left the world (*pabbajja*), who are shaven-headed (*muṇḍiya*), wearing the monastic robe (*kāsāvadhāra*) and carrying the begging bowl (*pattadhāra*). The Sammāsambuddhas, the Paccekabuddhas, the pairs of chief disciples (*sāvakayuga*) are not born among the Gods. Therefore, there can be neither cultivation of the path (*maggabhāvanā*) nor pure religious life.

- 4) The defilements (*kilesa*) are abandoned (*jahati*) piecemeal (*odhisodhiso*).⁸¹

The “stream-enterers” (*sotāpanna*) and other noble persons desire (*icchanti*) the abandonment of the defilements (*kilesappahāna*) part by part (*ekadesena ekadesena*), one after the other (*odhiso odhiso*), by the vision of suffering (*dukkhadassana*) and the other truths, by means of different clear understandings (*nānābhisamayavasena*). The Buddha, moreover, said:

Gradually (*anupubbena*), little by little (*thokaṃ thokaṃ*), from one instant to the next (*khāṇe khāṇe*), the intelligent man (*medhavi*) cleanses (*niddhame*) his own stains (*malamattano*) like a silversmith those of silver (*rajata*).

- 5) The ordinary person (*puthujjana*) abandons (*jahati*) the attachment to desire (*kāmarāga*) and malice (*byāpāda*).⁸²

It was said by the Blessed One:

In the past (*atitaṃsa*) there were (*ahesuṃ*) six famous (*yassassi*) masters (*satthā*), spreading the perfume of virtue (*nirāmagandha*), full of compassion (*karuṇā*), liberated (*vimutta*)

⁷⁸ *Kathāvatthu*, I, 1; Vinitadeva, thesis 1. TS 1649, pp. 462 a-469 b. See thesis 1 of the Vātsīputriyas.

⁷⁹ *Kathāvatthu*, I, 2. See thesis 13 of the Vātsīputriyas.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 3.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, I, 4.

⁸² *Ibid.*, I, 5.

from the fetter of desire <124> (*kāmasaññojana*). Being detached from the attachment to desire (*kāmarāga*), they attained the Brahma-heaven (*brahmalokūpaga*). They had several (*aneka*) hundreds (*satsa*) of hearers (*sāvaka*) spreading a perfume of virtue, full of compassion, liberated from the fetter of desire. Being detached from the attachment to desire, the latter have attained the Brahma-heaven.

The ordinary person who has obtained cognition (*ñāṇalābhi*), who is endowed with the clear understanding of the truths (*saha saccābhisamaya*), who is a non-returner (*anāgamin*), has abandoned (*pahina*) desire and malice.

- 6) Clear understanding (*abhisamaya*) is gradual (*anupubbha*).⁸³
- 7) In the eighth (*aṭṭhamaka*) person (*puggala*), the manifestly active defilements of afflicted views (*diṭṭhiparituṭṭhāna*) and the manifestly active defilements of afflicted doubts (*vicikicchāpariyuṭṭhāna*) are abandoned (*pahina*).⁸⁴

In the approacher of the fruit of "stream-enterer" (*sotāpattiphala*), two manifestly active defilements (*pariyuṭṭhāna*), those of afflicted views (*diṭṭhi*) and afflicted doubt (*vicikicchā*) are abandoned because of the non-existence of their present operation (*samudācārābhāvato*).

- 8) The divine eye (*dibbacakkhu*) is the fleshly eye (*maṃsacakkhu*) based on factors (*dhammūpatthaddha*).⁸⁵

The divine eye is only the fleshly eye based on the factors of the fourth meditation (*catutthajjhāna*). No proof of this thesis is mentioned.

- 9) Merit (*puñña*) arisen from enjoying the use of something (*paribhogamaya*) grows (*vaḍḍhati*).⁸⁶

The Buddha said:

For those who give (*dadanti*) something to drink (*papa*), a well (*udapāna*) or asylum (*upassaya*), the merit increases (*pavaḍḍhati*) by day (*divā*), by night (*ratta*), always (*sadā*).

In another *sutta*, the Buddha said:

For the one thanks to whom a monk (*bhikkhu*) enjoys the use (*paribhuñjamāna*) of robes (*cīvara*), alms-food (*piṇḍapāta*), etc., ..., there is the result of merit (*punābhisanda*), a good result (*kusalābhisanda*), the sustenance of happiness (*sukkhassāhāra*), satisfying maturation (*sukhavipāka*), heaven (*sovaggika*), leading to heaven (*saggasaṃvattanika*)...

These gifts consisting of enjoying the use of something are gifts of moral obligation (*deyyadhamma*).

⁸³ *Ibid.*, II, 7. See thesis 4 of the Andhakas.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 5.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 7.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, VII, 5.

- 10) There is an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).⁸⁷
- 11) There is an individual (*attabhāva*) endowed with six sense-spheres (*saḷāyatanika*) in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*).⁸⁸
- 12) The bodily action (*kāyakamma*) originating (*samuṭṭhita*) from a good (*kusala*) mind (*citta*) is good form (*rūpa*). Form is action.⁸⁹
- Bodily action and vocal action (*vacikamma*) are precisely manifest (*viññatti*) form (*rūpa*) by the body (*kāya*) or by the speech (*vacī*). If its origin is good (*kusalasamuṭṭhāna*), it is good, and if its origin is bad (*akusalasamuṭṭhāna*), it is bad (*akusala*).
- 13) There is no material (*rūpa*) life faculty (*jīvitindriya*).⁹⁰
- 14) The perfected being (*arhat*) retrogresses (*parihāyati*) from arhatship (*arahattā*) because of his actions (*kammahetu*).⁹¹ <125>
- 15) The form (*rūpa*) of those who are endowed with the path (*maggasamāṅgi*) is path (*maggā*).⁹²
- Right speech (*sammāvācā*), right action (*sammākammanta*), right livelihood (*sammājīva*) are material and, nevertheless, are part of the Path.
- 16) The manifest (*viññatti*) is morality (*sīla*).⁹³
- The bodily manifest action (*kāyaviññati*) is bodily action (*kāyakamma*), the vocal manifest action (*vacīviññati*) is vocal action (*vacikamma*). Now, morality is bodily and vocal action. Therefore the bodily manifest action and vocal manifest action are morality. Moreover, it cannot truly be said (*na hevaṃ vattaṃ*) that the manifest is a bad state (*dussīla*).
- 17) The latent tendencies (*anusaya*) are indeterminate (*abyākata*), non-caused (*ahetuka*) and dissociated from the mind (*cittavippayutta*).⁹⁴
- The ordinary persons (*puthujjana*) must be said to be endowed with latent tendencies (*sānusaya*) when their minds (*citta*) stay (*vattamāna*) good (*kusala*) or indeterminate (*abyākata*). But it cannot truly be said (*na hevaṃ vattaṃ*) that good and bad (*kusalākusala*) factors (*dhamma*) come (*āgacchanti*) face to face (*sammukhibhāva*) in them.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, VIII, 2. See thesis 11 of the Pūrvaśailas. TS 1649, pp. 469 b-471 c.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, VIII, 7. See thesis 36 of the Andhakas.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, VIII, 9.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, VIII, 10.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, VIII, 11. See thesis 15 of the Pūrvaśailas.

⁹² *Ibid.*, X, 1.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, X, 9.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, XI, 1.

Likewise, as it cannot be said that they are caused (*saḥetuka*) by a cause (*hetu*), the latent tendencies are non-caused.

Finally, since it cannot be said that they are associated (*sampayutta*) with the mind (*citta*), the latent tendencies are dissociated from the mind.

- 18) The attachment to form (*rūparāga*) that adheres closely (*anuseti*) to the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) is included in the realm of form (*rūpadhātupariyāpanna*). The attachment to the formless (*arūparāga*) that adheres closely to the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*) is included in the formless realm (*arūpadhātupariyāpanna*).⁹⁵

Since the attachment to desire (*kāmarāga*) that adheres closely to the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) is included in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), the attachment to form that adheres closely to the realm of form is included in the realm of form, and the attachment to the formless that adheres closely to the formless realm is included in the formless realm.

- 19) Action (*kamma*) is other (*añña*) than the accumulation of action (*kammūpacaya*).⁹⁶

What is called 'accumulation of action' is other than action dissociated from the mind (*cittavippayutta*), indeterminate (*abhākata*) and without an object-support (*anārammaṇa*).

- 20) Form (*rūpa*) is good (*kusala*) or bad (*akusala*).⁹⁷

Since bodily action (*kāyakamma*) and vocal action (*vacikamma*) are good or bad, bodily manifest action (*kāyaviññatti*) and vocal manifest action (*vaciviññatti*), which is included in bodily and vocal actions, is good or bad.

- 21) Form (*rūpa*) is maturation (*vipāka*).⁹⁸

Just as the factors (*dhamma*) minds and mental events (*cittacetasika*) produced (*uppanna*) as a result of performing (*katatta*) actions (*kamma*) are <126> maturation, the form produced as a result of performing action is maturation.

- 22) There are intermediate stages (*antarika*) between the meditations (*jhāna*).⁹⁹

In the fivefold method (*pañcakanaya*), there are five distinct (*vibhatta*) meditations, and only (*kevalaṃ*) three concentrations (*samādhi*) indicated (*udīṭṭha*). The appearance (*olāsa*) of the concentration devoid of initial inquiry but endowed only with investigation (*avīṭakhaṇīkaramatta*), which is placed between (*antare*) the first and second meditations, is called intermediate stage of meditation.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, XIV, 7.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, XV, 11.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, XVI, 7.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, XVI, 8.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, XVIII, 7.

- 23) The aggregates (*skandha*) remain steady even at another time.¹⁰⁰
- 24) The attachments (*rāga*) do not arise by way of the gate (*dvāra*) of the five consciousnesses. Neither are [the five consciousnesses] separate from the attachments.¹⁰¹
- 25) The path of vision (*darśanamārga*) has twelve moments of mind (*cittakṣāṇa*). Beyond that, one remains oriented on the fruit (*phalasthita*).¹⁰²
- 26) The object of cognition (*jñeya*) is both expressible (*abhilāpya*) and inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*).¹⁰³
- 27) The object-support condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) of a consciousness (*viññāna*) is that which gives rise to it (*janayati*).¹⁰⁴
- 28) The bodily manifest action (*kāyavijñapti*) is movement (*gati*).¹⁰⁵
- 29) The characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) must be attributed to a certain prolonged state.¹⁰⁶
- 30) There is a factor 'non-disappearance' (*avipraṇāśa*) that is dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayukta*).¹⁰⁷

This 'non-disappearance' is, without doubt, the same as what Candrakīrti defines thus:

When action arises, there also arises in the stream a factor dissociated from the mind, indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), destroyed by cultivation (*bhāvanā*), which is called 'non-disappearance', which produces the effect of the action.¹⁰⁸

Most of the theses defended by the Vātsīputriyas should also be attributed to the Sammitīyas.

According to Tāranātha, the school of the Avantakas had disappeared by the 7th century.¹⁰⁹ Only the school of the Kaurukulakas subsisted until the time of the Pāla kings (9th-10th century.)¹¹⁰ The whole system of this latter school was influenced by the Mahāyāna from the 7th

¹⁰⁰ Vinitadeva, thesis 2. Lacking any commentary, the meaning of this thesis is enigmatic. It seems to contradict thesis 4 of the Vātsīputriyas.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, thesis 3.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, thesis 4.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, thesis 5. Lacking any commentary, the meaning of this thesis is enigmatic.

¹⁰⁴ LVP: *Siddhi*, p. 43.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

¹⁰⁸ LVP: *Kośa*, ix. F 295, n. 4.

¹⁰⁹ Schiefner: *Tāranātha*, p. 175.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

century in which Tāranātha indicates Vimuktasena as their teacher at that time, who was born near Jvālaguhā, between the Madhyadeśa and the South.¹¹¹ <127>

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

D.

CHAPTER XVII: THE DHARMOTTARĪYAS

All the traditions agree in considering them as the first of the sects stemming from the Vātsīputriyas. According to the sources of the north-west, they appeared about the middle of the 3rd century E.N.

Their name means ‘those who are superior (*uttara*) in regard to the Dharma’. According to K’oueī-ki, they derived their name from their founder Dharmottara who was a Vinaya master, or else, having a supramundane (*lokottara*) law (*dharma*), they were superior (*uttara*) to other beings (*sattva*), whence their name: superior as to the Dharma.¹¹² The *Mañjuśrīpariṣcchāsūtra*¹¹³ and Bhavya (1st list) likewise assert that their name came from their founder Dharmottara, Vinaya master.

According to Paramārtha, the Dharmottariyas were one of the four sects who supplemented the *Abhidharmaṭīkā* of the Vātsīputriyas, also called *Śāriputrābhidharma* or *Dharmalakṣaṇābhidharma* in nine parts, with the treatises (*śāstra*), basing themselves on the meaning of the Sūtras.¹¹⁴

The Sammatīya tradition cited by Bhavya places them, next to the Bhadrāyānīyas, in the sub-group of the Mahāgiriya, those who live in the great mountains (*mahāgiri*).

Inscriptions of the 2nd century of our era attest to their presence at Kārle, Soparaka and Junnar,¹¹⁵ in the mountains of the Bombay area, which may without doubt be identified with the Mahāgiris of whom we have already spoken.

We know little of their doctrine. According to Bhavya, they maintained the same thesis as the Bhadrāyānīyas, that is to say:

In birth (*jāti*), there is ignorance (*avidyā*) and birth; in cessation (*nirodha*), there is ignorance and cessation.

In the absence of any commentary, it is difficult to interpret this proposition which seems very commonplace for Buddhism.

According to Vasumitra, they taught a special interpretation of the following stanza:

Having already been liberated, one falls back again.
Falling back is due to passion; one comes back again.
Having attained the place of calm joy, this is happiness.
Following the practices of happiness, this is complete happiness.

¹¹² K’oueī-ki: II, p. 6 b.

¹¹³ T.S. 468, p. 501 b.

¹¹⁴ Demiéville: *Origine des sectes bouddhiques*, pp. 23 and 58.

¹¹⁵ Hultsch: *Ep. Ind.*, vol. VII, 1902-3, p. 54-55; Lüders: *Ep. Ind.*, vol. X, 1912, Appendices, no. 1094, 1095, 1152; Burgess: *ASWI*, vol. IV, 1883, pp. 91-93.

In his commentary, K’ouei-ki clarifies their opinion on this point: the Arhant has the *dharma*s of retrogression (*parihāṇi*), stability (*sthiti*) and progress; the first two lines concern retrogression, the third concerns stability and the fourth, progress.¹¹⁶ <128>

¹¹⁶ K’ouei-ki, III, p. 29b-30a. Cf. LVP.: *Kośa*, VI, pp. 253 seq.

E.

CHAPTER XVIII: THE BHADRĀYĀNĪYAS

All the sources agree in considering the Bhadrāyānīyas as one of the sects stemming from the Vātsīputriyas and name them always as second, immediately after the Dharmottariyas. According to the sources of the north-west, they appeared about the middle of the 3rd century E.N.

Their name means ‘those whose path (*yāna*) is happy (*bhadra*)’.¹¹⁷ According to K’oueī-ki, Bhadra would be the name of the teacher of the school and *yāna* would mean ‘descent, heritage’. This is how he interprets the translation used by Hiuan-tsang, *hien-tcheou*. According to him, the name should then be understood as ‘[spiritual] descendance from the Arhant Bhadra’.¹¹⁸

Paramārtha tells us that the Bhadrāyānīyas were one of the four sects that supplemented the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* of the Vātsīputriyas, also called *Śāriputrābhidharma* or *Dharmalakṣaṇābhidharma* in nine parts, with the treatises, basing themselves on the meaning of the Sūtras.¹¹⁹

The Sammatīya tradition cited by Bhavya places them, next to the Dharmottariyas, in the sub-group of the Mahāgiriya, i.e., those who live in the great mountains (*mahāgiri*).

Inscriptions of the 2nd century of our era attest to their presence at Nasik and Kanheri in the mountains situated in the Bombay area,¹²⁰ which are undoubtedly the Mahāgiris who have just been mentioned.

We know little of their doctrine. According to Bhavya, they maintained the same thesis as the Dharmottariyas, that is to say:

In birth (*jāti*), there is ignorance (*avidyā*) and birth; in cessation (*nirodha*), there is ignorance and cessation.

According to Vasumitra, they had a special interpretation of the following stanza:

Having already been liberated, one falls back again.
Falling back is due to passion; one comes back again.
Having attained the place of calm joy, this is happiness.
Following the practices of happiness, this is complete happiness..

In his commentary, K’oueī-ki clarifies the opinion of the Bhadrāyānīyas on this point: the first two lines should apply to the perfected being (*arhat*) who can thus <129> retrogress; the third

¹¹⁷ Bhavya, 1st list.

¹¹⁸ K’oueī-ki, II, p. 6 b.

¹¹⁹ Demiéville: *Origine des sectes bouddhiques*, pp. 23 nd 58.

