

TREATISE ON THE DEMONSTRATION OF ACTION (KARMASIDDHIPRAKARAṆA)

BY VASUBANDHU

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TREATISE ON THE DEMONSTRATION OF ACTION (KARMA SIDDHIPRAKARAṆA)¹ BY VASUBANDHU

Homage to the Royal Prince Mañjuśrī²

A. FIRST PART: ERRONEOUS THEORIES ABOUT THE NATURE OF ACTION AA. MANIFEST ACTION (VIJÑĀPTI)

§ 1. In various *sūtras*, the Bhagavat said:

“There are three actions, namely, physical action (*kāyakarman*), vocal action (*vākkarman*) and mental action (*manañkarman*).”³ [781^a 26]

AAA. THEORY OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN-VAIBHĀṢIKAS: (VIJÑĀPTI-SHAPE)

AAA.1. PRESENTATION [OF THE THEORY]

§ 2. Some⁴ say:

Action done by the body (*kāyākṛta*) <208> is called ‘bodily action’; speech (*vāc*), being action, is called ‘vocal action’.⁵ These two are information/manifest action (*vijñāpti*) and non-information/unmanifest action (*avijñāpti*)⁶ in their intrinsic nature

¹ The Tibetan translator reads *karmasiddhaprakaraṇa*, but the meaning requires *karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, the title vouched for by the two Chinese versions. The meaning of *siddhi* seems to be ‘demonstration’, perhaps with the nuance of ‘illustration’. – Our translation is established according to the translation of Hsüan-tsang, Taishō, 1609.

² This homage is missing in the Chinese version. Mañjuśrī, patron of the doctrine and of letters is considered as being a student residing in the ninth stage of bodhisattvas, that of the ‘royal princes’ (*Muséon*, 1907, p. 251, note 1).

³ On the division into two and three actions, Introduction, § AA; *Aṅguttara*, III, 415; *Atthasālinī*, p. 88; *Kathāvatthu*, p. 393; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 305-6; *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 190 (*Muséon*, 1911, p. 245); *Kośa*, iv. F 1-2, from which we have borrowed these references.

⁴ [I.e., the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika:] For this school, see Introduction, § AB.

⁵ Actually, speech in its intrinsic nature is action, *vāg eva karma*. On the contrary, physical action is action due to the body or action of the body, *kāyena kāyasya vā karma* (see *Kośa*, iv. F 2).

⁶ For *vijñāpti* and *avijñāpti*, Introduction, § AAA; *Kośa*, iv. F 3; *Morale bouddhique*, p. 131; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 307-9.

LS: Both, Louis de La Vallée Poussin and Étienne Lamotte, translate *vijñāpti* into French as ‘information’ and *avijñāpti* as ‘non-information’. In modern scholarship, these terms have often been translated as ‘manifest action’ and ‘unmanifest action’. In general, I will do likewise, however, due to context, I will use both terms occasionally.

(*svabhāvatā*). Action associated with the mind (*manasamprayukta*) is called ‘mental action’. This action has only intention (*cetanā*)⁷ for its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).

What is the factor (*dharma*) called ‘manifest action’? – The action of bodily manifest action (*kāyavijñaptikarman*) has *rūpa*-shape (*saṁsthānarūpa*) as its intrinsic nature. It is produced through a mind ... that wants this shape (*tadāmbakacittād utpannam*).⁸

Of what is [bodily unmanifest action] the shape? – It is the shape of the body [shape that affects the body, gesture, etc.].

If it is the shape of the body, why is it said above that action done by the body is called ‘bodily action’?⁹ – Since this action [this gesture] relates to a member (*aṅga*) of the ‘body’ in general, it is called ‘shape of the body’; since it depends (*āśrita*) on the fundamental material elements (*mahābhūta*) of the body in order to arise, it is called ‘action done by the body’. What is said about the body in general is equally applicable to [all] its members. Thus people (*loka*) say: “I live in a village (*grāma*), I live in a forest (*vana*)” [when they live in a house or under a tree].

Why is it said that this manifest action is produced through a mind ... that wants [this shape]? – In order to exclude the shape of the lips, etc. (*oṣṭhādisaṁsthāna*): this is not produced through a mind ... that wants [the shape], but <209> through a mind ... that wants to utter phrases (*pada*). It is also in order to exclude the shape resulting from a mind ... of previous vows (*pūrvapraṇidhānacitta*): this shape is not produced through a mind ... that wants [this shape] but from quite another mind, the ripening cause (*vipākahetu*).¹⁰

Why call [the bodily manifest action] ‘information’/‘manifest action’ (*vijñapti*)? – Because it informs about or manifests (*vijñāpayati*) the mind that moves it (*tatpravartakacitta*) in such a way that someone else can be aware of it. To explain this, the stanza (*gāthā*) is quoted:

“External movements (*bāhya*), body and speech, inform about or manifest the intent (*āśaya*) of the heart. In the same way, the fish (*matsya*) hidden in the sea raises waves (*taraṅga*) and reveals its presence.”

⁷ For *cetanā*, which is imperfectly translated [into French] as ‘volition’, see *Kośa*, i. F 28; ii. F 154; iv. F 2, note 3; *Morale bouddhique*, p. 136.

⁸ For the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas, physical manifest action (*vijñapti*) is a shape (*saṁsthāna*), that is produced through intention, but distinct from this intention. See Introduction, § AAA; *Kośa*, iv. F 9-12; *Siddhi*, p. 48.

⁹ This should be understood, when one speaks of ‘bodily’ action. Action is bodily because it is an action of the body, a gesture relating to the body in general or to one of its parts, hand, foot, etc. Or else, action is bodily because its arising depends on the great elements (*mahābhūta*) of the body – earth, water, fire, wind – which are its generating cause (*jananahetu*), its tutelage cause (*niśrayahetu*). See *Kośa*, i. F 21; ii. F 65.

¹⁰ In order to be bodily manifest action (*vijñapti*), the shape must be directly wanted by the intention; the murderous act must result immediately from the murderous intention. Every shape is not bodily manifest action (*vijñapti*); the movement of the lips is the result of the syllable that the speaker wishes to pronounce, and is not wanted for itself.

What is 'shape' (*saṁsthāna*)? – It is the nature of long, etc. (*dirghādi*).¹¹

What is 'long', etc.? – It is that to which the epithet (*saṁjñā*) 'long', etc., is applied to.

In what sense-source (*āyatana*) does [bodily manifest action] fit? – It fits into the sense-source of visible form (*rūpāyatana*).¹² [718^b 18]

AAA.2.

REFUTATION¹³

§ 3. Here it is necessary to reflect and choose. Length ... is either (a) a special atom (*paramāṇuviśeṣa*, an atom of shape), like *rūpa*-color, or (b) a composite of special atoms (*paramāṇuviśeṣasaṁghāta*), or (c) a unique and distinct real entity (*ekam anyad dravya*) pervading the mass of *rūpa*, etc. (*rūpādisaṁgātavyāpi*). <210>

By accepting that, what are the faults (*doṣa*)?

- If length were a special atom [a *rūpa*-shape], it would be the same as with *rūpa*-color: length ... would be present in each little part (*ekaika avayava*) of the mass of *rūpa*.¹⁴
- If length were a composite of special atoms, what difference would there be between [length] and the composite of atoms of *rūpa*-color? [There would be no difference] and, consequently, the various composites of *rūpa*-color should be long, etc.
- Let us suppose that length is a unique and distinct real entity pervading the mass of *rūpa*. Being unique, being pervading, it should occur in each of the parts (*avayava*) separately and in all the parts at the same time. Or else, this real entity would not be one, residing separately in all the parts. – In addition, [such a hypothesis] destroys this established truth (*siddhānta*) which has it that the ten sense-spheres (*daśāyatana*) are all composites of atoms (*paramāṇusaṁghāta*);¹⁵ it brings confirmation for the disciples of Kaṇāda for whom those entities which have members (*aṅgin*) are real substances pervading its members (*aṅga*).¹⁶ [781^b 28] <211>

¹¹ Shape is eightfold: long (*dirgha*), short (*hrasva*), square (*vr̥tta*), round (*parimaṇḍala*), high (*unnata*), low (*avanata*), even (*śāta*), uneven (*viśāta*). See *Kośa*, i. F 16.

¹² Since it is shape, bodily manifest action (*vijñapti*) fits into the sense-source of visible form (*rūpāyatana*) which is twofold, color (*varṇa*) and shape (*saṁsthāna*). The sense-source of visible form, in turn, fits into the aggregate of form (*rūpaskandha*). See *Kośa*, i. F 16 and i. F 14.

¹³ Here the Vaibhāṣikas have the Sautrāntikas as their opponents (*Kośa*, iv. F 12).

¹⁴ For the Vaibhāṣikas, color and shape are distinct real entities (*dravya*). But the Sautrāntikas deny that shape is something other than color (*Kośa*, i, p. 16) and they reason as follows: "There is no atom of length. In fact, when a mass of color diminishes, there comes a moment when we no longer have the idea of 'long' with regard to it, but rather the idea of 'short': thus this idea does not proceed from the *rūpa*-shape existing in the entity [i.e., the mass]. Therefore what we designate as 'long' is a number of real entities (*dravya*)—atoms of color—arranged in a certain manner." (*Kośa*, iv. F 10).

¹⁵ See *Kośa*, i, p. 25, where it is said that form (*rūpa*) never exists in the state of an isolated atom, but in a state of agglomeration.

¹⁶ On the problem of the whole and the part (*avayavin, avayava*), of the substance and the quality (*guṇin, guṇa*), in Vaiśeṣika philosophy, see the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda, I, I, 15-16; *Kośa*, iii. F 210-211; ix. F 290;

AAA.3.

CONCLUSION

§ 4. When a mass of color appears in one direction (*ekadigmukha*) in large amount (*bhūyas, bahutaram*), it brings up the idea of 'long' (*dirgha*); when it appears in one direction in small amount, it brings up the idea of 'short' (*hrasva*). When it appears equally in the four directions, it brings up the idea of 'square' (*vr̥tta*); when it appears equally in every sense, it brings up the idea of 'circular' (*parimaṇḍala*). When it appears convex in its middle, it brings up the idea of 'high' (*unnata*); when it appears concave in its middle, it brings up the idea of 'low' (*avanata*). When it appears in one single direction, it brings up the idea of 'uneven' (*viśata*); when it appears in every direction, it brings up the idea of 'even' (*śāta*).¹⁷

Thus when one sees brocades on a variegated carpet (*citrāstarāṇa*), one produces various ideas of shape (*nānāvidhasaṃsthānaprajñā*); but it is impossible (*ayukta*) that these various *rūpa*-shapes are found together in one and the same place (*ekadeśa*): this is the same for the *rūpa*-colors; for, if that were so, one would form the idea of all shapes in no matter what place. Now that is not so.¹⁸ Therefore *rūpa*-shape is not a real entity distinct (*anyad dravyam*) [from *rūpa* itself].¹⁹ When the *rūpa*-color is arranged in a square, it does not at the same time bring up the idea of 'long', etc., as do, for example, <212> rows (*pañkti*) of trees (*vr̥kṣa*), of ants (*valmika*) etc. There is no problem there. [781^c 8]

AAA.4.

ANSWER TO ONE OBJECTION²⁰

§ 5. **If that is so [if shape does not differ from color], how is it that one does not discern (*avadhr̥*) *rūpa*-color from a distance (*dūrāt*) and in the dark (*tamasi*), but one does discern *rūpa*-shape? Without discerning the *rūpa*-shape of the trees (*vr̥kṣa*), etc., how does one discern the *rūpa*-shape of their row (*pañkti*)?**

There is no row distinct from the trees, etc. But, in these distant or obscure masses, color and shape are not discerned at the same time. One seizes (*grhṇāti*) something, but it is indistinct (*avyakta*): one wonders what it is that one sees. We know then that one seizes only the *rūpa*-color, but as it is distant and obscure, one sees only indistinctly. Therefore it is not proven (*asiddha*) that manifest action (*viññapti*) is shape (*saṃsthāna*). [781^c 14]

H. Ui, *Vaiśeṣika philosophy*, OTF, xxiv, 1917, p. 122; R. Grousset, *Philosophies indiennes*, Paris, 1931, vol. I, p. 71-2.

¹⁷ This entire paragraph is taken from *Kośa*, iv. F 9.

¹⁸ This is the second argument in *Kośa*, iv. F 10: "In a variegated carpet, one sees numerous shapes. Thus there would be, according to you, many forms (*rūpa*) of the 'shape' category in one and the same place (*ekadeśa*): that is impossible, as (it is likewise impossible) for color. [If shape is a real entity, then that part of the cloth which belongs to a long line cannot at the same time belong to a short line.]"

¹⁹ It is wrong that the Vaibhāṣika claim that visible form (*rūpa*) is of two types, color and shape, for, say the Sautrāntikas, how could a single real entity be (*vidyate*) twofold, color and shape at once? (See *Kośa*, i. F 16)

²⁰ Same objection and same answer in *Kośa*, iv, F 11-12.

AAB.

THEORY OF THE VĀTSĪPUTRĪYAS, SĀMMITĪYAS: (VIJÑĀPTI-MOVEMENT) PRESENTATION [OF THE THEORY]

AAB.1.

§ 6. Some²¹ say:

Bodily manifest action (*kāyavijñapti*) <213> is a movement (*gati*) produced through a mind ... that wants this movement (*tadviṣayā lambakacittādar utpannā*).

Why is it said that it is produced through a mind ... that wants this movement? – In order to exclude the movement of the lips, etc. (*oṣṭhādīkampita*) ... produced, not through a mind that wants it, but through a mind that wants to utter phrases (*pada*).

What is it that is called ‘movement’ (*gati*)? – A displacement (*deśāntarasamkrānti*).

In what sense-sphere (*āyatana*) does it fit? – It fits into the sense-sphere of visible form (*rūpāyatana*).²² [781° 19]

AAB.2.

FIRST ARGUMENT; REFUTATION

§ 7. How do you know that manifest action is a displacement?

Because it is not ascertained (*na avadhṛta*) to have a distinctive characteristic (*lakṣaṇaviśeṣa*) [apart from displacement].

This argument is worthless.

Thus the products of cooking (*pākajadravya*)—as soon as they are in contact (*saṃyoga*) with one of the conditions of cooking* (*pākapratyaya*), fire (*agni*), sun (*sūrya*), snow (*hima*), caustic substances

²¹ The thesis of *vijñapti*-movement is attributed to the Vātsīputriyas by *Kośa*, iv. F 4, to the Sāṃmitīyas by *Siddhi*, p. 48. But we know that the Sāṃmitīyas were directly linked to the Vātsīputriyas (cf. J. Masuda, *Origin and doctrines*, p. 57; P. Demiéville, *Origine*, p. 58; Tāranātha, p. 271-2; Bu-ston, II, p. 99; *Vyākhyā* ad *Kośa*, ix, p. 232: Vātsīputriyā Āryasāṃmitīyāḥ).

The thesis of *vijñapti*-movement goes hand in hand with that of duration (*sthiti*) of the *saṃskāras*: By virtue of the characteristic of impermanence, certain factors (*dharma*) (mind, mental events, sound, flame) perish immediately (*kṣaṇanirodha*) without the help of external causes; others, (wood, pitcher) are destroyed, after their arising, with the help of external causes (fire, hammer). See *Kośa*, ii. F 234; iv. F 4-5; J. Masuda, *Origin and doctrines*, p. 54 = Vātsīputriya (vii, 2): “Some *saṃskāras* exist for some time while others perish at every moment”. The Vātsīputriyas agree on this subject with the Mahāsaṃghikas (i B, 7 = Masuda, p. 34) and the later Mahīśāsakas (ix B, 8 = Masuda, p. 63); as opponents, they had the Sarvāstivādins (v, 41 = Masuda, p. 50), the early Mahīśāsakas (ix A, 23 = Masuda, p. 62), the Kāśyapiyas (xi, 4 = Masuda, p. 65) and, above all, the Sautrāntikas. – ‘Presentation’ summarized in Introduction, § ACA.

²² Movement (*gati*) fits into the sense-sphere of visible form (*rūpāyatana*) because it is a movement of the body, of visible form (*rūpa*).

* **Potter**: Vaiśeṣika: The whole process of qualitative change involving the atoms is referred to in Sanskrit as *pāka*, literally ‘cooking’. An unbaked pot is (depending on the kind of clay used) black, say, but after it comes out of the oven it is red all over, both outside and in. Yet, *ex hypothesi* it is the same atoms making the same pot. ‘Cooking’ does not only affect change in color, mind you; it applies equally to all sorts of changes of quality, including the gestation and maturation of plants and animal organisms. Any change which comes about through application of heat is classified under *pāka*. EIP.II.84.

(kaṭuka), etc.—have distinctive features (*viśeṣa*) without one being able to ascertain their distinctive characteristic (*lakṣaṇaviśeṣa*). However, they are not without <214> being different before and after. It is the same here.

Thus, equal piles (*tulyabhāga*) of tall grass to be burned (*dirghendhanatṛṇa*)—each producing their flame (*jvāla*) separately—have distinctive features without one being able to ascertain their distinctive characteristic. However, these different piles are not without difference. It is the same here.²³

If the characteristic of the cooked product did not appear on the first contact between the product of cooking and its condition, neither would it appear subsequently (*paścāt*), for the condition of cooking does not vary.

If the equal piles of tall grass to be burned did not produce their flame pile by pile and separately, these flames would not have any differences to be distinguished as to dimension (*pramā*), brightness (*dyuti*) and heat (*uṣman*).

Therefore it is not because a distinctive characteristic [other than displacement] is not ascertained [in manifest action] that one can say that manifest action is displacement. It is necessary to be aware of this distinctive characteristic. [782^a 1]

AAB.3.

SECOND ARGUMENT; REFUTATION

§ 8. **Since manifest action has no cause of destruction (*vināśahetu*), we know that it is a displacement.**

This argument is also worthless. Let us take as example mind (*citta*), mental events (*caitta*), sound (*śabda*), flame, (*jvāla*), etc. What cause of destruction do they have? [You know that they have none] and that they perish immediately (*kṣaṇanirodha*). It is the same for all of the rest: destruction does not depend on a cause (*na hetum apekṣate*).²⁴

**But mind, etc., also has a cause of destruction, its own impermanence (*svānityatva*).
<215>**

If that is so, why not reason in the same way for entities other [than mind, etc.]. [From this point of view], the other entities do not differ [from mind]. Why? You know that destruction, for mind, etc., does not depend on a cause, but it is the same for all the rest as for mind ...

If the destruction of factors (*dharma*) other [than mind, etc.] were not to depend on a cause, the material intrinsic nature ... (*rūpādisvabhāva*) of kindling (*indhana*) would no longer be perceived (*grhita*) before the contact (*saṃyoga*) of the kindling... with

²³ In other words, the nature of factors (*dharma*) is subtle (*sūkṣmā hi dharmaprakṛtayaḥ*). Although one sees them, one does not cognize their nature. Between clay and brick, there are infinite products of different color: one can see them without being able to define them. In a jungle fire, each clump of grass gives a flame differing in size, light, radiance; each clump has its own distinctive characteristic, but they cannot be defined exactly.

²⁴ This is an argument *ad hominem*: you accept that certain factors (*dharma*), mind, mental events, sound, flame, perish without the intervention of foreign causes. Then accept that *all* of the factors perish in the same way. (See above, note 21).

fire... (*agni*) as after this same contact; or else, it would be perceived after as well as before.²⁵

- a. As long as the wind (*vāyu*) does not reach the lamp (*dīpa*), as long as the hand (*pāṇi*) does not grasp or deaden the sound of the bell (*ghaṇṭā*), the flame of the lamp (*dīpajvālā*) and the sound of the bell (*ghaṇṭāśabda*) are clearly perceived; afterwards, that is not so. However, [even according to you], the destruction of the flame and of the sound depend neither on the wind nor on the hand. It is the same for the kindling, etc.; there is no problem there.²⁶
- b. Let us suppose that the kindling... perishes by means of the fire..., and that, in this way, its material intrinsic nature is no longer perceived. Immediately <216> after its contact with fire (*saṃyogāntaram*), we should no longer see it for, as soon as it is placed in contact, it is modified.²⁷
- c. If the external condition (*bāhyapṛtyaya*) of cooking remains unchanged (*nirviśiṣṭa*), there arise [successively] various products of cooking (*pākaja*) with the characteristics of a cooked product (*pākajalakṣaṇaviśeṣa*) that are more and more pronounced (lit.: of inferior, medium or superior category). But how would they arise afterwards from the same cause [from the same condition of cooking] that formerly made them perish? It is impossible (*ayukta*) that the factor (*dharma*) that causes arising coincides with the factor that causes perishing: two *dharma*s of opposite (*viruddha*) characteristics do not make one and the same cause: this is known by everyone (*lokaprasiddha*). Therefore conditioned factors (*saṃskṛta*) do not depend (*nāpekṣante*) on a cause of destruction (*vināśahetu*): they perish spontaneously (*svarasena nirudhyante*).²⁸

²⁵ The Vātsīputriyas insist. If wood perished by itself and not by fire, it must be one thing or another: either the wood would have already perished before being put on the fire, or else it would still exist after having passed through the fire. This alternative is contradictory to experience. Therefore wood does not perish by itself: it perishes with the help of fire.

²⁶ Cf. *Kośa*, iv. F 6: “Your reasoning is not conclusive. The fact that, after its conjunction with fire, we no longer see wood, is open to two interpretations:

- 1) either the wood perishes by reason of this conjunction;
- 2) or the wood perishes incessantly in and of itself, re-arises incessantly in and of itself under normal conditions, but stops renewing itself by virtue of its conjunction with fire.

You [i.e., the Vātsīputriya,] accept that the destruction of the flame is spontaneous (*ākasmika*). When, after a conjunction with wind, the flame is no longer visible, you admit that this conjunction is not the cause of the destruction of the flame; you admit that the flame, by virtue of this conjunction, has stopped renewing itself.

The same applies for the sound of the bell: the hand, placed on the bell, prevents the renewing of the sound; it does not destroy the sound that you admit is momentary.

Thus, it is inference (and not experience) that should settle this question.”

²⁷ According to the Chinese; the Tibetan renders the same idea in a different way.

²⁸ Cf. *Kośa*, iv. F 7: ‘Cooking’ (*pāka*), or a conjunction with fire (*agnisaṃyoga*), produces different products (*pākaja*), of deeper and deeper color. The same cause that produces the first color destroys this first color, or at least, – if you object that it refers to a new conjunction with fire, since the fire is momentary – the cause which destroys the first color is similar to the cause that produces it. Now it is impossible that a certain cause produces a certain effect and that later that same cause, or a similar cause, destroys the same effect.

That entities are perceived (*grhīta*) or are not perceived as previously (*yathāpūrvam*), that, as we know, is the distinctive characteristic (*lakṣaṇaviśeṣa*) of the continuation (*anupravṛtti*) and of the cessation (*nirodha*) of the stream (*saṃtāṇa*): [the stream] enjoys a subtle increase.

- d. If destruction (*vināśadharma*) had a cause, there would be no factor (*dharma*) perishing without cause; mind (*citta*), mental events (*caitta*), etc., which depend on a cause to arise, would also depend on a cause to perish. Now, [according to your own admission], mind and mental events have no other [cause of destruction] than their own impermanence (*svānityava*) as everybody knows (*lokaprasiddha*). <217>
- e. Since the causes [of destruction] would differ [according to the case], there would be different destructions (*vināśaviśeṣa*). Fire, sun, snow, caustic substances, etc., being different, the products of cooking would differ.²⁹
- f. Finally, for the factor (*dharma*) that has already perished, it would be necessary to find a cause that makes it perish again, as for *rūpa*, etc.

This is why destruction has absolutely no cause and, as destruction has no cause, everything perishes as soon as it arises (*utpattyanantaravināśa*). Thus we know that there is no displacement. [782^a 25]

AAB.4.

THIRD ARGUMENT; REFUTATION

§ 9. Since manifest action has no generating cause (*janahetu*), we know that it is a displacement (*deśānatarasaṃkrānti*).

This argument also is worthless, for manifest action has a generating cause. What is previous (*pūro*), with regard to what is later (*paścima*), constitutes a generating cause. Thus, for example, the mind of the previous moment (*pūroakṣaṇacitta*) with regard to the mind of the later moment (*paścimakṣaṇacitta*); the product of earlier cooking (*pākaja*) with regard to the product of later cooking; milk (*kṣīra*) with regard to coagulated milk (*dadhi*); grape juice (*drākṣārasa*) with regard to wine (*mṛdvikā*); wine with regard to vinegar (*kaṭuka*), etc.³⁰ Thus there is no factor (*dharma*) that changes its place. Since there is no displacement, how could there be movement? [782^a 29] <218>

AAB.5.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT

§ 10. In addition, [it must be one thing or the other]. If the factor (*dharma*) is stable (*avasthita*), it is without movement (*agatika*); being without movement, it should always remain in place. If the factor is not stable, it is also without movement for, perishing as soon as it arises (*utpattyanantaravināśin*), it does not involve movement.

If that is so, what is this movement that is noticed?

²⁹ If factors (*dharma*) perished by means of external causes, the destructions would vary because the external cause is changing: the destruction of wood by fire would differ from the destruction of wood by a caustic substance.

³⁰ Some equivalences: *jou* (5 and 7) = *ho ma* = *kṣīra* (M. V. 5685); *lo* (164 and 6) = *zho* = *dadhi* (M. V. 5686); *p'ou t'ao tche* (140 and 9; 140 and 8; 85 and 2) = *rgun ḥbruḥi khu ba* = *drākṣārasa* (M. V. 5715); *tsieou* (164 and 3) = *rgun chang* = *mṛdvikā* (M. V. 5718); *tso* (164 and 5) = *tshva* = *kaṭuka* (M. V. 1901).

That which is seen in another place is not the same thing as before (*yad deśāntare dṛṣṭaṃ mūladravyaṃ na bhavati*).

How do we know that it is not the same thing?

Because at a given place there is continually renewed arising: like the flames of a straw fire (*trṇajvāla*), or the play of the shadow (*chāyā*). The shadow seen at a given place is not that of another place; the screen remaining immobile, the light of the sun... (*sūryādidyuti*) goes further away, comes closer, turns, and then we see the shadow get larger, smaller or turn. If the light is hidden, no shadow appears.

Our opponent (*paravādin*) objects:

Why this subtle objection against movement? How do we know that what we see in one place is not the same thing as before?

But this again touches on our previously stated dilemma: “If the factor (*dharma*) is stable, it is without movement, etc.”

In addition, the external condition (*bāhyapratyaya*) of cooking, fire (*agni*), etc., does not vary (*abhinna*) and nevertheless, subsequently (*paścāt*), various products of cooking are perceived (*grṛhita*). By this proof, we know that, at each moment (*kṣaṇe kṣaṇe*), there is a different product of cooking [and not the same product cooked more and more].

Under the pretext that there is no cause for these products to be different, you claim that the product seen elsewhere is the same product as before. But as there is no reason for this [new product] to be identical with the former one, why not <219> accept (*kenāniṣṭam*) that it is no longer the former product? As these two hypotheses cannot be held together, movement (*gati*) is not proven (*siddha*). [782^b 13]

AAC.

**THEORY OF THE SAURYODAYIKA-DĀRṢṬĀNTIKAS:
(VIJÑĀPTI-WIND)**

AAC.1.

PRESENTATION [OF THE THEORY]

§ 11. The Sauryodayikas³¹ say:

³¹ The *Je-tch'ou luen* (72; 17 and 3; 149 and 8) = *nyi ma 'char ka pa* = Sauryodayika (?), ‘another name for the root-scholars of the Sautrāntika school’ (Bukkyo Daijiten, p. 1332)—closely allied with the Dārṣṭāntikas—are described in a note by K’oueï-ki ad *Siddhi*, ii, I, 36b: “Here the author refutes the Je-tch’ou-luen, i.e., the Sūtra-nikāya-mūla-ācāryas. In the first century after the Buddha’s death, in North India at Takṣaśilā, there was Ku-ma-ra-ta (Bukkyo Daijiten, p. 311), i.e., ‘Young-man-head’ who composed 900 śāstras. At that time, in the five Indias, there were five Mahāśāstrācāryas, like a ‘Rising of the Sun’ (*sūrya-udaya*), who illuminated-guided the world, whence the name Sauryodayika, because they were similar to the sun; also called Dārṣṭāntika-ācārya; or, because these masters composed the Dṛṣṭāntika-mālā-śāstra, bringing together the *adbhutavastus*, they are called Dārṣṭāntikas. – The seed-[scholars] of the Sūtranikāya gradually became the Sūtranikāya, for what they said became doctrine. However, at that time, there was still no Sūtranikāya; the latter appeared in the fourth century,” (*Siddhi*, p. 48). – See also K’oueï-ki, commentary on the *Siddhi*, iv, I, 53b; Noël Péri, *A propos de la date de Vasubandhu*, BEFEO, 1911, p. 360, mentions a Sūrya-udaya-śāstra the title of which, according to Ki-tsang, is taken from a comparison (Taishō, 1852).

In reality, formations (*saṃskāra*) are not displaced (*deśāntaraṃ na saṃkrāṃanti*), for, in their intrinsic nature (*svabhāvatā*), they perish instantaneously (*kṣaṇe kṣaṇe nirudhyante*). But, apart from that, there exists a factor (*dharma*) which has for its cause (*hetu*) a distinctive mind (*cittaviśeṣa*) that produces it by relying (*niśritya*) on the hand (*pāṇi*), the foot (*pāda*), etc. [This factor] is the cause that makes the hand, the foot... [renewed as a series] arise in another place. It is called ‘movement’ (*gati*) and also ‘bodily manifest action’ (*kāyavijñapti*). In what sense-sphere does it fit? – It fits in the sense-sphere of visual form (*rūpāyatana*).

Then why does the eye (*caḥṣus*) not see it when it sees rūpa-color (*varṇarūpa*)? Since it is not seen, it does not inform another or manifest to another: why call it information/manifest action (*vijñapti*)? How do you know that this factor (*dharma*) really exists? How does this factor make the body move and ‘another’ arise?

That is explained by the wind element (*vāyudhātu*) produced through a distinctive mind (*cittaviśeṣād utpannaḥ*). In its intrinsic nature (*svabhāvatā*) the wind element is mobile (*cala*). It is the cause that makes the foot arise in another place. Apart from the wind, where is there a factor (*dharma*) endowed with mobility? Grass (*trṇa*), leaves (*parṇa*), etc., have no other mobility than the external wind. How do they move? It is when the wind stirs (*cal-*) them, disperses (*ākṣip-*) them and touches (*saṃyuj-*) them that they move. Therefore it should be admitted that the wind is able to make the hand, etc., move and arise in another place. Why tire oneself out trying to find another thing which, neither in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) nor by its activity (*kriyā*), will be able to constitute a factor capable of movement? [782^b 26]

AAC.2.

REFUTATION

§ 12. a. According to you, the wind element (*vāyudhātu*) produced through a distinct mind (*cittaviśeṣa utpannaḥ*) and cause of the arising of the hand... in another place would be bodily manifest action (*kāyavijñapti*). But why is this wind element, which is not manifest action called ‘manifest action’? In addition, to claim (*iṣ*) <221> that the sense-sphere of the tangible (*sparsāyatana*)—into which wind is classified³²—is good (*kuśala*) or bad (*akuśala*) is not Buddhist (*na śākyaputriyam*).³³

On the doctrine of the Sauryodayikas, see Introduction, § ADA. It is to be compared with the Darṣṭāntika thesis stated in *Siddhi*, p. 48: “There exists a certain Rūpa that is neither color (*varṇa*) nor shape (*saṃsthāna*), which is produced by the mind. This Rūpa sets the hand and the other limbs in motion. It is called ‘action of bodily information’ (*kāyavijñaptikarman*).” – Compare also *Kośa*, ix. F 294: “What is the principal cause for the genesis of bodily action? Memory (*smṛti*) causes an inclination for action (*chanda* = *kartukamatā*) to arise; from the inclination comes initial inquiry (*vitarka*); from initial inquiry comes effort (*prayatna*), which gives rise to a wind (*vāyu*) which launches bodily action.”

³² According to *Kośa*, i. F 18, wind is one of the eleven types of tangibles. The sense-sphere of the tangible (*spraṣṭavyāyatana*) is part of the aggregate of form (*rūpskandha*).

³³ According to *Kośa*, i. F 54, eight sense-elements (*dhātu*): the five material sense-faculties, odor, taste and tangible are indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), being neither good nor bad.