¹²⁰ Hultzsch: *Ep. Ind.*, vol. VIII, 1905-6, pp. 61-62; Lüders: *Ep. Ind.*, vol. X, 1912, Appendice no. 987, 1018; Burgess: *ASWI*, vol. IV, London, 1883, pp. 110-111.

line would be concerned with the Pratyekabuddhas and the last line would refer to the Buddhas themselves.¹²¹

Finally, the Kāthavatthu ascribes one thesis to them:

- 1) The clear realization (*abhisamaya*) of the four truths (*sacca*) and the fruits (*phala*) is progressive (*anupubbenā*).¹²² <130>

¹²¹ K’oueï-ki, III, p. 30 a. Cf. LVP: Kośa, VI, p. 267 and n. 2.

¹²² *Kāthāvatthu*, II, 9. See thesis 4 of the Andhakas.

F.

CHAPTER XIX: THE SAṅṅAGARĪKAS OR SAṅḍAGIRIYAS

All the traditions agree in considering them as the last sect stemming from the Vātsīputriyas. According to the sources of the north-west, they appeared towards the middle of the 3rd century C.E.

Their name means ‘those of six (ṣaṣ) cities (*nagara*)’. It is often interpreted, especially in Chinese, as *saṅḍagiriya*, ‘those who live on the mountain (*giri*) of brushwood (*saṅḍa*)’. The *Mañjuśrīpariṣcchāsūtra*, which refers to this last form, interprets it as the name of their residence.¹²³ K’oueī-ki interprets the form translated by Hiuan-tsang, ‘sect of the mountain of dense forest’, by saying that the Saṅḍagiriya derived their name from the place of residence of their teacher, a thick forest with luxuriant vegetation and situated near a mountain.¹²⁴

According to Paramārtha, the Saṅṅāgarīkas were one of the four sects that supplemented the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* of the Vātsīputriyas, also called *Śāriputrābhidharma* or *Dharmalakṣaṇābhidharma* in nine parts, with the treatises (*śāstra*), by basing themselves on the meaning of the *Sūtras*.¹²⁵

The tradition of the Sammatīyas cited by Bhavya states that opinions were divided on the question of whether the Saṅṅāgarīkas were attached to the Sammatīyas or to the Mahāgiriya (Dharmottariyas and Bhadrāyānīyas).

We do not know the extent of their geographic domain. Undoubtedly they lived in the west of India with the other sects of the same group.

Only Vasumitra and K’oueī-ki tell us a little about their doctrine. They interpreted the stanza in a distinct way:

Having already been liberated, one falls back again.

Falling back is due to passion; one comes back again.

Having attained the place of calm joy, this is happiness.

Following the practices of happiness, this is complete happiness.

According to K’oueī-ki, they interpreted it as follows: There are six kinds of ‘those beyond training’ (*aśaikṣa*), i.e., Arhants, who are characterized, respectively, by (1) retrogressing (*parihāṇi*), (2) will (*cetanā*), (3) guarding (*anurakṣanā*), (4) abiding (*sthitā*), (5) penetrating (*pravedhanā*) and (6) unshakability (*akopya*),¹²⁶ those who are already liberated is the second one; those who can fall back is the first one; those who fall again into the passions as a result of their

¹²³ T. S. 468, p. 501b.

¹²⁴ K’oueī-ki: II, p. 7 a.

¹²⁵ Demiéville: *Origine des sectes bouddhiques*, pp. 23 and 58.

¹²⁶ Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, VI, pp. 251seq.

fall is the third one; those who return is the fourth one; the third line concerns the fifth one and the last line the sixth one.¹²⁷ <131>

¹²⁷ K'ouei-ki, III, p. 30 b.

G.

CHAPTER XX: THE VAIBHĀṢIKA SARVĀSTIVĀDINS

The Sarvāstivādins along with the Theravādins are the two sects that we know the best. The Sarvāstivādins have transmitted to us, particularly through their Chinese and Tibetan translations, their entire *Tripiṭaka* as well as their main post-canonical works, the entire set making up a mine of information of inestimable value.

They broke away from the Sthavira trunk after the Haimavatas and the Vātsīputriyas. Although the data of the problem of their origin are extremely clouded, a certain number of clues tend to place the schism which gave birth to them in the reign of Aśoka, in 244 or 243 B. C., following a synod held at Pāṭaliputra under the chairmanship of a certain Maudgalyāyana or Moggaliputta, which rejected the theory of the *sarvāstivāda* in the name of orthodoxy.

Their name means “those who teach that everything (i.e., notably the past, the future and the present) exists (*sarvam asti*)” and thus shows that they have the specific defense of this thesis as their origin.

According to Paramārtha, on the death of Kātyāyaniputra, the Sthaviras split into two sects, the Sthaviras and the Sarvāstivādins. “The reason for this schism was that the Sthāviriya school propagated the *sūtras* only; they took the *sūtras* as the correct norm” whereas “the Sarvāstivāda school, on the contrary, professed that nothing was superior to the Abhidharma, and propagated this Basket to the detriment of the other two.”¹²⁸ – K’oueī-ki cites another explanation: the schism might have been due to the fact that some Sthaviras had, at that time, rejected the five theses of Mahādeva.¹²⁹ – But these two explanations do not really have any value, for they are based on the tradition of the Sarvāstivādins represented by Vasumitra, which classifies all the Sthaviras—with the exception of only the Haimavatas—amongst the Sarvāstivādins. We have seen that this is a grossly inexact presentation.¹³⁰

Their history is very poorly known to us, despite their extensive literature. It is not without very great difficulties that one can extract—from the vast collection of legends that they have handed down to us—some facts that can offer an assured historical value.

Profiting from the extension of Aśoka’s empire and probably also because of the defeat of the Sarvāstivādins at the Pāṭaliputra synod,¹³¹ one among them, Madhyāntika, went to convert Kashmir,¹³² which became, for 1,000 years at least, their principal stronghold. This Madhyāntika

¹²⁸ Demiéville: *Origine des sectes bouddhiques*, pp. 53-54.

¹²⁹ K’oueī-ki, II, p. 4 a.

¹³⁰ See above, Part I, chap. I. [pp. 24-25].

¹³¹ As it is suggested by the account in *Vibhāṣā* TS 1545, pp. 511c-512a.

¹³² Przyluski: *Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 2-3, 46-61, 339-42; *Mahāvamsa*, XII, beginning.

was a disciple of Ānanda and belonged originally to the community of Mathurā.¹³³ The region of Mathurā and even the whole of the <132> upper basin of the Ganges and the Yamunā between this city and Sthāneśvara remained always a home of the Sarvāstivādins, but they were not alone there. In the middle of the 2nd century A. D., they benefited greatly from the generosity of the famous king Kaniṣka. Inscriptions dating from the latter's reign confirm this fact.¹³⁴ At that time, the Sarvāstivādins were present in the region of Peshawar in the west of Kashmir, at Mathurā and at Śrāvastī, one of the holy cities of Buddhism. At that time, as these inscriptions tell us, the Sarvāstivādin *Tripiṭaka* was completed. The legend places a synod under Kaniṣka, undoubtedly peculiar to the Sarvāstivādins, in which either their *Abhidharmapiṭaka* or the enormous commentary on it, the *Vibhāṣā*, had been set down.¹³⁵ And yet, the latter text itself tells us that it was composed quite a long time after Kaniṣka's reign. La Vallée Poussin rightly remarks that the oldest account that we have of this synod does not name the king under whose reign it took place and deduces from that that "probably the king did not convene the synod and that there had been no synod." It is possible that this synod had been a particular reunion of the Sarvāstivādins held in Kashmir in the 1st or at the beginning of the 2nd century A. D.¹³⁶ in which the Canon of this sect was set down. This reunion would be the counterpart—among the Sarvāstivādins of Kashmir—of the reunion held under king Vaṭṭagāmaṇi of Ceylon during which (about 15 A. D.) the *Tripiṭaka* of the Ceylonese Theravādins was set down. According to Paramārtha, it was Kātyāyanīputra who presided over the synod of Kashmir. The later Kashmirian tradition attributes to Vasumitra the supervision of the compilation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. We have no means to verify these two assertions. One fact is certain: a small Abhidharma treatise, clearly post-canonical, having been translated in the middle of the 2nd century A. D. by Ngan Che Kao;¹³⁷ at that time the compilation of the treatises of this [Sarvāstivādin] order had already begun for some time. One would not be too far mistaken in taking the setting down of the Sarvāstivādin *Tripiṭaka* back to the 1st century A. D. The *Vibhāṣā* attributed to Kātyāyanīputra¹³⁸ can be dated around the year 100, and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* attributed to Vasumitra, the plan of which is clearly different and which makes up an enormous volume, may be dated around the year 200.¹³⁹

¹³³ Przyluski: *Op. cit.*, pp. 50-53, 56-60.

¹³⁴ Sten Konow: *C. I. I.*: vol. II, part I: *Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions*, pp. 48-49, 137, 145, 155; Hultzsich: *Epigraphia Indica*, vol. VIII, pp. 181, 176, 177, 179.

¹³⁵ Cf. LVP: *L'Inde aux temps des Maurya*, pp. 326-8, which gives references; Przyluski: *Op. cit.*, p. 206.

¹³⁶ Since the inscriptions at Sārnāth and Śrāvastī mention the Sarvāstivādin *Tripiṭaka* in [reference to] the 3rd year of Kaniṣka's reign. Cf. Hultzsich, note above.

¹³⁷ TS 1557. The state of the language used by the translator leaves no doubt about the time when he lived.

¹³⁸ TS 1547. Translated into Chinese in 383 by Saṃghabhūti.

¹³⁹ TS 1546, partially translated into Chinese by Buddhavarman and Tao-t'ai in 439; TS 1545, completely translated by Hiuan-tsang in 658-659.

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* frequently quotes the names and the doctrines of several Sarvāstivādin masters, thus providing in regards to them a *terminus ad quem*. There are, above all, Pārśva, Vasumitra, Ghosaka, Buddhadeva, Dharmatrāta and another scholar designated only by his title of Bhadanta.¹⁴⁰ Others are quoted much more rarely: Kuśavarman, Ghosavarman, Drava, Dharadatta, Dharmanandin, Dhārmika, Subhūti, Pūrṇasa, Bakkula, Vāmaka, Śamadatta, Saṃghavasū, Buddharaṣita. Amongst them, there are many who were more or less under the influence of the Sautrāntikas.¹⁴¹

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* moreover points out that in the 2nd century there were several different schools—of which certain ones were more or less <133> breakaway [schools]—among the Sarvāstivādins:

- the orthodox Yuktavādins;
- the Abhidharmācāryas, i.e., those who understand without error the meaning of the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* and oppose the heretical Sautrāntikas;
- the Kāśmīrācāryas, masters of the Kashmir school;
- the Gandhārācāryas, teachers of the Gandhāra school, who perhaps may be identified with the Pāścātiyas, those of the West, and with the Bahirdeśakas, the foreigners.

Therefore, among the Sarvāstivādins also, geographical dispersion was one of the principal causes of division.

At an indeterminate time somewhere between the beginning of our era and the year 400 A. D.,¹⁴² there lived successively three masters who worked on a treatise entitled *Abhidharmasāra* or *Abhidharmahṛdaya*: Dharmāśrī, Upāśānta and Dharmatrāta. If this master should indeed be identified with the Dharmatrāta so often quoted in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, as La Vallée Poussin thinks, and this not without excellent reasons, these three scholars should thus have lived between the years 0 and 200 of our era, which is in no way impossible.

Nothing precise is known about the actual history of these three different masters. Legends and confused or even contradictory traditions that mention them do not allow us to take hold of the slightest historical indication with regard to them. We can assume that in some cases there were several eminent individuals bearing the same names: several Vasumitras, several Dharmatrātas, several Vasubandhus, etc. ...

If there is, as it seems, slightly better information on Vasubandhu, who was born in Puruṣapura, today's Peshawar, in the center of the main Sarvāstivādin stronghold, and lived for

¹⁴⁰ Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, Introduction, F xliii-li, and index.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Chap. XXII below.

¹⁴² Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, Introduction, F lxiii-lxvii. The work of Dharmatrāta, the most recent of the three, was translated into Chinese in 433.

a long time at Ayodhyā, on the borders of Madhyadeśa and Magadha, [i.e.,] other strongholds of the Sarvāstivādins but less exclusive than the first, the time at which he lived remains problematic. Two dates have been proposed, 300-350 or 420-500, and we must admit that the arguments for and against the one and the other make them both equally possible.¹⁴³ Vasubandhu, who was under certain Sautrāntika influences, is the author of the famous treatise entitled *Abhidharmakośaśāstra*. This very important work roused sharp criticism from the orthodox Saṃghabhadra who wrote two voluminous treatises to refute it, the *Nyāyānusāraśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośaśāstrakārikāvibhāṣya*, and who is considered to be contemporaneous with Vasubandhu. Later, the *Abhidharmakośaśāstra* was commented on by Guṇamati, Yaśomitra, Pūrṇavardhana, Śamathadeva and Sthiramati. At the beginning of the 6th century at Nālandā, Guṇamati wrote the *Lakṣaṇasāraśāstra* which was inspired by the *Abhidharmakośaśāstra*. Towards the end of his life Guṇamati went to settle at Valabhī, in Gujarat, where he had Sthiramati as a student. The latter was the teacher of Pūrṇavardhana, who taught the Sarvāstivādin doctrine to Jinamitra and Śilendrabodhi. Vasuvarman, author of the *Cahūṣsatyaśāstra*, which followed closely the doctrinal line of Vasubandhu, also lived in the 6th century.

When Hiuan-tsang visited India in the second part of the 7th century, he noted the presence of Sarvāstivādins in numerous places:

- 300 monks at Tamavāsana (region of Sialkot),
- 500 at Matipur (south-east of Sthānaśvara)
- 500 at Navadevakula (near Kanauij),
- 200 at Ayamukha (between Ayodhyā and Prayāga),
- 2,000 at Vārāṇasī,
- 200 near Nālandā,
- 1,000 at Iraṇaparvata (in the east of Nālandā),
- 100 in Bhilmal (in the north of Gujarat) for India proper;
- 2,000 at Karachar,
- 5.000 at <134> Kucha,
- 1,000 at Bāluka,
- 300 at Gaz Darah (between Balk and Bāmiyān),
- 500 at Khabandha,
- 1,000 at Wu-sa (Pamir),
- 1,000 at Kashgar and
- a few at Niya.

¹⁴³ Cf. LVP: *Kośa, Introduction*, F xxiv-xxviii, which summarizes the discussion and gives references.

See also E. Frauwallner: *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law, Vasubandhu*, Serie Orientale Roma III, 1951, which distinguishes two Vasubandhus, the second, born about 400 at an unknown place, being the Sarvāstivādin master.

This gives us hardly 16,000 monks living in some 300 monasteries of which there are only 5,000 monks and 50 monasteries in India proper. But it is advisable to add that Hiuan-tsang does not always specify, far from it, to which sects the monks belonged whom he met along the way. It is almost certain that the 5,000 monks living in 100 monasteries which he remarks existed in Kashmir, were Sarvāstivādins. There must also have been a large number of Sarvāstivādins among:

- the 2,000 undetermined monks at Jālandhāra,
- the 700 at Sthāneśvara,
- the 1,000 at Śrughna,
- the 2,000 at Mathurā,
- the 10,000 at Kanauj,
- the 3,000 at Ayodhyā,
- the thousands at Nālandā,
- the 1,000 of the land of the Vṛjjiis,
- the 2,000 in Nepal,
- the 3,000 at Puṇyavardhana.

The testimony of I-tsing, half a century later, allows us to affirm it. In so little time, the situation could not have changed so much and, if Hiuan-tsang notes the presence of 17,000 Sammatīya monks in the Ganges basin whereas I-tsing considers that the Sarvāstivādins were the most numerous in this region, we will probably not be much mistaken in estimating the number of Sarvāstivādins residing in this part of India in the middle of the 7th century as about 20,000. It is not without sadness that Hiuan-tsang notes the devastation of two of the main strongholds of the Sarvāstivādins, Gandhāra and Uḍḍiyāna: almost all the inhabitants are non-Buddhist; there are there ruins of some 2,500 deserted monasteries, in which formerly there lived perhaps more than 30,000 monks.¹⁴⁴ The decline, due to poorly discernable causes, had been rapid, for Song-yun, who had crossed this region 110 years earlier, saw it in the full splendor of victorious Buddhism.¹⁴⁵

At the end of the 7th century, I-tsing established the geographic distribution of Sarvāstivādins thus: the North, i.e., Kashmir and neighboring regions, is their almost exclusive stronghold; they are most numerous at Magadha, i.e., in the basin of the upper and mid-Ganges; they are encountered besides the other sects in the East, i.e., in Bengal; they have some representatives in the West, in Gujarat and Malva, and in the South, in the Dekkhan. They are clearly superior in numbers in the Sonde islands and in the whole of the south of China, and a few are met at Champa.

¹⁴⁴ Watters: *On Yuan-chwang's travels*, I, pp. 199-230.

¹⁴⁵ Chavannes: *Voyage de Song-Yun*, pp. 30-43.

We are very poorly informed on the subsequent destiny of the Sarvāstivādins in India. According to Taranātha, they were still represented at the time of the Pāla kings (9th to 10th centuries) by the Mūlasarvāstivādin school.