- b. According to you, a distinctive mind (*cittaviśeṣa*) makes the body arise in another place, and this arising of the body would be bodily manifest action. But such bodily manifest action is imagined (*kalpita*), nonexistent as a real entity (*na dravyasat*), for the body in its intrinsic nature is a composite of multiple factors (*sambahuladharmasaṃghāta*). In addition, why is [the body], which is not manifest action or information, called 'manifest action' or 'information'? Odor (*gandha*), etc., does not manifest to another or does not inform another. Finally, claiming that odor, etc., is good or bad is not Buddhist.
- c. According to you, *rūpa*-color (*varṇarūpa*) produced through a distinctive mind would be bodily manifest action. But this *rūpa*-color is not produced through a distinctive mind: it is produced through its own seeds (*svabīja*) and from a distinctive wind (*vāyuvīśeṣa*). In addition, claiming that *rūpa*-color is good or bad is not Buddhist.³⁴

§ 13. **If this *rūpa*-color itself is not bodily manifest action, its arising in another place will constitute bodily manifest action.**

What a fool you are (*devānāmpriya*)!³⁵ You are arbitrarily (*jen*) exhausting your strength on this action of information or manifest action (*vijñaptikarman*) and you are passionately accumulating hypotheses (*tchoan-ki*); but, when something cannot be acquired by effort, why persist in it (*prayatnato'sādhyeṣu kiṃ prayatnena*)? Who could <221> establish (*vyavasthāp-*) that this arising [of the *rūpa*] is a distinct real entity (*anyad dravyam*) [of *rūpa* itself]?

If the arising of the *rūpa* that is perceived is not the same as the *rūpa*, etc., if the sense-faculty that sees it is not the same as the eye, etc., how would the seeing subject recognize its existence?

If it is invisible, why name it manifest action/information? We have said above that it does not manifest to others or inform others.

Finally, if the *rūpa*-color could be good (*kuśala*) or bad (*akuśala*), we could say that its arising constitutes bodily manifest action. But *rūpa*-color is neither good nor bad: we have said that above. Therefore its arising also [is neither good nor bad, and does not constitute bodily manifest action].

Consequently, there is no true action of bodily information or bodily manifest action. [782° 15]

AB.

UNMANIFEST ACTION (AVIJÑĀPTI)³⁶

§ 14. **If that is so, then bodily action (*kāyakarman*) is merely an unmanifest action (*avijñapti*). What factor (*dharma*) is unmanifest action? It is a *rūpa*, discipline**

³⁴ According to *Kośa*, i. F 54, the sense-source of visible form (*rūpadhātu*) is good or bad when it constitutes a bodily action produced through a good or bad mind; it is indeterminate in all other cases. Now, in your hypothesis, *rūpa*-color is not produced through a mind but from its own seeds or from a distinctive wind. Therefore it is indeterminate from the moral point of view and cannot constitute any action.

³⁵ On the meaning of this epithet *t'ien ngai* (37 and 1; 61 and 9) = *lha rnam dgaḥ ba* = *devānāmpriya*, see S. Lévi, *Journal Asiatique*, 1891, II, p. 549; and *Bull. Ac. Roy. Belg.*, 1933, no. 1-6, p. 12-15.

³⁶ On the unmanifest action (*avijñapti*) of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas, Introduction, ABA; *Kośa*, i. F 20, 26; ii. F 241; iv. F 3, 13-17; threefold, p. 43; *tyāga*, p. 100; *Siddhi*, p. 50. They had as opponents the Sautrāntikas (*Vibhāṣā*, Taishō 1545, k. 74, p. 383b; *Kośa*, iv. F 13, 18-25) and the Vijñānavādins (*Siddhi*, p. 50-51).

(saṃvara),³⁷ etc., contained in the sense-sphere of factors (dharmāyatana).³⁸ But in the realm of desire (kāmadhātu), how does unmanifest arise without [prior] manifest action?³⁹ <223>

What is the fault (*doṣa*) if there is such unmanifest action in the realm of desire?

Unmanifest action will operate in conformity with the mind (*cittānuparivartin*) as in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*). But then, in the person who has a mind different [from that which produces unmanifest action (*avijñapti*)] or who is without mind (*acittaka*), there will be neither discipline (*saṃvara*) nor indiscipline (*asaṃvara*).⁴⁰

We say that the unmanifest action [called ‘discipline’] is projected for a fixed length of time (*kālasamādānāt*),⁴¹ and thus we avoid this fault. [You Vaibhāṣikas are forced to admit that, in the world of desire, an unmanifest action of lying can arise without a prior vocal manifest action]. Otherwise, when the Pratimokṣa is being read and a monastic remains silent and does not confess, how would the monastic be committing the offense of lying (*mṛṣāvādāpatti*)?⁴² <224>

³⁷ *Avijñapti* is of three types: (i) discipline (*saṃvara*); (ii) non-discipline (*asaṃvara*); (iii) neither discipline nor non-discipline (*naivasamvranāsaṃvara*) (see *Kośa*, iv. F 43).

³⁸ *Avijñapti* is part of the aggregate of form (*rūpaskandha*) because it is itself form/matter (*rūpa*): the manifest action (*viññapti*)—from which it is derived—is form/matter, and the fundamental material elements that constitute its support are form/matter (see *Kośa*, i. F 26). But unmanifest action (*avijñapti*) is invisible form/matter: as such, it is not part of the sense-sphere of visible form (*rūpāyatana*) but of the sense-sphere of factors (*dharmāyatana*) known by the mental consciousness (see *Kośa*, i. F 30).

³⁹ In order to understand this objection, one should know that, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, the arising of *avijñapti*, discipline, etc., is not the same in all the realms. Here in the realm of desire, discipline is always produced by a bodily or vocal manifest action (*viññapti*). On the contrary, in the higher realm of form, discipline operates in conformity with the mind (*cittānuparivartin*) that is strong enough to create the discipline by itself without the intervention of a manifest action (*viññapti*). If then, say the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas deny bodily and vocal manifest action, they must accept that, in the realm of desire, unmanifest action (*avijñapti*) does not arise. Compare *Kośa*, iv. F 13: “If manifest action does not exist, then the unmanifest action of the realm of Kāmadhātu will no longer exist, for this unmanifest action of Kāmadhātu depends on manifest action, bodily and vocal action, form (*rūpa*); it does not accompany the mind like the unmanifest action of the realm of Rūpadhātu.”

⁴⁰ Continuation of the objection: If the unmanifest action of the realm of desire arises without a prior manifest action, one must accept that it operates in conformity with the mind (*cittānuparivartin*) like the unmanifest action of the realm of form. Now, that is not so, for the unmanifest action of the realm of desire that develops during sleep, distraction, etc., does not operate in conformity with the mind. Same objection in *Kośa*, iv. F 13.

⁴¹ The Tibetan is clearer: *dus yongs su gzung bas ‘phangs pa’i phyir de ltar mi ‘gyur la*. The discipline of the realm of desire develops even in the state of sleep or distraction, because one has undertaken this discipline for a given length of time in advance: for life (*yāvājīvam*) or for a day-and-night (*ahorātram*). See *Kośa*, iv. F 62.

⁴² Every fortnight, the monastics in the parish come together for the ‘confession ceremony’. A monastic reads the Pratimokṣa, in which are listed all the rules which the monastics must observe, to the fellow members. He or she asks: “Are you pure or free (of breaking the rules)?” – If a guilty monastic does not

[If unmanifest action always resulted from manifest action], there would not be any indeterminate (*avyākṛta*: indeterminate from the moral point of view) bodily action, since the unmanifest action has only two moral types [goodness or badness].⁴³

Finally, there would not be good and bad bodily actions at the same moment (*ekakṣaṇe*), since the unmanifest action necessarily continues, in the sense that a weak mind (*mṛducetanā*) does not project (*ākṣipati*) unmanifest action, but an unmanifest action projected by a strong mind (*tivracetanā*) necessarily continues.⁴⁴

Although one arbitrarily (*anurucim*) assumes the existence of material actions (*rūpakarman*), bodily and vocal, one cannot prove that they are good or bad. Why? Because at the end of the lifetime, material action will be completely abandoned. How then could it produce (*abhinivṛt*) an agreeable (*manojña*) or disagreeable (*amanojña*) effect (*phala*) later on? [782° 28]

confess his or her fault, he or she is evidently committing a lie, an unmanifest action of lying. However, this unmanifest action is not preceded by a vocal manifest action. Therefore the Vaibhāṣikas are mistaken when they affirm that all unmanifest actions in Kāmadhātu derive from a manifest action. (For the Vaibhāṣika reply, see *Kośa*, iv. F 163, note 5, and *Morale bouddhique*, p. 133).

⁴³ Why accept that every unmanifest action of Kāmadhātu proceeds from a manifest action, since the manifest action is sometimes indeterminate from the moral point of view, whereas the unmanifest action is always determinate, good or bad (*Kośa*, iv. F 30)?

⁴⁴ On weak and strong intention, see *Kośa*, iv. F 58.

B. **SECOND PART: MECHANISM OF THE RETRIBUTION OF ACTION**

BA. **THEORY OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN-VAIBHĀŚIKAS: EXISTENCE OF PAST ACTION**

§ 15. Some⁴⁵ say:

Why would this be impossible (*ayukta*)? <225> Past action (*atitakarman*), in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāvatā*), really exists (*asti*) and it gives forth its effect (*phala*) accomplished in the future (*anāgatādhvany abhinirvṛttaḥ*).

Pustules (*visphoṭa*) are growing on a tumor (*gaṇḍa*)! Now you are claiming that past action exists as intrinsic nature.⁴⁶ But that which no longer exists after having existed (*yad bhūtapūrvam paścān na bhavati*) is called 'past'.⁴⁷ How can you accept that it exists as intrinsic nature (*svabhāvatā*)?

But the Bhagavat said:

"Actions do not perish, even after hundreds of millions of cosmic aeons (*kalpa*). When the complex [of conditions] and the appropriate time <226> come together, they bear an effect for the soul (*dehinam*) [i.e., the stream]."⁴⁸

⁴⁵ In the Introduction we state the various theories on the ripening of action. Here we will limit ourselves to some bibliographical and lexicographical information.

a) Action exists whether past, future or present: thesis of the Sarvāstivādins (v, 1 = Masuda, p. 39; *Kośa*, v. F 51-65) and of the later Mahīśāsakas (ix B, 1 = Masuda, p. 62).

b) Present and past action that has not given forth its effect exists: thesis of the Kassapikas (*Kathāvatthu*, i, 8) or Kāśyapiya (xi, 2 = Masuda, p. 65) and of the Vibhajyavādin (*Kośa*, v. F 52 and Introduction, F lv and following).

c) Only present action exists. It creates 'non-disappearance' [i.e., seeds] (*avipraṇāśa*): thesis of the Vātsīputriyas, etc. (below, note 57). It modifies the stream (*saṃtāna pariṇāma-viśeṣa*) by planting a seed in it: thesis of the Mahāsaṃghikas (i A, 45 and i B, 5 = Masuda, p. 31 and 33), of the early Mahīśāsakas (ix, A, 1 = Masuda, p. 59) and the Sautrāntikas (*Kośa*, ii. F 185, 272; v. F 63; ix. F 296; below, § 20).

The Vaibhāśikas have a precise vocabulary with which the translator should familiarize him- or herself. They speak in a general manner of the accomplishment of the effect: *phalābhinirvṛtti* = 'bras bu [mngon par] 'grub pa = te kouo (60 and 8; 75 and 4). They say that action is permanent 'by itself' or 'in its being', i.e., in its intrinsic nature, *svabhāva* = [tse] t'i (132; 188 and 13), or in its particular inherent characteristic, *svalakṣaṇa* = rang gi mtshan nyid = tse siang (132; 109 and 4), but that it varies in its 'mode of existence', *bhāva* = lei yeou (181 and 10; 74 and 2). According to them, present action when it is accomplished, 'projects' *ākṣipati* = 'phen pa = in (57 and 1) or 'takes' *pratigrhṇāti* = 'dsin pa = ts'iu (29 and 6) its effect. But it is only when it is past that it 'gives forth' *prayacchati* = 'byin pa = te (60 and 8) or better *yu* (134 and 8) its effect.

⁴⁶ I.e.: "You have already affirmed the existence of bodily and vocal action, distinct from the intention, and now you are claiming that past action exists! This is a case of saying that pustules are growing on the tumor that is eating into you." – There is *li* (104 and 19) = 'bras = *gaṇḍa* (M. V. 9487); *yong* (104 and 18) = 'brum bu = *visphoṭa* (Vyutpatti 9490).

⁴⁷ *Kośa*, v. F 58.

⁴⁸ *na praṇaśyanti karmāṇi kalpakotiśatair api /
sāmagrīṇi prāpya kālaṃ ca phalanti khalu dehinām //*

The Bhagavat said that action does not perish. How do you explain that?

What that means is that action done (*kṛtakarman*) is not without effect (*niḥphala*), as is explained in the second half of the stanza. Who does not accept (*kenāniṣṭam*) that good or bad action (*kuśalākūśala*) gives forth (*prayacchati*) its effect even long afterwards (*yun ring por yang*). But it is necessary to ask oneself (*vicārayitavyam*) how it gives forth its effect. Does it give forth its effect like the rice seed (*śālibija*), etc., through a distinctive characteristic of the transformation of the stream (*saṃtānapariṇāmaviśeṣa*)?⁴⁹ Or does it give forth its effect because its particular inherent characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) remains for a long time (*dirghakālam avatiṣṭhate*) and does not perish (*na vinaśyate*)?⁵⁰ – If it is by the distinctive characteristic of the transformation of the stream that it gives forth its effect, that is fine; but if it gives forth its effect because its particular intrinsic characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) remains for a long time, then we must say that action in its intrinsic nature (*t'i = svabhāva*) escapes destruction for a long time (*dirghakālam na vinaśyate*) and that this is the way it gives forth its effect. But it is not because the action no longer has any particular inherent characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) that it is called 'destroyed' (*vinaśṭa*); it is because the action no longer exercises its activity (*kriyām na karoti*) that it is called 'destroyed'.⁵¹ Why does action no longer exercise its activity? Because it no longer projects (*ākṣip-*) the future effect. <227> Why does it no longer project the future effect? Because formerly it has already projected its effect and, having projected it, it is unable to project it again; in the same way, after having arisen, a factor (*dharma*) does not arise anew. [783^a 16]

§ 16. Why does this action not project other effects, effects of uniform outflow (*niṣyandaphala*), etc?⁵²

Because the effects of universal outflow are unlimited.⁵³

Frequently cited stanza, nine times, for example, in *Divyāvadāna* (see JPTS, 1886, p. 86), *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjika*, ix, 71; *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, 221a9; *Madhymakavṛtti*, p. 324. There is a variant: *api kalpaśatair api* or *kalpakotiśatair api*. The Chinese version does not translate *dehinām*.

⁴⁹ This is the Sautrāntika thesis described below, § 20.

⁵⁰ In Tibetan: Does it give forth its effect through a state of its particular inherent characteristic (*svalakṣaṇāvasthā*)? – Compare *Kośa*, v. F 53: "The Bhadanta Vasumitra defends difference in state (*avasthānyathatvā*): the time periods differ through a difference of state (*avasthā*). The factor (*dharma*), going through the time periods, having taken up (*prāpya*) such and such a state, becomes different through the difference of its state, not through a difference in its real entity (*dravya*). Example: a token (*vartikā*, *gulikā*) placed on the square of ones, is called 'one'; placed on the square of tens, it is called 'ten', placed on the square of hundreds, it is called 'one hundred'."

⁵¹ Cf. *Kośa*, v. F 55: "It is the activity (*kāritra*) not done, in the process of being done, or already done, that determines the time period of the factor (*dharma*)."

⁵² The effect of uniform outflow is the effect similar to its cause (*hetudṛṣṭa*). See *Kośa*, ii. F 288; iv. F 186, 191. – "In fact, it is difficult to attribute to action an effect of outflow properly so-called; action does not engender action; action does not bear an effect that is exactly identical to the action. But 'approved' covetousness has covetousness—a predisposition for covetousness, a certain *habitus* favorable to acts of covetousness—as effect of uniform outflow." (*Morale bouddhique*, p. 182-183).

⁵³ What this means is: "Because there is no limit (*fen-hien*, 18 and 2, 170 and 6) to the arising of these effects during the course of transmigration." (See *Kośa*, text vi, fol. 12a; transl. ii, F 272, note 1). Whereas the

Should the action—existing at the present moment (*vartamāna*)—that already has projected its effect, no longer project [the effect] again? The action in its intrinsic nature (*karmasvabhāva*) does not perish, but remains permanently (*nityam*) present. Why does it not project eternally the effect that it gives forth?