In China, the translation of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośaśāstra* by Hiuan-tsang in 651-654 provoked the appearance of a new sect that took this work as its basis and thus deserves also to be considered as a Chinese branch of the Sarvāstivādins. It remained flourishing until the end of the 9th century, then declined and disappeared quickly because its doctrine was too scholastic and too dry for the Chinese taste.¹⁴⁶ Its only notable representative was P'ou Kouang, a disciple of Hiuan-tsang, who composed a commentary on the *Abhidharmakośaśāstra* between 650 and 655 at Tchang-ngan. This sect was introduced to Japan in 658 by the Chinese monks Tchi-tsu and Tch-ta-tsu, but it has also disappeared from this country for a long time.¹⁴⁷

According to certain late texts, the Sarvāstivādins had for their teacher Rāhula or <135> Rāhulabhadra, a Kṣātriya, their language was Sanskrit, their emblem an *utpala* lotus flower, a *padma* lotus flower, a jewel and a leaf of a tree. They wore an outer robe having from twenty-five to twenty-nine sections or from nine to twenty-five sections of fabric. Their names ended preferentially with *-mati*, *-śrī*, *-prabhā*, *-kirti* and *-bhadra*.¹⁴⁸

According to two older works, the Sarvāstivādins distinguished themselves through their erudition and their perspicacity, and propagated the Buddhist Dharma widely. Their garments were black or dark red.¹⁴⁹

I-tsing gives us some information on particular customs of the Sarvāstivādins. They cut the bottom of their robes in a straight line. Each monk had his own cell. They received their alms-food directly into their hands (i.e., into the begging-bowl which they held in their hands). They wore their lower robe by folding the end sections of the two sides at the same time. It was made of one piece of cloth five cubits long and two cubits wide, of silk or of linen.¹⁵⁰ Describing particularly the customs of the Sarvāstivādins of whom he was a member, I-tsing also gives much other information about them.

The Sarvāstivādin literature is well known to us, for the Chinese and Tibetan translations have preserved their most important works.

Their *Tripiṭaka* consists of:

¹⁴⁶ Ch. Eliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism*, III, pp. 314-315; Id: *Japanese Buddhism*, p. 173.

¹⁴⁷ Id: *Japanese Buddhism*, p. 212.

¹⁴⁸ Lin Li-Kouang: *Introduction au Compendium de la Loi*, pp. 176-178, 181 and 197-201.

¹⁴⁹ TS 1465, p. 900 c; TS 1470, p. 925 c; Lin Li Kouang: *Op. cit.* Pp. 80-81.

¹⁵⁰ Takakusu: *A Record of Buddhist Religion*, pp. 7, 66, 75.

I. *Vinayapiṭaka* (10 items to be recited).¹⁵¹

- 1-3) *Pratimokṣa*
- 4) *Saptadharmā*.
- 5) *Aṣṭadharmā*.
- 6) *Kṣudrakaparivarta*.
- 7) *Bhikṣuṇīvinaya*.
- 8) *Ekottaradharmā*.
- 9) *Upāliparipṛcchā*.
- 10) *Kuśalaparivarta*.

II. *Sūtrapiṭaka* (4 āgama):¹⁵²

- 1) *Dirgha-Agama*.
- 2) *Madhyama-Agama*.
- 3) *Samyukta-Agama*.
- 4) *Ekottara-Agama*.

III. *Abhidharmapiṭaka* (6 pāda):¹⁵³

- 1) *Jñānaprasthāna*.
- 2) *Sanḡitiparyāyapāda*.
- 3) *Dharmaskandhapāda*.
- 4) *Prajñāptipāda*.¹⁵⁴
- 5) *Vijñānakāyapāda*.
- 6) *Dhātukāyapāda*.
- 7) *Prakaraṇapāda*.

The most important of the works corresponding to those that constitute the Pāli *Khuddakanikāya* also exist, but they were not classified in the Canon. There are also the collections of *Jātakas* and *Avadānas*, a *Dharmapada* and an <136> *Udānavarga*, without counting other works having been lost today. Let us mention only the *Avadānaśāntaka*, the *Divyāvadāna*, the *Aśokāvadāna* which are more especially linked, moreover, to the Mūlasarvāstivādin school whose enormous *Vinayapiṭaka* contains numerous recitations of this order.

The literature of the canonical large commentaries is well represented. If it is reduced to a single rather short work on the Vinaya,¹⁵⁵ we possess two different *Vibhāṣās* commenting on the

¹⁵¹ TS 1435 to 1439 and 1441.

¹⁵² There exist in Chinese four complete *Āgamas* and more than 200 different *sūtras*. The *Dirghāgama* and the *Ekottarāgama* are not of Sarvāstivādin origin. As for the others, it is impossible to say to which exact sect they could have belonged.

¹⁵³ TS 1536 to 1544.

¹⁵⁴ *Tanjur-Mdo*, vol. LXII, 2 and 3.

Abhidharmapiṭaka.¹⁵⁶ The more important of these two—the enormous collective work full of precious information on the doctrines of the various Sarvāstivādin schools and other sects—is more precisely a commentary on the *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra*. Its doctrinal importance was such that it represented the surest criterion of orthodoxy and gave its name to the most orthodox school of the Sarvāstivādins, the Vaibhāṣikas.

Apart from these works of canonical nature, we have a whole series of diverse treatises the doctrinal nuances of which are of great importance for the history of ideas. They can be classified into groups.

The oldest of these is without doubt that which is represented by three short treatises entitled *Pañcavastu* or *Pañcadharma*, and of which one is attributed to Dharmatrāta and the other two are anonymous.¹⁵⁷ One of the latter dates from as late as the beginning of the 2nd century A. D.¹⁵⁸ All three deal with the classification of factors (*dharma*) into five classes that are particular to the Sarvāstivādins; mind (*citta*), mental events (*caitta*), [formations] dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayukta*), form (*rūpa*) and unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛta*).

A second group is made up of the *Abhidharmasāra* or *Abhidharmahṛdaya* of Dharmaśrī, Upāśanta and Dharmatrāta.¹⁵⁹ These are treatises of medium length all composed along the same plan and including ten chapters: sense-elements (*dhātu*), formations (*saṃskāra*), actions (*karman*), contaminants (*anuśaya*), career of the noble persons (*ārya*), cognitions (*jñāna*), concentrations (*saṃādhi*), *sūtra*, conjoined (*saṃyukta*) and treatises (*śāstra*).

Apart from these two groups, we should point out three isolated treatises. One bears Vasumitra's name, is of medium length and treats the different questions of the Abhidharma in fourteen chapters.¹⁶⁰ The *Abhidharmāmṛtarasa* by Ghosa, rather short despite its sixteen chapters, is of the same type as the preceding.¹⁶¹ The *Abhidharmāvatāraprakaraṇa* by Skandhila, the teacher of Saṃghabhadra, is shorter and deals in a very concise way with very diverse Abhidharma problems.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁵ TS 1440.

¹⁵⁶ TS 1547 and TS 1545 and 1546.

¹⁵⁷ TS 1555, 1556, 1557.

¹⁵⁸ TS 1557.

¹⁵⁹ TS 1550, 1551 and 1552.

¹⁶⁰ TS 1549.

¹⁶¹ TS 1553.

¹⁶² TS 1554, *Tanjur-Mdo*, LXX, 5 and 4 (anonymous commentary).

We must reserve a special place for the *Lokaprajñāpti*, undoubtedly a very old work which is a Buddhist description of the world, with its kingdoms, its parks, cities, hells, cataclysms. etc. ...¹⁶³

Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* in its two forms, *kārikā* or verse summary, and *śāstra* or *bhāṣya*, exposition in prose¹⁶⁴ is placed in the 4th or 5th century. This work in nine chapters is, thanks to its translator, La Vallée Poussin, too well known for us to spend too much time on it here. The extensive <137> literature that it has provoked and which has largely been conserved for us should be mentioned: commentaries by Guṇamati, Sthiramati, Puṇyavardhana, Yaśomitra,¹⁶⁵ not to forget the vast *Nyāyānusāra* by Saṃghabhadra who criticized it sharply.¹⁶⁶

There remains to be mentioned the *Catuhṣatyaśāstra* by Vasuvarman, a treatise of medium length dealing with the four truths as its title indicates¹⁶⁷ and the *Lakṣaṇānusāra* by Guṇamati, much shorter, or rather what remains of it, and which sets forth the sixteen aspects (*ākāra*) of the truths.¹⁶⁸

Here are the theses of the Sarvāstivādins:

- 1) Everything (*sarvaṃ*) exists (*asti*). The past (*atīta*) and the future (*anāgata*) exist really and as a real entity.¹⁶⁹

This is their fundamental thesis.

(i) The Blessed One said in a *sūtra*: "O monks, if past form (*rūpa*) did not exist, the learned noble hearer (*śrāvaka*) would not 'not take into consideration' the past form... If future form did not exist, the learned noble hearer would not 'not delight' in the future form. It is because future form exists that the learned noble hearer..."

(ii) And again: "Consciousness (*viññāna*) is produced due to two things. – What are these two? – The eye sense-faculty (*caṅṣurindriya*) and visible form (*rūpa*), ... the mental faculty (*manas*) and the factors (*dharma*)".

(iii) Now it is impossible that, in a same person (*pudgala*) two minds (*citta*) exist at the same time, in particular, that of the object-support (*ālambana*) to be cognized and that of the agent of cognition. Therefore, the one will be past when the other will appear and the latter will still be future at the time when the first will arise. If thus past and future factors

¹⁶³ TS 1644, *Tanjur-Mdo*, LXII, 1.

¹⁶⁴ TS 1558, 1559, 1560. *Tanjur-Mdo*, LXIII and LXIV, 1.

¹⁶⁵ TS 1561, *Mdo* LXV to LXX.

¹⁶⁶ TS 1562 and 1563, *Mdo*, LXIV, 2.

¹⁶⁷ TS 1647.

¹⁶⁸ TS 1641.

¹⁶⁹ Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 3. LVP: *Kośa*, v. F 49-65. TS 1539, pp. 531 a-537 a; TS 1545, pp. 393 a-396 b. *Kathāvatthu*, I, 6.

did not exist, there could not be a meeting between the agent of cognition and its object-support, and everything, cognition would be impossible. There is cognition of past and future factors, notably in the act of recollection and the act of presentiment, which are common experience. If past and future factors did not exist, this cognition would be impossible since it would not have an object-support, whereas any cognition must possess a really existent object-support.

(iv) On the other hand, the same person cannot accomplish an action (*karman*) and receive its ripened effect (*vipākaphala*) simultaneously. When the action is accomplished, its ripened effect is a future factor and, when the agent receives this effect, the action that gave rise to it is a past factor. If past and future factors did not exist, past actions, being non-existent, would not produce effects.

- 2) Everything is included (*saṃgrhita*) in name (*nāman*) and form (*rūpa*) (matter).¹⁷⁰

The characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of form (*rūpa*) is its coarseness (*sthūlatā*). It is easy to know that a real entity of this kind should be designated as form. The real entity of the other four aggregates (*skandha*) and the unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛta*) is subtle (*sūkṣma*), hidden, difficult to know. Because [this real entity] presents the appearance of the name, it is designated as name.¹⁷¹

- 3) All the sense-spheres of the mental factors (*dharmāyatana*) are <138> entirely objects of cognition (*jñeya*), that which is to be perceived by consciousness (*viññeya*) and that which is comprehensible by super-knowledge (*abhijñeya*).¹⁷²

Since the mind (*citta*) or mental faculty (*manas*) and mental events (*caitta*) that make up the sense-sphere of mental factors, [i.e.,] the specific object of the mental faculty, have the same real entity (*dravya*) and the same characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*), the mental factors are completely cognizable, perceptible to the consciousness and comprehensible.

- 4) The characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of birth (*jāti*), decline (*vyaya*),¹⁷³ continuance (*sthiti*) and termination (*anityatā*), just as 'that which is disassociated from the mind' (*cittaviprayukta*), are included (*saṃgrhita*) in the aggregate of formations (*saṃskāraskandha*).¹⁷⁴

The characteristics of the conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*), really existing and being themselves conditioned, must therefore be included in the aggregates just as the 'factors

¹⁷⁰ Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 2; Vinītadeva, thesis 1. LVP: *Kośa*, iii. F 94-95; TS 1545, pp. 71 c-75 b.

¹⁷¹ K'oueiki, III, p. 11 b.

¹⁷² Vasumitra, thesis 3. TS 1537, p. 500 c; TS 1541, p. 646 bc; TS 1542, p. 713 c; TS 1545, p. 976 c.

¹⁷³ LS: AKB ii. 45 c-d and Masuda have 'aging' (*jarā*).

¹⁷⁴ Vasumitra, thesis 3. LVP: *Kośa*, i. F 29, 40. TS 1545, p. 198 b.

disassociated from the mind'. Since neither the ones nor the others can be classified in any of the other four aggregates, they are therefore included in the aggregate of formations.

- 5) Conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*) are of three types: past (*atīta*), future (*anāgata*) and present (*pratyutpanna*).¹⁷⁵

The [phenomena of the] three times are conditioned because they arise due to causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*) and they have an activity.

- 6) Unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛta*) are of three types: 'cessation due to discriminative cognition' (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), 'cessation without discriminative cognition' (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*), space (*ākāśa*).¹⁷⁶
- 7) The characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*) are distinct and exist really and as a real entity.¹⁷⁷

There are four (and not three, as Vasumitra and Bhavya claim) characteristics of conditioned phenomena: (i) arising (*utpāda*), (ii) continuance (*sthiti*), (iii) decline (*vyaya*) or change (*anyathatva*) and (iv) termination (*anityatā*) or cessation (*nirodha*). Each of them really exists, is itself conditioned and endowed with a distinct intrinsic nature.

- 8) The truth (*satya*) of cessation (*nirodha*) is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), but the other three truths are conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).¹⁷⁸

The truth of cessation, being identical with *nirvāṇa*, i.e., with cessation due to discriminative cognition (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), is unconditioned. The other three truths are not in this way.

- 9) Clear understanding (*abhisamaya*) of the four noble truths (*āryasatya*) is successive (*anupūrvā*).¹⁷⁹

The Blessed One has said in a *sūtra*: "There is, O householder, successive clear understanding of the four noble truths, but not single clear understanding (*ekābhisamaya*). Those, O householder, who would say: 'Without having clearly understood (*anabhisametya*) the noble truth of suffering, I will clearly understand (*abhisameṣyāmi*) the noble truth of the origin..., I will completely understand the noble truth of the path that leads to the cessation of suffering' <139> should not speak in this way." – For what

¹⁷⁵ Vasumitra, thesis 4. LVP: *Kośa*, i. F 11-12; TS 1545, p. 74 b, 85 b, 190 a, 479 a. 919 a.

¹⁷⁶ Vasumitra, thesis 4; Vinitadeva, thesis 3. LVP: *Kośa*, i. F 7-11; TS 1537, p. 505 a; TS 1541, p. 627 a; TS 1542, p. 694 ab; TS 1545, p. 65 a.

¹⁷⁷ Vasumitra, thesis 4; Bhavya, thesis 5. LVP: *Kośa*, ii, F 226 seq. TS 1545, p. 198abc.

¹⁷⁸ Vasumitra, thesis 4. TS 1536, p. 392 a; TS 1545, pp. 34 c, 985 b.

¹⁷⁹ Vasumitra, thesis 5; Bhavya, thesis 6. LVP: *Kośa*, vi, F 185-188 and vii, p. 31. TS 1545, p. 533 ab and 405 a-406 a. *Kathāvatthu*, II, 9. See thesis 4 of the Andhakas.

reason? – It is as unsuitable (*asthāna*) and impertinent (*anavakāśa*) to say 'Without having understood...' as to say, O householder: 'Without having established (*apratisthāpya*) the foundations (*mūlapada*) of the top storey (*kūṭāgāra*) or of a room situated on the top storey (*kūṭāgārasālā*), I will establish (*pratiṣṭhāpayiṣyāmi*) the walls (*bhitti*) of it. Without having established the walls, I will establish the ceiling (*talaka*). Without having established the ceiling, I will establish the roof (*chadana*).' One must not speak in this way."

And again: "The one who would say in this way: 'Not having ascended the first flight (*prathamāśopānakaḍvara*) of a staircase (*sopāna*) of four flights (*catuḥkaḍvara*), I will ascend (*abhiroḥṣyāmi*) the second (*dvitīya*). Not having ascended the second...' must not speak in this way. – For what reason? – It is also unsuitable and impertinent to say..."

And again: "In this way, here too, there is no reason (*sthāna*) that, not having seen (*adrṣṭvā*) the truth of suffering, one could see (*drakṣyati*) the truth of the origin... The noble Ānanda spoke thus: 'What then, O Venerable One, is the successive clear understanding of the four noble truths?' – ... All the same, O Ānanda, as with the one who would say: 'Not having ascended the first (*prathama*) stairs of a staircase (*niḥśreṇīpāda*) of a staircase (*niḥśreṇī*) of four stairs (*catuṣpadikā*), I will ascend the terrace (*prāsāda*)...' ..., because of the variety of the aspects (*ākāra*) of the four truths, it is impossible to maintain that clear understanding takes place at one single time because 'one does not see the origin, etc., ... under the aspects of suffering'. Moreover, clear understanding does not consist just in seeing the generic characteristics of the truths such as their aspect of nonself (*anātmakāra*), but in seeing the particular inherent characteristics of each of them, and that in all stages of the path, 'for one cultivates the truths in the same way as one has envisioned them'.