Did we not say above that, after having projected its effect, [the action] can no longer project it again? In the same way, after having arisen, a factor (*dharma*) cannot arise again.

Why bring back this difficulty?

Although we have mentioned it above, you have not resolved this difficulty. If the action in its intrinsic nature (*karmasvabhāva*) were constantly present, it ought to be, as at the very center of its present [existence], always called ‘present’ and always project its effect; it should always re-arise, as at the beginning [of its present existence].

But although past action in itself (*atītakarmasvabhāva*) really exists (*asti*), it no longer has activity (*kāritra*) and consequently is not present. Not being present, it no longer projects an effect. <228>

That is not correct either, for if [action] in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) always existed, it should, as during its present [existence], always exert its activity. In addition, if the past factors (*dharma*) accepted by you had the capability (*sāmarthyā*) of giving forth (*prayam*) an effect, why would they not be present?

But the expression ‘present’ is applied exclusively to factors (*dharma*) that take (*pratigṛhṇanti*) – or that project – their effect.

That is not correct either, for the [ripening] activity being the same, one would have present (*vartamāna*) and past (*atīta*) factors at the same time.⁵⁴ The factor that no longer exercises the activity of taking (*pratigrah-*) the effect is called ‘past’; the factor that exercises the activity of giving forth (*prayam-*) the effect is called ‘present’. When this activity is exhausted, it is called ‘destroyed’ (*vinaṣṭa*). If, after having perished, the factors perished again, it also would have to be the case that after having arisen, they would arise again. Therefore your theory [of a past action causing a effect] does not hold (*asiddha*). [783^b 1]

§ 17. How does the factor (*dharma*) ‘project’ (*ākṣipati*) its effect?

By establishing (*vyavasthāp-*) it in such a manner that it arises later.

ripened effect exhausts the force of ripening of an action, the effect of universal outflow, in its intrinsic nature, cannot come to an end by itself. (*Morale bouddhique*, p. 183).

⁵⁴ *Kośa*, v. F 55-56: “Are you saying that the operation is to project and to give forth an effect (*phaladānaparigraha*)? But then, if giving forth the effect is ‘operation’, the causes, homogenous cause (*sabhāgaḥetu*), etc., give forth their effect when they are past, one arrives at the conclusion that, being past, they accomplish their operation and consequently would be present. Or if the operation, in order to be complete, requires the projecting and the giving forth of the effect, these past causes will at least be semi-present. The time periods are thus mixed up.

But then in the very last moment of his existence, [the Arhat] freed from contaminations (*kṣiṇasarva*) does not project an effect, since this effect does not arise later.⁵⁵ Consequently, the mind of the Arhat is not present, will not be destroyed (*vināṣṭa*) and will not enter into the past. If, in the present, it is without activity (*kāritra*), how, in the future, could one say that it is destroyed? <229>

Although it is without activity [in the present moment], it will even so be destroyed [later].

Then, while being past, it could again be destroyed! If the already destroyed entity could again be destroyed anew, the already arisen entity could re-arise. This is in contradiction (*virodhadoṣa*) to what has been said above.

The mind of the Arhat exists; it has the power to engender an effect in the future; nevertheless, if conditions (*pratyaya*) are lacking, this effect will not arise.⁵⁶

That is not correct either. If the effect does not arise, how will one know if the mind [that projects it in vain] exists and is capable of engendering it? We would have to say that this mind contradicts the law of twofold condition (*pratyaya*), for it both is and is not [at the same time]: although produced through a cause (*hetuta utpannam*), it is not capable of engendering its effect later. This is why the system according to which a [mind] of this kind can project its effect, is not valid. It is absolutely necessary that the seed (*bija*) makes the effect grow (*ṛdh-*) for it to be called ‘projector of the effect’.

In addition, the school [of the Vaibhāṣikas] holds that the past (*atita*) and the future (*anāgata*) exist in their intrinsic nature (*svabhāvatā*). But then how would the future not be present and a projector of the effect? If everything (*sarvadravya*) existed at all times (*sarvakāla*), at what moment would there be something not existing in its intrinsic nature? However, according to the *sūtra*, [action] ripens only when it encounters the collocation of conditions (*pratyayasāmagrī*) and the favorable time (*kāla*).

Finally, the [Vaibhāṣikas] should tell us what this principle is, <230> this state (*avasthā*), this power ‘establishing the effect in such a way that it arises’ and is called for this reason ‘projector of the effect’; actually, [according to them,] everything exists always.

Therefore their theory that has it that past action (*atitakarman*) exists in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāvatā*) and gives forth (*prayam*) an effect that is accomplished in the future (*anāgatādhvany abhinirvṛttam*), does not hold (*asiddha*). [783^b 19]

⁵⁵ No mind, no mental event arises after the last mind and last mental events of the Arhat. The last mind of the Arhat does not engender a ripened effect, but an effect of disconnection (*viśaṃyogaphala*): Nirvāṇa. (*Kośa*, ii. F 305)

⁵⁶ For the Vaibhāṣikas, the last mind of the Arhat is a mental sense-faculty (*manas*), i.e., a support mind that would be capable of supporting a subsequent mind if that would arise. But as, in fact, this subsequent mind does not arise in the absence of other necessary causes for its arising, the mental sense-faculty of the Arhat—unlike other minds—is not the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent (*samanantarapratyaya*) in regard to the subsequent mind (*Kośa*, ii. F 305).

BB.

THEORY OF THE EARLY SĀMMITĪYAS: NON-DISAPPEARANCE (AVIPRAṆĀŚA)

BBA.

PRESENTATION [OF THE THEORY]⁵⁷

§ 18. In this case, it must be accepted that the two bodily and vocal actions, good or bad, deposit (*ādadhati*)⁵⁸ into the psycho-physical stream (*skandhasaṃtāna*) a separate factor (*dharma*), existing as a real entity (*dravyasat*) and classed among the formations dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*)⁵⁹. <231> This factor is called 'increase' (*upacaya*)⁶⁰ by some, 'non-disappearance' (*avipraṇāśa*)⁶¹ by others. Due to this factor, one accomplishes (*abhinirvṛt-*)⁶² the agreeable or disagreeable future effect. The existence of this factor must also be accepted for mental action (*manāḥkarman*). Otherwise (*anyatra*), when another mind arises and the mental action has disappeared (*nirvṛtta*), if this particular factor were not deposited in the mental stream (*cittasaṃtāna*), how could the future effect be accomplished? Therefore it is necessary (*niyatam*) to accept the existence of such a factor. [783^b 26]

BBB.

REFUTATION

§ 19. a. When one has first studied (*abhyas-*) a text (*grantha*)⁶³ and when, long afterwards, one recalls the memory (*smṛti*) of it; when, first, one has seen or heard... the object-fields (*viṣaya*) and when, long afterwards, one reproduces the memory of them, at what moment (*kṣana*) does one produce (*utpādayati*) the factor (*dharma*) that later allows one to recall its memories?

⁵⁷ The theory of non-disappearance (*avipraṇāśa*) is explained: *a.* in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 317-323; *b.* in the *Madhyamakāvātara*, p. 126, l. 12 (*Muséon*, 1910, p. 318: "The one who maintains that action perishes, in order to answer the question: How can the effect arise from the action that has perished?, imagines... an entity, non-disappearance (*avipraṇāśa*), similar to a register of debts"; *c.* maybe in *Kośa*, ii. F 304: "According to other masters (*Vibhāṣā*, 179,4; *Samghabhadra*, *Taishō* 1562, 444^b23, there is a certain factor (*dharma*) in the stream of beings that is the indicative mark (*cihna* = *liṅga*) of the effects that will arise in the future, namely, a certain formation (*saṃskāra*) dissociated from the mind."

Since Kouei-ki, in the list of the formations dissociated (*viprayukta*) from the mind in *Siddhi*, p. 71, mentions the non-disappearance (*avipranāśa*) of the Early Sāmmītiyas, we can attribute this theory to the Vātsīputriya-Sāmmītiyas. But other schools also accept the non-disappearance: the *Karmasiddhi* informs us that this factor (*dharma*) is called 'accumulation' (*upacaya*) by some, non-disappearance (*avipraṇāśa*) by others; we read in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 318: *yaś cāyam avipranāśo 'smabhir uktāḥ sūtrāntaroktāḥ*... [The *Vaibhāṣika*s of Kashmir also refer to the example of debt, see *Kośa*, iv. F 95.]

⁵⁸ *in...* *k'i* (57 and 1; 156 and 3) = *skyed* = *ādadhāti*.

⁵⁹ On the factors (*dharma*) dissociated from the mind, see *Kośa*, ii. F 178 and following.

⁶⁰ *tseng tch'ang* (32 and 12; 168) = *brtsegs* = *upacaya*. [Compare *Kathāvatthu*, xv, II, where the *Andhakas* and the Sāmmītiyas distinguish *kamma* and *kamma-upacaya*.]

⁶¹ *pou che hoai* (1 and 3; 37 and 2; 32 and 16) = *chud mi za ba* = *avipraṇāśa*.

⁶² *te* (60 and 8) = *mngon par 'grub pa* = *abhinirvṛt-*.

⁶³ *wen yi* (62; 123 and 7) = *gzung* = *grantha*.

- b. As for the mind of entering into the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamātticitta*), what factor (*dharma*) does this mind produce, by virtue of which, subsequently (*paścāt*), upon leaving the absorption, the mind of leaving the absorption (*vyutthānacitta*)⁶⁴ will arise? <232>
- c. Finally, when one dyes the flower of the lemon-tree (*mātuluṅgapuṣpa*) with the red essence of lacquer (*lākṣārasarakta*),⁶⁵ – and both [lacquer and flower] are going to perish together, – what factor (*dharma*) is produced by virtue of which, subsequently, when the fruit will arise, the [lemon-]seed (*kesara*) will be red in color (*raktavarṇa*)?⁶⁶ [783° 3]

BC. **THEORY OF THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS: TRANSFORMATION OF THE STREAM (SAṂTĀNAPARIṆĀMA)**

BCA. **PRESENTATION [OF THE THEORY]⁶⁷**

§ 20. This is why—with the exclusion of this imaginary (*parikalpita*) factor (*dharma*) produced separately through the two bodily and vocal actions—it is enough that a distinct intention (*cetanāviśeṣa*) exercises a perfuming (*bhāvana*) on the mental stream (*cittasaṁtāna*) and creates a potentiality (*śakti*) in it. By means of a distinctive characteristic of the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of this potentiality, later there will arise a distinctive effect (*phalaviśeṣa*). Thus, when one dyes the flower of the lemon tree (*mātuluṅgapuṣpa*) with the essence of red lacquer (*lākṣārasarakta*), the stream of the flower transforms (*pariṇāmate*) and, at the time when the effect is formed, the [lemon-]seed (*kesara*) is red in color (*raktavarṇa*). We will know that the perfuming (*bhāvanā*) of inner (*ādhyātmika*) factors occurs in the same way.⁶⁸ [783° 8] <233>

BCB. **REPLY TO OBJECTIONS**

- § 21. **Why not accept that the two bodily and vocal actions perfume the mental stream (*cittasaṁtāna*)?**

⁶⁴ During the absorption of cessation (of conception and sensation), the mind is interrupted for a long time. Upon coming out of the absorption, how can a new mind arise from a mind that has been destroyed for a long time? For the Vaibhāṣikas who accept the existence of past dharmas, there is no difficulty (see *Kośa*, ii. F 211). But for the Sāṃmitīyas, the question is insoluble; since the mental stream is interrupted during the absorption, their non-disappearance (*avipraṇāśa*) will rest no longer on anything.

⁶⁵ *tse kong tche* (120 and 6; 112 and 15; 85 and 2) = *rgya skyegs khu ba dmar po* = *lākṣārasarakta*.

⁶⁶ If the lemon flower is dyed with lacquer, the seed of the new effect is red. But the red seed when planted will not produce a new red seed again. Same comparison below, § 20, 32, 40; *Kośa*, ix. F 299.

⁶⁷ On the distinctive characteristic of the transformation of the stream (*saṁtānaparināma*) of the Sautrāntika stream, see Introduction, § ADB, and *Morale bouddhique*, p. 198. – Detailed statement in *Kośa*, ii. F 185, 272; v. F 63; ix. F 296; *Madhyamavṛtti*, p. 312-314.

⁶⁸ “Just as, when one dyes the seed, the plant gives forth a flower the color of the dye, without this color being visible in the stem or in the sap; in the same way the mental series undergoes a subtle transformation due to the action and blossoms according to the action, assuming a certain body, experiencing a certain suffering, enjoying a certain ecstasy.” (*Morale bouddhique*, p. 198).

a. Because it is by virtue of a mind (*cittam apekṣya*) that bodily or vocal action is good (*kuśāla*) or bad (*akuśāla*).⁶⁹ It is impossible (*ayukta*) that—rendered good or bad by a mind—[bodily or vocal action] would be able [on its own initiative] to give forth (*prayam-*) a future agreeable or disagreeable effect in a distinct mental stream. Actually, it is not one who performs the action and another who gathers the effect. (*Tibetan version*: That by which something is made good or bad is capable of giving to the stream of this entity an agreeable or disagreeable effect, but the stream cannot do [anything similar]).

b. Let us suppose that the intrinsic nature (*t'i, svabhāva*) of the accomplished action is destroyed (*vinaṣṭa*), but that, nevertheless, the mental stream (*cittasaṃtāna*) that is perfumed (*bhāvita*) by this action can—by virtue of a distinctive characteristic of the transformation of its potentialities (*śaktipariṇāma viśeṣa*)—give forth (*prayam-*) a future agreeable or disagreeable effect. But then, after the absorptions without mind (*acittakasamāpatti*) and after the existence among the non-identifying gods (*asaṃjñnideva*)⁷⁰ where the mental stream (*cittasaṃtāna*) is cut (*chinna*), how could the action prior [to these states] later bring an agreeable or disagreeable effect? [783^c 14]

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⁶⁹ For the Vaibhāṣikas, bodily action is a form (*rūpa*). Now form can be neither good nor bad (see above, § 12c). The mind alone gives their moral value to actions.

⁷⁰ The two absorptions without mind are the absorption of non-conception (*asaṃjñīsamāpatti*) and the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), *Kośa*, ii. F 200-214. The non-identifying gods are beings conscious at birth and at death. In the interim, their consciousness is suspended. After a long time, when they produce consciousness anew, they die. – See *Kośa*, ii. F 199-200.

C. **THIRD PART: THE 'STREAM' OR THE RIPENING ACTION**
 CA. **PRELIMINARY QUESTION: NIRODHASAMĀPATTI (ABSORPTION OF CESSATION)⁷¹**
 CAA. **OPINION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN-VAIBHĀŚIKAS**

§ 22. Some⁷² say:

In the present life (*iha janmani*), <235> mind (*citta*) perfumed (*bhāvita*) by prior actions resumes its course (*pratisaṃdadhāti*) after the absorption; thus, [mind] gives forth future agreeable and disagreeable effects.

But since the mind has been eradicated (*samucchinna*) [during the absorption], how could it resume its course?

⁷¹ In order to define exactly the nature of the stream (*saṃtāna*) wherein action ripens, it is necessary to determine the precise nature of the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*). On the one hand, the Buddha declared that during this absorption, consciousness (*viññāna*) does not leave the body; on the other hand, by definition, conception and sensation are absent in this absorption, which is the cessation of conception and sensation (*saṃjñāveditanirodha*). The discussion which follows will be clear if one remembers the birth of a conscious consciousness. In order and in dependency: 1. the mental sense-faculty (*manas*); 2. the object to be cognized (*dharma*); 3. the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*); 4. contact among the first three (*sparśa*); 5. sensation and conception (*vedanā, saṃjñā*) which are absent in the absorption of cessation; 6. craving (*trṣṇā*). The whole question is to know if the encounter of the first three elements necessarily entails contact, and if every contact necessarily entails sensation. In the affirmative, the absorption of cessation does not contain the mental consciousness, for the latter would necessarily entail sensation and conception which must be absent in the absorption.

Some schools claim that the absorption of cessation is without mind (*acittaka*). If the Buddha affirms that, in this state, consciousness does not leave the body, it is because the mind is produced again after the absorption, either the mind subsequent to the absorption has the mind prior to absorption as the equivalent and immediate antecedent (Vaibhāṣika thesis), or [the mind] arises from the material sense-faculties that are left intact by the absorption (root opinion of the Sautrāntika-Darṣāntikas).

Other schools claim that the absorption of cessation is endowed with a mind (*sacittaka*), namely, a subtle consciousness (*sūkṣmaviññāna*) that does not leave the body, according to the word of the Buddha. But they are not in agreement on the nature of this consciousness: mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) with all the mental events (*caitta*) that are necessarily associated with it, with the exception of conception and sensation (thesis of Vasumitra, of the Vibhajyavādins, branch-opinion of the Sautrāntikas); or else, mental consciousness without mental events (variant branch-opinion of the Sautrāntikas); or else, a ripening consciousness (*vipākaviññāna*) better known under the name of 'store-consciousness' (*ālayaviññāna*) (opinion of the Sūtrapramāṇikas). The references to these schools will be given below.

⁷² The Vaibhāṣika theory is stated: a. in *Kośa*, ii. F 211: "Past factors (*dharma*) exist. Consequently, the mind (just) prior to this absorption, the mind of absorption (*samāpatticitta*) or the mind of entry into the absorption, is the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent (*samanantarapratyaya*) of the mind subsequent to the absorption, or the 'emerging-mind' (*vyutthānacitta*)"; b. in *Samgraha* (Chin. 334^c 8-9; Tib. 12^a 6-7), *Bhāṣya* (Chin. 334^c 10-13; Tib. 164^a 1-3), *Upanibandhana* (Chin. 395^c 6-9; Tib. 263^b 3-4); c. in *Siddhi*, p. 205.

[Mind] has the ‘mind of entry into absorption’ (*samāpatticitta*) for its ‘condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent’ (*samanantarapratyaya*) and thus resumes its course.

But the mind of entry into absorption has been destroyed (*vinaṣṭa*) for a long time. How could it constitute a ‘condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent’? We have excluded the hypothesis that past action (*atitakarman*) can give forth (*prayam-*) an effect. This exclusion must be applied here also.⁷³ Therefore the ‘emerging mind’ (*vyuttānacitta*) does not resume the course of the mind. [783^c 19]

CAB.

ROOT-OPINION OF THE DĀRṢṬĀNTIKAS

§ 23. Some⁷⁴ say:

It is through the force of its seeds (*bījavaśāt*) <236> in dependence upon the material sense-faculties (*rūpindriyāsṛita*) that the mind subsequent to the absorption comes into existence. Actually, the seeds (*bīja*) that give rise to mind and mental events (*cittacaitta*) rest, according to the case (*yathāyogam*), on [one] of the two following (*saṃtāna*) streams: the mental stream (*cittasaṃtāna*) or the stream of the material sense-faculties (*rūpindriyasaṃtāna*).

But the *sūtra*⁷⁵ does not say that the mental sense-faculty (*manas*) and the factors (*dharma*) are the conditions (*pratyaḥ*) that give rise to the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*). [If during the absorption the material sense-faculties alone carried the seeds of the future mental consciousness], if there were no mental sense-faculty [to carry these seeds], how could the mental consciousness arise?

You should know the following: it happens (*syāt*)⁷⁶ that, by ‘mental sense-faculty’ (*manas*), the *sūtra* designates the seeds of the mental sense-faculty (*manobīja*); it is using the name of the effect, [namely, the mental sense-faculty itself] metaphorically (*upacāra*) in order to designate the cause, [namely, the seeds of the mental sense-faculty]. In the same way, in order to designate the tangible (*spraṣṭavya*), we use the

⁷³ The mind of entry into absorption, which is past, cannot ‘give forth’ the mind emerging from absorption.

⁷⁴ The root-opinion of the early Dārṣṭāntikas is stated: *a.* in *Kośa*, ii. F 212: “When a person is born in Ārūpyadhātu, form or matter (*rūpa*) is cut off for a long period of time; if this person is then reborn in Kāmadhātu or in Rūpadhātu, his or her new form does not come from the stream of form previously interrupted for a long period of time, but rather, from the mind. In the same way, the mind emerging from absorption does not have for its cause the mind just prior to the absorption: it is born from the ‘body possessed with sense-faculties’ (*śendriyakakāya*). This is why the ancient masters say: Two factors (*dharma*) are each other’s seeds (*anyonyabījaka*): these two factors are the mind and the ‘body possessed with sense-faculties’; *b.* in *Samgraha* (Chin. 336^a 9-12; Tib. 12^b 4-6), *Bhāṣya* (Chin. 336^a 13-21; Tib. 167^b 5-168^a 2), *Upanibandhana* (Chin. 396^b 23-396^c 11; Tib. 265^b 108); *c.* in *Siddhi*, p. 207).

⁷⁵ See § 25.

⁷⁶ *houo che* (62 and 4; 72 and 6) = *syāt*.

name of the [effects of the tangible] metaphorically: hunger (*bubhukṣā*) and thirst (*pipāsā*).

But how could each mind and each mental event arise from two streams of seeds (*bijasaṃtāna*)? We do not see that there is anything similar in the factors (*dharmā*) produced from seeds, the shoot (*aṅkura*), etc. There may be several conditions (*pratyaya*) for one and the same effect, but it is wrong that one and the same effect arises from two seeds (*bija*).

By accepting that, you will not escape from the difficulty mentioned above (§ 21): "But then, after the absorptions without mind (*acittakasamāpatti*) and after existence among the non-identifying gods (*asaṃjñīdeva*) where the mental stream (*cittasaṃtāna*) is cut off (*chinna*), how could the action prior [to these states] bear an agreeable or disagreeable effect later?" [783^c 29]

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CAC.

BRANCH-OPINION OF VASUMITRA, OF THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS, ETC.

§ 24. Some say:

But this fault (*doṣa*) is due to the theory (*pakṣa*).

To what theory?

To the theory of those who accept that these states (*avasthā*) of absorption and non-consciousness are without mind (*acittaka*). Some⁷⁷ say that these states are endowed with a mind (*sacittaka*) and thus they avoid the fault mentioned [in § 23]. Thus the Bhadanta Vasumitra in his treatise (*śāstra*) entitled *Paripṛcchā* says: "Those who consider the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) as being without mind (*acittaka*) come up against the difficulty [of explaining how the mind resumes after the absorption]. But I maintain that this absorption of cessation is endowed with a subtle mind (*sūkṣmacitta*). The difficulty does not exist for me." Vasumitra also cites the *sūtras* to establish his theory, such as the *sūtra* that says: "In the person who dwells (*viharati*) in the absorption of cessation, the bodily energies (*kāyasaṃskāra*) do not allow themselves to be destroyed (*niruddha*)", etc., up to "his or her sense-faculties do not deteriorate (*praluj-*), his or her consciousness (*viññāna*) does not leave the body."⁷⁸ [784^a 6] <238>

⁷⁷ The theory of the subtle consciousness (*citta*) is attributed: *a.* to the Bhadanta Vasumitra by *Kośa*, ii. F 212. This Vasumitra, described as Bhadanta or Sthavira, is different from the Vasumitra of the Vibhāṣā. He is the author of a *Paripṛcchāśāstra* and of a *Pañcavastuka* commented on by Dharmatrāta (Taishō 1555). – See *Kośa*, Introduction, F xlviv-xlv; *b.* to the opinion of the variant branch-system of the Sūtra-nikāya (*tsong tchoan ki*; 40 and 5; 159 and 11; 149 and 2) and to the Sthavirācāryas by the *Vibhāṣā* (Taishō 1545, k. 151, p. 772^c, 774^a).

This theory is stated and refuted: *a.* in *Kośa*, ii. F 212; *b.* in *Samgraha* (Chin. 334^c 14-21; Tib. 12^a 7-12^b 4), *Bhāṣya* (Chin. 334^c 22-335^c 2; Tib. 164^a 3-166^a 2), *Upanibandhana* (Chin. 395^c 16-396^a 16; Tib. 263^b 4-264^b 1); *c.* in *Siddhi*, p. 208-210.

⁷⁸ *Siddhi*, p. 204, quotes the entire passage: "In the person who dwells (*viharati*) in the absorption of cessation, the formations (*saṃskāra*) of the body, speech and mind do not allow themselves to be destroyed (*nirodha*); but his or her life (*āyus*) is not destroyed, he or she does not lose warmth (*uṣman*), his or her sense-

§ 25. With what consciousness is this state endowed?

Some say:

It is endowed with the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*).

But⁷⁹ does the *sūtra* not say: “By reason of the mental sense-faculty (*manas*) and the factors (*dharma*), there arises the mental consciousness; from the collocation of the triad, contact; and at the same time as contact, there arise sensation, conception, intention” (*manaḥ pratitya dharmāṇś cotpadyate manovijñānam. trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ. sahajātā vedanā saṃjñā cetanā ca*).⁸⁰ How could this state (absorption of cessation) be endowed with a mental consciousness without the collocation of the triad [mental sense-faculty, factors (*dharma*), mental consciousness]? How could there be a collocation of the triad without contact? How could there be contact without sensation and conception? Now, this state is called ‘absorption of cessation of conception and sensation’ (*saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*).

Someone makes the objection to us:

Why did the Bhagavat say: “Conditioned by sensation, there is craving” (*vedanāpratyayā tṛṣṇā*), while every sensation is not equally the cause of craving? It is the same for contact (*sparśa*). Any contact whatsoever is not equally the condition of sensation (*vedanāpratyaya*).

In another *sūtra*, the Bhagavat himself distinguished (*viśiṣṭ*, *prabhid*) between the cases. He said that “sensation produced through contact accompanied by ignorance” (*avidyāsaṃsparśajā vedanā*) is the condition of craving (*tṛṣṇā*),⁸¹ but nowhere does he distinguish a particular contact that would [alone] be the condition of sensation. Since he does not distinguish one separately, your objection is not valid. [784^a 14] <239>

CAD.

VARIANT BRANCH-OPINION OF THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS

CAD.1.

STATEMENT

§ 26. Some⁸² say:

The phrase: “From the collocation of the triad (*trisaṃnipāta*), there is contact (*sparśa*)” means that, when the three real entities [mental sense-faculty, factors and mental

faculties do not deteriorate (*praluj-*), his or her consciousness (*vijñāna*) does not leave (*hā*) the body.” (Compare *Majjhima*, i, 296). – The bodily energies (*kāyasaṃskāra*) are inhalation and exhalation (*ānāpāna*); the vocal energies (*vāksaṃskāra*) are initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*); the mental energies (*manaḥsaṃskāra*) are intention (*cetana*), conception (*saṃjñā*), etc. (See *Samgrahabhāṣya*, Taishō, 1597, 335^b 20).

⁷⁹ Same objection and same answer in *Kośa*, ii. F 212-3.

⁸⁰ Similar passages in *Samyukta*, 11, 2; 13, 4. – Compare *Samyutta*, ii, 72; iv, 33 et passim: *cakkhuṃ ca paticca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānam; tiṇṇaṃ saṃgati phasso; phassapaccayā vedanā; vedanāpaccayā taṇhā; ayaṃ kho dukkhassa samudayo*.

⁸¹ *Samyukta*, 2, 4. – Compare *Samyutta*, iii, 96: *avijjāsamphassajena bhikkave vedayitena phuṭṭhassa assutavato puthujanassa uppannā taṇhā*.

⁸² This is the variant branch-thesis of the Sautrāntikas stated and refuted in *Samgraha* and commentaries (see references to note 77) and in *Siddhi*, p. 211-4.

consciousness] are capable of uniting, contact arises. But in this state (*avasthā*: absorption of cessation), they are not capable of producing (*utpād-*) contact or either sensation (*vedanā*) or conception (*saṃjñā*) [which result from contact], for the mind of entry into absorption (*samāpatticitta*) is damaged (*dūṣita*). If then there is no contact in this state of absorption, all the more reason (*kim uta*) that sensation and conception will be lacking. Therefore, in this state, there is only a mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) without mental events (*caitta*).

In this case, is the mental consciousness of this state good (*kuśala*), afflicted (*kliṣṭa*) or indeterminate (*avyākṛta*)?

What is faulty in accepting that? [784^a 18]

CAD.2.

REFUTATION

§ 27. **THIS MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (MANOVIJÑĀNA) CANNOT BE EITHER GOOD (KUŚALA) OR AFFLICTED (KLIṢṬA) OR INDETERMINATE (AVYĀKṚTA).**⁸³

a. If this mental consciousness were good (*kuśala*) how could it be good without being associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the good roots, absence of greed, etc. (*alobhādikuśalamūla*)?⁸⁴ Assuming <240> that [mental consciousness] is associated with these good roots, absence of greed, etc., how could there not be contact?

But, being projected (*akṣipta*) by a good 'condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent' (*kuśala samanantarapratyaya*), this mental consciousness is good.⁸⁵

That is not so for, immediately after a good mind, there can arise three kinds of mind [good, bad, indeterminate].⁸⁶ – In addition, a good mind projected by the force of the good roots is not capable of removing (*nivṛt-*) absence of greed (*alobha*). – Finally, without good roots, [this mental consciousness] cannot be good. Now, the absorption of cessation, like cessation [*nirvāṇa*] itself, is good. [784^a 25]

b. If this mental consciousness were afflicted (*kliṣṭa*), how could it be afflicted without being associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the afflictions, greed, etc. (*lobhādikleśa*)? Supposing that it were associated with the afflictions, greed, etc., how could there not be a contact [involving the presence of the mental events]? Thus, in the *Daśaparipṛcchāsūtra*, the Bhagavat himself said: "Any (*anyatama*) aggregate of sensation (*vedanāskandha*), aggregate of conception (*saṃjñāskandha*), aggregate of formation (*saṃskāraskandha*) whatsoever has contact (*sparśa*) as condition (*pratyaya*)."

⁸³ This special point is treated: a. in *Samgraha* (Chin. 335^c 3-4; Tib. 12^b 4); *Bhāṣya* (Chin. 335^c 5-336^a 8; Tib. 166^a 2-167^b 5), *Upanibandhana* (Chin. 396^a 18-196^b 19; Tib. 264^b 1-265^b 1); b. in *Siddhi*, p. 213.

LS: Bold capitals from now on designate Vasubandhu's position.

⁸⁴ A mind is good through association (*saṃprayogatas*) when it is associated with the good roots that are part of the good mental events (see *Siddhi*, p. 319-20).

⁸⁵ This is the thesis of the *Kośa*, ii. F 203; iv, p. 33, for which the factors (*dharma*) can be good or bad by means of their arousing cause (*samutthānata*).

⁸⁶ See *Siddhi*, p. 213, and the lengthy analysis in *Kośa*, ii. F 316-331.

– In addition, if the absorption of non-conception (*asaṃjñisaṃāpatti*) is not considered to be afflicted, all the more reason (*kim uta*) the absorption of cessation.⁸⁷ [784^a 28]

c. **But, you say, this mental consciousness is unobscured-indeterminate (*anivṛtāvyākṛta*).**

Is it produced from ripening (*vipākaja*) or relative to the modes of proper deportment (*airyāpathika*) or relative to the skill in the creative arts (*śailpasthānika*) or relative to miraculous emanations (*nairmita*, *nairmānika*)?⁸⁸ <241>

What is the fault with accepting that? [784b1]

§ 28. **THIS MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (MANOVIJÑĀNA) DOES NOT EXIST AS A RIPENED EFFECT (VIPĀKAJA).**

a. Let us assume that this mental consciousness is produced as a ripened effect (*vipākaja*). Following a mind absorbed in the summit of cyclic existence (*bhavāgrasamāpatticittānantaram*),⁸⁹ after [already] having been prevented during eight successive stages (*bhūmi*),⁹⁰ how could the mind of the realm of desire produced as a ripened effect (*kāmāvacara vipākaja citta*) arise? – On the other hand, how could the non-agitated mind (*āniñjyādicitta*) [of the two higher realms]⁹¹ arise after it? Thus, in the *Mahākauṣṭhulasūtra*,⁹² it is asked: “Upon leaving the absorption of cessation, how many contacts (*sparsā*) will one will get hold of?” – Answer: “O Mahākauṣṭhila, one will get hold of three contacts: contact with non-agitation (*āniñjyasparśa*), contact with nothingness (*ākimcanyasparśa*), and contact with signlessness (*animittasparśa*).”⁹³ [784^b 6]

b. In addition, assuming that this mental consciousness is a ripened mind (*vipāka-citta*) projected by former actions (*pūrvakarmākṣipta*), for what reason does [this mental consciousness] not go past

⁸⁷ Actually, nothing is afflicted or indeterminate in a good absorption (*samāpatti*) (see *Siddhi*, p. 213; *Kośa*, viii. F 145).