- 10) By leaning on the concentrations of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and wishlessness (*apraṇihita*) together, one can enter into the 'assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good' (*samyaktvaniyāma*).¹⁸⁰

The two concentrations concern the aspects (*ākāra*) of the truth of suffering (*duḥkhasatya*). The concentration of emptiness has as object the two aspects: 'empty' (*śūnya*) and 'non-self' (*anātman*), and the contemplation of wishlessness has the two aspects: 'impermanent' (*anitya*) and suffering (*duḥkha*). Therefore, when one leans on these two concentrations, one concentrates on the four aspects of the truth of suffering and thus one enters in this way onto the path of liberation.

- 11) By meditating on desire (*kāma*), one can enter into the 'assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good' (*samyaktvaniyāma*).¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ Vasumitra, thesis 6; Bhavya, thesis 7. LVP: *Kośa*, viii. F 184-195. TS 1545, pp. 538 a seq.

¹⁸¹ Vasumitra, thesis 7. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 195 and 232.

- 12) When one has entered into the ‘assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good’ (*samyaktvaniyāma*), at the time of the first fifteen arisings of mind (*cittotpāda*), one is called “approacher” (*pratipanna*), at the sixteenth mind, one is called “fruit of abiding” (*sthitiphala*).¹⁸²

In regard to the truth of suffering, one successively produces:

- i) a presentiment of cognition of the doctrine (*dharmajñānakṣānti*) with regard to suffering in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), which is the entry into the ‘assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good’;
- ii) a cognition of the doctrine (*dharmajñāna*), having the same object;
- iii) a subsequent presentiment of the cognition (*anvayajñānakṣānti*) with regard to suffering of the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*); <140>
- iv) a subsequent cognition (*anvayajñāna*), having the same object.

The same for the other three truths, thus sixteen minds in all. But the sixteenth mind no longer belongs to the path of vision (*darśanamārga*) since there is nothing more to be seen that has not been seen. It meditates on the truth as it has been seen, and thus belongs to the path of cultivation (*bhāvanamārga*).

- 13) The highest mundane factors (*laukikāgradharma*) are a single instantaneous mind (*ekakṣāṇikacitta*). The highest mundane factors are determined (*niyata*) and without retrogression (*parihāṇi*), whereas the three factors of preparation (*prayoga*) are with retrogression.¹⁸³
- 14) The ‘stream-enterer’ (*srotāpanna*) does not retrogress (*parihāṇi*), but the perfected being (*arhat*) does retrogress.¹⁸⁴
- 15) All perfected beings (*arhat*) do not obtain the cognition of non-arising (*anutpādayjñāna*).¹⁸⁵
- Only the unshakable (*akopya*) perfected beings (*arhat*), those who do not retrogress (*parihāṇi*), obtain the cognition of non-arising. The other five perfected beings, being susceptible of retrogression, cannot obtain it.
- 16) [Even] the ordinary persons (*pṛthagjana*) are able to abandon desire (*kāma*) and malice (*vyāpāda*).¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² Vasumitra, thesis 6. Bhavya, thesis 8. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 179 seq. and 191 seq.

¹⁸³ Vasumitra, thesis 7. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 163-179. TS 1545, pp. 20 b-22 c. A very long discussion, impossible to summarize here.

¹⁸⁴ Vasumitra, thesis 8; Bhavya, theses 4 and 10. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 251-257. TS 1545, pp. 931 b, 933 seq. *Kathāvatthu*, I, 2. See thesis 13 of the Vātsīputriyas.

¹⁸⁵ Vasumitra, thesis 9. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 240.

By the mundane path (*laukikamārga*), one can also abandon certain contaminants (*anuśaya*). It is said in the *sūtras* that Udraka Rāmaputra, one of the secular masters that the Buddha had accompanied before his Awakening, had abandoned the defilements (*kleśa*) of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the first three stages of the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*) and that he was reborn in the perception-sphere of neither conception nor non-conception (*naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*).

- 17) [Even] the non-Buddhists (*tirthika*) are able to obtain the five super-knowledges (*abhijñā*).¹⁸⁷
- 18) Among the gods (*deva*) there is pure conduct or the religious life (*brahmacaryā*).¹⁸⁸
- 19) In seven equipoises (*samāpatti*) the limbs of enlightenment (*bodhyāṅga*) can be obtained, not in the others.¹⁸⁹

These seven equipoises are the four meditations (*dhyāna*) and the three lower formless (*ārūpya*) equipoises. In the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and in the highest formless equipoise, there are neither limbs of enlightenment nor members of the noble path (*mārgāṅga*) because in these two places, the pure (*anāsrava*) path does not exist. The highest formless equipoise is never pure because of the weakness of the extremely subtle conception (*saṃjñā*) that alone remains therein and that prevents one from meditating on the path.

- 20) All the meditations (*dhyāna*) are included (*saṃgrhita*) in the applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*).¹⁹⁰

The 'stages leading to penetration' (*nirvedhabhāgiya*) of the preparation (*prayoga*) for the noble path (*mārga*) are the foundations of mindfulness. The path of vision <141> (*darśanamārga*) is, in its nature, the application of mindfulness of factors (*dharmasmṛtyupasthāna*). The applications of mindfulness are discrimination (*prajñā*) by nature, thus contributing to enlightenment (*bodhi*) and belonging the essential members (*aṅga*) of the meditations.

- 21) Without leaning on the meditations (*dhyāna*), one can enter the 'assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good' (*samyaktvaniyāma*) and obtain in this way the fruit of arhatship (*arhattvaphala*).¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁶ Vasumitra, thesis 10; Bhavya, thesis 11. TS 1545, pp. 264 b, 741 c.

¹⁸⁷ Vasumitra, thesis 11; Bhavya, thesis 12. LVP: *Kośa*, vii. F 97-100.

¹⁸⁸ Vasumitra, thesis 12; Bhavya, thesis 13.

¹⁸⁹ Vasumitra, thesis 13. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 290 seq; viii. F 144-145 and 181-182. TS 1545, pp. 497 b seq. and 321b seq.

¹⁹⁰ Vasumitra, thesis 13. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 153-161 and 283-289. TS 1545, pp. 945 a seq.

Bodhisattvas and self-enlightened ones (*pratyekabuddhas*) enter into the ‘assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good’ by directly leaning on the fourth meditation and entirely or partially on the four stages leading to penetration (*nirvedhabhāgiya*). The Bodhisattva does not enter into the equipoise of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) before attaining enlightenment (*bodhi*).

- 22) If one leans on the bodies of the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*), although one can experience (*sākṣītkuryāt*) the fruit of arhatship (*arhattvaphala*), one cannot enter into the ‘assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good’ (*samyaktvaniyāma*). If one leans on the body of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), not only can one enter into the ‘assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good’, but one can also experience the fruit of arhatship.¹⁹²

In the realm of form and the formless realm, one can produce the cognition (*jñāna*) but not the presentiment (*kṣānti*), one can produce the subsequent cognition (*anvayaññāna*) but not the cognition of the doctrine (*dharmajñāna*), and, furthermore, one cannot experience suffering (*duḥkha*) there. For all these reasons, when one resides in these higher realms, one cannot enter into the path of liberation. On the other hand, if one has already entered it during a previous existence, one can continue to progress there until obtaining the fruit of arhatship. It is only in the realm of desire that the necessary conditions for entering into the path are realized.

- 23) The inhabitants of Uttarakuru have no detachment (*virāga*) and noble persons (*ārya*) are not born there. Neither are [the noble persons] born among the gods without conception (*asaṃjñīdeva*).¹⁹³

Uttarakuru is the northern continent in Buddhist cosmology. Its inhabitants live in perfect happiness without experiencing any suffering with which they might be disgusted, which would encourage them to detach themselves from the passions. The gods without conception are the gods of the fourth stage of the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) corresponding to the fourth meditation (*dhyāna*). During their extraordinarily long life without conception, they can only exhaust the maturation of their previous good actions without becoming detached from the world and progressing along the path.

- 24) The four noble fruits of religious life (*śrāmaṇyaphala*) are not necessarily obtained gradually [i.e., one after the other]. If one has already entered into the ‘assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good’ (*samyaktvaniyāma*), by leaning on the mundane

¹⁹¹ Vasumitra, thesis 13. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 205 seq; iv. F 220-231; vi. F 175-177; viii. F 192-195; TS 1545, pp. 33 ab and 417 c.

¹⁹² Vasumitra, thesis 14; Bhavya, thesis 15. TS 1545, p. 33 c.

¹⁹³ Vasumitra, thesis 15. TS 1545, p. 33 bc. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 174; iv. F 104, 182-183, 205. K’oueï-ki, III, p. 17 a.

path (*laukikamārga*), one experiences (*sakṣitkaroti*) the fruits of being a once-returner (*sakṛdāgāmiphala*) and of a non-returner (*anāgāmiphala*).¹⁹⁴

The person who enters into the 'assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good' is immediately destined to any of the first three fruits according to the number of fetters (*saṃyojana*) he has <142> already previously cut through by means of the mundane, i.e., non-Buddhist, path. If he has not broken any of the fetters or has broken from one to five of them, he is destined to the fruit of stream-enterer (*srotāpanna*). If he has broken six to eight fetters before having entering into the 'assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good', he is immediately destined to the fruit of once-returner. If he has previously abandoned the defilements of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) or the other realms including in it the perception-sphere of nothingness (*ākāṅkanyāyatana*), he is immediately destined to the fruit of non-returner. In this way the newly converted does not lose the benefit of efforts accomplished before his conversion.

- 25) The four applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) can include all the factors (*dharma*).¹⁹⁵

It is said in a *sūtra*: "All factors, that is to say, the very four applications of mindfulness". The four applications of mindfulness are, indeed, the body (*kāya*), sensation (*vedanā*), mind (*citta*) and factors (*dharma*), i.e., everything that can serve as object-support of the mind (*manas*).

- 26) All the contaminants (*anuśaya*) are completely mental events (*caitta*), associated with the mind (*cittasaṃprayukta*) and 'having an object-support' (*sālabhāna*).¹⁹⁶

- 27) All the contaminants (*anuśaya*) are entirely included in the manifestly active defilements (*paryavasthāna*), but all the manifestly active defilements are not included in the contaminants.¹⁹⁷

- 28) The nature (*bhāva*) of the members (*aṅga*) of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is necessarily conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).¹⁹⁸

Since dependent origination is included in the threefold world of which it is the fundamental law, it can only be conditioned like it. Moreover, if it is by basing one's judgment here on the fixedness of the nature that one wants to prove the unconditioned

¹⁹⁴ Vasumitra, thesis 16. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 243. TS 1545, p. 278 b.

¹⁹⁵ Vasumitra, thesis 17. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 158-162. TS 1545, p. 936 c-937 a.

¹⁹⁶ Vasumitra, thesis 18. LVP: *Kośa*, v. F 4 seq. TS 1545, pp. 257 b, 110 ab.

Masuda: "All the *anuśayas* (dormant passions) are *caitasika*: (they) combine with the mind (*cittasaṃprayukta*). (Therefore they can also become) objects of thought (*ālabhāna*)."

¹⁹⁷ Vasumitra, thesis 19. LVP: *Kośa*, v. F 73, 81, 89-91.

¹⁹⁸ Vasumitra, thesis 20. LVP: *Kośa*, iii. F 77-78. TS 1545, p. 116 c.

character of dependent origination, then one should also recognize as well the form (*rūpa*), the four fundamental material elements (*mahābhūta*), the aggregates (*skandha*), etc., ..., as being unconditioned, since each of them always retains its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). Now they are manifestly conditioned. Therefore dependent origination is conditioned.

- 29) [Certain] members (*aṅga*) of dependent origination (*pratityasamutpāda*) also operate in the perfected being (*arhat*).¹⁹⁹

It is easy to show that certain members of dependent origination, such as consciousness (*viññāna*), sensation (*vedanā*), name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*), the six sense-sources (*ṣaḍāyatana*), contact (*sparsā*), play a rôle in the perfected being's life.

- 30) In the perfected beings (*arhat*), there is an increase (*vardhana*) of meritorious actions (*punyakarman*).²⁰⁰

When a perfected being has committed an action producing merit, he makes sure that, by the power of the meditation and of the one-pointedness of the mind, this action produces a retribution (*vipāka*), not in enjoyment (*bhoga*) in another life since he must no longer be reborn, but in the life-force (*āyus*), i.e., in the increase of the present life.

- 31) It is only in the realms of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and of form (*rūpadhātu*) that there is an intermediate existence (*antarabhava*).²⁰¹ <143>

The intermediate being who makes thus the passage from one existence to the next is made up, like every living being, of five aggregates (*skandha*). Its existence is proved by the fact that one cannot have here any discontinuity in time and space between the place and moment of death and those of rebirth, and therefore it must be that the two existences belonging to the same stream are linked in time and space by an intermediate stage. The intermediate being is the Gandharva the presence of which is necessary at conception in the same way as the fecundity and union of the parents. Furthermore, the 'one who obtains *nirvāṇa* in the intermediate existence' (*antarāparinirvāyin*) is a never-returner (*anāgamin*) who obtains *parinirvāṇa* during the intermediary existence. As for the heinous criminal guilty of one of the five 'offenses with an immediately successive retribution' (*ānantarya*), he passes in the same way through an intermediate existence after which he is reborn necessarily in hell.

- 32) The five sense consciousnesses (*viññāna*) are endowed with attachments (*sarāga*) and are lacking in detachment (*avirāga*).²⁰²

¹⁹⁹ Vasumitra, thesis 21; K'ouei-ki, iii. pp. 17b-19a.

²⁰⁰ Vasumitra, thesis 22. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 120-121. TS 1545, p. 656 b.

²⁰¹ Vasumitra, thesis 23. LVP: *Kośa*, iii. F 31-50. TS 1545, pp. 352 a seq and 356 c seq.

²⁰² Vasumitra, thesis 24; Bhavya, thesis 17, maintains the contrary. LVP: *Kośa*, i. F 58.

- 33) The five sense consciousnesses (*vijñāna*) take on only their particular inherent characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*)²⁰³ and have no conceptual construction (*vikalpa*).²⁰⁴

The five sense consciousnesses are specialized as to their respective sense-spheres (*āyatana*) and not as to the different real entities (*dravya*) that these sense-spheres can contain, for example, blue, yellow, red, etc., ... They do not take on generic characteristics, like the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) which plays a centralizing role. They are free of 'conceptual construction consisting of examining' (*nirūpaṇāvikalpa*), i.e., of unconcentrated discrimination (*prajñā*), of the sense-sphere of mental consciousness, and of 'conceptual construction consisting of recollection' (*anusmaraṇavikalpa*), i.e., of memory associated with mental consciousness. But they are endowed with 'conceptual construction in its intrinsic nature' (*svabhāvavikalpa*), i.e., with initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*).

- 34) The factors (*dharma*) minds (*citta*) and mental events (*caitta*) really exist. They have an object-support (*sāmbhāva*). The intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) is dissociated from the intrinsic nature (*svabhāvaviprayukta*). Mind is dissociated from mind (*cittaviprayukta*).²⁰⁵

The first part of the thesis is a corollary of the doctrine that everything exists (*sarvāstivāda*) (thesis 1). Mind and mental events having object-supports, their activity is efficient. Mind is dissociated from mind because in one and the same body two minds cannot be produced at the same time.

- 35) There is a mundane (*laukika*) right view (*samyagdrṣṭi*).²⁰⁶

Mundane right view is the discrimination (*prajñā*) associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the good (*kuśāla*) but impure (*sāsrava*) mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*).

- 36) The five praxis-oriented faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*śraddha*), etc., ... are both mundane (*laukika*) and supramundane (*lokottara*).²⁰⁷

- 37) There are two indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) factors (*dharma*).²⁰⁸

Masuda: "The five consciousnesses [...] (conduce to) passion (*sarāga*); (they) do not (conduce to) freedom from passion (*virāga*)."

²⁰³ **Masuda:** "(Their functions are) only to perceive (lit. to take) the individual aspects (*svalakṣaṇa*) (of their external correlatives): (they have) no thinking (faculty) (*avikalpa*) at all."

²⁰⁴ Vasumitra, thesis 24, LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 39 and i. F 19-20 and 60-61. TS 1545, pp. 64-66, 219 b and 610 a. K'oueiki, III, p. 19 b.

²⁰⁵ Vasumitra, thesis 25. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 177. TS 1545, pp. 270-271.

²⁰⁶ Vasumitra, thesis 26. Bhavya, thesis 16. LVP: *Kośa*, i. F 80-81.

²⁰⁷ Vasumitra, thesis. 26. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 118-120. TS 1545, p. 7 c. See thesis 189 of the Theravādins.

²⁰⁸ Vasumitra, thesis 27. LVP: *Kośa*, i. F 53 seq.; iv. F 31, 35, 105-6, etc. TS 1541 and 1542, *passim*.

Like most of the sects of the Small Vehicle, the Sarvāstivādins accepted <144> the existence of indeterminate factors, i. e., neither good (*kuśala*) nor bad (*akuśala*) and not bearing any [karmic] effect.

- 38) The perfected beings (*arhat*) also have factors (*dharma*) that do not belong either to those in training or to those beyond training (*naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣa*).²⁰⁹

These factors are impure (*sāsrava*) factors.

- 39) The perfected beings (*arhat*) obtain the meditations (*dhyāna*) but do not [all] achieve manifesting them clearly.²¹⁰

It is by means of the four fundamental equipoises (*maulasamāpatti*) that the perfected beings get rid of the defilements. As soon as they are on the path of liberation (*vimuktimārga*), they obtain the fundamental meditations. Nevertheless, they cannot manifest them in a clear way or examine them in depth and know to which specific class they belong.

- 40) The perfected beings (*arhat*) [still] experience (*bhuj*) the ripening (*vipāka*) of their former actions (*pūrvakarma*).²¹¹

The perfected beings, and even the Buddha, continue to experience the effects of their former actions.

- 41) There are [even] ordinary persons (*pṛthagjana*) who die with a good (*kuśala*) mind (*citta*).²¹²

- 42) When one is in concentration (*samādhi*), one does not die.²¹³

- 43) The liberations (*vimukti*) of the Buddhas and of their disciples are identical, but the three vehicles (*yāna*) each have distinctive characteristics.²¹⁴ The loving-kindness (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), etc., ... of the Buddhas does not take sentient beings (*sattva*) as object-support (*ālambana*).²¹⁵

²⁰⁹ Vasumitra, thesis 28. LVP: *Kośa*, i. F 6-7 and 58; vii. F 24-25.

Masuda: "For Arhants there are things which are no longer to be learnt and things which are (still) to be learnt (*naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣadharmā*)."

²¹⁰ Vasumitra, thesis 28. LVP: *Kośa*, viii. F 166 seq. TS 1545, pp. 822 c. Oyama, III, p. 20 a.

Masuda: "Arhants all gain the (four fundamental) *dhyānas*: they cannot all (however), realize (lit. manifest,—*abhivyaṃj*) (the fruition of) *dhyāna*."

²¹¹ Vasumitra, thesis 28. TS 1545, p. 655 ab. Oyama, III, p. 20 ab.

²¹² Vasumitra, thesis 29. Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 133-136; iii. F 133. No proof is given.

²¹³ Vasumitra, thesis 30. LVP: *Kośa*, iii. F 132.

²¹⁴ Vasumitra, thesis 31. TS 1545, pp. 162 ac and 735 bc.

²¹⁵ Vasumitra, thesis 31. TS 1539, pp. 543 c-545 b.

Since sentient beings do not exist as persons (*pudgala*) but as unstable groups of aggregates (*skandha*), the loving-kindness, compassion, etc., ... of the Buddhas cannot be aimed at the sentient beings themselves but at the streams of impermanent aggregates that are wrongly designated as sentient beings.

- 44) As long as they attach themselves to existence (*bhava*), sentient beings (*sattva*) cannot obtain final liberation (*vimukti*).²¹⁶

It seems that this is a corollary of the rejection of the doctrine of the person (*pudgalavāda*).

- 45) The Bodhisattvas are necessarily ordinary persons (*prthagjana*), because their fetters (*saṃyojana*) are not yet abandoned (*prahīṇa*). As long as they have not entered into the 'assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good' (*samyaktvaṇīyāma*), they have not gone beyond (*saṃatīkrāṃanti*) the stage of the ordinary person (*prthagjanabhūmi*).²¹⁷
- 46) Sentient beings (*sattva*) are merely the provisional designation (*prajñāpti*) of the stream (*saṃtati*) of successive existences (*bhava*).²¹⁸
- 47) All conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*)²¹⁹ are destroyed in each moment (*kṣāṇikaniruddha*).²²⁰
- 48) Nothing transmigrates (*saṃkrāmati*) from this world here (*asmāḷloka*) to another world (*paraṃ lokaṃ*). To say that the person (*pudgala*) transmigrates is <145> merely a figure of speech. As long as life lasts, the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) are gathered together. When there is cessation without remainder (*aśeṣanirōdha*), the aggregates (*skandha*) stop being transformed (*parīṇamanti*).²²¹
- 49) There are supramundane meditations (*dhyāna*).²²²
- The four pure (*anāsrava*) fundamental meditations (*mauladhyāna*) are called supramundane.
- 50) Initial inquiry (*vitarka*) can [also] be pure (*anāsrava*).²²³
- In the first pure meditation (*dhyāna*), initial inquiry exists.

²¹⁶ Vasumitra, thesis 31.

²¹⁷ Vasumitra, thesis 32. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 206; iii. pp.129-130. TS 1545, pp. 780 ac.

²¹⁸ Vasumitra, thesis 33. LVP: *Kośa*, chap. ix. TS 1539, pp. 537 a-547 c. Bhavya, thesis 1.

Masuda: "(The term) 'sentient being' (*sattva*) is a provisional name (which is applied to) the actual continuation (*santāna*) of *upādāna*."

²¹⁹ **Masuda:** "Here this term means the *saṃskṛta-dharmas*."

²²⁰ Vasumitra, thesis 34. LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 4.

²²¹ Vasumitra, thesis 35. LVP: *Kośa*, chap. ix. TS 1539, pp. 537 a-547 c.

²²² Vasumitra, thesis 36. LVP: *Kośa*, viii. F 146 seq. and 170-173. TS 1545, pp. 820-821. Oyama, III, p. 22 a.

²²³ Vasumitra, thesis 37. LVP: *Kośa*, viii. F 147. TS 1545, p. 219.

- 51) The good (*kuśala*) is a cause of existence (*bhavaḥetu*).²²⁴
It is because of the maturation of good actions that one is reborn among the various gods.
- 52) In the state of concentration (*samādhi*), one cannot utter words (*vacibheda*).²²⁵
- 53) [Only] the eightfold (*aṣṭāṅgika*) noble path (*āryamārga*) forms the wheel of the Dharma (*dharmacakra*). When the Tathāgatas speak, they do not always turn the wheel of Dharma.²²⁶
- 54) The Buddha cannot expound all factors (*dharma*) by means of one single utterance or sound (*svara*).²²⁷
- 55) All the words (*vāc*) of the Buddhas are not in accordance with the truth (*yathārtha*).²²⁸
- 56) All the *sūtras* delivered by the Buddha do not have a completely explicit meaning (*nītārtha*). The Buddha himself said that there are *sūtras* the meaning of which is not explicit.²²⁹
- 57) The steam-enterer (*srotāpanna*) and the once-returner (*sakṛdāgāmin*) do not obtain the meditations (*dhyāna*).²³⁰
Indeed, they have not yet abandoned desire (*kāma*).
- 58) Concentration (*samādhi*) is the continuity of the mind (*cittasantati*).²³¹
Concentration that is able to last for a very long time without being interrupted is defined as the continuity of mind during all this time.
- 59) The five praxis-oriented faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*śraddha*), etc., ... are both impure (*sāsrava*) and pure (*anāsrava*).²³²
The highest mundane factors (*laukikāgradharma*) have the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of the five praxis-oriented faculties. Now these highest mundane factors can be found among all sentient beings (*sattva*). Therefore the five praxis-oriented faculties can also be found among the impure sentient beings.

²²⁴ Vasumitra, thesis 37. Oyama, III, p. 22a. TS 1545, p. 820 c.

²²⁵ Vasumitra, thesis 38. TS 1545, p. 929 c. Oyama, III, p. 22 ab. No proof is mentioned.

²²⁶ Vasumitra, thesis 39. TS 1545, p. 911 b-913 a. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 245-249,

²²⁷ Vasumitra, thesis 40.

²²⁸ Vasumitra, thesis 40.

²²⁹ Vasumitra, thesis 40. LVP: *Kośa*, iii. F 75; ix. F 246. Bhavya, thesis 14, says the opposite.

²³⁰ TS 1545, p. 693 bc, 719 c. Bhavya, thesis 9, says the opposite.

²³¹ *Kathāvatthu*, XI, 6.

²³² TS, 1545, p. 7 c.

- 60) The nature (*bhāva*) of the five praxis-oriented faculties (*indriya*) of faith, etc., ... is not exclusively good (*kuśala*).²³³

The five praxis-oriented faculties are mingled with other factors and have the same basis (*āśraya*), same action, same object-support (*ālambana*), same arising (*utpāda*), <146> same continuance (*sthiti*), same cessation (*nirodha*), same effect (*phala*), same uniform outflow (*niṣyanda*), same maturation (*vipāka*). Now, these factors are not always good. Therefore the five praxis-oriented faculties are not always good.

- 61) The highest mundane factors (*laukikāgradharma*) are included (*paryāpanna*) only in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*).²³⁴

They cannot be included in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) since in it one cannot definitively abandon the obstructions (*āvaraṇa*) and the fetters (*saṃyojana*). They are not included in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*) for one must produce them before entering into the meditations of this realm.

- 62) The highest mundane factors (*laukikāgradharma*) last only a moment (*ekakṣaṇika*).²³⁵

- 63) The afflicted view of self (*satkāyadrṣṭi*) has a real object-support (*ālambana*), namely, the five appropriative aggregates (*upādānaskandha*), which it takes for the self (*ātman*) and that which relates to the self (*ātmanya*), and which are real.²³⁶

- 64) One single cognition (*jñāna*) cannot cognize all factors (*sarvadharmā*).²³⁷

It cannot cognize its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), for it cannot be at the same time its own cause (*hetu*) and its own effect (*phala*), its own agent (*karṭṛ*) and its own result (*kṛta*), perceiver and perceived, etc., ... It cannot cognize factors (*dharma*) that are associated with it, for they have the same object-support (*ālambana*) and function at the same time. It cannot cognize the factors that are simultaneous (*sahabhū*) with it, for their characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) are too close.

- 65) It is the cognition (*jñāna*) that cognizes, and not the person (*pudgala*).²³⁸

Since the person is merely a purely provisional designation and not a reality, it cannot cognize anything.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 8 b.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14 a seq.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20 b seq.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 36 a.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 42 c seq.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 42 c seq.

- 66) The cognition (*jñāna*) and the consciousness (*viññāna*) are at the same time members of existence (*bhāvaṅga*) and members of the path (*mārgāṅga*).²³⁹
- 67) In one and the same person (*pudgala*), two minds (*citta*) do not occur at the same time.²⁴⁰
- On the one hand, the person does not really exist in anybody, and on the other hand, two factors [of the same entity] cannot be mutually causes of one another.
- 68) The cognition (*jñāna*) and the consciousness (*viññāna*) occur at the same time.²⁴¹
- 69) The two eyes (*caṅṣus*) together see the forms (*rūpa*).²⁴²
- Neither the visual consciousness (*caṅṣurviññāna*) nor the discrimination (*prajñā*) can see the forms for they do not have the characteristics of vision (*darśana*). Nor is it the complex (eye and visual consciousness) that sees the forms, for then one would always see, which is not the case, as experience proves. If only one eye would see and not both together, there would not be simultaneous perceptions.
- 70) Names (*nāma*), phrases, syllables, etc., really exist and are included (*saṃgrhita*) in the aggregate of formations (*saṃskāraskandha*) dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayukta*).²⁴³
- <147>
- 71) Causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) really exist.²⁴⁴
- 72) Mind (*citta*) and mental events (*caitta*) occur simultaneously.²⁴⁵
- Both lean on one and the same faculty (*indriya*) and objectivize the same object-field (*viṣaya*). Therefore they occur simultaneously.
- 73) Ignorance (*avidyā*) and afflicted views (*drṣṭi*) are or are not pervasive (*sarvatraga*) according to the case.²⁴⁶
- 74) Craving (*trṣṇā*), pride (*māna*) and mind (*citta*) are never pervasive (*sarvatrāga*).²⁴⁷
- 75) The five aggregates (*skandha*) can just as well be ripening causes (*vipāka*) as ripened effects (*vipākaphala*).²⁴⁸

²³⁹ Ibid, p. 44 b.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 47 b.

²⁴¹ Ibid. p. 44 b.

²⁴² Ibid., p. 61 c.

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 70 a.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 79 a, 680 c.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 79 c.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 90 c.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 90 c.

- 76) Form (*rūpa*), mind (*citta*), mental events (*caitta*) and formations dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*) can just as well be ripening causes (*vipāka*) as ripened effects (*vipākaphala*).²⁴⁹
- 77) The ripening cause (*vipākahetu*) the effect (*phala*) of which has already ripened really exists.²⁵⁰
- 78) Factors (*dharma*) do not occur or cease without causes (*hetu*).²⁵¹
- 79) The craving for non-existence (*vibhavatrṣṇā*) should be abandoned (*prahātavya*) only by cultivation (*bhāvanā*).²⁵²
- 80) The nature (*bhāva*) of mind (*citta*) is not fundamentally pure (*prabhāsvāra*). It is the mind that has got rid of desire (*kāma*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and ignorance (*avidyā*) which is liberated (*vimukta*).²⁵³

The defilements (*kleśa*), the nature of which is fundamentally defiled (*kliṣṭa*) and which are associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the mind, are impure. It is not the defilements that defile the mind, for they have the same nature as the latter, and since they are impure, the latter is equally impure. Furthermore, [if it were the defilements that defile the mind], one would have to accept that the mind was pure before being defiled. In this case, how can one maintain that the future mind is fundamentally pure? On the other hand, as long as desire, hatred and ignorance have not been abandoned, the mind cannot be liberated.

- 81) The three cessations (*nirodha*) really exist.²⁵⁴
- 82) The cessation due to impermanence (*anityatānirodha*) is conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).
This is a characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of conditioned phenomena and [cessation due to impermanence] is therefore conditioned like them.
- 83) Extinction (*nirvāṇa*) is defined as not concerning either those in training or those beyond training (*naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣa*).²⁵⁵

Extinction is not an effect (*phala*) that could be cultivated like the path (*mārga*) or the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) fruits of those in training (*śaikṣa*) and those beyond training (*aśaikṣa*).

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp 96 a, 263 c.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 96 a.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 90 b, 263 c.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 103 c.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 138 b. Very lengthy discussion based on the interpretation of a *sūtra*.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 140 bc seq.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 161 a. See thesis 86.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 169 a. **LS**: See *Kośa* vi. F 232.

- 84) Dream really exists.²⁵⁶ <148>
- 85) The defilements (*kleśa*) are either bad (*akuśala*) or indeterminate (*avyākṛta*).²⁵⁷
- Because they produce undesirable effects (*phala*), they are called bad. Craving (*tṛṣṇā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*) can be indeterminate.
- 86) The characteristics of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) really exist.²⁵⁸
- 87) The characteristics of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) are exclusively conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).²⁵⁹
- 88) A single instant (*kṣaṇa*) [of a factor] possesses the three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of arising (*utpāda*), decline (*vyaya*) and cessation (*nirodha*).²⁶⁰
- The moments of action [of these characteristics] are different: at the moment when a factor occurs, arising becomes active; at the moment when a factor ceases, decline and cessation become active. Although the real entity manifests only in a single moment, the activity [of the characteristics] has a before and an after.
- 89) Intention (*cetanā*) and mental speech (*manojaḥpa*) are mental events (*caitta*) factors (*dharma*) having distinct intrinsic natures (*svabhāva*).²⁶¹
- Intention is action (*karman*): it is mental action (*manokarman*). Mental speech is discrimination (*prajñā*).
- 90) Initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) are mental events (*caitta*) factors (*dharma*).²⁶²
- 91) All cognitions (*jñāna*) objectivize an object-field (*viṣaya*).²⁶³
- 92) The body of birth (*janmakāya*) of the Buddha is impure (*sāsrava*).²⁶⁴
- If the body of birth of the Buddha were pure (*anāsrava*), it would not have given rise to desire in a woman, hatred in Aṅgulimāla, pride in Mānaśrabdhā, ignorance in Uruvilvā Kāśyapa.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 193 b This thesis leans on a group of *sūtras*.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 196 a, 259 c.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 198 a.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 198a.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 200 a.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 216 b seq.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 218 c.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 228 b.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 229 a, 392 a.