⁸⁸ Like every unobscured-indeterminate (*anivṛtāvyākṛta*) factor (*dharma*), the unobscured-indeterminate mental consciousness may be: 1. arisen from ripening (*vipākaja*); 2. relative to the modes of deportment, lying down, sitting, etc. (*airyāpathika*); 3. related to professional work or skill in the creative arts (*śailpasthāstanika*); 4. the mind capable of miraculous emanations (*nirmānacitta*). See *Kośa*, ii. F 265. But the absorption of cessation, good in its intrinsic nature, cannot contain any mental consciousness of this kind.

⁸⁹ One enters into the absorption of cessation on leaving the absorption of perception-sphere of neither conception nor non-conception (*naivasamjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*) also called the ‘summit of cyclic existence’ (*bhavāgra*), *Kośa*, ii. F 203.

⁹⁰ Namely, the four trances (*dhyāna*) and the four non-material absorptions (*ārūpya*), *Kośa*, viii. F 132-4.

⁹¹ Good action belonging to the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) is called ‘meritorious’; good action belonging to the two higher worlds (*rūpa-* and *ārūpyadhātu*) is called ‘non-agitated’, *āniñjya* (*Kośa*, iv. F 107).

⁹² An unknown *sūtra* by a famous individual, see M. Akanuma, *Dictionnaire des noms propres du bouddhisme indien*, Nagoya, 1931, p. 373. [In *Samyutta*, iv, 295, the three contacts are emptiness (*suññatā*), (signlessness) *animitta*, wishlessness (*appaṇihita*).]

⁹³ These three contacts of the three absorptions are to be compared to the three absorptions called ‘absorption of emptiness’ (*śūnyatāsamādhi*, absorption of signlessness’ (*ānimittasamādhi*), absorption of wishlessness (*apranihitasamādhi*), (*Kośa*, viii. F 184).

<242> the limit,⁹⁴ the moment of leaving the contemplation fixed by the resolution of entry? [784^b 8]

c. Moreover, why is it necessary that the mind absorbed in the summit of cyclic existence (*bhavāgrasamāpatticitta*)—having cessation as object-support (*nirodhālambaka*)—must have arrived at the end (*niṣṭhāgata*), so that the mind arisen as ripened effect (*vipākaphalacitta*) and projected (*ākṣipta*) by the traces of previous actions (*pūrvakarmavāsana*) of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) comes to be manifested, whereas it was not manifesting in the previous actions? [784^b 10]

d. Finally, among sentient beings here, if matter arisen as a ripened effect (*vipākajarūpa*) does not resume (*na pratisamādhātī*) after having been cut (*samucchinna*), why does the mind arisen as ripened effect, once cut, resume? [784^b 11]

§ 29. **THIS MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (MANOVIJÑĀNA) IS NEITHER RELATIVE TO A MODE OF PROPER DEPORTMENT (AIRYĀPATHIKA) NOR RELATIVE TO SKILL IN THE CREATIVE ARTS (ŚAILPASTHĀNIKA) NOR RELATIVE TO MIRACULOUS EMANATIONS (NAIRMITA).**

But this mental consciousness exists relative to a mode of proper deportment (*airyāpathika*) or relative to the skill in the creative arts (*śailpasthānika*) or also relative to magical emanations (*nairmita*, *nairmāṇika*).

a. How could this mind be concerned (*ālambeta*) with the mode of proper deportments, etc.? In the absence of contact (*sparsā*), how would it be able to instigate them (*abhisamskṛ-*)?

b. In addition, it is accepted (*iṣyate*) that the nine successive absorptions (*navānupūrvavūhārasamāpatti*)⁹⁵ and the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*)⁹⁶ are good (*kuśala*) in their intrinsic nature. Therefore it is not possible (*ayukta*) that these states (*āvasthā*) show an afflicted (*kliṣṭa*) or indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) mind. <243>

c. Finally, it is by utilizing the summit of cyclic existence (*bhavāgra*), by taking cessation (*nirodha*) as object-field (*viśaya*) and the attention to calmness (*śāntamanasikāra*) as basis (*āśraya*) that one enters into the absorption of cessation of conception and sensation (*saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*).⁹⁷ Thus, this question on the absorption of cessation is asked in the *Mahākauṣṭhīlasūtra*: “How many causes (*hetu*), how many conditions (*pratyaya*) are the basis allowing entry into the absorption of the element-of-signlessness (*animittadhātusamāpatti*)?” – Answer: “O Mahākauṣṭhīla, two causes, two conditions, are the basis allowing entry into the absorption of the element-of-signlessness: absence of attention to all marks (*sarvanimittamanasikārābhāva*) and attention to the

⁹⁴ “What proof is there that the ripened effect which [the mental consciousness] constitutes has not already been exhausted?”

⁹⁵ Namely, the four trances (*dhyāna*), the four formless absorptions (*ārūpya*) and the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*). – On these nine absorptions acquired one after the other, *Dirgha*, 17, 11: *Digha*, iii, 266; *Mahāvvyutpatti*, 1498.

⁹⁶ On the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*), the last of which is the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), *Kośa*, viii. F 294-211.

⁹⁷ The absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) has as its stage the summit of cyclic existence (*bhavāgra*), as preparation (*prayoga*) the idea of calmness, as object the cessation (*nirodha*) of mind and mental events (*Kośa*, ii. F 210).

element-of-signlessness (*animittadhātu-manasikāra*).” Then, if there were a mental consciousness in the absorption of cessation, what would be its object-support (*ālambana*), what would be its aspect (*ākāra*)?

It has cessation (*nirodha* = *nirvāṇa*) as object-support and calmness (*śāma*) as aspect.

Then why would it not be good? If it is accepted that it is good, why not accept that it is associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the good roots, absence of greed, etc. (*alobhādikuśalamūla*)? If it is accepted that it is associated with them, why not accept that it arises with contact (*sparsā*) as condition?

But if it has another object-support [than cessation] and another aspect [than calmness]?

Then after the mind of entry into the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatticitta*), how could a distracted mind (*vikṣiptacitta*) arise without there being a contradiction (*virodha*)? To arbitrarily assume the existence of another type of indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) [factor distinct from the four known indeterminate factors] is not correct (*ayukta*) for these two reasons. <244>

Therefore you do not correctly (*yathābhūtam*) understand the meaning of the Scripture (*Āgama*) [according to which consciousness does not leave the body during the absorption]. You arrogantly (*āhopuruṣikā*)⁹⁸ imagine that the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), is present in the absorption of cessation, etc., and that these states are thus endowed with mind (*sacittaka*).⁹⁹ [784^b 27]

CAE.

THEORY OF THE SŪTRAPRĀMĀNIKAS AND OF VASUBANDHU.

§ 30. **In this case, according to you, is the absorption of cessation a state (*avasthā*) without mind (*acittaka*) or endowed with mind (*sacittaka*)?**

We answer that this state is endowed with a mind: the subtle mind (*sūkṣmacitta*) accepted by a class of Sūtraprāmānikas.¹⁰⁰ The ripened-effect consciousness (*vipākaphalavijñāna*), endowed with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka*), from the beginning of conception (*pratisaṃdhibandhana*) until death (*cyutī*), continues as a stream (*saṃtānena pravartate*) without interruption (*samucchinna*). In a given existence or birth (*janman*), due to ripening (*vipāka*), [this existence] flows as a stream under distinctive aspects (*ākāraviśeṣa*) until *nirvāṇa* where it is definitively destroyed (*niruddha*). Since this consciousness is not interrupted [during its <245> absorptions], these states that are said to

⁹⁸ The Chinese *tsong ts'ing* (120 and 11; 61 and 8) means: ‘indulging in one’s feeling’; this expression corresponds to the Tibetan *gzū lums* ‘not listening to any instruction or order, selfish’ (Chandra Das, p. 1105). But the *Tibetan-Sanskrit Index of Nyāyabindu* by Obermiller (Bibl. Buddh. XXV, p. 116) notes *gzū lums* = *āhopuruṣikā* f. 128.15, ‘great self-conceit or pride; military vaunting, boasting; vaunting of one’s own prowess’ (Apte, p. 92).

⁹⁹ In other words: “The Scripture (*Āgama*) says that, during the absorption of cessation, consciousness does not leave the body. You affirm that this consciousness is the mental consciousness. Now, this refers to the store-consciousness.”

¹⁰⁰ In Tibetan: “As some Sautrāntikas (*mdo sde pa kha cig*) accept”. The Sūtraprāmānikas are those for whom the *sūtras* [alone] are authoritative. The Sautrāntikas are defined by the *Kośavyākhyā*, p. 11, l. 30: *ye sūtraprāmāṇikā na śāstraprāmāṇikāḥ*. – On the Sautrāntika origin of the Vijñānavāda psychology, see Introduction, B.

be without mind are also called 'endowed with mind'. As the six bodies of consciousness (*ṣaḍvijñānakāya*) no longer exist in these states, they are called 'without mind'.¹⁰¹ It happens that the seeds (*bija*) of the six consciousnesses are temporarily subdued (*vinaṣṭa*) and no longer manifest due to the force of the preparatory mind (*prayogikacitta*)¹⁰² of the absorption of cessation; and thus the absorption is called 'absorption without mind'. But it is not without any mind at all. [784^c 7]

§ 31. There are two types of mind: a store-mind (*ācayacitta*), because it is the place where innumerable seeds (*apramāṇabija*) are stored; a multiple mind (*nānācitta*) because it functions (*pravartate*) with different object-supports (*ālambana*), aspects (*ākāra*) and modalities (*viśeṣa*).¹⁰³ Since this second mind is absent in these states of absorption, etc., they are called 'without mind'. Thus, when a chair (*āsana*) has only one leg and the other legs are missing, we say that it is without legs. [784^c 10]

§ 32. In these states where the seeds of the consciousnesses are subdued, the ripened-effect consciousness (*vipākaphalavijñāna*) [undergoes] a distinctive development (*pariṇāma*)¹⁰⁴ from moment to moment (*kṣane kṣane*), and the force that subdues [the seeds of the consciousnesses] diminishes gradually until it disappears entirely, <246> just like boiling water (*āpaḥ kvāthyamānāḥ*)¹⁰⁵ and the speed of an arrow's flight (*iṣṭvāvedhavaṇa*)¹⁰⁶ which gradually diminish until they entirely disappear. Thus, the seeds of the consciousnesses give forth their effects: first, by virtue of these seeds, the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) comes into existence; next and according to the conditions (*anupratyayam*), the other consciousnesses arise successively (*krameṇa*). The ripened-effect consciousness, of which we have spoken above and where the seeds of the various factors (*dharma*) are deposited (*āliyate*),¹⁰⁷ is perfumed (*bhāvita*) by one or another

¹⁰¹ Compare the *Samgrahapanibandhana* (Taishō 1598, 395^b 26): "The *sūtra* says: Consciousness does not leave the body. Why? The absorption of cessation does not counteract (*pratipakṣa*) the store-consciousness and the latter does not hinder the absorption from being produced because the object-support (*ālambana*) and the aspect (*ākāra*) of the store-consciousness are difficult to cognize [or imperceptible] (*asaṃvidita*)... . Not being counteracted, the store-consciousness does not disappear [during the absorption]. But the absorption counteracts the active consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) ... because their object-supports and aspects are not 'calm', and are easy to cognize. Therefore the absorption of cessation destroys only the active consciousnesses, but does not destroy the store-consciousness."

¹⁰² As we have seen (note 97), the antecedent or preparation (*prayoga*) for the absorption of cessation is the notion of tranquillity which is incompatible with the presence of the six active consciousnesses.

¹⁰³ The store-mind or 'store-consciousness'; the 'multiple mind' is the six active consciousnesses.

¹⁰⁴ See above, § 20.

¹⁰⁵ See *Kośa*, iv. F 8 (*Vyākhyā*, 348): By reason of the conjunction with fire... the heat element – which is present in water – increases and, increasing, causes the mass of the water to re-arise in increasingly reduced quantities (*kṣāmakṣāma*) until, being totally reduced (*atikṣāmatā*), the water ceases to renew itself (*na punaḥ saṃtānaṃ saṃtanuta iti*). – *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, xviii, 83, p. 150: *apām api kvāthyamānānām agnisambandhād alpataratamotpattito 'timandyād ante punar anutpattir grhyate*.

¹⁰⁶ The arrow falls when its momentum is exhausted: *Vibhāṣā*, Taishō, 1545, k. 20, p. 103^c; k. 21, p. 105^a; *Kośa*, ii. F 200, 217; iv, p. 102; MCB, vol. III, 1934-5, p. 248.

¹⁰⁷ *che ts'ang* (64 and 18; 140 and 14) = *sbyor ba* = *āliyate* (MCB., *ibid*, p. 174).

consciousness and by their simultaneous (*sahabhū*) factors, good or bad. According to the circumstances (*yathāyogam*), the force of the seeds (*bijabala*) increases. By a distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the stream (*saṃtānapariṇāmaviśeṣa*), in view of the maturity of the seeds and the coming together of the cooperative causes (*sahakārikāraṇa*), this [ripened consciousness] realizes (*abhinirvartate*) the future effects, agreeable (*iṣṭa*) and disagreeable (*aniṣṭa*).

A stanza (*gāthā*) is cited on this subject:

“The mind (*citta*) endowed with infinite seeds (*anantabijaka*) flows in a continuous current (*srotasā vahati*). Encountering (*prāpya*) their own conditions (*svapratyaya*), the seeds of the mind (*cittabija*) increase.

The force of the seed ripens gradually (*krameṇa*) and, when the conditions come together, [the seed] gives forth (*prayacchati*) its effect. In the same way, when one dyes the flower of the lemon tree (*mātuluṅgapuṣpa*), <247> at the time of fruit, the [lemon-]seed (*kesara*) has a red color (*raktavarṇa*).”

On this subject, in the *Samdhinirmocana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra*, the Bhagavat said:

“The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle, like a violent current, proceeds with all the seeds. Fearing lest they imagine that it is a self, I have not revealed it to fools.”¹⁰⁸ [784° 26]

CB. **STORE-CONSCIOUSNESS (ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA)¹⁰⁹**

CBA. **NAMES¹¹⁰**

§ 33. Since this consciousness continues (*pratisaṃdadadhātī*), and since it appropriates (*upādadhātī*) the body (*kāya*), it is called ‘appropriating consciousness’ (*ādānavijñāna*).

Since the seeds (*bija*) of all the factors (*dharma*) settle down therein (*āliyate*), it is called ‘store-consciousness’ (*ālayavijñāna*).

Since it is the ripened effect (*vipāka*) of actions carried out in former lives (*pūrvajanman*), it is also called ‘ripened-effect consciousness’ (*vipākaphalavijñāna*). [784° 29] <248>

¹⁰⁸ *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, v, 7, frequently cited stanza: *Samgraha* (Chin, 324^b 24; Tib., 3b8); *Triṃśikābhāṣya* of Sthiramati, p. 34; *Siddhi*, p. 173; *Madhyamakāvātāra*, p. 196.

ādānavijñāna gabhiraśūḥsmo
ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo /
bālāna eṣo mayi na prakāśi
mā haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ //

¹⁰⁹ The manuals of Buddhist philosophy have more or less accurate statements on Yogācāra psychology, but publication of the *Siddhi* gives us more exact information on the *Ālayavijñāna*. See *Note sur l’Ālayavijñāna*, in MCB, vol. III, p. 1934-5, p. 145-168.

¹¹⁰ On the names of the *Ālaya*, see *Samdhinirmocana*, v, 3; *Samgraha* (in MCB, vol. III, p. 171-186); *Siddhi*, p. 166; *La Notation de Tréfonds*, in S. Lévi. *Matériaux*, p. 125.

CBB.

DEMONSTRATION¹¹¹

§ 34. a. If the existence of this ripened-effect consciousness (*vipākaviññāna*) is not accepted, which consciousness will appropriate (*upādā-*) the body? The other consciousnesses are unable to penetrate-grasp (*pien-tch'e*) the body without abandoning it until the end of life (*āyus*).

b. What is the sense-sphere (*āyatana*) or aggregate (*skandha*) which, at the moment when the counteragent for the afflictions (*kleśas*) and for their contaminants (*anuśaya*) arise, will be capable of cutting them?