- 93) The nature (*bhāva*) of ordinary persons (*prthagjana*) is included (*paryāpanna*) in the three realms (*dhātu*). It must be abandoned (*prahātavya*) by cultivation (*bhāvanā*). It is not defiled (*kliṣṭa*). It is included (*saṃgrhita*) in the aggregate of formations (*saṃskāraskandha*) dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayukta*).²⁶⁵
- 94) The intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of ordinary persons (*prthagjana*) really exists.²⁶⁶
- 95) Initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) are in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and in the first meditation (*dhyāna*). Investigation alone without initial inquiry is in the intermediate meditation (*dhyānāntara*). There is absence of initial inquiry and investigation in the three higher meditations and in the four formless equipoises (*ārūpya*).²⁶⁷
- 96) Factors (*dharma*) occur together and not necessarily one after another.²⁶⁸
- Each [factor] arises because of its particular inherent characteristic of arising (*svotpādalakṣaṇa*).
- 97) The two fetters (*saṃyojana*) of envy (*irīyā*) and selfishness (*matsara*) exist only in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*).²⁶⁹ <149>
- 98) The nature of the conditions (*pratyayatā*) really exists.²⁷⁰
- If the nature of the conditions did not exist, no factor (*dharma*) could really exist for the four kinds of conditions include all factors.
- 99) The fetters (*saṃyojana*) and the fettered factors (*saṃyojaniya*)²⁷¹ really exist, but the person (*pudgala*) does not exist.²⁷²
- 100) All factors (*dharma*) are included (*saṃgrhita*) in their intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*); this is the understanding in the ultimate sense (*paramārtha*).²⁷³
- If the inclusion in the nature of another (*parabhāva*) would be the ultimate sense, the intrinsic nature of one factor alone would be that of all factors. In that case, when one factor would occur, all factors would occur, and when one factor would cease, all factors would cease, which is not the case.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 231 b.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 231 b.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 269 c, 462 c.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 270 a, 463 a, 493 c.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 271 b.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.* p. 283 ab.

²⁷¹ **LS:** See *Kośa* ii. F 186.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 288 b.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp 306 c, 550 a.

- 101) It is only the defiled (*kliṣṭa*) mind (*citta*) that can ensure the continuity of existence (*bhavasantati*).²⁷⁴

When a male being enters into his mother's womb, it produces a mind of love towards its mother and a mind of hatred towards its father. When a female being enters into her mother's womb, it produces a mind of love towards its father and a mind of hatred towards its mother. When a Bodhisattva enters into his mother's womb, he produces a mind of love equally towards the father and the mother. But, since it is a mind of love [and thus endowed with passion], his mind is defiled. Therefore, in every case, it is the defiled mind that ensures the continuity of existence.

- 102) All the defilements (*kleśa*) ensure the continuity of existence (*bhavasantati*).²⁷⁵

It is not only love and hatred, but all the defilements that ensure the continuity of existence.

- 103) The four fruits of the religious life (*śrāmaṇyaphala*) are conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) as well as unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).²⁷⁶

- 104) The person who overcomes the defilements (*kleśa*) is not reborn in the higher realms.²⁷⁷

In order to abandon the lower realms and be reborn in the higher realms, it is necessary to exhaust the defilements.

- 105) There is form (*rūpa*) which is included (*saṃgrhita*) in the sense-source of factors (*dharmāyatana*), namely, the unmanifest (*avijñapti*).²⁷⁸

- 106) Vocal sounds (*śabda*) really exist. Images reflected in water or in a mirror really exist.²⁷⁹

[Vocal sounds and images] have multiple causes which produce them. The sounds are produced because of the lips, teeth, tongue, palate, trachea, etc. ... which are struck and from which the sounds emanate. The images are produced because of the light of the sun or the moon and of jewels, vases, water, etc., ... on which they are reflected. Being products due to causes, sounds and images really exist. <150>

- 107) There is no distinction between the nature of time (*kāla*) and that of the conditioned forces (*saṃskāra*).²⁸⁰

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 309 a.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 309 a.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 337 a seq.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 355 a.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 383 b.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 390 c.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 393 a, 700 a.

Time is the formations, and the formations are time. Time is that, the increase of which reveals the conditioned forces.

108) There is no form (*rūpa*) in the formless realm (*ārūpydhātu*).²⁸¹

109) The mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) has object-supports (*ālambana*) similar to or different from those of the five sense consciousnesses. It has as well the internal (*adhyātmika*) faculties (*indriya*) and the other consciousnesses (*vijñāna*) as object-supports.²⁸²

110) The mind (*citta*) and mental events (*caitta*) evolve together and can mutually act as 'conditions as the equivalent and immediate antecedent' (*samanantarapratyaya*).²⁸³

Only the mind and mental events are 'conditions as the equivalent and immediate antecedent', because other factors do not produce effects that are equivalent to their causes.

111) The 'possessions' (*prāpti*) and 'non-possessions' (*aprāpti*) really exist.²⁸⁴

112) The path (*mārga*) is conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).²⁸⁵

One cultivates the Path, but one cannot practice the unconditioned phenomena. Thus the path is conditioned.

113) Pure (*anāsrava*) presentiment (*kṣānti*) is vision (*darśana*) and not cognition (*jñāna*).²⁸⁶

It is not cognition for, when it is produced, afflicted doubt (*vicikitsā*) is not abandoned, whereas cognition is produced only when afflicted doubt has been abandoned. By nature it is examination (*upanidhyāna*), thus vision.

114) Good (*kuśala*) impure (*sāsrava*) discrimination (*prajñā*), associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), is seeing (*darśana*).²⁸⁷

It belongs to conventional (*saṃvṛti*) right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*).

115) Mistaken views (*viparyāsa*) are of four types only and can be abandoned (*prahātavya*) only by vision (*darśana*).²⁸⁸

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 431 b seq. LVP: *Kośa*, viii. F 135-141.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 449 a

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 461 b. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 300.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 479 b, 550 c-562 a.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 479 c.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 489 b. LVP: *Kośa*, vii. F 2.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5012 ab. LVP: *Kośa*, v. F 23 seq.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 536 c. LVP: *Kośa*, v. F 23 seq.

- 116) In the same mind (*ekacitta*), there are at the same time,²⁸⁹ cognition (*jñāna*) and non-cognition (*ajñāna*), or absence of cognition (*na jñāna*) and absence of non-cognition (*nājñāna*), or afflicted doubt (*vicikitsā*) and assurance (*niyāma*), or absence of afflicted doubt (*na vivikitsā*) and absence of assurance (*na niyāma*), or coarseness (*sthūlatā*) and subtleness (*sūkṣmatā*), or absence of coarseness (*na sthūlatā*) and absence of subtleness (*nā sūkṣmatā*).²⁹⁰
- 117) Outside of intention (*cetanā*), the intrinsic natures (*svabhāva*) of bodily actions (*kāyakarman*) and vocal actions (*vākkarman*) exist distinctly.²⁹¹
- 118) Covetousness (*abhidhyā*), malice (*vyāpāda*) and false views (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*) do not have the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of action (*karman*).²⁹²
- 119) Not all actions (*karman*) can be reversed.²⁹³ <151>
- There are actions that cannot be atoned by means of good actions, like the actions entailing an immediately successive ripened effect (*ānantaryakarman*).
- 120) Right livelihood (*samyagājīva*) and false livelihood (*mithyājīva*) have vocal action (*vākkarman*) and physical action (*kāyakarman*) as their nature.²⁹⁴
- Physical and vocal actions, according to whether they are bad or good, produced or not produced by the passions, make up false livelihood or right livelihood.
- 121) Sound (*śabda*) is not a ripened effect (*vipākaphala*).²⁹⁵
- Sound is not a ripened effect, “for the voice proceeds from a desire for action”.
- 122) When an action is not yet cleared of defilements (*kleśa*), its maturation is not cleared of defilements either.²⁹⁶
- In this case, their maturation can only be abandoned (*prahātavya*) by cultivation (*bhāvanā*).
- 123) Objects of magical creation (*nirmāṇavastu*) really exist.²⁹⁷
- This is, more precisely, a question of the magical bodies which the meditator can produce in some other cosmic sphere than the one he resides in.

²⁸⁹ **LS:** I am not sure whether “à la fois” should not be translated here as “both”.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 547 b.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 587 a. LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 136.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 587 a. LVP, *Kośa*, iv. F 136.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 593 b, 359 b.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 604 c. LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 189.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 612 c. LVP: *Kośa*, i. F 68-70.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 629 a.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 696 bc.

- 124) Contact (*sparśa*) really exists.²⁹⁸

If contact did not exist, a link would be missing in the chain of dependent origination (*pratityāsamutpada*), and sensation (*vedanā*) would not occur.

- 125) The life-force (*āyus*) does not operate in conformity with mind (*cittānuparivartin*).²⁹⁹

Factors (*dharma*) that operate in conformity with mind necessarily have the same arising (*ekotpāda*), same continuance (*ekasthiti*) and same cessation (*ekanirodha*) as the mind. Now this is not the case for the life-force.

- 126) There is untimely death (*akālamaraṇa*).³⁰⁰

There can be untimely death among the beings of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) who are not in the two higher equipoises. Among them, the life-force (*āyus*) is 'dependent on the life-stream' (*saṃtānavartin*) and therefore, when the body is harmed, the life-force is harmed. On the contrary, among beings of the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*) and those of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) who are in the two higher equipoises, the life-force is such that once they are born, the life-force lasts. In this case, the body cannot be harmed, the life-force cannot be harmed either. Besides, one does not die when one is in meditation.

- 127) There is no mind (*citta*) in the equipoise of non-conception (*asaṃjñāsamāpatti*).³⁰¹

- 128) In the equipoise of cessation of conception and sensation (*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*), all minds have ceased (*niruddha*).³⁰²

- 129) All the meditations (*dhyāna*) have members (*aṅga*).³⁰³

- 130) One enters into the 'assurance [of the eventual attainment] of the absolute good' (*samyaktvaniyāma*) by meditating on the three types of suffering (*duḥkha*), namely, the suffering which is suffering (*duḥkhaduḥkhatā*), <152> the suffering which is the fact of being conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) (*saṃskāraduḥkhatā*) and the suffering which is transformation (or change) (*parināmaduḥkhatā*).³⁰⁴

- 131) The category (*rāśi*) of beings (*sattva*) who are predestined to the perverted (*mithyatvaniyāta*) appears only in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*). The category of beings who are assured

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 760 b.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 770 c.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 771 a. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 218.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 772 c, 774 a. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 200.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 775 a. LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 203.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 814 a. LVP: *Kośa*, viii. F 132-133 and 147-161.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 928 a. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 125.

[in the eventual attainment] of the absolute good (*saṃyaktvaṇiyata*) and that of beings who are not assured (*aniyata*) appear in the three realms.³⁰⁵

132) All the fetters (*saṃyojana*) are bad (*akuśala*) in the three realms (*dhātu*).³⁰⁶

The Sarvāstivādins stick to the formal teaching of the Buddha.

133) There is no perfected being (*arhat*) “with the same head” (*samaśirṣin*).³⁰⁷

134) There are ten emptinesses (*śūnyatā*): of the internal (*adhyātma*), of the external (*bahirdhā*), of the internal-external (*adhyātmabahirdhā*), of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*), of unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛta*), of that which is without beginning and end (*anavarāgra*), of the nature (*prakṛti*), of that which is not to be rejected (*anavakāra*), of the ultimate (*paramārtha*) and of emptiness (*śūnyatā*).³⁰⁸

135) The atoms (*paramāṇu*) are only points without extension. They do not touch.³⁰⁹

136) The atoms, taken individually (*pratyekaṇ*) but when they are assembled together (*saṃghaṭita*), are the supporting object condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) of the consciousness (*viññāna*).³¹⁰

137) In name and form (*nāmarūpa*), there is a consciousness (*viññāna*) that is maturation (*vipāka*), therefore indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), and that is produced by *karma*-formations (*saṃskāra*), for the latter exist although they are past.³¹¹

138) Non-violence (*avihiṃsa*) is not the absence of hatred (*adveṣa*), but it possesses a nature of its own, namely, goodness.³¹²

139) The four characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) are attributed to the instant (*kṣaṇa*).³¹³

140) The bodily manifest form (*kāyaviññaptirūpa*) is shape (*saṃsthāna*).³¹⁴ <153>

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 930 b. LVP: *Kośa*, iii. F 137-138.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 260 abc.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 929 bc.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 37 a and 540 a. TS 1656, pp. 27 a and 347 c.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, LVP: *Siddhi*, p. 39. *Kośa*, i. F 89-92.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, LVP: *Siddhi*, p. 44.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

³¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 335-336.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

H.

CHAPTER XXI: THE MŪLASARVĀSTIVĀDINS.

Their name is unknown in all the old lists (the Ceylonese lists, *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra*, Vasumitra, *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchāsūtra*, the three traditions cited by Bhavya), i.e., all the lists made up of two main trunks and the single list made up of three trunks. All these lists are earlier than the 7th century A. D. In the first half even of this 7th century, Hiuan-tsang nowhere mentions the Mūlasarvāstivādins. It is I-tsing who, less than half a century later, is the first to speak of them, making of them one of the four fundamental sects having as subdivisions the Mūlasarvāstivādins, the Dharmaguptakas, the Mahīśāsakas and the Kāśyapiyas.³¹⁵ But he mentions also the Sarvāstivādins, in such a way that he does not seem to differentiate between the latter and the Mūlasarvāstivādins.³¹⁶ If Vinitadeva, shortly after I-tsing, and later the authors of the *Bhikṣuvarṣāgraṇṇī*, who adopted the same classification of four trunks, call one of them the trunk of the Sarvāstivādins and not that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, the latter, with the exception of the former, appear among the sects stemming from this trunk.

Only the *Vinayaṭīkā* of this sects has survived. It is clearly distinct from that of the Sarvāstivādins, which has also been preserved for us. It is I-tsing to whom we owe the Chinese translation of this vast work,³¹⁷ made according to copies brought back by him from India. The sole *Vinayaṭīkā* possessed by the Tibetans is also that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, which was translated into Tibetan by Jinamitra during the reign of Ralpachan, at the beginning of the 9th century A.D.³¹⁸

The latter proves that, at that time and, without doubt, during the previous century, in the part of India which bordered on Tibet and with which the latter was in direct contact, i.e., Kashmir and the Ganges basin, the sect of the Mūlasarvāstivādins was very definitely predominant. I-tsing had already pointed out this fact in the last quarter of the 7th century. According to him, the Mūlasarvāstivādins were the most numerous in Magadha, i.e., in the middle Ganges basin, some of them were found in the west, at Lāta and at the Sindhu, and in the south, and they were well represented in the east (Bengal), but they were the sole Buddhists in the north (north of the Punjab and in Kashmir), which for a long time had been the main stronghold of the Sarvāstivādins.³¹⁹ They made up almost all of the Buddhists in the Sonde islands and some of them were found in Champa.³²⁰

³¹⁵ Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiv, 7, 8, 20, etc.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 76, 140.

³¹⁷ TS 1442 to 1459. In all, 200 *k'iu*an.

³¹⁸ Ch. Eliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. III, p. 379 and 351. In all 7 works in 13 volumes.

³¹⁹ Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiv, 8, 9.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 10 and 12.

The literary language used by the Mūlasarvāstivādins was Sanskrit, a <154> purer Sanskrit than that used by the Sarvāstivādins, which would indicate that the works of the Mūlasarvāstivādins belonged to a period later than those of the Sarvāstivādins.³²¹

Nevertheless, according to detailed but very partial comparative studies, the *Vinayaṭīka* of the Mūlasarvāstivādins seems clearly more archaic than that of the Sarvāstivādins and even most of the other *Vinayaṭīkas*.³²² Huber and Sylvain Lévi, followed by Przyluski, have, on the other hand, recognized in our *Vinayaṭīka* the source from which most of the stories of the *Divyāvadāna* have been taken.³²³ To appreciate these facts well, we must remember that, whilst the *Vinayaṭīka* of the Mūlasarvāstivādins was translated into Chinese in the first years of the 8th century by I-tsing, that of the Sarvāstivādins had been translated by Kumārajīva right at the beginning of the 5th century, 300 years earlier. Therefore it must have been in the 4th century at the latest and probably much earlier that the two *Vinayaṭīkas* had already existed together. But it is quite improbable and even impossible that one and the same sect would have possessed simultaneously two different *Vinayaṭīkas*. As no trace of the name of the Mūlasarvāstivādins has been found before the end of the 7th century, it follows that from the 4th century, two different sects claimed the name of Sarvāstivādin and possessed, if not perhaps two absolutely distinct Canons, at least two different *Vinayaṭīkas*. What we know, moreover, of the history of the Sarvāstivādins, of their tendencies to split up into distinct and more or less rival schools,³²⁴ allows us to assume that this was also indeed the case here.

Only Vinitadeva, who does not consider the Sarvāstivādins as a distinct sect but as a group of sects, gives us information about the doctrine of the Mūlasarvāstivādins. The latter is not essentially different from that of the Sarvāstivādins: Here are the theses:

- 1) All conditioned phenomena are included (*saṃgrhita*) in the [factors of the] three times, in name (*nāman*) and form (*rūpa*).³²⁵
- 2) Those [conditioned phenomena] that do not belong to the sixth [the sense-sphere of factors (*dharmāyatana*), and the unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛta*) are objects of cognition (*jñeya*) and that which is to be perceived by consciousness (*vijñeya*).³²⁶
- 3) There are three types of unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛta*).³²⁷

³²¹ Lin Li-Kouang: *Introduction au Compendium de la Loi*, pp. 198-201 and 221-222.

³²² Przyluski: *Légende d'Asoka*, pp. 23, 68-69. etc; Hofinger: *Concile de Vaiśālī*, pp. 233-241, etc.

³²³ Przyluski: *Op. cit.*, p. v-vi, ix, 14, etc.

³²⁴ Cf. preceding chapter.

³²⁵ Vinitadeva, thesis 1. See thesis 2 of the Sarvāstivādins.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, thesis 2. See thesis 3 of the Sarvāstivādins, which is contradicted here, but the negation seems to be faulty.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, thesis 3. See thesis 6 of the Sarvāstivādins.

- 4) The defilements (*kleśa*) are endowed with equality.³²⁸
- 5) The Munis are of two types. Among them, the sermons (*pravacana*) and the faculties (*indriya*) are very slightly material (*rūpin*).³²⁹
- 6) The worship (*pūjā*) of a sanctuary (*caitya*) produces great effect (*mahāphala*).³³⁰
- 7) In regard to the abandonment (*prahāna*) of the bad destinies (*durgati*) by the Bodhisattvas, it is said that there is a desire (*icchā*) of two types³³¹
- 8) Merit (*punya*) accomplishes the accumulation (*sambhāra*) of the Path (*mārga*).³³² <155>

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, thesis 4. The meaning of this thesis remains enigmatic.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, thesis 5.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, thesis 6.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, thesis 7.

³³² *Ibid.*, thesis 8.

I.

CHAPTER XXII: THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS OR SAṆKRĀNTIVĀDINS

All the sources agree in considering them as a sect descending late in time from the Sarvāstivādins. The sources of the north-west make it the last-appearing of the classical sects and place its origin in the 4th century after the Nirvāṇa (≈ 480 B.C.).

The *Śāriputrapariṇchāsūtra* distinguishes the Sautrāntikas from the Saṅkrāntivādins as it distinguishes the Kāśyapiyas from the Suvarṣakas, but all the other sources identify them.

According to Paramārtha, they taught that the five aggregates (*skandha*) transmigrate (*saṅkrānti*) from one existence to another, hence their name Saṅkrāntikas, and cease only when one cultivates the path. As they recognize only the authority of the *Sūtrapiṭaka*, they are also called Sautrāntikas.³³³

The various recensions used by the translators of Vasumitra's treatise give some other information. According to the version of Hiuan-tsang, they venerated Ānanda as their teacher. According to the Ts'in version, their founder was called Uttara. According to the Tibetan version, they were called Uttariyas because they were superior (*uttara*) as regards the law (*dharma*).

Bhavya (1st and 3rd list) confirms that the Saṅkrāntivādins were also called Uttariyas from the name of their founder Uttara, a dissident master of the Sarvāstivādins.

Tāranātha affirms that the Saṅkrāntivādins, the Uttariyas and the Tāmraśatīyas were one and the same school.³³⁴

La Vallée Poussin has shown that the Darṣṭāntikas, denounced often as heretics in the *Vibhāṣā*, are very probably the Sautrāntikas.³³⁵

K'ouei-ki takes up the traditions cited by Paramārtha and adds some information on the origin of the sect. A master named Pūrṇa elaborated especially the Abhidharma and the Vinaya. He followed a reaction among certain monks who broke away by taking Ānanda, the great *sūtra* master, as patron.³³⁶

We know nothing of their domain, apart from the fact that Hiuan-tsang found at Śrughna, near Sthāneśvara, a teacher who taught him the doctrine of the Sautrāntikas.³³⁷

We know nothing of their literature either.

³³³ Demiéville: *Origine des sectes bouddhiques*, pp. 23 and 63.

³³⁴ Schiefner: *Tāranātha*, p. 273.

³³⁵ LVP: *Kośa, Introduction*, F lii-lv.

³³⁶ K'ouei-ki, II, pp. 9 b-10 a.

³³⁷ Watters: *Yuan-chwang's travels*, I, p. 321.

Vasumitra says that the doctrine of the Sautrāntikas was very close to that of the Sarvāstivādins.

Here are the theses attributed to them: <156>

- 1) The five aggregates (*skandha*) transmigrate (*saṃkrānti*) from one existence to another.³³⁸
- 2) Apart from the path (*mārga*), there is no definitive cessation (*nirodha*) of the aggregates (*skandha*).³³⁹

This is a corollary of the preceding thesis.

- 3) The person (*pudgala*) does not exist in the absolute sense (*paramārtha*).³⁴⁰

Although Vasumitra states the opposite, here it is Bhavya who must be right. Indeed, the *pudgalavādin* doctrine is well known, but it is always attributed to the Vātsīputriyas and to the Sammatīyas and never to the Sautrāntikas. Yet the latter are very well known to the Sarvāstivādins. If they had actually maintained this opinion, as Vasumitra claims, Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra on the one hand, the Vibhāṣā on the other hand, would not have failed to make it known to us in the long passages of their works where they denounce the doctrine of the person (*pudgalavāda*) by attributing it formally to the Vātsīputriyas, as do also the *Kathāvatthu* and the *Satyasiddhiśāstra*.³⁴¹ On the other hand, this thesis would needlessly strengthen the first [i.e., "the five aggregates transmigrate..."], which suffices to explain the continuity in the mechanism of retribution of actions. K'oueiki comments on this passage of Vasumitra by distinguishing this thesis from that of the Sammatīyas, etc., who maintain that the person (*pudgala*) is neither identical with nor different from the aggregates (*skandha*).³⁴²

- 4) The aggregates (*skandha*) have a root and an end (*mūlānta*). The aggregates are of one taste (*ekarasa*) only.³⁴³

According to K'oueiki, a subtle (*sūkṣma*) persistent mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) would assure the continuity of the aggregates, constitute their root and their end and give them this single taste.³⁴⁴

³³⁸ Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 1; Vinītadeva, thesis 1.

³³⁹ Vasumitra, thesis 2; Bhavya, thesis 2; Vinītadeva, thesis 3.

³⁴⁰ Bhavya, thesis 4; Vasumitra, thesis 5, says the opposite, likewise Vinītadeva, thesis 1 of the Vibhajyavādins, which immediately follows the Saṅkrāntivādins.

³⁴¹ LVP: *Kośa*, chap. ix. Saṃghabhadra: TS 1562 and 1563, chap. ix; *Vibhāṣā*: TS 1545, pp. 288 b, 42 ab, 110 b; *Kathāvatthu*, I, 1; *Satyasiddhiśāstra*: TS 1646, p. 259 a; *Vibhāṣā*: TS 1545, p. 288 b attributes to the Darṣṭāntikas the thesis according to which the person (*pudgala*) is fictitious.

³⁴² K'oueiki, III, p. 48 ab.

³⁴³ Vasumitra, thesis 3.

³⁴⁴ K'oueiki, III, p. 47 ab. Cf. also LVP: *Kośa*, Introduction, F liii, liv.

- 5) In the state of the ordinary person (*prthagjana*), there are also noble factors (*āryadharma*).³⁴⁵
6) The four aggregates (*skandha*) are fixed in their intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).³⁴⁶

Through lack of a commentary, the meaning of this proposition remains unknown. Perhaps it should be put side by side with the 4th thesis above, the first four aggregates being determined by the fifth, the aggregate of consciousness (*vijñānaskandha*) which, being identical with the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), would make up their intrinsic nature.

- 7) The aggregates (*skandha*) are endowed with primary offenses (*mūlāpatti*).³⁴⁷

Through lack of a commentary, it is impossible to regain the true meaning of this thesis. According to the *Abhidharmakośaśāstra*, the primary offenses (*maulī āpatti*) are those causing the monk to fall (*pataniya*) from the quality of *bhikṣu*, i.e., incontinence, important theft, killing a man and lying about supernatural powers.³⁴⁸ Does this mean that, as long as the aggregates have not been definitively destroyed, one is exposed to the committing of these sins? <157>

- 8) Everything (*sarva*) is impermanent (*anitya*).³⁴⁹

This confirms thesis 3 above.

- 9) The unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛta*) do not really exist.³⁵⁰

The unconditioned phenomena are not real and distinct entities but rather mere absences. Space is the absence of the tangible (*spraṣṭavya*). The cessation due to discrimination (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*) or *nirvāṇa* is the absence of latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) and of existence (*bhava*) obtained with the help of discrimination (*prajñā*). The cessation not due to discrimination (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*) is the absence of the arising of future factors obtained through the absence of causes and independently from the power of discrimination.

- 10) Past (*atīta*) and future (*anāgata*) factors (*dharma*) do not really exist.³⁵¹

If they really existed, the conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*) would always exist and would therefore be eternal, which is not the case.

- 11) The possessions (*prāpti*) do not really exist.³⁵²

³⁴⁵ Vasumitra, thesis 4.

³⁴⁶ Vinitadeva, thesis 2.

³⁴⁷ Bhavya, thesis 3.

³⁴⁸ LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 95 and n. 2.

³⁴⁹ Bhavya, thesis 5.

³⁵⁰ LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 278-287.

³⁵¹ LVP: *Kośa*, v. F 49-50.

They are indeed not perceived either directly or by their effects. The two theories by which the Sarvāstivādins explain the mechanism of the retribution of actions are thus refuted.

- 12) The mechanism of the retribution of action is explained by the theory of seeds (*bija*).³⁵³

The seed (*bija*) is the group of the five aggregates (*skandha*) capable of producing an effect either immediately or after a certain time, thanks to the stream:

"Stream (*saṃtati*) is the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) of the past, of the present and of the future, having the nature of cause and effect, that constitute an uninterrupted stream.

Pariṇāma, or 'transformation' is the change (*anyathāva*) between prior and subsequent moments within the stream.

Viśeṣa, or 'distinctive characteristic' or the culminating point of this transformation, is the moment of this stream that is capable of producing an effect immediately."

- 13) There are only four characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*), continuance being made one with change (*sthityanyathāva*).³⁵⁴

The *sūtra* in which they are referred to mentions only three characteristics,³⁵⁵ as Vasubandhu acknowledges.

- 14) The unmanifest (*avijñapti*) does not really exist.³⁵⁶

Indeed, the unmanifest (*avijñapti*) "solely of not doing an action after having committed oneself not to do it; ... is a factor which would exist by reason of past fundamental material elements..., now, past factors (*dharma*) no longer exist; ... unmanifest action (*avijñapti*) does not have the nature of form (*rūpa*)...", for it is "non-resisting" (*apratigha*).

- 15) The life faculty (*jīvitendriya*) does not really exist.³⁵⁷

"This is a certain momentum that the action of a previous personal existence places in the sentient being at the moment of its conception, a momentum through which, for a determined period of time, the aggregates (*skandha*) renew themselves in this homogeneous stream that constitutes an existence (*nikāyasabhāga*)."

- 16) Bodily action (*kāyakarman*) does not really exist.³⁵⁸ <158>

³⁵² LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 181 seq.

³⁵³ LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 183-185.

³⁵⁴ LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 223-224.

³⁵⁵ TS 99, p. 83 c. *Āṅguttaranikāya*, III, 47; PTS., I, p. 152; *Kathāvatthu*. I, 1.

³⁵⁶ LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 14.

³⁵⁷ LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 215-217.

³⁵⁸ LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 12.

“Bodily action is the action that has the body for its object-support...: that is to say, the intention (*cetanā*) which puts a body into motion in diverse ways: intention proceeds by relying on this gate that is the body, and is thus called bodily action.”

- 17) The eye (*cakṣus*) does not see visual forms (*rūpa*).³⁵⁹

“There is neither a sense-faculty that sees, nor visible form that is seen; there is neither any action of seeing nor any agent that sees; this is only a play of causes and effects.”

- 18) The mind (*citta*) and the body (*kāya*) possessed with sense-faculties (*indriya*) are mutually seeds (*bija*).³⁶⁰

“When an individual is born in Ārūpyadhātu, form (*rūpa*) is cut off for a long period of time: if this individual is then reborn in Kāmadhātu or in Rūpadhātu, his new form (*rūpa*) does not proceed from the stream of form (*rūpa*) previously interrupted for a long time, but from the mind. In the same way, the mind emerging from equipoise does not have for its cause the mind just prior to the equipoise: it is born from a ‘body endowed with sense-faculties’ (*śendriyakāya*).”

- 19) There is no simultaneous cause (*sahabhūhetu*).³⁶¹

One observes the cause-effect relationship only in the cases where the cause is prior to the effect, never when it is simultaneous with the effect.

- 20) Unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛta*) are not causes (*hetu*).³⁶²

The *sūtras* teach, indeed, that causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*) are impermanent (*anitya*) and are consequently conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*).

- 21) The omniscience (*sarvajñāna*) of the Buddha is carried out by direct seeing (*sākṣātkāra*) of every factor, including those of the past and the future, and not by deduction or divination.³⁶³

- 22) Among formless sentient beings (*arūpin*), the mental stream of the mind (*citta*) and of the mental events (*caitta*) has no support external to it.³⁶⁴

³⁵⁹ LVP: *Kośa*, i. F 86.

³⁶⁰ LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 12. *Siddhi*, pp. 183 and 207: the aggregates (*skandha*) are perfumable (*vāsyā*) and carry the seeds (*bija*).

³⁶¹ LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 253.

³⁶² LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 277-287.

³⁶³ LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 304-305.

³⁶⁴ LVP: *Kośa*, iii. F 6.

The mind and the mental events lean on one another. The mental stream of a new existence is 'projected' by a cause, and if the latter is devoid of attachment to form, the mental stream will be reborn and will exist without relationship to form.

- 23) Shape (*saṃsthāna*) is not a distinct real entity in and of itself (*anyad dravyam*) but merely a provisional designation (*prajñāpti*).³⁶⁵

If shape were a real entity, it would be perceived by two sense-faculties.³⁶⁶ Now shape is a part of visual form (*rūpa*) which is defined as the special object of the eye. Since we see numerous shapes in a complex shape [i.e., a variegated cloth], there would therefore be numerous visual forms (*rūpa*) in one and the same place, which is impossible. There are no atoms of shape.

- 24) Intention (*cetanā*) is not a [separate] mental action (*manaskarman*).³⁶⁷

There is no mental action outside of covetousness (*abhidhyā*), malice (*vyāpāda*) and false views (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*).

- 25) The atom is extended, it involves spatial division (*digbhāgabhedā, digvibhāga*). The atoms touch one another and have contact through resistance because of their extension (*digdeśabheda-pratighāta*).³⁶⁸ <159>

- 26) The object-support condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) is the composite (*saṃghāṭita*) atoms (*paramāṇu*).³⁶⁹

When the visual consciousness (*caṅsurvijñāna*) perceives a visual form (*varṇa*), it does not perceive the individual atoms, but only their composite, since it perceives the aspect of this composite (*tadākātvāt*): we see a mass of blue, not the atoms of blue.

- 27) The four characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) are attributed to the instant (*kṣaṇa*) and to a certain prolonged state.³⁷⁰

- 28) The six active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) are seeds (*bīja*).³⁷¹

- 29) The mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), in the subtle (*sūkṣma*) state, subsists in the equipoise of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*).³⁷²

³⁶⁵ LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 8-11.

³⁶⁶ LS: *Kośa*, iv. F 9: "The eye sense-faculty and the body sense-faculty".

³⁶⁷ LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 169-170 and 136.

³⁶⁸ LVP: *Siddhi*, p. 39.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

- 30) The five sense consciousnesses (*viññāna*) do not have a simultaneous (*sahabhū*) basis (*āśraya*). It is an earlier moment of the sense-faculty (*indriya*) that generates the subsequent consciousness. It is the same for the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*).³⁷³
- 31) Among the gods without conception (*asaṃjñīdeva*), there is no adhesion to the self (*ātmaḡrāha*), but the seeds (*bija*) of adhesion to the self remain in the state of non-conception. Therefore this state does involve adherence to the self.³⁷⁴
- 32) Concentration (*samādhi*) is not a factor on its own but the minds that have a single object-support (*cittāny evaīkālamabāni*), for the *sūtra* says that, among the three trainings (*śikṣā*), the teaching of the higher mind (*adhicittaṃ śikṣā*) is the one-pointedness of the mind (*cittaikāgratā*).³⁷⁵ <160>

³⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 142, 212-213, and 211. The opposite is said on p. 207, very probably in error (Cf. thesis 18 and 22 above).

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 313; *Kośa*, viii. F 129.

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CHAPTER XXIII: THE DĀRṢṬĀNTIKAS

Although, as La Vallée Poussin remarks,³⁷⁶ the Dārṣṭāntikas seem to be identical with the Sautrāntikas, as Tāranātha confirms,³⁷⁷ it is perhaps more prudent to treat them separately. Indeed, Vasubandhu and the *Vibhāṣā* distinctly acknowledge the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas. It is therefore possible that the Dārṣṭāntikas had been one of the schools, and even the main one, of the Sautrāntikas, but that there had been a difference, however slight, between them.

The Dārṣṭāntikas may owe their name to their frequent usage of comparisons (*dṛṣṭānta*) as the few fragments of their literature that have reached us show.