This aggregate (*skandha*) resides in the mind that counteracts them (*pratipakṣacitta*).

That cannot be (*ayukta*), for, being tied (*baddha*) to the afflictions and their residues, how could [the aggregate] counteract them?¹¹²

c. Among beings (*sattva*) born into the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*), when an afflicted (*kliṣṭa*) good (*kuśala*) or pure (*anāsrava*) mind is produced, where will these factors of retribution (*vipākadharma*) dwell that constitute their destiny (*gati*) [if not in the store-consciousness]? Or else, [if you do not accept this store-consciousness], you ought to say that their destiny contains factors that exist not as a ripened effect or that are foreign to *saṃsāra* (*aparyāpannadharma*). Now that is contrary to your theories.¹¹³ In addition, the never-returners (Anāgāmins) <249> born in the perception-sphere of the summit of cyclic existence (*bhāvāgrāyatana*) and wishing to destroy the last of their contaminations (*āsrava*), practice (*bhāvayanti*) the path of counteraction (*pratipakṣamārga*).¹¹⁴ But when the pure mind (*anāsravacitta*) of the perception-sphere of nothingness (*ākīñcanyāyatana*) arises among them, what is this separate real entity (*anyas dravyam*), belonging to the summit of cyclic existence, by virtue of which their existence (*ātmabhāva*) remains in this place without someone saying that they are dead? It is neither the

¹¹¹ For the proof of the Ālaya, see *Samgraha* and *Bhāṣya* (Chin. 330^b 19-336^b 26); *Upanibandhana* (Chin. 391^a 2-397^a 19); *Siddhi* (p. 182-220).

¹¹² The Chinese is obscure. According to the Tibetan, we have: "Where are the residues of the afflictions when they are cut off by their counter-agent? – In the very mind that counteracts them, you say. – No; for, being tied by the said residues, how can you claim that [the mind] counteracts them?"

¹¹³ When a being is born into a destiny (*gati*) of the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*), it is not only a mind, but an indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) mind from the moral point of view, for the 'destiny' is essentially a ripened effect (*vipākaphala*) (*Kośa*, iii. F 12). If this destiny-mind constituted a particular reward distinct from the store-consciousness, one would have to say that the being born in the formless realm loses his or her destiny as soon as he or she produces a good or bad mind; or else, one ought to accept that the destiny is not only a ripened effect, but also contains elements foreign to ripening. Now that is not accepted by anyone (*Siddhi*, p. 192).

¹¹⁴ A being born in the summit of cyclic existence (*bhāvagra*), also called 'perception-sphere of neither conception nor non-conception' (*naivasañjñānāsañjñāyatana*) is too numb to practise the pure (*anāsrava*) path which destroys the afflictions belonging to the summit of cyclic existence. In order to practise it, he or she must realize the absorption of the immediately lower sphere called 'perception-sphere of nothingness' (*ākīñcanyāyatana*) (*Kośa*, viii. F 173). However, by producing a mind of the perception-sphere of nothingness, he or she retains his or her destiny in the summit of cyclic existence: it is there that his or her store-consciousness has been projected by his or her actions.

‘homogenous character of the group’ (*nikāyasabhāgata*) nor the life faculty (*jīvitendriya*)¹¹⁵ that do not form a distinct real entity (*anyad dravyam*) separate from mind (*citta*) and matter (*rūpa*). Both are simply metaphors (*upacāra*) designating the homogeneous progression (*āvedha, pratikṣepa*) of the ripened aggregates (*vipākaskandha*), and this homogeneous progression is not a real entity distinct [from these aggregates]. In the same way, the homogeneous progression of rye-grass, etc., [is not distinguished from the rye-grass]. This is why it is necessary to accept that there is, beyond the six bodies of consciousness (*ṣaḍ vijñānakāya*), a special consciousness such as we have described above, that contains the seeds. [785^a 13] <250>

CBC.

EARLY SOURCES¹¹⁶

§ 35. In the *Tāmraparṇīyanikāya*¹¹⁷ *sūtras*, this consciousness is called member-of-existence consciousness or subliminal consciousness (*bhavāṅgavijñāna*);¹¹⁸ in the *Mahāsāṃghikanikāya sūtras*, root consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*);¹¹⁹ the *Mahīśāsakanikāya* calls it ‘aggregate lasting until the end of saṃsāra’ (*āsaṃsārikaskandha*).¹²⁰ [785^a 15]

CBD.

OBJECT-SUPPORT (ĀLAMBAṆA) AND ASPECT (ĀKĀRA)

§ 36. **What is the object-support (*ā lambana*) and the aspect (*ākāra*) of this consciousness?**

Its object and its aspect are imperceptible (*asaṃvidita*).

¹¹⁵ For the Vaibhāṣikas, apart from the material and mental elements, there exists a separate entity, a homogenous character of sentient beings (*sattvasabhāgata*), a quality of humans, etc., a ‘formation (*saṃskāra*) dissociated from the mind’. The Sautrāntikas and Vasubandhu see in the homogenous character of sentient beings only a similarity in the manner of existence of a human being, etc., a similarity that is mixed up with the aggregates, without constituting a distinct real entity (*Kośa*, ii. F 196-8).

¹¹⁶ This topic is developed in *Samgraha* (MCB, vol. III, p. 207-211) and *Siddhi*, p. 178-182. – The text, which is corrupt, is easily corrected. Line 14, *Tche t’ong ye*: replace *ye* (167 and 9) meaning ‘metal plate’ (Couvreur, p. 960, col. 1) by its homophone *ye* (140 and 9) meaning ‘leaf’, which gives *Tāmraparṇīya*. Line 15, *Hoa t’a*: replace *t’a* (9 and 3) by *ti* (32 and 3) which gives *Mahīśāsaka*. The Tibetan version differs: “The venerable *Tāmraśāṭīyas* (*btsun pa dmar sde pa rnams*) called it ‘member-of-existence consciousness’ or ‘subliminal consciousness’ (*bhavāṅgavijñāna*); others, ‘root consciousness’ (*mūlavijñāna*).”

¹¹⁷ The *Tāmraparṇīyas*, scholars from Taprobane, are named in the *Vyākhyā*, p. 39, l. 26; p. 705, l. 6 (ad *Kośa*, i. F 32; ix. F 252).

¹¹⁸ On the *bhavāṅgavijñāna*, notes and references in MCB, vol. III, p. 212-215. Its invention is attributed to the Ārya Sthaviras by the *Samgraha* and the *Siddhi*.

¹¹⁹ The ‘root consciousness’ of the Mahāsāṃghikas seems to be closely related to the aggregate of one taste (*ekarasaskandha*) which, in their thesis xii, 3, the Sautrāntikas contrast with the derived aggregates (*mūlāntikaskandha*) (see J. Masuda, *Origin*, p. 68).

¹²⁰ The *Upanibandhana* (MCB, vol. III, p. 211) informs us that the Mahīśāsakas accept three kinds of aggregates: instantaneous aggregates (*kṣanikaskandha*), aggregates that last for a lifetime (*ekajanmāvadhisikandha*) and the aggregate that lasts until the end of saṃsāra (*āsaṃsārikaskandha*). It is perhaps to the latter that the thesis ix B, 9, of the later Mahīśāsakas alludes (= Masuda, p. 63): “The aggregate (*skandha*), sense-source (*āyatana*) and sense-element (*dhātu*) are always present.”

How can a consciousness be thus?

You do indeed accept that there is a special consciousness in the state of the absorption of cessation, etc., the object-support and aspect of which are difficult <251> to cognize. It is the same here [for the store-consciousness].¹²¹

Into which aggregate (*upādānaskandha*) does this consciousness fit?

In truth (*arthena*), one must say that it fits into the aggregate of consciousness (*viññānopādānaskandha*). [785^a 20]

CBE.

REPLY TO OBJECTIONS

§ 37. a. In that case, how should the phrase of the *sūtra* be understood: "What is the appropriate aggregate of consciousness? – It is the six bodies of consciousness" (*viññānopādānaskandhaḥ katamaḥ ṣaḍ viññānakāyāḥ*)?¹²² And also: "Name and form are due to consciousness and consciousness is the six bodies of consciousness" (*viññānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam. viññānaṃ ṣaḍ viññānakāyāḥ*).

It should be known that this *sūtra* has a hidden meaning (*abhiprāya*, *abhisamdhī*), like the *sūtra* that says: "What is the aggregate of formations? – It is the six bodies of intention" (*saṃskāraskandhaḥ katamaḥ. ṣaḍ cetanākāyāḥ*),¹²³ whereas the aggregate of formations is not without containing other factors (*dharmā*) [than these six intentions].¹²⁴ It is the same here: [the aggregate of consciousness contains other entities than the six bodies of consciousnesses, notably the store-consciousness].

b. But the *sūtra* is speaking only about the six consciousnesses [and does not say anything about the store-consciousness]; what is its intention?

The Bhagavat explains it in the *Samdhinirmocana*: "Fearing that they only would imagine the [the store-consciousness] to be a self, I have not revealed it to fools."¹²⁵ <252>

Why would fools imagine that it is a self?

Because this consciousness does not have a beginning (*anādikālīka*) and lasts until the end of *saṃsāra*; because, being very subtle (*atisūkṣma*) in its aspect, it does not change. But, as the six consciousnesses are coarse (*sthūla*) and easy to cognize in their basis (*āśraya*), object-support (*ālambana*), aspect (*ākāra*) and modality (*viśeṣa*); as they are associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the afflictions (*kleśa*) and the path that counteracts them (*pratipakṣamārga*), as they fit into (*vyavasthāpita*) the categories of affliction (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*), their nature is that of a caused consciousness (*phalaviññāna*). Through this inference (*anumāna*), it should be

¹²¹ Same objection and same answer in *Siddhi*, p. 142.

¹²² *Madhyama*, 24, 1; *Majjhima*, I, 53; *Pratityasamutpādasūtra* cited *Kośa*. iii. F 85 (*Vyākhyā*, Index of proper names, p. 12).

¹²³ Compare *Kośa*, i. F 28; *Saṃyutta*, III, 60; *Vibhaṅga*, p. 144; *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, p. 64.

¹²⁴ All conditioned factors that are not part of the other four aggregates fit into the aggregate of formations (see *Kośa*, i. F 28-29).

¹²⁵ Above, § 32.

known that there exists a causing consciousness (*bijavijñāna*).¹²⁶ However, out of expediency (*soei souo yi chouo*), the *sūtras* do not speak about this cause-consciousness (*hetuvijñāna*)¹²⁷ because it differs from the aforementioned [six consciousnesses]. This is the intent of the *sūtra* when it speaks of only six consciousnesses. By that, we have explained why the *sūtras* of the other schools (*nikāya*) speak solely of the six bodies of consciousness as factor-of-existence consciousness (*bhavāṅgavijñāna*),¹²⁸ etc.; and according to the circumstances (*yathāyogam*), they are not wrong. – Moreover, it should be known that today, in each school, innumerable *sūtras* have disappeared (*apramāṇāni sūtrāṇy antarhitāni*),¹²⁹ as the *Vyākhyāyukti*¹³⁰ explains in detail. This is why it cannot be said that the *sūtras* have never spoken of the store-consciousness, for there are reasons that it exists. [785^b 5] <253>

§ 38. c **If that is so, in one and the same person (*kāya*) there will be two consciousnesses (*vijñāna*) existing together: the ripened-effect consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) and the other, the active consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*).**

What is faulty with that?

If two consciousnesses exist at the same time in one and the same person, one would have to see (*upacar-*) two beings (*sattva*) at the same time, like two consciousnesses existing at the same time in [two] different persons.

That is no problem, for these two consciousnesses, cause (*hetu*) and effect (*phala*), depend upon each other (*anyonyaniśrita*) and are not distinct (*bhinna*), for the ripened-effect consciousness is perfumed (*bhāvita*) by the other, the active consciousness.¹³¹ When two consciousnesses exist at the same time in [two] different individuals, there is nothing the same in them. Therefore there is no difficulty. [785^b 11]

§ 39. d. **But don't you see that the seed (*bija*) and the fruit of the seed (*bijaphala*) are of different streams (*saṃtāna*)?**

We also see that—in an ordinary blue lotus (*nilotpala*), etc.—the root (*mūla*) and the shoot (*aṅkura*), etc., each have a different stream: it is the same for the seed and the fruit. But what is more, does it matter what one sees or what one does not see? If you do not accept the existence of the store-consciousness, you will come up against the faults mentioned above (§ 34). Thus it is

¹²⁶ See the § Store-Consciousness and Active Consciousness, in *Samgraha* (MCB, vol. III, p. 251-5) and the chapter on the six consciousnesses (*vijñāna*) in *Siddhi*, p. 289.

¹²⁷ Compare *Samgraha* (in MCB, vol. III, p. 203-207): reason for the Buddha's keeping silence about the store-consciousness.

¹²⁸ Above, note 118.

¹²⁹ On the *sūtras* that have disappeared, see *Kośa*, Index, F 138 and especially Bu-ston, *History of Buddhism*, part II, p. 169-171: *On the Lost Parts of the Kanon*.

¹³⁰ *Che koei luen* (165 and 13; 159 and 2) = *rnam par bcad pa'i rigs pa* = *Vyākhyāyukti*, a work by Vasubandhu (Tangyur, MDO. lviii. *Kośavyākhyā*, p. 6, l. 20). Obermiller refers to the edition of the Aga monastery, 97^b 6.

¹³¹ On the mutual causality between store-consciousness and active consciousnesses, see *Samgraha* in MCB, vol. III, p. 252-254 with the citations of the *Abhidharmamahāyānasūtra* (in *Madhyāntavibhāga*, ed. V. Bhattacharya-Tucci, p. 28; ed. Yamaguchi, p. 34) and *Yogacaryābhūmiśāstra* (Taishō 1579, 580^b 10).

necessary to accept the existence of a store-consciousness distinct from the six bodies of consciousness (*ṣaḍ vijñānakāya*) and existing in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāvasat*). [785^b 15] <254>

CBF.

STORE-CONSCIOUSNESS (ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA) AND SOUL (ĀTMAN)¹³²

§ 40. **Why not accept a soul or self (*ātman*) existing as a real entity (*dravyasat*) and the basis (*āśraya*) for the six bodies of consciousness?**¹³³

In this soul accepted by you, what is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) allowing you to say that it is the basis of the six bodies of consciousness? If you accept that this soul, as store-consciousness, is a stream of productions and destructions (*utpādanirodhasaṃtana*) which transform according to the conditions (*anupratyaya*), what will be the specific difference between it and the store-consciousness that permits you to think that it is a soul?

But this soul is unique (*eka*) and absolutely immutable!

Then how can you say that it is a basis (*āśraya*) capable of receiving the traces of the consciousnesses (*vijñānavāsa*)? A trace makes the stream that it perfumes (*tadbhāvitasaṃtana*), to be transformed (*pariṇam-*) and acquires special potentialities (*śaktiviśeṣa*). In the same way, lacquer (*lākṣārāsa*) applied to the lemon-tree flower (*mātulūṅgapuṣpa*) allows the flower stream to be transformed [and to give a fruit the pips of which are red]. Without traces, no special transformation is possible. But then, [if the soul is immutable], how could the difference of practices (*abhyāsa*), such as the experiences (*anubhava*), cognitions (*jñāna*) and attachments (*rāga*) of an earlier time period, produce differences of memories (*smṛti*), cognitions and attachments long afterwards?¹³⁴

In addition, in the states without mind (*acittakāvasthā*) where [according to you] the soul remains unchanged, there is no consciousness. But then, coming out of these states, from what mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), etc., could [the consciousness] arise? <255>

Finally, what is this power of the soul over the consciousnesses, etc., that makes you consider the soul as the base of the consciousnesses?

The consciousnesses arise from the soul which is their cause.

But since the soul remains always immutable, why do the consciousnesses arise from it successively (*kramaṇa*) and not all at once?

Because they require (*apekṣante*) other cooperative causes and conditions (*sahakārihetupratyaya*) in order to arise.

But how do you know that, in addition to these causes, the soul also intervenes in their production?

Because the consciousnesses arise depending (*niśritya*) on the soul.

All factors (*dharma*) perish as soon as they arise (*utpattyanantaram nirudhyante*). Being unstable, how would these consciousnesses last? Therefore it is impossible (*ayukta*) to accept a soul existing in its intrinsic nature and as a base for the six bodies of consciousness.

¹³² See *Siddhi*, p. 12-24.

¹³³ The Vaiśeṣikas say that the minds arise from the self (*Kośa*, ix. F 284).

¹³⁴ The problem of memory is studied in *Kośa*, ix. F 274; *Siddhi*, p. 21.

Moreover, accepting the existence of the soul is to contradict the Scripture (Āgama) that says: “Factors (*dharmā*) are not a self and do not belong to a self” (*sarve dharmā anātmānaḥ*).¹³⁵ The unique, eternal and existent soul accepted by you does not hold, is only an invention or fabrication. In that way, it is established (*siddha*) that only distinctive intentions (*cetanāviśeṣa*) perfume (*bhāvayanti*) the simultaneous store-consciousness and—by a distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the stream (*saṃtānapariṇamaviśeṣa*)—make this consciousness produce the future agreeable and disagreeable effects (*iṣṭāniṣṭaphala*): this is not the bodily and vocal actions such as they have been described. [785^c 8] <255>

¹³⁵ *Samyukta*, 10, 7. Cf. *Vyākhyā* ad *Kośa*, ix. F 252: *na caita ātmasvabhāvāḥ na caiteṣv ātmā vidyata ity anātmānaḥ*; *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, xviii, 101 (p. 158): *dharmoddāneṣu sarve dharmā anātmāna iti deśitam*; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 65: *anātmānaḥ sarvadharmā ity āgamāt*.

D. **FOURTH PART: SAUTRĀNTIKA THEORY ON THE NATURE OF ACTION**

§ 41. **If you do not accept the existence of the two actions, bodily and vocal, are you not contradicting the *sūtra* that assumes three actions?**¹³⁶

We do not contradict (*nirākr*) this *sūtra*, but we interpret it properly without committing any fault (*dośa*).

How do you interpret it without committing any fault?

One must avoid taking the poison (*viṣa*) of the text. We will deal with it in detail:

- Why does the *sūtra* speak of three actions? (§ 42)?
- What is body (*kāya*) and what is action (§ 43)?
- In what sense (*kenārthena*) is body spoken of (§ 44), in what sense is action spoken of (§ 45)?
- In what sense are bodily action (§ 46-47), vocal action (§ 48), and mental action (§ 49) spoken of?
- Finally, we will ask why the *sūtra* speaks only of three actions, bodily action, etc., and not of visual action, etc (§ 4) [785^c 15]

DA. **THE THREE ACTIONS OF THE SŪTRA**

§ 42. **Why does the *sūtra* speak of three actions?**

In order to show that the three actions include (*saṃgrhṇanti*) the ten paths of action (*karmapatha*)¹³⁷ and thus to reassure those who are afraid of having too much to do (*bahukāra*). In the same way, [the Buddha] taught summarily (*saṃkuṣepatas*) the three trainings (*śikṣātraya*) and gave them to Vṛjiputraka.¹³⁸ <257>

Some people think that action is accomplished solely by the body and not by the speech (*vāc*) or by the mind (*manas*). In order to show them that it is also accomplished by these two, the *sūtra* speaks of three actions. [785^c 18]

DB. **BODY (KĀYA) AND ACTION (KARMA)**

§ 43. The body (*kāya*) is a distinctive aggregation (*saṃghātaviśeṣa*) of sense-faculties or organic matter (*indriya*), [fundamental] material elements (*bhūta*) and derived material elements (*bhautika*).¹³⁹

Action (*karman*) is a distinctive intention (*cetanāviśeṣa*). [785^c 19]

¹³⁶ Cf § 1, note 3. Same objection in *Siddhi*, p. 31.

¹³⁷ On the ten paths of action, *Kośa*, iv. F 21, 137, 168, 181-188, 227; below, § 46-47.

¹³⁸ See *Aṅguttara*, i, 230, where the Buddha briefly explains the three trainings to *aññātara Vajjiputtaka*: training in higher morality (*adhisīlasikkhā*), training in higher thought (*adhicittasikkhā*), training in higher discrimination (*adhipaññāsikkhā*). The Chinese *fou li che* [tse] (9 and 5; 75 and 6; 83) and the Tibetan 'bri rdzi ['i bu] is a phonetic transcription of Vṛji [putraka].

¹³⁹ According to the Tibetan: *byung dang* 'bhung ba las gyur pa; the Chinese *ta tsao* (37; 162 and 7) supposes an original *mahābhūtanā upādāya rūpāṇi*.

DC.

MEANING OF THE WORD KĀYA

§ 44. As far as there is accumulation there is a body (*cīyata iti kāyaḥ*):¹⁴⁰ actually, the body results from an accumulation (*ācaya*) of atoms (*paramāṇu*) of [fundamental] material elements (*bhūta*) and derived material elements (*bhautika*). For some, there is a body insofar as there is accumulation of excrement (*kuhanācaya*) because the body is a reservoir (*kūpa*) of all kinds of impure substances (*nānāśucidraṇya*).¹⁴¹ But in that case, the gods would have no body. [785° 22]

DD.

MEANING OF THE WORD KARMAN

§ 45. – As far as there is mental instigation or activity (*abhisaṃskāra*) of the mind-agent (*kāraḥ*) there is action (*karman*).¹⁴² [785° 23] <258>

DE.

MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION KĀYAKARMAN

DEA.

PROPER MEANING

§ 46. The intention (*cetanā*) that moves the body is called ‘bodily action’ (*kāyakarman*).¹⁴³ There are three kinds of intentions: (1) deliberation-intention (*gati*); (2) decision-intention (*niścaya*); (3) movement-intention (*kiraṇa*).¹⁴⁴ The intention that moves the body is called ‘bodily action’, for this intention produces (*abhinirharati*) the wind element (*vāyudhātu*), the cause of the arising of the bodily stream (*kāyasāntāna*) in another place (*deśāntara*).

In order to be complete (*kiu tsou*), one should say ‘action that moves the body’ [and not ‘bodily action’], but the word ‘move’ is omitted and one simply says ‘bodily action’. In the same way, the oil that increases power is simply called ‘power oil’ (*balataila*) and the wind that moves the dust is simply called ‘dust wind’ (*rajoṇvāyu*).

But it is also accepted that the first three of the ten paths of action (*karmapatha*), namely, killing (*prāṇātipāta*), stealing (*adattādāna*) and sexual misconduct (*kāmaṃkathācāra*) are bodily actions.¹⁴⁵ Why does the action of intention (*cetanākarma*) take the same name?

Because it is the action of intention that moves the body in order to commit killing, stealing and sexual misconduct. But that which is done by the bodily stream (*kāyasāntāna*) moved by intention is done by the intention. In the same way, it is said that the robbers (*caura*) <259>

¹⁴⁰ Cf. *Amarakośa*, ed. Nirṇaya-Sāgar, p. 226, col. 2: *cīyate ‘nnādibhiḥ / ciñ cayane*.

¹⁴¹ We have the expression *śarīrāśucitā* in *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 57.

¹⁴² In other words, action is essentially and exclusively intention (*cetanā*). It is the intention that ‘forms’, that ‘instigates’ (*abhisaṃskar-*) the action in its moral quality, good or bad (*Morale bouddhique*, p. 136-7).

¹⁴³ This is the thesis of the Sautrāntikas (*Kośa*, iv. F 12) and the Vijñānavādins (*Siddhi*, p. 51).

¹⁴⁴ Cf. *Siddhi*, p. 52. There is *chen liu* (40 and 12; 61 and 11) = ‘gro ba = *gati*; *kiue ting* (85 and 4; 40 and 5) = *nges pa* = *niścaya*; *tong fa* (19 and 9; 105 and 7) = *gyo bar byed pa* = *kiraṇa*. But La Vallée Poussin (*Siddhi*, p. 52, note 1) proposes *upanidhyāna*, *saṃtiraṇa*, *ceṣṭā* or *viṣpanda*.

¹⁴⁵ Of the ten paths of action, the first three are paths of action and bodily actions, the next four are paths of action and vocal actions, the last three are only paths of action (see *Kośa*, iv. F 168-9).

burn a village (*grāma*) and that the grass (*trṇa*) cooks the rice (*śāli*) [because fire is used to burn the village and to cook the rice].

Why is intention also called ‘path of action’ (*karmapatha*)?

Insofar as it acts, intention is called ‘action’, but insofar as it engages in the paths (*patha*) of good and bad destinies (*sugatidurgati*), it takes the name of ‘path of action’.¹⁴⁶ Or else, it is the body in movement that is the path of action, for the three actions of intention arise depending (*niśritya*) on the body. [786^a 6]

DEB.

FIGURATIVE MEANING

§ 47. In addition, killing, stealing, and sexual misconduct, which arise from an action of intention, arise depending on the body and, by convention (*saṃvṛtita*), are also called ‘bodily actions’. However, in their intrinsic nature, they are neither good (*kuśala*) nor bad (*akuśala*), and it is also by convention that these qualifiers are attributed to them metaphorically (*upacar-*) so that the world (*loka*), by this means (*taddvāreṇa*), may nourish good intentions and abstain from bad ones. This is why the qualifiers of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ are attributed to them metaphorically.

If only the action of intention (*cetanākarmaṇ*) is good or bad, why does the Karmapathasūtra say: “The threefold bodily action that is caused intentionally (*kāyasya trividhaṃ saṃcintya karma*)—done (*kṛta*) and accumulated (*upacita*)—is bad (*akuśala*) and, consequently, produces a frustrating effect (*duḥkhaphala*) and a frustrating ripened effect (*duḥkhavipāka*)”?¹⁴⁷ <260>

Here the *sūtra* means to say: The action of intention (*cetanākarmaṇ*) that moves the body, that utilizes the body as means (*dvāra*), that employs the body as basis (*āśraya*), that has as object-support (*ālambate*) killing, stealing, and sexual misconduct – this action of intention is the cause (*hetu*) that realizes a frustrating effect and ripened effect. It is what the phrase “the threefold bodily action that is caused intentionally” (*saṃcintya; ched du bsams pa*) (*kāyasya trividhaṃ saṃcintya karma*) means. The other intentions [deliberation and decision], distinct from this [third] intention [or intention that moves the body], are called ‘mental action’ (*manahkarmaṇ*) because they are associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the mental sense-faculty (*manas*) and because they do not move either the body or the speech.

If that is so, why does the *sūtra* speak of two actions: action of intention (*cetanākarmaṇ*) and action subsequent to intention (*cetayitvākarmaṇ*)?

¹⁴⁶ *Siddhi*, p. 52: “The third intention (*cetanā*) which moves the body and creates the speech—being ‘instigated as good or bad’ (*abhiśaṃskṛta*)—is called ‘action’ (*karmaṇ*). And [it is also called] ‘path of action’ (*karmapatha*): 1. because it is trodden upon—like a path—by the intentions of deliberation and decision, 2. because it is the path of the agreeable and disagreeable ripened effect.

¹⁴⁷ The Tibetan is different. Cf. the *Saṃcetanīyasūtra* (*Madhyama*, 18, 14; *Āṅguttara*, v, 292; *Majjhima*, iii, 207) cited in *Kośa*, iv. F 136: *kathaṃ ca bhikṣavaḥ saṃcetanīyaṃ karma kṛtaṃ bhavaty upacitam / iha bhikṣava ekatyāḥ saṃcintya trividhaṃ kāyena karma karoty upacinoti caturvidhaṃ vācā trividhaṃ manasā*. – *Saṃcintya* is rendered here in Chinese as *kou se* (66 and 5; 61 and 5), in Tibetan as *ched du bsams pa*.

Among the three kinds of intentions mentioned above (§ 46), the first two intentions are action of intention (*cetanākarma*) and the third intention is action subsequent to intention (*cetayitvākarma*). This does not contradict the *sūtra*. [786^a 18]

DF.

MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION VĀKKARMA

§ 48. Speech (*vāc*) is the pronunciation of sounds (*ghoṣoccarāṇa*). Because these sounds inform (*vijñāpayanti*) about the idea one wishes to express, they are called ‘speech’. – The intention (*cetanā*) that emits the speech (*vāksamutthāpikā*) is called ‘vocal action’ (*vākkarma*). Or else, the speech is the basis (*āśraya*) of syllables (*vyāñjana*, *akṣara*) and because these syllables also inform about the idea, they are called ‘speech’.

In order to be complete, one should say <261> ‘action that emits the speech’ [and not ‘vocal action’], but the word ‘emit’ is omitted and one simply says ‘vocal action’. See the examples of [abridged phrases] above (§ 46). [786^a 22]

DG.

MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION MANAḤKARMA

§ 49. The Manas is the consciousness (*vijñāna*). Because [the consciousness] ‘reflects’ (*manyate*, *manute*),¹⁴⁸ because it heads towards other births (*jātyantara*) and towards object-fields (*viśaya*), the consciousness is called ‘Manas’. The ‘intention which is the action of the Manas’ (*manaskāracetanā*) is called ‘mental action’ (*manaḥkarma*) for it makes the Manas accomplish all kinds of things, good (*kuśala*), bad (*akuśala*), etc.

In order to be complete, one should say ‘*manaskārakarma*’ [and not *manaḥkarma*], but the word ‘*kāra*’ is omitted and one simply says ‘*manaḥkarma*’.

Or else, the action associated with the Manas (*manaḥsaṃprayukta*) is called ‘mental action’: one omits the word ‘associated’ and simply says ‘mental action’. See the examples [of abridged phrases] above (§ 46).

Let us accept that the three actions are intention only; but then, in the state of distracted mind (*vikṣiptacitta*) and in the states without mind (*acittakāvastu*) where intention is absent, how can there be discipline (*saṃvara*) and indiscipline (*asaṃvara*)?

Because the seed [of discipline and indiscipline] planted and perfumed (*vāsita*) by a distinctive intention (*cetanāviśeṣa*) has not been destroyed [in the aforementioned states], there can be discipline and indiscipline: there is no difficulty there (*nāsty atra doṣaḥ*). We say ‘distinctive intention’, i.e., strong intention creating (*samutthāpaka*) a manifest action (*vijñapti*) of discipline and <262> indiscipline. This intention plants two kinds of strong seeds [seed of discipline and seed of indiscipline]. The state of non-destruction of these two seeds metaphorically (*upacāra*) is called ‘unmanifest action (*avijñapti*) of good and bad discipline’.¹⁴⁹

What is the destruction of the seed planted and perfumed by this distinctive intention?

¹⁴⁸ On the etymology of the word Manas, see *Lañkāvatāra*, x, 400: *manasā manyate punaḥ*; 461, *mano manyati vai sadā*; *Kośa*, ii. F 177; *Saṃgraha* (in MCB, III, p. 192).

¹⁴⁹ Very simple concepts expressed in scholastic jargon. It is the positively expressed intention that creates in its author the state of discipline or indiscipline. This state perdures, even if the person is distracted or deep in unconsciousness. It ceases as soon as the person positively retracts it. (cf. *Kośa*, iv. F 93-94).

The fact that [the seed] is no longer the cause of the intention of abstention (*virati*) or non-abstention (*avirati*) conforming to the undertaken commitment.

What is it that destroys this seed?

The intention (*cetanā*) capable of creating the manifest action (*vijñaptisamutthāpaka*) that is the cause of the abandonment of discipline or of indiscipline, or any other cause of this abandonment. [786^b 7]

DH.

PRINCIPLE OF CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIONS

§ 50. Why does the *sūtra* not speak of action of the eye (*caṅṣuḥkarman*), etc.? Because this *sūtra* speaks only of the actions of the application of beings (*sattva-prayoga-karman*) and not of the actions of the activity of factors (*dharma-kāritra-karman*).¹⁵⁰

What is the action of the application of beings?

It is that which is instigated (*abhisamśkrta*) according to the intention of the agent (*kāraṇamānas*).

What is the action of activity of factors (*dharma*)?

It is the particular power (*śakti, prabhāva*) of the eye (*caṅṣus*), the ear (*śrotra*), etc. <263>

The Buddha spoke about three actions: the meaning of this is profound (*gambhīra*) and subtle (*sūkṣma*). Basing myself on reasoning and doctrine, I have explained and demonstrated it. I wish to utilize my merit (*puṇya*) in order to save beings: may they all attain the pure mind. [786^b 13]

¹⁵⁰ In other words, the *sūtra* studies here only actions properly human; conscious, voluntary and morally retributive actions; it is not concerned with the purely mechanical activity of the sense-faculties.