Here are the theses attributed to them:

- 1) Form (*rūpa*) is not a homogeneous cause (*sabhāgaḥetu*) of form.³⁷⁸
- 2) The form (*rūpa*) of the perfected being (*arhat*) and external (*bāhya*) form, i.e., the five sense objects, are pure (*anāsrava*) because they are not the basis (*āśraya*) of the impurities (*āsrava*).³⁷⁹
- 3) There are four types of actions (*karman*) in connection with 'assurance' (*niyāma*):
 - a) action assured as regards the time of retribution, not assured as regards retribution;
 - b) action assured as regards retribution, not assured as regards the time of retribution;
 - c) action assured as regards two points of view;
 - d) action not assured as regards two points of view.³⁸⁰
- 4) Covetousness (*abhidhā*), malice (*vyāpāda*) and false views (*mithyādrṣṭi*) are mental actions (*manaskarman*) for the *Samcetanīyasūtra* considers them as actions.³⁸¹
- 5) In the first three meditations (*dhyāna*), the faculty of satisfaction (*sukhendriya*) is only bodily (*kāyika*) and not mental (*caitasika*).³⁸²
- 6) The afflicted view of self (*satkāyadrṣṭi*) is without a real object.³⁸³

The afflicted view of self consists of believing that the self (*ātman*) and that which is connected with the self (*ātmanya*) really exist. Since in the absolute sense (*paramārthena*)

³⁷⁶ LVP: *Kośa*, Introduction, F lii-iv; *Siddhi*, pp. 221-224.

³⁷⁷ Schiefner, *Tāranātha*, p. 274.

³⁷⁸ LVP: *Kośa*, ii. F 256. Cf. thesis 19 of the Sautrāntikas.

³⁷⁹ LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 19.

³⁸⁰ LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 116-117.

³⁸¹ LVP: *Kośa*, iv. F 136. Cf. thesis 24 of the Sautrāntikas.

³⁸² LVP: *Kośa*, viii. F 151.

³⁸³ TS, 1545, 36 a.

neither the self (*ātman*) nor that which is connected with the self (*ātmanya*) exist, the afflicted view of self is therefore without object. It is the same for a man who, seeing a rope, thinks: “That is a snake”, or who, seeing a tree trunk, thinks, “That is a man”.

- 7) Cognition (*jñāna*) is not simultaneous with consciousness (*viññāna*).³⁸⁴
- 8) It is the group of aggregates (*skandha*) that sees visual forms (*rūpa*).³⁸⁵ <161>
- 9) Causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*) are not realities.³⁸⁶

Indeed, the law of dependent origination (*pratityasamutpāda*) teaches that ignorance (*avidyā*) conditions the *karma*-formations (*saṃskāra*). Now, these are characterized as multiple and diverse, whereas ignorance is characterized as single. That which is single cannot be condition of that which is multiple. Therefore condition and causality are not realities.

- 10) There are two pervasive (*sarvatraga*) latent tendencies (*anuśaya*), namely, ignorance (*avidyā*) and craving for existence (*bhavatrṣṇā*).³⁸⁷

Indeed, the roots (*mūla*) of dependent origination (*pratityasamutpāda*) are what are called the pervasives. Now, ignorance (*avidyā*) is the root of dependent origination that constitutes the earlier limit and the craving for existence (*bhavatrṣṇā*) is the root that constitutes the later limit.

- 11) Outside of intention (*cetanā*) there is no ripening cause (*vipākahetu*). Outside of sensation (*vedanā*) there is no ripened effect (*vipākaphala*).³⁸⁸
- 12) Although all factors arise because of causes (*hetu*), they cease without cause.³⁸⁹

Examples: when an archer shoots an arrow, it soon falls down to the ground; likewise, the wheel of the potter that stops after a certain time. In both cases, the falling or the stopping, i.e., the cessation of the movement, take place by themselves, without cause.

- 13) The latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) grow (*anuśayana*) neither in their object-supports (*ālambana*) nor in the factors (*dharma*) associated with the mind (*cittasṃprayukta*).³⁹⁰

If the latent tendencies grow in their object-supports, it would be that they also grow in another realm (*dhātu*) and in pure factors (*anāsrava dharma*) when the latter are their object-supports. If they grow in factors associated with the mind, they would never be abandoned,

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44 b. No explanation is given on it.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 61 c. Cf. above thesis 17 of the Sautrāntikas.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 79 a, 680 bc and 833 a.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 90 c.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 96 a, 741 b.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 103 c and 105 a.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 110 a.

or else, if they would nevertheless be abandoned, they would always grow, for one cannot definitively disjoin the mind from that with which it is associated.

14) It is the mind (*citta*) endowed with all the obstructions (*āvaraṇa*) that attains liberation (*vimukti*).³⁹¹

15) The three cessations (*nirodha*) are devoid of reality.³⁹²

These are cessation due to discrimination (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), cessation not due to discrimination (*aprasaṃkhyānirodha*) and cessation due to impermanence (*anityānirodha*). No proof is given for this thesis.³⁹³

16) Dream (*svapna*) has no reality.³⁹⁴

Common experience proves this. Thus, in a dream, one sees plenty of food and drink and one consumes it until one has completely satisfied one's hunger and thirst. But as soon as one has awakened, one is hungry, one is thirsty, the body is weak and feeble. <162>

17) The characteristics of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*) are not real entities (*dravya*).³⁹⁵

Indeed, these characteristics are included in the formations dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*), which are not real entities.

18) The instant (*kṣaṇa*) is devoid of the three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of arising (*utpāda*), passing away (*vyaya*) and cessation (*nirodha*).³⁹⁶

If the instant possessed these three characteristics, it would have to arise, pass away and cease at the same time, which is impossible.

19) Intention (*cetanā*) and mental speech (*manojaḥṣa*) are merely mind (*citta*).³⁹⁷

20) The nature of the ordinary person (*prthagjanatva*) does not exist as reality.³⁹⁸

21) All the defilements (*kleśa*) are completely bad (*akuśala*).³⁹⁹

22) The ordinary person (*prthagjana*) is unable to abandon the defilements (*kleśa*).⁴⁰⁰

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 141 b.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 161 a.

³⁹³ See thesis 9 of the Sautrāntikas.

³⁹⁴ TS 1545, p. 193 b.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 198 a and 977 b.

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 200 a.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 216 b.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 231 b.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 259 c.

- 23) There is initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) from the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) up to the realm of the Akaniṣṭha gods.⁴⁰¹

The Dārṣāntikas lean on the *sūtra* that defines initial inquiry as the coarse (*sthūla*) nature of the mind (*citta*) and investigation as the subtle (*sūkṣma*) nature of the mind. Now, this twofold nature of the mind appears in the three realms (*dhātu*), therefore initial inquiry and investigation are found in the three realms.

- 24) Factors (*dharma*) arise gradually (*anupūrvena*) and not suddenly.⁴⁰²

- 25) The fetters (*saṃyojana*) really exist, but their objects (*vastu*) and the person (*pudgala*) are unreal.⁴⁰³

The objects of the fetters are unreal because object-fields (*viṣaya*) endowed with or devoid of impurities are not determined (*niyata*). Thus, a respectable woman, adorned with jewelry and ornaments, goes to a worldly gathering. The sight of her arouses in others very different feelings: covetousness, lust, hatred, envy, disgust, sorrow, indifference, according to the personal latent tendencies of each.

- 26) Attachment (*rāga*) and repugnance (*pratigha*) are the only decisive elements for the continuity (*saṃtati*) of the life-stream from one existence to the next.⁴⁰⁴

At the moment of conception, the Gandharva, whose presence is necessary, always experiences a twofold mind: it loves one of the parents and hates the other. This is why attachment and repugnance are the only decisive elements for reincarnation that ensure the continuity of the life-stream.

- 27) Only the person who overcomes the defilements (*kleśa*) obtains a higher rebirth.⁴⁰⁵

- 28) All actions (*karman*) can be reversed.⁴⁰⁶

Even the actions called ‘offense with an immediately successive ripened effect’ (*ānantaryakarma*) can be reversed, without which the supremacy of the good actions of the Akaniṣṭha gods would no longer be a <163> supremacy. Therefore, all actions can be redeemed by good actions.

- 29) The unmanifest (*avijñapti*) does not exist.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 264 b.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 269 b and 462 c.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 270 a and 463 a.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 288 b.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 309 a. Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, iii. F 50-51.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 355 a.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 359 b and 593 b.

In other words, there is no form (*rūpa*) in the sense-sphere of factors (*dharmāyatana*).

30) Time (*kāla*) is distinct from the conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*).⁴⁰⁸

Indeed, time is permanent (*nitya*) whereas the conditioned factors are impermanent (*anitya*). The conditioned factors are in time like a fruit in a bowl. Just as fruit can be taken out of one bowl and be placed into another, or like many men leave one house and enter another, so the conditioned factors leave the future (*anāgata*) and enter into the present (*pratyutpanna*), then leave the present and enter into the past (*atita*).

31) The truths (*satya*) are defined in this way:

- i) The truth of suffering (*duḥkha*) is name (*nāman*) and form (*rūpa*).
- ii) The truth of the origin (*samudaya*) is the actions (*karman*) and the defilements (*kleśa*).
- iii) The truth of cessation (*nirodha*) is the destruction (*kṣaya*) of actions and defilements.
- iv) The truth of the path (*mārga*) is calming (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*).⁴⁰⁹

32) The six consciousnesses (*viññāna*) each having distinct objects, the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) does not have as object those of the five sense consciousnesses.⁴¹⁰

33) The six consciousnesses (*viññāna*), having only external objects, do not have as object either the internal faculties (*indriya*) or the consciousnesses themselves.⁴¹¹

34) The possessions (*prāpti*) and the non-possession (*aprāpti*) do not really exist.⁴¹²

The possessions are merely purely provisional designations (*prajñapti*). When sentient beings (*sattva*) do not abandon the factors, there is said to be possession. When they abandon the factors, there is said to be non-possession (*aprāpti*). It is the same for the group of the five fingers which is called the hand.

35) The presentiment (*kṣānti*) that belongs to clear understanding (*abhisamayāntika*) has the nature of cognition (*jñānatva*).⁴¹³

When, at first, pure (*anāsrava*) cognition has retrogression as object-field (*viṣaya*), it is called presentiment (*kṣānti*). When, later, it has stability (*sthiti*) as object-field, it is called cognition (*jñāna*).

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 383 b and 634 b. Cf. above thesis 14 of the Sautrāntikas.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 393 a, 700 a. See *Kathāvatthu*, XV, 3, anonymous thesis: the three periods (*addhā*) of time, i.e., past, present and future, are predetermined (*parinipphanna*).

⁴⁰⁹ TS 1545, p. 397 b.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 449 a.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 449 a

⁴¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 479 a and 550 c.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 489 b.

36) If a mind (*citta*) is endowed with cognition (*jñāna*), it is devoid of ignorance (*ajñāna*). If a mind is endowed with afflicted doubt (*vicikitsā*), it is without assurance (*niyāma*). If a mind is endowed with coarseness (*sthūlatā*), it is devoid of subtleness (*sūkṣmatā*).⁴¹⁴

37) The means of right livelihood (*saṃyagājīva*) and false livelihood (*mithyājīva*) are distinct entities of words (*vāc*) and actions (*karman*).⁴¹⁵

Indeed, the Buddha said in a *sūtra* that each of the eight members of the path has its own and distinct entity.

38) Magical creation (*nirmāṇa*) is not real.⁴¹⁶ <164>

39) Contact (*sparsā*) is not real.⁴¹⁷

Indeed, the *sūtra* says:

The eye (*caḥṣus*) and visual form (*rūpa*) produce visual consciousness (*caḥsurvijñāna*). The group of the three form contact (*sparsā*).

Outside of the eye, form and visual consciousness, there is no external reality that could be called contact.

40) A subtle (*sūkṣma*) mind subsists in the equipoise of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*).⁴¹⁸

If no mind subsisted in the equipoise of cessation, the life faculty (*jīvitendriya*) would then be interrupted, in other words there would be death (*maraṇa*) for the meditator.

41) There is retrogression (*parihāṇi*) for the one who is in the equipoise of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*).⁴¹⁹

This is a corollary to the preceding thesis⁴²⁰ according to which all actions are reversible. In this case, retrogression is always possible.

42) There is mixing of meditations (*dhyāna*).⁴²¹

Meditations perfume themselves mutually.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 547 b.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 604 c.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 700 a. Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, iii. F 9-11.

⁴¹⁷ TS 1545, p. 760 a.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 774 a and 775 a.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 773 c-774 a.

⁴²⁰ Thesis 28

⁴²¹ TS 1545, p. 879 c.

43) One enters into assurance (*niyāma*) by meditating only on the suffering which is the fact of being conditioned (*saṃskāraduḥkhata*).⁴²²

44) The three categories (*rāśi*) of sentient beings are found from Avici hell up to Akaṇiṣṭha heaven.⁴²³

These are the three categories of sentient beings: (1) those assured of the absolute good (*samyaktva*), (2) those assured of the perverted (*mithyātva*), and (3) those who are not assured (*aniyata*).

45) Names (*nāman*), phrases (*pada*) and syllables (*vyañjana*) do not really exist and have sound (*śabda*) as their intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).⁴²⁴

46) Mind (*citta*) and the factors (*dharma*) of mental events (*caitta*) do not occur at the same time.⁴²⁵

Just as a merchants in a group, passing through a gorge between steep mountains, walk one behind the other and not two by two, the minds and the mental events occur one after the other.

47) Initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) are mind (*citta*).⁴²⁶

48) There are cognitions (*jñāna*) the object-supports (*ālambana*) of which do not exist.⁴²⁷

When the object-support of a cognition is of illusory nature (*māyā*), whether it is a city of the Gandharvas, a circle of fire [produced by a glowing ember being whirled about rapidly], a mirage (*mrgatrṣṇā*), etc. ..., the cognition resulting from it has no objective object-field (*viśaya*).

49) There is neither an exact moment of arising nor an exact moment of cessation.⁴²⁸

The conditioned phenomena (*samskr̥ta*) exist in only two times: when they are not yet produced and when they have already been produced, or when they have not yet ceased and when they have already ceased. <165.

50) The images reflected on the surface of water or in a mirror have no real existence.⁴²⁹

⁴²² *Ibid.*, p. 928a. Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, vi. F 125.

⁴²³ TS 1545, p. 930 c. Cf. LVP: *Kośa*, iii. F 137.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 70 a.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 79 c.

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 218 c.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 228 b.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 141 b and 949 b.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 390 c.

The face does not enter into the mirror and the mirror does not occur in the face, then how could the mirror produce real images of the face?

51) Sounds have no real existence.⁴³⁰

All sounds, having an instantaneous (*kṣaṇika*) nature (*bhāva*), occur and cease in the same place and in the same instant. Then how could they reach into a valley, etc., and produce an echo?

52) Minds (*citta*) are the conditions as the equivalent and immediate antecedent (*samanantarapratyaya*) in regard to minds and not in regard to mental events (*caitta*). Mental events are conditions as the equivalent and immediate antecedent in regard to mental events and not in regard to minds.⁴³¹

53) Good (*kuśala*) and impure (*sāsrava*) discrimination (*prajñā*) associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) is never vision (*darśana*).⁴³²

54) Bodily actions (*kāyakarman*), vocal actions (*vākkarman*) and mental actions (*manokarman*) are solely (*eka*) intention (*cetanā*).⁴³³

55) On the stages (*bhūmi*) having close members (*antikāṅga*), there are only good (*kuśala*) factors (*dharma*).⁴³⁴

56) Magically created objects (*nirmāṇavastu*) have no real existence.⁴³⁵

If they would really exist, why is it said that they are magically created?

57) There is no untimely death (*akālamaraṇa*).⁴³⁶

This thesis rests on the *sūtra* that says:

One cannot remedy death.

58) In the equipoise of non-conception (*asaṃjñāsamāpatti*), the subtle (*sūkṣma*) mind (*citta*) has not ceased (*niruddha*).⁴³⁷

If there were no mind in the equipoise of non-conception, the life faculty (*jīvitendriya*) would be destroyed and this state would have to be called death and not equipoise.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 390 c.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 461 b.

⁴³² *Ibid.*, p. 502 a.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, p. 587 a.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 693 c.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 696 c and 700 a.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 771 a.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 772 c.

- 59) Retrogression (*parihāṇi*) has no real intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), it is merely a provisional designation (*prajñapti*).⁴³⁸

In the body, there previously were good (*kuśala*) merits (*punya*). Now, following fortuitous circumstances, they have been lost. What is the intrinsic nature of these factors? Likewise, if someone asks a man whose wealth has been stolen by a thief: "What is the nature of the wealth that you have lost?", the owner would reply: "Previously I had this wealth. Presently, a thief has stolen it from me and I have no more wealth. How could I know what nature it has?"

- 60) Abandonment (*prahāṇa*) of the good roots (*kuśalamūla*) has no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).⁴³⁹

Abandonment of the good roots is only cessation (*nirodha*), the absence of the latter. <166>

- 61) There exists a certain form (*rūpa*) that is neither color (*varṇa*) nor shape (*saṃsthāna*), which is produced by the mind (*citta*). It makes the hand and the other limbs move. It is called bodily manifest action (*kāyaviññaptikarman*).⁴⁴⁰

- 62) It is the earlier instant that perfumes (*vāsayati*) the later instant.⁴⁴¹ <167>

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 313 a.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 182 c.

⁴⁴⁰ LVP: *Siddhi*, p. 48.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 183 and 186.